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PREFACE 
 
“Is your offer still on?” I asked Raúl Espejo. “Yes” he said. Raúl 
offered me to be my Ph.D. supervisor years ago. But at that time I had 
other things on my mind. Fred Huijgen finished our meeting stating “I go 
along with you in this adventure”. Fred and Raúl asked me at the start 
“What do you expect of me”? “That you prevent me from drowning in 
disciplines that are not mine” was my answer. I only had vague ideas when 
I started ‘officially’ this Ph.D. in a meeting with my boss Hans Doorewaard 
on September 11, 2001. An hour later I heard the terrible news from New 
York on the car radio. I immediately called my wife Karin to switch on the 
television. This is to mention a few people who were invaluable in the past 
period, for which I thank them hearty. Besides that, Fred, Hans and Raúl 
were my professors years ago; Karin is also my critical editor. 
 
There are many more people I wish to thank. My mother and 
father for their support, my sister Erna, who read as one of the few people 
in the Netherlands Merleau-Ponty in the French language, my brother-in-
law Maurits Visser for lending me his laptop and providing me IT service. 
My colleagues Jan Achterbergh, Jac Christis and Harrie Regtering 
graduated as doctor, apart from one, but he did two studies, which is 
according to him the same. Moreover, he will never finish his Ph.D. 
because it is so much fun to do. Years ago Harrie was my lecturer 
Philosophy & Management and supervisor in my M.Sc. thesis. Jan (who 
did three studies; Harrie knows) was the reader. At the award of my degree 
certificate, Harrie proposed me to do a Ph.D. But at that time I had other 
things on my mind.  
The subject of the M.Sc. thesis was the Viable System Model 
(“VSM”). The VSM as developed by Stafford Beer, Raúl’s friend and 
former business partner. Thereafter it took me a year sabbatical to really 
understand what Beer had to say, if that is possible at all (for me). This 
time it helped to read the books in the right order. I appreciate having met 
Stafford and Allenna several times. Stafford influenced my thinking. Or 
better said, the pieces of my working life experiences, good and bad, fell 
together and got a place in a coherent whole.  
 Moreover, Stafford’s invention Team Syntegrity is a real pleasure to do and a 
valuable tool. Most loops of some 12 years are closed. 
 
Is writing a Ph.D. fun? You invest a lot of spare time but other 
people do that as well or allow you to do that. Your brains sometimes 
crunch. “I read him/her but I do not have the slightest idea what (s)he is 
talking about”. And then comes the beauty of a book written in all simplicity. 
You know that you cannot be complete in the time given, which can be 
frustrating. In that sense this Ph.D. is in my opinion only the start of more 
research in this domain. Writing in the English language complicates things 
and is time consuming. But it was more than worth it. After all, yes, it is fun 
to learn that there are so many valuable insights, friends and people. 
 
And of course I want to thank the managers who were willing to co-
operate in the research. Mrs. drs. C. (Cathy) C. van Beek MCM, drs. W. 
(Wim) J.H.M. de Bie, B. (Bert) H. van Bolderick and Mrs. drs. M.(Marja) M.J. 
Kamsma MBA / MBI. Your stories in all openness were fascinating and 
there will be enough said about your insights in the remainder of the thesis.  
 
‘Never say never’ but I once said that I would never work again in a French 
milieu. By some strange whim of fate this Ph.D. is influenced by Frenchmen 
or people who worked in France. It is read and commented on in France. 
Strictly speaking, as neurobiologist Maturana said in the framework of 
evolution, nothing is coincidence. So it will be good for something. One 
thing (or action) led to another.  
 
So, yes, there are structures or patterns at work and loops closed. 
You see them with hindsight. Who could have predicted that I would end up 
‘part-‘time at the Radboud University Nijmegen? I would have certified them 
insane. And to object to a prejudice, I have never been evaluated more in my 
working life than within the walls of the University and the theatres. After I 
entered ‘part-‘time the University in April 2001 more time could be made 
available to do a Ph.D. I just seized the opportunity. I wish you much 
reading pleasure; but sometimes (as in chapter 2) have an aspirin within 
reach. 
 
Amerongen, the Netherlands  
 
 
Keywords: meaning (sense making), Weltanschauung (world-view), structure, proverbs and 
metaphor. 
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 All we are, we are in the world 
 In different ways and on different levels 
 
 R. Bakker 
 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1  One must look in order to see  
(Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 281) 
 
It was in the early days of colour television in the 1970’s that a 
French television director turned upside down a Dutch TV studio with a 
spectacular new show. He combined green and blue, colours that were 
before supposed to clash and used visual effects that took lighting 
technicians, set designers and cameramen days to understand. It turned out 
that his innovations had to do with angle and perspective making, for 
instance, an egg shaped scenery look like a circle. From that day on green 
and blue didn’t clash anymore. 
 
This story -I was present as a cameraman- has two senses for me. 
First, we had learned to believe that …(fill in as you please) meant …(fill in 
as you please). This experience permeates our history as human beings. 
Even when the proof to the contrary came we didn’t believe it or were not 
allowed to believe it. Second, even for professionals it was difficult to 
disentangle perception and illusion. “In perception originates a meaning of 
the world preceding any scientific explanation. Perception has its own 
truth” (Vlasblom & Tiemersma, 1997, p. 16 in Merleau-Ponty, 1997). 
There is a point of mature perception and this moment determines a more 
stable meaning for an object. We keep looking for a better focus, like we 
look for the best position to see a painting in a museum (Merleau-Ponty, 
1997, p. 357). “There is therefore a general perceptual optimum which has 
to do with the balance of clarity and richness in all the sensory fields as 
they gear into one another” as Langer (1989, p. 96) puts it. It has to do 
with balance and tension, contrary to vagueness and confusion, which 
could also be labelled as composition in art. Before you knew it, you are in 
the middle of phenomenology.  
 
 
 
         1 
 Colours bring about changes in the direction of our arms’ 
movements. Green and blue are accompanied by an inward bend. Red and 
yellow are accompanied with a centrifugal outward sweep. “Green usually is 
said to be a ‘calming’ colour. […] It makes no demand on us and does not 
enjoin us to do anything, says Kandinsky” (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 258). 
The artist Kandinsky also commented on colour and motion with regard to 
two circles, one blue and one yellow. The yellow circle is spreading 
movement out from the centre in an approach to the spectator. The blue 
circle moves into itself, like a snail retreating into its shell  
(Varela et al, 1992b, p. 162). The supposed ‘clashing’ of these ‘harmless’, 
‘non-threatening’ colours, the one ‘moving into itself’ and the other ‘makes 
no demand on us’ must be looked for in phenomena we as human beings 
deal with. The answer lays in our accompanying ‘bodily attitude’ and/or our 
changed aesthetical approval over the years. “If a test subject tries to 
experience a specific colour, blue for example, while trying with all his 
strength to take up the bodily attitude appropriate to red, an internal struggle 
results, a kind of cramp, which stops directly the moment the bodily attitude 
is adopted corresponding to blue” (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 262). 
 
This of course relates to how we as human beings experience colours; a 
yellow circle on a painting does nothing by itself. However, the yellow’s 
‘movement’ and our arm movement illustrate how we as human beings, later 
on called ‘body-subjects,’ are ‘mixed’ or ‘intermingled’ with the objects in the 
world. ‘Subject’ means according to Bakker (1986, p. 44) ‘subject to’, 
‘subordinated’ or ‘dependent on’. “It is meant in the sense that we place our 
selves in service of our general relation with the spectacle the world is” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 489). 
 
This thesis is not about colour but rather about meaning and 
worldview. Worldview, or particular philosophy or view of life, also called 
Weltanschauung in system theory, is at the core of this thesis. We will use that 
term in the future although I realise that the word with the prefix Welt can be 
emotionally charged for someone. For this I refer the reader to section 2.5 of 
appendix 2.  
But we will sometimes deal with colour because, as Varela et al 
(1992b, p. 157) put it, the study of colour provides a microcosm of cognitive 
science, and many disciplines have contributed to the understanding of 
colour. 
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 Maturana and Varela (1989) define cognition, the process of knowing, as 
the entire process of life. And colour has immediate perceptual and 
cognitive significance in human experience.  
 
1.2  The central question and two related questions 
 
In organisational theory a one-sided and partial image exists of the 
human being (as a manager). Complexity of organisations is acknowledged 
but there is little attention for the complexity of human beings as the basis 
of these organisations. The actions of human beings are not arbitrary but 
rather are aimed at something, which can also be labelled as purpose-
fulness. Purpose, what a system does, relates to meaning, what it does for 
what purpose. For human beings a purpose can also be an inner drive to 
do something, as will be seen. For some people getting rich in business is 
meaningful for whatever reason. For others it is not. The words meaning 
and sense making are employed indiscriminately throughout this thesis. 
Checkland (2000) thinks that the idea of meaning will eventually be seen to 
be as important as energy and information. It may even herald a revolution 
in social thinking as significant as the two Industrial Revolutions. Searle 
(1981, p. 42, 77) distinguishes many meanings, such as for instance literal 
meaning, figurative meaning, word meaning and indirect speech acts (the 
speaker means what he says, but means more as well). Langer (1989, p. 8) 
retains the distinction between ‘sens’, (immanent) meaning and 
‘signification’. “Signification is… at once centrifugal and centripetal: we 
bestow history’s meaning, but it itself puts that meaning forward” (Langer, 
1989, p. 146). But as she states (p. 173): “Nor is his (Merleau-Ponty’s, HL) 
own use of them always entirely consistent – especially in the case of 
‘meaning’, ‘significance’…”.  We will just stick to the concept of meaning 
as sense of purpose, making here and there use of these other senses, 
mostly in the appendixes 1 and 2 about metaphor and proverb. The 
concept of meaning is broader than just meaning in language. “What is 
unspoken is as much part of the meaning as what is spoken” (Winograd & 
Flores, 1994, p. 57).  
 
The central question in this thesis is: 
 
How do people make sense of their experiences and engage  
in social and organisational action? 
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 Related to this question I’ll offer two related questions. With regard 
to the first key question the hypothesis is that meaningful events and first 
time experiences rather early in life form our Weltanschauungen, which also 
directs our acting. ‘Also’, because meaning and Weltanschauung stand in a 
circular relation. The one presupposes the other. It is because one 
remembers these meaningful experiences rather early in life at best 
throughout our life. They leave the best lasting impression.  
Weltanschauung can be regarded as the core, essence or sediment of 
sense making in the past and serves as background for sense making in the 
present. Weltanschauungen determine how we see our selves, the other, the 
organisation and reality. Weltanschauung is not an ideology but rather 
ideology can form part of a Weltanschauung. Not everybody has an ideology 
but we all have a Weltanschauung. 
 
The first key question is: 
 
How is it that a manager’s biology, history and cultural context  
influence the formation of his/her Weltanschauungen? 
 
The second key question is:  
 
How do these Weltanschauungen affect the unfolding in time  
of the structures underpinning the creation and  
implementation of the manager’s organisational tasks?  
 
1.3  The conceptual framework  
 
This thesis started as an adventure and a voyage of discovery. The 
starting point was astonishment about the acting of people, which can also 
be labelled as behaviour in line with what has been said at the start of section 
1.2. Gradually a conceptual framework emerged which is helpful in the 
modulation. Merleau-Ponty uses among other things the words ‘tacit 
transposing’. We will mainly deal with theoretical insights in phenomenology, 
neurobiology, organisational psychology, cognitive science and organisational 
cybernetics. I realize I am using theories in this thesis that are rather 
controversial, alternative, counter-intuitive or relatively unknown in 
organisational theory.  
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 In his early days, only some 50 years ago (less than my life), Norbert 
Wiener, one of the fathers of cybernetics, the science of communication 
and control in the animal and the machine, was denounced and accused of 
blasphemy (Mc. Corduck, 1979). But it seems that the metaphors used in 
these theories, as Lakoff & Johnson (1999) make clear, appeal to me (see 
appendix 1). The structure of this thesis’ conceptual framework is as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
 
Meaning originates in perception as was stated in section 1.1. In 
perception a pre-reflective level and a reflective level are distinguished as 
two aspects of the act of perception. The reflective level is always based on 
the pre-reflective level and is only an extract thereof. That is the reason we 
have to find out more about perception. The phenomenology of 
perception of Merleau-Ponty is the obvious source for doing that. 
The simplest organisms are capable of perception and thus of 
cognition. The simplest organisms do not see but perceive changes in their 
environment, like plants perceive light and dark. At a certain level of 
complexity a living organism couples structurally not only to its 
environment but also to itself. In human beings as observers of situations 
this is linked to language, thought and consciousness. Observing can thus 
be regarded as a particularization of perception. This is the reason we have 
to find out more about the uniqueness of the observer in the neurobiology 
of Maturana and Varela. It turns out that in both phenomenology and 
neurobiology the human being lives in dualities. 
The kingpin of cognition is its capacity for bringing forth meaning. 
The cognitive contributions of Varela et al, Dreyfus and Brooks will 
punctuate the phenomenology and neurobiology.  
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 Varela et al also pay attention to a school in Buddhism. It will be seen that 
some of these Eastern insights come back in various issues under discussion, 
also in combination with insights of Merleau-Ponty’s mentor Husserl.  
Meaning and Weltanschauung stand in a circular relation. The one 
presupposes the other as was stated above. Weltanschauung can thus be 
regarded as a particularization of meaning ‘in the background’. 
Perception and action are inseparable. That is why we speak of 
perceptual guided actions. Meaning (also in the form of beliefs) and action 
are closely linked. On the reflective level Weick’s organisational psychology 
has a lot to say about sense making in organisations. Organisational or 
structural acting can be regarded as a particularization of action. In saying 
how we see our selves, our relations with others and organisations we come 
across the structure of the organisation. The hypothesis is that a manager’s 
Weltanschauung influences the structure of his/her organization. In other 
words, how he or she would like to see the relations among people and 
his/her own role thereby. From here on ‘he’ may be read as ‘she’. 
Organisational cybernetics, in particular Beer’s Viable System Model and 
Espejo’s Viplan offer us valuable insights with regard to structure. The 
choice for organisational cybernetics is based on the fact that it was the 
subject of my 1993 Master thesis at the Radboud University, where after I 
specialized further in this direction. The Viable System Model is much 
indebted to neurophysiology. Moreover, the starting point of the Viable 
System Model is the duality of autonomy and cohesion. That closes the 
loops, as is said in system theory. It is the connection on the right side of the 
framework in figure 1. ‘Closing the loops’ differs from the every-day 
language ‘back to square one’ in that ‘closing the loops’ is an ongoing 
circularity without loose ends, whereas ‘back to square one’ did not yield 
anything in the process.   
This is our broad line of reasoning in the remainder of this thesis. With 
regard to Merleau-Ponty, the translation from the Dutch language into the 
English language is mine. Afterwards I have checked the translation with the 
translation of Smith in the 2004 Routledge Classic series. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         6 
 There are deviations1. But in my opinion these deviations do not harm the 
underlying understanding for the particular aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought used in this thesis. And sometimes I have replaced my words by 
the words used by Smith. The page numbers in the two publications differ 
(considerably) but the many footnotes in the works are helpful in the 
search for the quotes. With regard to other authors, most of the original 
sources are written in the English language. 
 
In organizational cybernetics and lately cognitive science various 
disciplines have been brought together. In cognitive science, Varela and 
Brooks claim that even the most primitive insects are far superior to the 
most advanced (mobile) robots. Therefore we can conclude that complex 
human beings are at the same time interesting, limited, layered creatures, 
difficult to imitate in Artificial Intelligence. Human beings operate on a 
primordial, pre-reflective level and a reflective level. With regard to 
meaning Merleau-Ponty embarks mainly on the primordial, pre-reflective 
level; Weick on the reflective level. Most of the time, but not always, they 
say similar things despite the fact that Weick does not refer to Merleau-
Ponty. They both stress human beings believe in a world (see appendix 3).  
 
 
 
1  For instance, the last sentence in a preceding paragraph in section 1.1: “It is meant in 
the sense that we place our selves in service of our general relation with the spectacle the 
world is” reads in the English translation (2004, p. 499): “in short only if we place, at the 
service of the spectacle, our collusion with the world”. In the Dutch translation it says 
‘general relation’ and not ‘collusion’, the latter meaning ‘a secret agreement, especially in 
order to do dishonest or to trick people’. Also remarks of Langer (1989) made me think 
that the procedure described in this paragraph is the best one. Langer (1989, p. vii) states: 
“Finally, the English translation compounds the difficulties which Merleau-Ponty’s rich 
prose itself presents. Even the revised (1981) English edition is frequently misleading and 
occasionally downright incorrect; at best it lacks the nuances of the original”. And in a 
footnote on page xviii: “I have altered Colin Smith’s translation to bring it closer to the 
French original, which reads…” However, Langer (1989, p. 61) argues: “Different 
languages express different ways of being-in-the-world; hence the nuances – ‘the full 
meaning’ – of one cannot be rendered by another, as translators know only too well”. 
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 1.4  A division into chapters 
 
This thesis consists of 2 parts. In part 1, the chapters 2 through 6, we 
will deal with theoretical insights in the disciplines as mentioned in section 
1.3. It is a collection of voyages of discovery in at first sight unrelated 
disciplines. However, in the end it turns out that these disciplines say much 
the same about what human beings, and thus managers, are and how they 
perceive reality. The linking of the various disciplines will be done in a zigzag 
mode, meaning that what one discipline/author has to say will be confirmed 
or not confirmed by another discipline/author. 
 
In chapter 2 we make a start with the lines connecting perception – 
meaning - action in figure 1. On the pre-reflective level meaning originates in 
perception. In chapter 2 we will mainly deal with that pre-reflective level. 
Merleau-Ponty is regarded as one of the great philosophers of the last 
century. He was deeply inspired by Husserl. Merleau-Ponty takes over a lot 
of Husserl’s insights gratefully, which is not to say he always agrees to them. 
The findings of Merleau-Ponty’s work can be described as a prelude around 
the following five themes and I give his answers straight away, anticipating 
their explanation in the coming chapters and appendixes: 
- Overcoming the dichotomy between physiological and psychic and the  
dichotomy between empiricism (or representionalism, HL) and idealism 
(or solipsism, HL). His answer is a bodily primordial, pre-reflective being- 
in-the-world as a project. Human existence is between psysiological and  
the psychic as a third kind of being. The word ‘overcoming’ may be  
substituted by the word ‘transcending’, surpassing towards. The body- 
subject opens itself to the world. This theme will come back in chapter 2. 
- Emphasizing that Descartes ‘I think, I am’ has to be interpreted the  
other way round in ‘I am, I think’, ending in ‘I can’. We do not 
think our world, but rather we perceive, live and experience our 
world. We are no impartial observer in or of the world but rather 
we execute in acts, for instance, feelings and time. Already Husserl 
used the ‘I can’ meaning anticipating unrealised possibilities in 
perception (Moran, 2001, p. 162); the intention and the realization 
thereof. This theme will come back in chapter 2. 
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 -    “Merleau-Ponty’s existential analysis of habits draws our attention to a 
new meaning of both ‘knowledge’ and ‘meaning’  which eludes the  
traditional approaches” (Langer, 1989, p. 47). Cognition or our  
conscious life is the entire process of life and the body ‘understands’.  
This is not the everyday, objective body but rather the phenomenal  
body. It is the body as an experiential structure and as the context of  
cognitive mechanisms. The phenomenal body is active on the  
primordial, pre-reflective level. The body is there where it has 
something to do. (One’s activity is completely geared into the demands 
of the situation, Dreyfus, 1996).  “It is clear that this presupposes a  
profound alteration of the concepts body and consciousness”  
(Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 409). This theme will come back in chapter 2. 
-     Being-in-the-world is inseparable from temporality. Temporality is the  
meaning of our existence. “Our actual experience of being present in  
the world discloses that our phenomenal body is essentially a knowing  
body; thus the traditional body-soul problem vanishes” (Langer, 1989,  
p. 131). The true time experience will be discussed in chapter 2. 
- Nothing is absolute, neither ‘either…or’ nor ‘all or nothing’, nor ‘pure’  
(thoughts or reason). Instead Merleau-Ponty speaks of ‘ambiguity’ and  
‘contingency’. 
 
Merleau-Ponty was too individualistic to collaborate in research 
with anyone (Moran, 2001, p. 431). “It is this very diversity and conflict 
among the practitioners of phenomenology that leads one from an interest 
in the general considerations of phenomenology to the study of the 
thought of the individual phenomenologists themselves” (Moran, 2001, p. 
22). Merleau-Ponty feels that philosophy lacks the power of visual art to 
convey the meaning he sought. As he puts it ‘philosophy limps’ (Moran, 
2001, p. 431). It is a wording deficiency that does not enable him to 
properly express himself. Even his kindred spirit Sartre confessed that the 
book ‘Phenomenology of Perception’ was a mystery to him (Moran, 2001, 
p. 399). But that might as well be dictated by their complex relationship 
later on in their life.  
In chapter 2 we will also deal with the role memory plays in the 
true time experience. Meaning is related to time. Meaning and time form a 
unity because we demarcate meaningful activities belonging to the present. 
Appendix 3 is a glossary of some phenomenological terms not or hardly 
used in the text of chapter 2. 
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 In chapter 3 we will discuss the line connecting perception - particularization 
of the uniqueness of the observer in figure 1. We will also deal with the line 
connecting meaning and Weltanschauung. Meaning and Weltanschauung, the 
subject of the first key question, stand in a circular relation. The one 
presupposes the other. Sense making is dynamic and ongoing whereas 
Weltanschauung is more static. An implicit, tacit Weltanschauung in the 
background that can be evoked brings further order in our life. We will deal 
with the human being as an observer of systems from a neurobiological 
stance. Both chapter 2 and 3 ends in a duality the human being lives in. In 
one newspaper the concepts of duality and circularity are combined with 
regard to utterances about humour. “That is also the best humour, that takes 
into account the black side, with the tragedy and the sadness (ex-politician 
Hedy d’Ancona, p. 42) and “Behind each laughter hides a tear, behind each 
tear gleams a smile (comedian Herman van Veen, p. 63), UN, 11.22.2003. 
“Duality, as opposed to dualism, relates to two complementary explanations 
of the same phenomenon from different […] stances. As long as we make 
clear the stance […] the two indications are complementary and not 
contradictory […]” (Espejo in correspondence). Duality (the first utterance) 
with regard to the autonomous human being is a central concept in this 
thesis. We will deal with duality in the chapters 2 and 3. Circularity is shown 
in sentences like “We choose our world and the world chooses us” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1997, p. 514). Varela et al (1992b, p.173) quote one of Merleau-
Ponty’s, as they call it, more visionary passages in his early work. “Merleau-
Ponty clearly recognized, then, that we must see the organism and environ-
ment as bound together in reciprocal specification and selection”. Weick 
(1995, p. 34) argues: “People create their environments as those environ-
ments constrain them”. It illustrates how intermingled human beings are 
with their environment, also called milieu. In chapter 3 Varela et al (1992b) 
come up with what they call alternative theories and give an insight in a 
school of Buddhism. They illustrate how sloppy we normally deal with 
‘strange’ basic concepts, leading to misunderstandings. “The word karma has 
also found its way into contemporary English vocabulary where it is 
generally used as a synonym for fate or predestination. This is definitely not 
the meaning of karma within Buddhism. Karma constitutes a description of 
psychological causality – of how habits form and continue over time (1992b, 
p. 110). Habits (or skills) are at the core of Merleau-Ponty’s work.  
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 In chapter 4 we discuss the lines connecting meaning – action in figure 1. 
Here we will deal with meaning on the reflective level. Most, but not all, of 
what organisational psychology has to say about meaning will be confirmed 
by phenomenology. At the end of chapter 4 a definition of meaning will be 
given based on what has been said so far. Also the role of background or 
context will be emphasized. We will briefly deal with related concepts such 
as information and common sense as background know-how. The 
interruptions of situations and expectations lay at the heart of our 
emotions. “It makes good evolutionary sense to construct an organism that 
reacts significantly when the world is no longer the way it was” (Weick, 
1995, p. 45). Although we all will know what Weick humorous means, here 
is the first deficiency between Weick and Merleau-Ponty. The world 
remains the same throughout my entire life, Merleau-Ponty says. However, 
as Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 273) points out, hysterical people look behind 
them to see whether the world is still there. The concrete unity with the 
world is somehow broken up for them. Meaning and Weltanschauung are 
layered concepts. It explains among other things Bakker’s remark at the 
outset of this chapter. Proverbs are expressions of our Weltanschauung 
pre-eminently (Mieder, 1995e). Proverbs are also discussed in more depth 
in appendix 2. Proverbs can also be seen as operationalisations, realisation 
or shorthand for common sense. Proverbs can have the function of 
warning, reprimand, description, justification, persuasion, admonition, 
summarization and explanation. It is well possible that one and the same 
proverb takes completely different functions in different contexts of usage. 
In chapter 4 I will argue that human beings are not rational or at least are 
less rational than is pretended by managers in the boardrooms. In this 
thesis I distinguish between rationality (well thought-out) and reflection 
(the thinking, considerations). So where I cast doubt on rationality nothing 
is said about reflection. 
 
In chapter 5 we will discuss the line connecting action – 
particularization of structural action in figure 1. We start with a brief 
discussion of organisation and some mainstream theories. These theories 
are relevant in the context of Weltanschauung. Meaning is a concept that 
plays a role in the interaction among people. In organisations these 
relations are called structure as a temporally solidified process. Structure 
and organisational cybernetics are discussed in chapter 5 and a brief 
explanation of the Viable System Model will follow. 
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 The Viable System Model is included as appendix 8. This model is itself a 
duality; it deals with autonomy and cohesion. One would say that autonomy 
excludes cohesion but that is not the case. They must be balanced in 
combination. These insights are made operational in chapter 8 and applied in 
the appendixes 5, 6 and 7. The word structure will be often used in a rather 
loose way in this thesis. In this organisational context, structure is defined as 
the relations constituted by the specific resources producing the 
organisation’s relationships. The same relationships (more abstract) may 
underpin different relations (concrete individuals). The structure is made up 
of people in particular relations to each other (Espejo, 2002). As Espejo 
(2003) puts it, the essence of an organisation is not producing products or 
services, but producing a meaning (e.g. what it does for what purpose) 
through particular products or services. Managers try to influence and 
change the structure of their organisation. They do that among other things 
in communication through language and metaphors. Communication is 
discussed in the chapters 3, 5 and 9. Metaphor is discussed in more depth in 
appendix 1. After a summary of the findings so far in chapter 6, the first part 
of the thesis ends here. 
 
The following concepts will be emphasized in part 1: balance (in 
perception and structure), perception and action (is only what matters), 
meaning, Weltanschauung, duality, ambiguity, variety, systems and their 
behaviour, human nervous system, operational closure, emergent properties, 
structural coupling, heuristics and circularity (that is life itself). It is 
illustrative these concepts can hardly be found in a Dutch standard work on 
management and organization (Keuning & Eppink, 1982) or some concepts 
can be found in a different meaning than in the meaning used here.  
 
Part 2 of the thesis consists of the chapters 7 through 9. The subject 
matter in part 1 is broader than the empirical research in part 2. The 
empirical research in part 2 is no verification of the theory. Only a part of the 
theory will be tested.  
 
In chapter 7, methodology, a questionnaire in order to measure 
Weltanschauungen of managers in semi-structured interviews is designed. 
This questionnaire is included as appendix 4. The reason for designing a 
questionnaire is that such a questionnaire could be found nowhere by me. 
The questionnaire comprises questions related to the self, the other, the 
organisation and reality as among other things discussed in part 1.  
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 Proverbs, metaphors and three mainstream organisational orientations in 
dichotomies are also included. The proverbs mainly relate to co-operation. 
 
Chapter 8 reflects the findings based on the semi-structured 
interviews with four managers of whom two are male and two are female. 
These managers in the care sector (one until recently) are on Board level 
responsible for up to 2.500 employees. They are in the age category 45 to 
60 year. The Weltanschauungen are made visible in a profile. The given 
clarifications by the managers in the text together with the profiles reflect 
the Weltanschauungen. It seemed also possible to predict why which 
manager will work well together with another manager. In this co-
operation it is assumed that these managers would share some fields of 
attention in their tasks. 
The structures of the manager’s organisations were discussed with 
three out of four managers based on the Viable System Model and Viplan 
insights, as discussed in chapter 5. The organisations and the structures are 
discussed in the appendixes 5, 6 and 7. Two issues are the most striking in 
the interviews for me. The purposefulness of these managers in terms of 
strong inner drives and the fact, that some managers are interested or ‘live’ 
in Eastern insights. The interviewed managers are guaranteed anonymity. 
That is the reason why the managers cannot be linked to the organisations 
by the reader. 
 
In chapter 9 conclusions are drawn and recommendations are 
made. One of the conclusions is that the managers them selves see aspects 
of their Weltanschauung back in the structures of their organisations. 
Another conclusion is that we can see back theoretical issues as discussed 
in part 1 in what the managers say, although they do not refer to these 
theories. Moreover, the used mainstream theories as dichotomies in the 
questionnaire are at best ideal typical and cannot be found back in practice. 
In other words, manager’s Weltanschauungen combine orientations of, for 
instance, Theory E and Theory O. In chapter 9 we will also discuss what it 
means if managers ask employees to change in fundamental change 
processes and what is needed in order to be successful in these change 
processes. 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to contribute to the further 
development of organisational theory, especially in the domain of meaning 
and Weltanschauung.  
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 1.5  Why bother? 
 
Following Searle, this leaves one crucial question unanswered: Why bother? 
In my opinion we have paid little attention in the relatively young discipline 
of organisational theory to the human factor. We have ‘integrated’ disciplines 
like economics, financial accounting, marketing, logistics and psychology. In 
psychology the emphasis is on motivation, power, status, roles, teamwork 
and the work itself. It seems we are mostly talking at a meta-level and have 
skipped a level. My argument is much in line with Merleau-Ponty’s critique 
on cybernetics as thinking ‘operationally’, as a sort of artificialism (Langer, 
1989). We must return to the ‘there is’, in his case the life world, the pre-
reflective consciousness. For Husserl, this life-world is a layer of meaning 
between the nature world and the culture (or human) world (Moran, 2001, p. 
181). “Returning to examine this pre-given world is a return to the life-world, 
the world in which we are always already living and which furnishes the 
ground for all cognitive performance and all scientific determination” 
(Moran, 2001, p. 12). “Returning to the things themselves means returning to 
this world prior to knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks and in 
relation to which each scientific definition is abstract, indicated and 
dependent, like geography is in relation to the landscape, in which we learned 
previously what a forest, a grassland or a river is” (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 
29). In our case we return to the human being as he gives meaning. 
Thereafter we will turn to organizational cybernetics.  
 
We know little about ourselves. What we could know about 
ourselves are often not easy reading theories and thus do these theories not 
concern most of us. I can imagine Skarda (in Varela & Dupuy, 1992a, p. 266) 
argues in order to approach cognition we need more than the 
phenomenologists that the Continental tradition have produced […] more 
than Varela’s claim that […] if you want to know exactly how the nervous 
system works. However, a lot cannot be properly understood by a layman. 
Intelligible insights and the direction of the research will do for our 
purposes.  
According to Beer, Merleau-Ponty, Maturana & Varela and Varela et 
al the human being is viable, meaning ‘able to maintain a separate (or 
independent) existence; not in isolation but rather in (vital) interaction with 
the environment’. According to Beer (1990a, 1990b, 1991) the problem is 
most organizations are not viable. Most organizations lack for instance five 
essential functions or mechanisms necessary for viability or operate them in 
a fragmented form.  
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 We will come back on the subject in the chapters 5, 8 and the related 
appendixes 5, 6 and 7. 
Why do managers take management courses and sometimes read 
management books? “Because” a female manager says in an article (NRC, 
07.10.02) “I became a manager ‘accidentally’ as so many, without real 
training. So I went after how it really ought to be done”. Does anyone 
really know that? As Langer (1989, p. 45) puts it, in Merleau-Ponty’s study 
of human behaviour the facts are ambiguous. And it is something to say: 
“We still operate in that sense very much animal like” as the communi-
cation analyst Boermans did in his column (FD, 07.13. 2002) but it is 
different to say: “We human beings are not rational animals; we are 
emotional, languaging animals that use the operational coherences of 
language, through the constitution of rational systems to explain and justify 
our actions, while in the process and without realising it, we blind 
ourselves about the emotional grounding of all the rational domains that 
we bring forth” as biologist Maturana (1988, p. 78) did. With regard to 
Maturana’s position above it is already here interesting to see how Merleau-
Ponty envisages language: “The dawn of language lies in emotional 
gesticulation” (Langer, 1989, p. 62).  
 
Also Ackoff (1978) argues understanding human behaviour, 
particularly consuming behaviour, is obviously of value to those who 
provide the products consumed. Few of us understand why we behave as 
we do, but we are convinced that we have such understanding. Our 
explanations of our own behaviour are often excuses and rationalizations 
of it. This would be bad enough but, in addition, we tend to infer from our 
self-misunderstandings to misunderstandings of others. Correct 
explanations of human behaviour, even partial explanations are often very 
difficult to come by, even when the behaviour involved is commonplace. 
Ackoff does not say human beings are emotional, languaging animals, but 
for the rest his statement is much in line with what Maturana claims. 
 
It is also a challenge to make these theories more accessible to a 
broader community (of management scientists). With this thesis a place for 
these insights in the management science discourse is requested, because 
these theories make clear what it means to be a human being, how we can 
organize on a more humane scale and how we can avoid pitfalls in 
communication and change processes. 
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 Now that we have discussed briefly perception, meaning, action, 
observing, Weltanschauung and structure we will make a start to discuss 
them in more depth in the chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. Maturana, Varela and 
Merleau-Ponty all end up in duality as will be seen. It will also be seen that 
human beings never coincide completely with themselves and yet are present 
to them selves because we have the distance of non-coincidence. That 
distance also plays a role in the duality of the observer, as described by 
Maturana and Varela (1989) in chapter 3.  
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 Vienne la nuit sonne l’heure 
      Les jours s’en vont je demeure 
 
      Al komt de nacht en slaan de uren 
       De dagen gaan en ik blijf duren 
 
      At nightfall chimes the hour 
      Days go by but I remain 
 
     Le Pont Mirabeau / Apollinaire (1912) 
 
  
CHAPTER 2.  DUALITY 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will discuss the lines connecting perception – 
meaning – action in figure 1 in chapter 1. We will mainly deal with the 
primordial, pre-reflective level in perception. Meaning originates in 
perception and perception and action are inseparable. 
Behind the words ‘how we as human beings perceive the world’ a whole 
‘world’ lies hidden. The taken-for-granted stance is that the world is 
divorced from the subject and the subject’s thoughts from its body 
(Langer, 1989). This view will be challenged in this chapter. In section 2.2 
we will describe what perception is. In perception originates immanent 
meaning as the first layer of meaning. In perception ambiguity is essential 
for the human existence. In section 2.3 we will deal with ambiguity as 
unclear meaning. The phenomenal body as an existential structure is the 
subject of perception. We are our body in being-in-the-world. In being-in-
the-world we open ourselves to the world. This will be discussed in section 
2.4. In section 2.5 it will be seen that the brain lays the ground for 
perception. The life of consciousness is subtended by an intentional arc, 
which projects around us our past, our future and various situations. In the 
intentional arc unity of our life comes into being. With that intentional arc 
will be dealt in section 2.6. The past, the present and the future originate 
from our being-in-the-world in relation with the things. We will end this 
chapter with a description of that true time experience in section 2.7. The 
most exact consciousness discovers itself in a duality of time already 
unfolded (the time aspect) or a life as a project of unfolding time (the being 
aspect). It turns out that temporality is the meaning of our existence. 
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 2.2  The middle course 
 
Maturana (1988) claims that the most central question that humanity 
faces today is the question of reality. The taken-for-granted picture is that 
there is a pre-given world in which human beings form representations of 
objects and situations in a causal relation (cause-effect) as responses to 
stimuli from the outside world. This is shown in figure 2 (mind the 
projecting and encoding busy little men in the brain; aguila means eagle). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Making representations 
 
This view will be challenged in this chapter. As Langer (1989) argues, 
common sense also divorces the world from the subject and the subject’s 
thoughts from its body. This view will also be challenged in this chapter. It 
will be argued they form a comprehensive system. For the neurobiologists 
Maturana & Varela (1989) reality is the domain of things, and in this sense, 
that what can be distinguished by an observer is real. Observers indicate 
distinctions.  
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 With regard to cognition, the process of knowing, Maturana & Varela 
(1989, p. 192) steer a middle course between representionalism, a portrayal 
of the world ‘outside there’ (figure 2) and solipsism, being the own inner 
emotional/spiritual life has only it’s right of existence.  
For Merleau-Ponty (1997) the world is that what we perceive. 
Langer (1989) argues the middle course which phenomenology takes 
describes human existence as action or doing. The certainty of seeing is the 
act of seeing. “For Husserl (and Merleau-Ponty will follow him closely) 
phenomenology must steer a path between traditional empiricism 
(representionalism, HL) and forms of idealism (solipsism, HL) (Moran, 
2001, p. 129).  
 
The way we perceive objects and the surrounding objects in a 
changing foreground-periphery or object-horizon manner or in figure-
background setting is not an intellectual operation and there is no need to 
know anything about the eyes’ retinal structure for it to occur (Langer, 
1989, p. 25). First, the sensory fields gear into one other, as we already said 
in chapter 1. Second, in for instance seeing colours the brain is much more 
involved than the eyes’ retinal structure, as Varela et al (1992b) will make 
clear in this chapter. The brain lays the ground for perception. Third, 
Merleau-Ponty gives illustrative examples of what perception is. “For my 
perception the removing object reduces and the approaching object 
enlarges less quickly than the physical image on my retina. That is why a 
train coming towards us in the cinema is much bigger than it would 
become in reality” (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 312). There is much that can 
be said against this statement, for instance the use of special effects, special 
lenses, ‘unnatural’ low viewpoints and the large screen. An example the 
other way round is more illustrative: ”That is why a hill that seemed 
substantial to us becomes unremarkable in a photograph”. Generations of 
amateur photographers have violated this rule of professionals. It is 
interesting to note that professionals most of the time crowd round the 
same ‘mature’ or ‘best’ standpoint. They have learned the effects of a lens. 
Or in other words, they have learned to ‘translate’ perception into ‘picture 
language’. The perceived can also be a ‘value unity’. If one has taken away a 
painting from our house, we can perceive a change without knowing 
which. 
“The physiological (theory of phenomena of life, HL) occurrence is 
only the abstract pattern of the occurrence of perception. 
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 Perception must no longer be understood as constituting of the real object 
but rather as our inseparable (concrete, HL) connectedness with the things” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 408). We cannot exist separated from the world. 
We are always situated and orientated perceivers or observers. 
 
In perceiving the world human beings give meaning to objects and 
situations. Perception is according to Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 65) suddenly 
seeing the spring out from an immanent (inherent, HL) meaning in a 
constellation of data. Perception is no memory. The world is full of meaning, 
as he says. “A wooden wheel laying on the ground is for the seeing quite 
something different than a wheel bearing a load”, Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 
95) argues. The seeing is already inhabited by a meaning that allocates it a 
function, both in the spectacle of the world as well as in our existence. That 
function will be discussed in this chapter. In acquiring new skills originates a 
new meaning of the situation in a motility field.  
For Merleau-Ponty (1997) in perception on the pre-reflective level 
we make the indeterminate as determinate as possible whereby a satisfying 
balance is the success criterion. Weick (1995) argues on the reflective level 
sense making is to be separated from other explanatory processes such as 
understanding, attribution and the class of interpretive activities and set 
above this class as a higher level abstraction that includes them. “Noticing is 
filtering, classifying and comparing, whereas sense making refers more to the 
activity what the noticed cues mean” (Weick, 1995, p. 51). 
 
The first question is to what extent the observer and observing 
(indicating distinctions) differ from the perceiver and perceiving. The various 
aspects of perception, such as the phenomenal body, will be discussed under 
various sections in this chapter. “The act of perceiving discovers not only the 
meaning which they (data, HL) have, but moreover sees to it, that they have 
a meaning (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 80). “Perception is no memory” (1997, 
p. 65). Weick (1995, p. 24) argues: “Accordingly, if ‘memory’ is defined as 
‘experience of the past’ then all perception…is a form of memory by this 
definition of the word”. Weick’s formulation runs counter completely to 
Merleau-Ponty’s formulation. For Merleau-Ponty memory can only be 
understood as an immediate property of the past. We shall come back on 
these issues in chapter 4. However, Weick’s (1995, p. 133) formulation with 
regard to sense making, although on the reflective level, is much in line with 
Merleau-Ponty. “Sense making is about the enlargement of small cues […] or 
small structures”. 
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  “Organizing and sense making have much in common. […] To organize is 
to impose order, counteract deviations, simplify and connect, and the same 
holds true when people try to make sense” (Weick, 1995, p. 82). These 
cues may be labelled in language using salient features. Merleau-Ponty 
(1997, p. 408) argues perception must no longer be understood as 
constituting of the real object but rather as our inseparable connectedness 
with the things. According to the Van Dale dictionary observation is 
‘systematically (consistent or according to a method, HL) perception and 
registration of phenomena’. An observer is according to Van Dale a 
perceiver. Maturana (1988) says farther on, the observer can know existing 
things using reference to some entity through perception or reason and 
Maturana & Varela (1989) argue what we say reflects our experience and 
perception. The observer can know them through perception, which is the 
pre-reflective level of Merleau-Ponty and reason, which is the reflective 
level, the latter according to Merleau-Ponty always based on the former. In 
figure 1 in chapter 1 we said that observing is a particularization of 
perception due to the complexity of the human nervous system including 
the brain. 
 
Cognition, the process of knowing, is defined by Maturana & 
Varela as the entire process of life. This corresponds with Husserl’s view. 
“[…] By cognition (in German: Erkenntnis) Husserl means the experiences 
in which something comes to be grasped as known. He is not primarily 
dealing with theoretical knowledge […], rather he includes all forms of 
knowing-how and emotional states wherein something can be intuited 
(observed, HL) and fulfilled – for example, what it means to be in love, 
and so on” (Moran, 2001, p. 108). Varela, in Understanding Origins’ states 
(1992a, p 235) “The kingpin of cognition is its capacity for bringing forth 
meaning: information is not pre-established as a given order, but 
regularities emerge from a co-determination of the cognitive activities 
themselves”. Regularities, habits (or skills), order and unity in our life are 
concepts that come back over and over in what follows. 
According to Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 181) our conscious life is the 
life of knowing, desiring and perceiving. So cognition and conscious life 
stand in an exact relation. They stand for the entire process of life. 
 
In both theories there is a kind of kernel (the phenomenal body 
with habits and the operational closure of the nervous system) from which 
all the rest ‘originates’, ‘comes into being’ or ‘brings forth a world’, the 
latter called ‘enactment’ by Varela et al. 
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 They both end up in a duality. The problem of the world, and to start with 
that of the own body, as Merleau-Ponty (1997) points out, is that everything 
is present in it in an ambiguous way and ‘becomes’. We will amplify on these 
kernels in the present chapter and chapter 3. Let us start to see what 
ambiguity is. 
 
2.3  Ambiguity 
 
Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 53) uses for ambiguity also the word 
‘moveable’. “The phenomenon of ‘moveable’ of powers that inhibit this 
picture, that are looking for balance and that carry her to something more 
determinate” (1997, p. 93). It is the tension of the powers in the composition 
of the picture. Arnheim (1988) has a lot to say about these powers. Accor-
ding to him, composition is the manner in which forms, colours and move-
ment is brought together. A dynamic balance presupposes a field of force 
that radiates energy. A static balance, like a point right in the middle of a 
square, we experience as boring. A point out of the middle, connected with 
an imaginary elastic band to the middle, is more exciting. Later on in an 
example in this chapter this tension of powers or field of forces is also called 
a force of attraction on distance. 
Husserl used the word ‘kinaesthetic’, meaning the same, moveable 
(Moran, 2001, p. 166). As an example of what Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 48-
54) means by ambiguity we take the following two lines: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Ambiguity 
 
Both lines are neither equal nor unequal. In this visual field there is 
an indeterminate seeing, a seeing of ‘I don’t know exactly what’. It belongs 
essentially to the perceived to admit ambiguity, movement in terms of 
powers that seek a balance leading to the determinate in order to let it be 
formed by a context. “In this illusion the one line seems to be unequal to the 
other line, without thereby becoming unequal; the line becomes ‘different’ “.  
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 In other words, Merleau-Ponty argues, for the perception an isolated 
objective line and the same line included in a figure is not the same 
anymore. In this respect he refers to Koffka, one of Husserl’s pupils, 
stating: “One is inclined to say: the sides of a rectangle are straight lines. 
Yet, an isolated straight line as phenomenon […] is something different 
than the side of a rectangle. This side has […] an inside and outside, 
whereas the isolated line has two completely equal sides”. In other words, 
Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 215) argues, ambiguity is essential for the human 
existence and everything we experience or think always has a plural 
meaning.  
On the reflective layer Weick (1995, p. 137) comes to the same 
conclusion. “[…] In every question there are two sides to the argument 
exactly opposite to one other. […] Thus any individual statement of an 
opinion is potentially controversial and potentially a part of a social 
argument in which someone else will argue the other side. […] Facing such 
a world (of antithetical processes) realistic people must have numerous 
sense making frameworks that contradict each other”. Contradict relates to 
dualism; complement to duality. Human beings also deal with duality, 
which is at the core of this chapter. So I would also like to include the 
word complement here. Realistic people must have numerous sense 
making frameworks that contradict and complement each other. 
Weick (1995) uses also the word ‘equivocality’, which is the 
equivalent of ambiguity. But he argues (1995, p. 92) some distinguish 
between ambiguity as more about unclear meaning and equivocality as 
more about the confusion created by two or more meanings, as in a pun. 
Merleau-Ponty’s usage of the word ambiguity is ‘unclear meaning’ as 
among other things the examples show. “The problem in ambiguity is not 
that the real world is imperfectly understood and that more information 
will remedy that. The problem is that information may not resolve mis-
understandings”, Weick (1995, p. 92) says. Nielen once said to one of my 
colleague-students: “Now you are mixing up two mis-understandings”; it 
can always be worse. What Weick says here relates to the reflective level. In 
chapter 4 many examples will be given. In this chapter we look for 
phenomena that precede this reflective level. 
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 “The movements of the own body are already covered by nature (not 
learned, HL) with a certain perceptual meaning; they (movements, HL) form 
with the external phenomena a so much related system that the external 
perception ‘takes account’ of the movements of the sensory organs and if 
not being the explicit explanation, at least finds in it the motive of the occurring 
changes in the spectacle and can thus understand them immediately” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 91).  
The motive is an antecedent (an earlier happened fact to which a 
similar fact can be judged, HL) that is only active by its meaning. Moreover, 
it is the decision that declares this meaning as legitimate and lends the power 
and effectiveness to it. Motive and decision are two elements of a situation. 
The motive is the factual situation, the decision the accepted situation. The 
relation of the motivating and motivated is reciprocal (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, 
p. 311). I get the message someone has died. I undertake the trip because I 
have something to do there (assist the family and/or my presence is wanted 
and/or pay someone one’s last respect etc.). So the decision and the act are 
based on the meaning(s) the fact lends. Meaning is a layered concept as will 
be seen. For Beer (1990, p. 10) a fact is that what is the case. However, “[…] 
we have to agree on the convention about the nature, the boundaries, and 
the purpose of any System before we can agree what is to count as a fact”. 
This is the first occasion we can cast doubt on rationality (well thought-out) 
of human beings. If we agree on what is to count as a fact or a factual 
situation, it is active by the meaning it lends, whereby it is the decision that 
declares this meaning legitimate as the accepted situation. In other words, 
meaning is involved in decisions. We will come back on meaning, judgement 
and decision in the next chapter. In section 2.6 we will pay attention to what 
is to count as similar, called generalizing. 
 
Ambiguity can also be the start of spontaneity, creativity, 
imagination, playfulness and amazement in art and science, characteristics 
most of us have unlearned since our childhood. Merleau-Ponty pays 
attention to children, artists, especially Cézanne, and scientists. Ambiguity 
can also be the start of sense making on the reflective level as will be seen in 
chapter 4.  
  
The question then becomes for whom or what there is ambiguity or unclear 
meaning in perception. The subject of perception is our phenomenal body as 
an experiential structure and as the context of cognitive processes. In the 
next section we will discuss that phenomenal body. 
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 2.4 The phenomenal body 
 
In this section we will elaborate on what the phenomenal body is and what 
being-in-the-world means. Some attention will be paid to the co-evolving 
of species with their environment in evolution. According to Merleau-
Ponty (1997) our phenomenal body is the subject of perception. We do 
not have a body, but rather we are our body. The body is our general 
means through which we have a world (1997, p. 192). Reflection or the 
understandable meaning always only remains an extract (1997, p. 273). The 
body executes the function in order to lend to the immediate movements 
of the spontaneity a rather repeatable acting and independent existence. 
The habit (or skill, HL) is nothing else than a way of this fundamental 
power (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 192). We are no impartial observer in or of 
the world because we inhabit the world, time and space.  
The French word ‘habiter’ and the English word ‘inhabit’ refer to 
the words ‘habitude’ or ‘habit’ which is not the case in the Dutch language. 
“The world”, Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 391) argues, “does not lay on the 
field of the objective thinking, on which solutions are located. The world 
in the fullest sense of the word is no object; she has a covering of objective 
conditions, but also chinks and gaps through which subjectivities become 
implanted, or rather, that are the subjectivities self. Thing and world only 
exist lived through me because they are the chaining up of our 
perspectives. But they outshine all perspectives, because the chaining up is 
temporary and unfinished. It seems then as if the world lives itself outside 
me”. The temporary aspect will be discussed later on; it is unfinished 
because we have only limited perspectives and we only perceive aspects of 
objects. We see the front of a lamp and not its rear side. However, the wall 
‘facing’ the back may say us something about the rear side. “No single 
explanatory hypothesis is clearer than the act itself with which we retake 
this still unfinished world in trying to complete and to think her” (1997, p. 
40).  The act is being-in-the-world, being in vital communication with the 
world through mediation of the perceiving body, whereby body and world 
form a unity, a system. Being-in-the-world means that a subject carries with 
him around himself a system of meanings of which the mutual similarities, 
relationships and mutually participations do not require to be made explicit 
in order to be exploited, according to Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 174). 
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 “In our house we know directly where to walk without any 
reasoning. When we talk with a well-known friend, each word of him and of 
ours contains a multitude of references to the kernel of dimensions of both 
his and our character, without having to remind our previous talks. These 
acquired worlds, that lend a second meaning to our experience, are in turn 
cut free out of a primordial world, that base their first meaning. In this 
formulation we find the life-world, the layer of meaning between the 
primordial world (nature world) and the acquired world (cultural world) as 
was mentioned in chapter 1. In this primordial world the phenomenal body 
is active in being-in-the-world. This is the first time we come across the 
layers of meaning. Meaning originates in the primordial world. In the same 
way there is a world of thoughts. Our acquired thoughts are no absolute 
acquisition; they feed themselves any moment with our present thinking. 
They offer us a meaning, but we give them that meaning our selves. In fact 
our available acquisitions are on any moment an expression of the energy of 
our present conscious”. If for instance we are tired the energy of our 
consciousness is less. Merleau-Ponty’s claim that thoughts feed themselves is 
much in line with disputes among Abhidharma schools in Buddhism. Varela 
et al (1992b, p. 68) state: “A third claim was that mind and object were 
simultaneous for sight, sound, smell, taste and touch but that the thinking 
consciousness took as its object the preceding moment of thought”. 
Merleau-Ponty (1997) continues: “The essence of the consciousness 
is to provide itself with a world or worlds, that is to say, to bring into being 
its own thoughts before itself, as if they were things, and it demonstrates its 
vitality indivisibly by outlining these landscapes for itself and then by 
abandoning them”. ‘Providing itself with a world’ is much in line with Varela 
et al’s use of the word ‘enact’, meaning ‘bringing forth a world’ and Maturana 
& Varela’s argument ‘the nervous system creates itself a world’. 
“At times the body restricts itself to gestures that are necessary for 
the conservation of life and places in accordance with that a biological world 
around it; then again it shows, while playing with these first gestures and 
transforms of their original meaning to a figurative meaning, straight across a 
new core of meaning, […] such as dancing”. Musical tones elicit from us 
grabbing movements. That is why ‘it takes two to tango’. “In still another 
case, the  meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body’s natural means; 
it must then build itself an instrument and projects so a cultural world 
around it” (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 192). 
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 With regard to thoughts Husserl argues: “The thinker knows 
nothing of his lived experiences of thinking but only of the thoughts, 
which his thinking engenders continuously. The point was to bring this 
obscurely occurring life of thinking into one’s grip by subsequent reflection 
and to fix it in faithful descriptive concepts” (Moran, 2001, p. 93).  
 
Anticipating a discussion later on the following quotation fits in well in 
what has been said: “Merleau-Ponty points out that thought does not itself 
suffice for recognizing things; nor does speech presuppose thinking. In 
fact there can be no pure thought prior to speech. Lacking all supports, 
such thought would vanish instantly and we could never be aware of it. 
Our experience shows us that even familiar objects appear indeterminate 
until we remember their names; consequently, naming is recognition. […] 
We ourselves do not know our own thoughts until we formulate them in 
‘internal or external speech’. Hence it is evident that speaking accomplishes 
thought rather than merely translating an already accomplished thought”. 
Authentic speech is something one expresses for the first time. This for the 
first time does not only relate to our childhood; it can be the expression of 
someone who falls in love for the first time as a 24 year old. “Authentic 
speech is the presence of thought in the world –not its garment, but its 
body” (Langer, 1989, p. 58). These first time experiences play an important 
role in the formation of our Weltanschauung because they are the most 
lasting experiences in memory. They are meaningful events rather early in 
our life. These meaningful events, in a positive or negative sense, then, set 
in a stream of (perceptual guided) actions. “The habit expresses our power 
to broaden our being-in-the-world or to change our existence by incorpo-
rating new tools” (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 189). Playing an instrument 
shows that the habit does neither live in the thinking, nor in memory, nor 
in the objective body, but rather in the body as intermediary of a world. 
Memory plays an important role in our true time experience, as will be 
seen.  
 
However, here the first problem arises. The habit does not live in 
the memory. In an article in NRC (10.25.2003) it is stated: “Who digs up a 
recollection out of his memory must store this again –otherwise it is lost. 
This principle had already been proven for rats, but in research in Nature 
(October 9) it is also now concluded for people. 
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 It is about the motility memory (the ticking of fingers). […] Researchers of 
Harvard Medical School let test subjects learn finger-tick patterns, for 
instance 4-1-3-2-4 (whereby the little finger is 1 and the forefinger 4)”. The 
rest of the article and the outcomes are not relevant here. So we are talking 
of exactly the same thing; how to learn a habit or skill, in this case playing an 
instrument (but the same goes for instance for typing). Now either Merleau-
Ponty is wrong or these researchers are wrong. I do not think there is a way 
in between but it might be. I am inclined to say these researchers are wrong. 
I realize that is a dangerous position not having read the article in Nature 
(why would I if there is a summary in the scientific supplement of a quality 
newspaper), being a layman in this field, whereas Harvard and Nature is not 
just anybody. But I have five reasons. First, other authors in this thesis say 
the memory does not store. Second, the outcomes of the research can be 
right, but do not prove that there is a motility memory involved and that is 
my point. It looks like they just assume there is a motility memory involved, 
because what would count otherwise for the learning process? Third, do we 
consult a motility memory if we cycle or swim? The only thing that can be 
said according to Dreyfus (1996) is we need a lot of practice and the body 
takes over. Four, in our true time experience, that will be discussed later on, 
we do not dig up recollections but rather we re-open time without recollec-
tions or ideas in between. Five, last but not least, it would undermine 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory for the most part. I admit defeat if it can be proven, 
first there is a motility memory and second that it is involved in these 
processes. Langer (1989, p. 47) argues the world is not ready-made as 
common sense supposes it to be; rather it is ‘built up’ and the dialectical 
movement whereby it takes shape cannot be broken apart into so many self-
contained fragments. The consideration of habits (or skills, HL) reveals this 
especially well. “[…] To learn to type or play an instrument…is to be 
transplanted into them (instruments, HL), or conversely, to incorporate them 
into the bulk of the body itself”. A nice start, is it not?  
 
Four examples may clarify the role of the body. With regard to a man 
who treats leather, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between abstract- and 
concrete movements (cutting leather), that only has a place in the dimension 
of behaviour (1997, p.169). Abstract movements relate to ‘playing’ a situation 
or raising an arm on command. With regard to concrete movements he 
states (1997, p. 150): “The work-bench, the scissors and the pieces of leather 
form for the subject as it were the poles of his acting; they define a certain 
situation by their related values, and an open situation that requires a certain 
way of resolution, a certain kind of work.  
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 The body is only one element in the system of the subject and his world 
and the task elicits from him a necessary movement by a kind of force of 
attraction on distance, as the phenomenal powers at work in the visual 
field elicit from me the motility reactions without any calculation that will 
put in the best balance […]”. So objects, their related values and a force of 
attraction define an open situation that requires a certain work. It is much 
the same as what was said at the start of section 2.3 with regard to 
ambiguity. For a person who has never treated leather, the objects will 
have no related values and may be no force of attraction. No related 
values, because you do not know how to use the instruments. That will 
result in unclear, immanent meaning. “In the concrete movement the 
patient (Schneider, a man to whom Merleau-Ponty refers extensively, HL) 
has no […] conscious of the stimulus and no […] conscious of the 
reaction: he simply is his body, and his body the power of being-in-the-
world and the power to act in the world”, translated as the-power-of-the-
world, because this power also belongs to the world, due to the non-
separation of inner and outer. Later on it will become clearer what 
Merleau-Ponty means by this non-separation, in using the word ‘flesh’, 
overcoming the subject-object dichotomy. What is stated here applies to 
patients and ‘normal’ persons, although Schneider lacks to project around 
himself a ‘human space’ freely in abstract movements. According to 
Vlasblom & Tiemersma (1997, p. 23) later research has demonstrated the 
relativity of Merleau-Ponty’s findings in the Schneider case. However, 
Moran gives a different account in a footnote (2001, p. 515; 32). Two 
German neurologists tracked down Schneider concluding he was unreliable 
and might have been feigning the symptoms when undergoing tests. 
Langer (1989, p. 171) argues in her conclusion: “Merleau-Ponty’s recurrent 
heavy reliance on the results of studies dealing with pathological behaviour 
– particularly […] pertaining Schneider – also considerably weakens his 
description of perception. […] The grounds for such dismissal (of the 
theory, HL) might well be that Schneider’s experience proves nothing 
because it is too individual […]”. But, as she ends (p. 174) Merleau-Ponty’s 
work in describing phenomena makes a very substantial contribution to the 
philosophical discourse of our time 
 
It all has to do with our grip or hold on the world. Another 
example might illustrate what is partially meant here, because with grip on 
the world is meant more, like for example spatial orientation. 
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 I know from my experience as a sailor how fearful a big approaching object 
can be on the sea the moment I saw it turning up in the fog, but was unable 
to recognize it, let alone to name it. ‘It’ was outside the shipping lanes. In my 
natural attitude I had no perceptions, but rather a stream of experiences 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 335). I switched from the natural attitude or 
focussing, in which I surrendered myself to the spectacle the world is, to the 
analytical focussing, in which I turned myself to my glance, thereby breaking 
up my natural unity of the sensory organs. From that moment on I was 
completely absorbed in an act to find out what the object was; the need to 
get a maximum grip on it. All I was became ‘placed in service of 
recognizing’, so to speak. Although there was rigidity, my knees that shook 
did not remind me of fear, as Merleau-Ponty would say; I was anxious. My 
world, my field of phenomena as the ambiguous domain in which 
perspectival incarnate subjects are situated, my horizon became for minutes 
very small. This is what Bakker means at the outset of chapter 1, where he 
says we are in the world ’in different ways and on different levels’. “This 
distinction (between pointing or ‘Zeigen’ and grabbing or ‘Greifen’, HL) can 
only be maintained if there are several ways on which body is body and 
several ways on which conscious is conscious” (Merleau-Ponty, 1997,  
p. 169). As will be seen, here Merleau-Ponty links up with what practitioners 
of meditation in a school of Buddhism say. In the end the object turned out 
to be, while changing its course, a flat square formed car transport ship, seen 
on front. If I had had a different perspective, I would have seen the big 
letters on the side. However, Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 147) emphasizes we 
are familiar with the spectacle the world is; we ‘inhabit’ the world and are 
attached to the world in every meaning of the word. The body attaches the 
primordial space and time and encloses it (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 186). 
 
Another example that in the habit (or skill) the phenomenal body 
‘knows’ and ‘understands’ is a typist. A typist able to type fast is nevertheless 
unable to indicate the position of the various keys on the keyboard. The 
typist just types without any conscious ‘knowing’ or ‘thinking’ so to speak; he 
or she just executes the act of typing. The body knows and takes over in the 
words of Dreyfus (1996)). Typists can also type a letter ‘in the air’ without a 
keyboard. They are still unable to indicate the position of the keys on the 
imaginary keyboard. 
 
Merleau-Ponty gives the example of an experienced organist capable 
of playing an organ, which he does not know. Here I use the translation of 
Smith (2004, p. 168). 
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  “But during a short rehearsal preceding the concert, he does not act like a 
person about to draw up a plan. He sits on the seat, works the pedals, pulls 
out the stops, gets the measure of the instrument with his body, 
incorporates within himself the relevant directions and dimensions, settles 
into the organ as one settles into a house. He does not learn objective 
spatial positions for each stop and pedal, nor does he commit them to 
‘memory’. […] The stops, pedals and manuals are given to him as nothing 
more than possibilities of achieving certain emotional or musical values, 
and their positions are simply the places through which this value appears 
in the world. Between the musical essence of the piece as it is shown in the 
score and the notes which actually sound round the organ, so direct a 
relation is established that the organist’s body and his instrument are 
merely the medium of this relationship. Henceforth the music exists by 
itself and through it all the rest exists. […] The whole problem of habit 
here is one of knowing how the musical significance of an action can be 
concentrated in a certain place to the extent that, in giving himself entirely 
to the music, the organist reaches for precisely those stops and pedals 
which are to bring it into being. Now the body is essentially an expressive 
space. […] The body is our general medium for having a world. […] It is 
literally true that the subject who learns to type incorporates the key-bank 
space into his bodily space”.  
 
“The body can be understood in an immediate, single and full 
experience, but also under an aspect of generality and as an impersonal 
being” (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 127). This can partly be clarified by what 
Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 384) says about animals. “The animal behaviour 
concentrates on an animal environment (Umwelt) and centres of resistance 
(Wiederstand). […] The human behaviour opens upon a world (Welt) and 
upon an object (Gegenstand) beyond all the tools it makes for itself and 
even the own body it can treat as object”. That ‘gegenstand’ manifests 
itself in communication (dialogue) with the object, which has a certain 
texture. “Human life is defined by the capacity to deny itself in the 
objective thinking and this capacity stems from its primordial attachment 
to the world itself”. If the latter would be not the case we would have lost 
our anchor the world is. “Human life ‘understands’ not only this one 
limited milieu but an infinite number of possible milieus, and it under-
stands itself because it is thrown into a natural world”. We change for 
instance of milieu if we start playing in a situation. With the ‘human life 
understands’ is not meant the intellectual understanding but rather the 
bodily understanding in the relation with the world.  
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  “This natural world can be compared with a person whom I already 
recognise with irrefutable evidence before I succeed to sum up his qualities 
of character, because he continuously maintains the same style in all his 
expressions and all his behaviours, even when he changes of milieu or ideas”. 
A style is the way we stand in situations. “[…] I experience the unity of the 
world as I recognise a style. That style of a human being or a town does not 
stay constant for me”. After having lived many years in a neighbourhood as 
part of our world our experience of this neighbourhood can change. It has 
become more familiar or we dislike changes. “With regard to the things, on 
the other hand, only the knowledge thereof is changeable. The world 
remains the same throughout my entire life” (1997, p. 385). This formulation 
has again much in common with what was said earlier in this section ‘each 
word of him and ours contain a multitude of references to the kernel of 
dimensions of both his and our character’. 
 
The difference between human beings and animals is also mentioned 
by Espejo (2003). “There is something special about being human. Our 
languaging not only contains information (e.g. a message where to find food) 
but also meaning (e.g. for what purpose). Humans have managed to 
decouple their operational domain from their informational domain, 
something that other mammals apparently have not achieved, and in the 
process have become purposeful rather than just purposive“. If a fat cat goes 
after a bird, it is not intentional, may be something inborn or instinctive. But 
the cat is purposive because otherwise she will never catch the bird and just 
show incoherent movements. If a fat human being goes after a cat, it is not 
inborn, no need, but it has a purpose. Hence Beer’s motto: the purpose of a 
system is what it does. For instance, to chase cats out of the garden.  
 
“For Merleau-Ponty, as for us, embodiment has this double sense: it 
encompasses both the body as a lived, experiential structure and the body as 
the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms” (Varela et al, 1992b, p. xvi). 
“Adopting Husserl’s […] distinction between a material body (Körper) and a 
living, animate body (Leib; with a soul or mind, HL, Merleau-Ponty, 1997,  p. 
337), Merleau-Ponty further explores the manner my experience of my own 
body differs from my experience of inanimate physical objects. My whole 
mode of being in regard to my body is very different from my relation to 
other things […]” (Moran, 2001, p. 13, Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 33).  
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 Yet, Merleau-Ponty stresses the interwoven-ness, the intertwining of body 
and world and subject and object. “When one hand shakes the other, the 
left hand (the subject in this case, HL) touches the right (the object in this 
case, HL) and the right hand also feels touched and this situation is 
reversible. To touch is at the same time to be touched, and yet these are 
distinctly different sensations” (Moran, 2001, p. 409; Merleau-Ponty, 1997, 
p. 137). Sensations are only the most simple among the perceptions 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 291). Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 174) argues: “As 
the normal subject directly understands that the relation between the eye 
and seeing is the same as the relation between the ear and hearing is that 
because eye and ear are given directly as a means of entrance to one and 
the same world, because the subject possesses a pre-predicative (pre-
reflective, HL) evidence of a single world, so that the equivalence of the 
sensory organs and their analogy is to be read off from things and already 
can be lived before they are being grasped conceptually.  
 
“[…] Because the body is not a sum of next to each other arranged organs, 
but a synergistically system of which the collective functions are being 
admitted and connected in the encompassing movement of being-in-the-
world, because it is the solidified form of existence itself. […] When I say 
‘I see a tone’ I mean to say by that, that I let resound the vibrations of the 
tone through my entire sensory essence and especially through that part of 
myself that is susceptible to colours. The movement […] as design of 
movement or as virtual (by the spectacle required, HL) movement forms 
the foundation of the unity of the sensors”. Or as Langer (1989, p. 79) puts 
it: “The inter-communication of the senses in experience is based on ‘a 
project towards movement’, which is inseparable from the very existence 
of the body itself as primordial expression”. “[…] The sensors translate 
themselves in each other without the need of an interpreter” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1997, p. 283). Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 276) distinguishes between 
an objective tone, that resounds in an instrument outside of us, an 
atmospheric tone between the object and our body, a tone that thrills in us 
‘as if we ourselves were becoming the instrument’ and a tone in which the 
tone element disappears and becomes a precisely to be determined 
experience of a certain transformation of our entire body. The latter can be 
compared to the ‘stomach’ effect if one for instance stands too close to the 
stage on which a pop band is performing. 
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 This view is confirmed by Varela et al, 1992b, p. 163: “Visual 
perception is in active exchange with other sensory modalities. For example, 
the associations of color and sound, as well as color and horizontal/vertical 
perception (involving the sense of orientation and equilibrium [balance, HL]) 
are well known to artists, though less studied by neurobiologists. Beyond 
these intermodal relations there are, of course, varieties of cognitive 
expectancies and memories. […] Perception and action, sensorium and 
motorium are linked together as successively emergent and mutually 
selecting patterns”.   
Varela (1992a, p. 254) discusses in an essay cognitive science and 
various ways of thinking in Artificial Intelligence. “The preceding conside-
rations are usually made in the realm of language and human communi-
cations and it would seem that for the more immediate perceptual world they 
would not be relevant. But the whole point is that enaction [bringing forth a 
world by human beings, HL] applies at all levels”. With all levels Varela 
means the whole range of levels from the primordial pre-reflective to the 
reflective. These levels are no categories, no sections, no rubrics, no 
breakdowns, as we are fond to use, but rather ‘fluid’, in the sense of streams, 
aspects of our life, our existence. Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 210) uses the 
words ‘transitive nature’, ‘tacit or implicit transposing’ (transcribing into 
another tone or relation) and ‘transition synthesis’ (from the dialectic way: 
thesis, antithesis, synthesis). I think these words are helpful in understanding 
his position. If our hand reaches to an object we know implicitly that our 
arm stretches. So there is always more than one ‘dimension’ involved. To 
give an example of these concepts the following is illustrative, apart from its 
content. “The language is thus based on layered powers that can be regarded 
as relatively apart. Yet, at the same time it is impossible to find somewhere a 
malfunction of speech that would be ‘purely motility’ and that would not 
relate itself in a certain way to the meaning of language” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1997, p. 243). It stresses what has been said in chapter 1. Nothing is 
absolute, neither ‘all or nothing’ nor ‘pure’. With the meaning of language 
Merleau-Ponty means an emotional shock where language, thus words, can 
‘kill’ in the words of Maturana. The malfunction of speech is a reaction as a 
kind of protest. 
 
Varela et al (1992b, p. 94) describe how we see colours. They have 
two reasons for choosing of focus on colour (1992b, p. 157). First, the study 
of colour provides a microcosm of cognitive science, and many disciplines 
have made important contributions to our understanding of colour. 
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 Second, colour has immediate perceptual and cognitive significance in 
human experience. My reasons to include it here is that it runs counter to 
the representation view as shown in figure 2. Moreover, it is an 
opportunity to explain some key concepts in this thesis.  
 
“The optic nerve connects from the eyes to a region in the 
thalamus called the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) and from there to the 
visual cortex. The standard information-processing description (still found 
in textbooks and popular accounts) is that information enters through the 
eyes and is relayed sequentially through the thalamus to the cortex where 
‘further processing’ is carried out. […] It is evident that 80% of what any 
LGN cell listens to comes not from the retina but from the dense inter-
connectedness of other regions in the brain. Furthermore, one can see that 
there are more fibres coming from the cortex down to the LGN than there 
are going in the reverse direction. […] The basic mechanism of recognition 
of a visual object or a visual attribute could be said to be the emergence of 
a global state among resonating neuronal ensembles. […] Thus the 
behaviour of the whole system resembles a cocktail party conversation 
much more than a chain of command (1992b, p. 96). “All the rules in ART 
[Adaptive Resonance Theory, HL] describe emergent properties [self-
organizing, self-stabilizing and self-scaling, HL] of parallel [contrary to 
sequential, HL] network interactions” (1992b, p. 97). It is clear that 
emergent properties play an essential role in Varela et al’s theories. In 
Varela et al’s terms it is about the working of components in local 
environments leading to global co-operation without the need for a central 
processing unit to guide the entire operation. It has to do with what is 
called in (organisational) cybernetics self-organization. “There is some 
detailed evidence that emergent properties are fundamental to the 
operation of the brain itself” (Varela et al, 1992b, p. 93). There is a 
condition: dense connections or relations between the components.  
In this context it is amazing what Brooks, a mobile robot builder 
and director of the MIT AI Laboratory has to say in the NRC Supplement 
(10.19.2002). He threw overboard many traditional dogmas in AI. His 
mobile robots perform better and his concept (emergent properties) was 
taken over by building the robot that ‘discovered’ Mars. He builds his 
robots in layers. A layer ‘learns’ something and another layer is built on it 
keeping the first layer in tact. “Lower levels never rely on the existence of 
higher level layers” (Varela et al, 1992b, p. 210). The layers have dense 
connections. “Even the most primitive insects are superior to our most 
advanced robots. 
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 Insects do not map their environment and do not map out a route. They just 
go on route and react ad hoc to the obstacles they face underway”. His 
robots do more or less the same and are capable of adjusting their behaviour 
based on experience. This description has much in common with what is 
called heuristics. Heuristics means the principles of finding; you know what 
the goal is but not where it resides. Like when you are in a labyrinth and you 
try to find the exit. The goal is to find the exit but you do not know where it 
is. The article on Brooks reads: “People often ask why I do not give my 
robots consciousness. I have no idea how that should be done, so I do not 
even try it. There are so many simpler, more fundamental functions that 
precede consciousness and that we have by far not understood”. The article 
does not mention which functions he means. In chapter 4 we will come back 
on the subject in the section on ‘common sense’. “Insects have been 
evaluated in the course of time. Initially they had simple capacities and 
developed more and more refined capacities later on. That is the metaphor I 
chose for my robots”. These more refined capacities will come back in 
chapter 3 where we build up complexity in the human nervous system. 
 
Varela (1992a) says pigeons (seem to, HL) require four (types of, HL) 
primary colours in contrast to our ‘chromatic space’ where three (types of, 
HL) primary colours suffice (red/green, yellow/blue, black/white). “These 
various perceived worlds of colours reflect various forms of adaptation to 
diverse ecological niches. Each animal group optimally exploits different 
regularities of the world” (Varela et al, 1992b, p. 183). Later on Varela et al 
renounce from the word ‘optimally’ and use instead the word ‘satisficing’; it 
might have to do with an editorial anomaly. “This is not a merely expansion 
in diversity within the same spectrum, but an entirely new dimension which 
brings forth a chromatic world as incommensurable to ours […]. Colour 
here appears not as a correlate of world properties, but as regularities which 
are co-defined with a particular mode of being” (Varela, 1992a, p. 254). If 
pigeons would have four types of colours “we are simply at a loss to envision 
what their color experience could be like” (Varela et al, 1992b, p. 183).  That 
particular mode of being relates to a different way in the relation between the 
organism and its environment, called structural coupling. We will deal with 
structural coupling in chapter 3. Here we are in the middle of the question of 
reality.  
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 This ‘entirely new dimension’ is the important remark in order to 
understand Varela’s and Maturana’s position that they steer a middle 
course (beyond the chicken and egg positions, as Varela calls it) between 
‘the world outside there with its own laws’ (the chicken position) and ‘our 
own inner world with its own laws’ (the egg position).  The taken-for-
granted picture, as in figure 2, is there is a world ‘out there’ surrounding us, 
on which we react in a stimulus-response fashion. Research so far has 
shown this is a misrepresentation. To some extent it is also the other way 
round. “Presentation of odorants to the receptors in unmotivated subjects 
does not lead to any observable changes in the system” (Skarda in Varela & 
Dupuy, 1992a, p. 268). This statement confirms Stein’s remark below. 
However, she continues: “Perception does not begin with causal impact on 
receptors; it begins within the organism with internally generated (self-
organized) neural activity that, by re-inference, lays the ground for 
processing of future receptor input. It is the brain itself that creates those 
conditions for perception by generating activity patterns that determine 
what receptor activity will count for it”.  
“What can be said is that our chromatic world is viable: it is effective 
since we have continued our biological lineage. […] The basic notion, then, 
is that cognitive capacities are inextricably linked to a history that is lived, 
much like a path that does not exist, but is laid down in walking. 
Consequently, the view of cognition is not that of solving problems 
through representations, but as a creative bringing forth of a world where 
the only required condition is effective action: it permits the continued 
integrity of the system involved” (Varela, 1992a, p. 255). “How do I know 
when a cognitive system is functioning adequately? When it becomes part 
of an existing on-going world of meaning in ontogeny (the history of 
development of a living being, HL) or shapes a new one in phylogeny 
(development of plants and groups of animals out of lower forms in 
evolutionary history, HL)”. Varela et al, 1992b, stress we are not 
parachuted in a pre-given world, but rather enact or bring forth a world 
and in this sense Merleau-Ponty’s ‘thrown in a world’ and Varela’s ‘not 
parachuted’ have to be understood. 
Varela et al (1992b, p. 201) give a nice example of what is meant 
here. “It is well-known that honey bees are trichromats whose spectral 
sensitivity is shifted toward the ultraviolet. It is also well known that 
flowers have contrasting reflectance patterns in ultraviolet light. 
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 Consider now our ‘chicken-and-egg’ question […]. Which came first, the 
world (ultraviolet reflectance) or the image (ultraviolet sensitive vision)? 
Most of us would probably answer with little hesitation, the world 
(ultraviolet reflectance). It is therefore interesting to observe that the colors 
of flowers appear to have co-evolved with the ultraviolet sensitive trichromatic 
vision of bees. Why should such co-evolution occur? On the one hand, 
flowers attract pollinators by their food content and so must be both 
conspicuous and yet different from flowers of other species. On the other 
hand, bees gather food from flowers and so need to recognize flowers from 
a distance. These two broad and reciprocal constraints2 appear to have 
shaped a history of coupling in which plant features and the sensory-motor 
capacities of bees co-evolved”.  
 
This example illustrates Varela et al think different about evolution in terms 
of circularity than the traditional notions. The species and their 
milieu/environment were co-determining. In their view there is also no talk 
in evolution of ‘optimising’ as in natural selection but rather of ‘satisfying’ 
(taking a sub-optimal solution that is satisfactory) in natural drift in structural 
coupling.  
So the phenomenal body is a lived, perceptual, experiential structure and the 
body as the context of cognitive mechanisms. The body carries with it 
around itself a system of meanings that do not have to be made explicit to be 
of use. The sensors translate themselves in each other without the need of an 
interpreter. The body opens itself to a world with which it forms a unity; the 
chinks and gaps in the world that are the subjectivities. Before we continue it 
is already here good to realize that these theories run counter completely to 
the taken-for-granted picture of how we perceive reality. We will now come 
to see how the one phenomenon launches another by lending its latent or 
inner meaning. 
 
2.5  Prepared for and tuned into the phenomena 
 
Have you ever realized why you do not see the spaces between trees as 
things, as figures, and the trees themselves as background?  
 
 
2 A constraint is a relation between two sets, and occurs when the variety that exists under 
one condition is less than the variety that exists under another condition (Ashby, 1971, p. 
127). More about this in chapter 5; but it says that some things will never happen. That is 
why nature is not chaotic. 
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 “It is because our glancing through is not random; it is being pointed out 
and recommended by the phenomena themselves. The things, the objects 
already ‘say’ something; they spread their latent meaning themselves”. In 
the same sense a new piece of music or a painting, that at first is not 
understood, creates its own public itself, if it really says something, by 
carrying out its meaning itself (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 226). For Merleau-
Ponty the one phenomenon launches another, not by an objective 
working, like that what lays connections between events of the nature, but 
rather by the meaning it lends – there is a reason of existence that gives the 
stream of phenomena direction without sitting in one phenomenon 
especially, a kind of operative (in German: fungierende; functional, HL3) 
reason that establishes the natural and pre-reflective unity of the world and 
our life. It is the sensory consciousness that expresses given situations. So 
here we see again the words ‘meaning it lends’. Factual situations (as in the 
motive) and the stream of phenomena lend their inner meaning. In 
appendix 3 under ‘intentionality’ is said more about the subject. 
“Everything is full of indications without anyone giving them”. 
Indications are according to Husserl signs that point beyond themselves to 
something else as smoke indicating fire or a flag standing for a nation, 
contrary to expressions that are parts of only speech which require a 
meaning and whose purpose is to communicate. Indications have no 
intrinsic meaning and the indicative relation is causal or conventional, 
external (Moran, 2001, p.110). 
 “The things give answers how vaguely they may be to the 
questions we ask our selves”. This has not to be interpreted in any spiritual 
sense. Rather it has to be interpreted as some starting point of meaning by 
the human being, the body-subject, on a primordial, pre-reflective level of 
our existence. Husserl used the word ‘spirit’ in the sense of the German 
word ‘Geist’. “The meaning of the thing self is being built-up by our eyes. 
In a normal range of vision a certain division of fields and contours is not 
to be stopped. It is not a matter of a compulsory demand, because it is an 
ambiguous figure. The perceived can also be a ‘value unity’; if one has 
taken away a painting from our house, we can perceive a change without 
knowing which. Perceived is everything that is part of our environment, all 
with its being or not-being, so-being or different-being we practically take 
into account. We are prepared for and tuned into the phenomena in the 
world”. 
 
 
3 In Dutch: dienst doen. 
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 Although our glancing through is not random, these sentences have been 
picked randomly out of the text to illustrate the ‘character’ of the work of 
Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty uses the word atmosphere regularly. “In the 
same way on which our entire life breathes a sexual atmosphere, without that 
only one could indicate a single content of consciousness that is ‘purely 
sexual’ or to the contrary which is not sexual at all […]” (1997, p. 219). In 
this context, in a long footnote (Smith’ translation, 2004, p. 198) Merleau-
Ponty comes back on existence, motivation and plural meaning. “There is no 
one meaning of history; what we do has always several meanings and this is 
where an existential conception of history is distinguishable from materialism 
and from spiritualism. But every cultural phenomenon has, among others, an 
economic significance, and history by its nature never transcends, any more 
than it is reducible to, economics. […] But in each case, one of the orders of 
significance can be regarded as dominant: one gesture as ‘sexual’, another as 
‘amorous’, another as ‘warlike’. As an example of the motivation he says: 
“Thus Marx not content to be the son of a lawyer and student of philosophy 
(factual situation, HL), conceives his own situation as that of a ‘lower 
middle class intellectual’ in the new perspective of the class struggle” 
(accepted situation, HL). 
 
Later research showed how right Merleau-Ponty was in stating ‘we are 
prepared for and tuned into the phenomena in the world’. He (1997, p. 119) 
himself already gives a clue, quoting (J.) Stein: “A nerve stimulation is not 
being perceived when it reaches a sensory organ that is not ‘tuned into’. The 
function of the organism in taking in the stimuli is, as it were, to ‘understand’ 
a certain form of stimulation. […] The stimulation is being taken in and 
reorganized by transversal (related to a collateral line, HL)4 functions that 
harmonize her with the perception (In the English translation: which make it 
resemble the perception, HL) which it is about to arouse”. This will be 
confirmed only partly by later research. And it shows a lot of research has 
been done since then (1911) in neurology, although, as Varela et al say, how 
we perceive colours is still only partly understood.  
According to Merleau-Ponty, the subject that gets sensations and the 
sensory perceivable are not two external opposed to each other stated terms; 
the sensation is no invasion of the sensory perceivable in the subject that 
gets sensations. It is our gaze, which subtends, or is attached to, the colour 
of the object, for which we are susceptible, and it is the movement of our 
hand that supports the form, and the hardness, of the object. 
 
4 In Dutch: verwant in de zijlinie  
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 Without the exploration of our gaze or our hand and before our body has 
tuned in, the sensory perceivable is only a vague thrill. Skarda (in Varela & 
Dupuy, 1992a, p. 268) argues: “Perception is interaction initiated by the 
organism, not reaction caused by the object at the receptor level”. Merleau-
Ponty’s statement ‘We are prepared for and tuned into the phenomena in 
the world’ is confirmed by Skarda’s statement ‘Perception is interaction 
initiated by the organism’.  
Apart from perception we so far used the words experiences, 
impressions, sensations and vague thrills. Langer (1989, p. xvi) argues for 
Merleau-Ponty experience is a process of transcendence. Surpassing 
towards in which the existence once again accounts for or retakes a factual 
situation and transforms it in another meaning (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 
216).  
The act of transcendence, wherein the subject opens itself to the 
world, brings about itself. Just because the existence is this movement of 
transcendence, she never oversteps something definitely, because then the 
tension would disappear that belongs to her (existence, HL) being or 
nature (1997, p. 200). This statement is much in line with what will be said 
of non-coincidence with others and our selves in the true time experience 
and with what was said with regard to chaining up temporary and un-
finished. But the important remark is of course ‘transforms it in another 
meaning’. 
In plain English, nothing is absolute, definite, finished; we are 
always ‘underway’ dealing with ambiguous phenomena in what I would like 
to call a splits in duality. Sensations and impressions are the simpler among 
perceptions. The vague thrill occurs when the body is not tuned into. At 
the start of this chapter we said that order and unity are concepts that 
show up over and over. We will now discuss what it is that takes care that 
there is unity in our life.  
 
2.6  The intentional arc 
 
Varela et al (1992b) distinguish a reflective form of experience 
itself. They discuss Buddhist meditation in the context of cognitive science 
and human experience. We will only go in some detail where they refer to 
the mind, self and consciousness. Meditation is investigation of the nature 
of experience and an examination of the sense of self (Varela et al, 1992b, 
p. 63).  
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 The goal is to be mindful of the mind as it takes its own course. So our true 
time experience, that will be discussed later on, and mind are supposed to 
take their own course. Under some conditions we can become aware or 
conscious of them. The French word ‘sens’ indeed stands for both ‘meaning’ 
and ‘direction’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 304). Langer (1989, p. 83) argues: “If 
there is to be meaning, there must be direction; meaning and direction go 
hand in hand”. 
 “According to Brentano (Husserl’s mentor, HL) all mental states 
(perception, memory etc.) are of or about something; in his words, mental 
states necessarily have ‘reference to a content’ or ‘direction toward an object’ 
(which is not necessarily a thing in the world)” (Varela et al, 1992b, p.15). 
Not necessarily a thing in the world because Husserl distinguishes between 
real existing things, like stones and ideal objectivities, like the number ‘4’. 
The mind is restless; a practitioner of meditation tries to calm the mind. It is 
a means of discovery about the nature of experience. It disrupts the normal 
(everyday) mode of being. “What mindfulness disrupts is mindlessness -that 
is, being mindlessly involved without realizing that, that is one is doing. It is 
only in this sense that the observation changes what is being observed […]” 
(1992b, p. 32).  
 
In Buddhism five omnipresent mental factors (to be distinguished 
from mental states, HL) are present. The mental factors are the relations that 
bind the consciousness to its object, and at each moment a consciousness is 
dependent on its momentary mental factors (Varela et al, 1992b, p. 68). 
These are contact (an emergent property), feeling, discernment (perception), 
intention and attention (arises in interaction with intention). Intention directs 
consciousness and the other mental factors toward some general idea, at 
which point attention moves them toward specific features. The mental 
factors present at a given moment interact with each other such that the 
quality of each factor as well as the resultant consciousness is an emergent 
(1992b, p. 121). This points in the direction of deductive logic (from the 
general to the specific). In chapter 4 we will see that in sense making we both 
use deductive and inductive logic. 
According to Varela et al (1992b, p. 68) there are similarities with a 
system of intentionality’s along Husserlian lines. There is no consciousness 
without an object of consciousness and a relation. The difference is that 
consciousness is only one mode of knowing; insight/wisdom do not know 
by means of these relations. 
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 Another difference is that Husserl elaborated it into a representational 
theory. I cannot judge this claim because I only read about Husserl in 
Moran. But in my opinion Merleau-Ponty did not elaborate it into a 
representational theory mindful of ”one will never understand this as long 
as one makes of the world an object”. 
Normally we never actually experience our feelings (a mental 
factor) because the mind jumps so quickly to the reaction. The same goes 
for intention (also a mental factor), a process that functions to arouse and 
sustain the activities of consciousness with its mental factors from moment 
to moment (Varela et al, 1992b, p. 120, 121). Intention is the manner in 
which the tendency to volitional action (egocentric) manifests itself in the 
mind at any given moment. 
“This question (that action and reflection are not contradictory, 
HL) brings us to the methodological heart of the interaction between 
mindfulness/awareness meditation, phenomenology and cognitive 
science”. Awareness is ‘a step further’ than mindfulness in meditation; 
practitioners get some kind of panoramic view. “What we are suggesting is 
a change in the nature of reflection from an abstract, disembodied activity 
to an embodied (mindful), open-ended reflection. By embodied, we mean 
reflection in which body and mind have been brought together. What this 
formulation intends to convey is that reflection is not on experience, but 
reflection is a form of experience itself -and that reflective form of 
experience can be performed with mindfulness/awareness.  
When reflection is done in that way, it can cut the chain of habitual 
thought patterns and preconceptions such that it can be an open-ended 
reflection, open to possibilities other than those contained in one’s current 
representations of the life space. We call this form of reflection mindful, 
open-ended reflection” (1992b, p. 27). “When the mindfulness mediator 
finally begins to let go rather than to struggle to achieve some particular 
state of activity [what they call unlearning, HL], then body and mind are 
found to be naturally coordinated and embodied. Mindful reflection is then 
found to be a completely natural activity” (1992b, p. 29). ‘Open to possi-
bilities other than’ has much in common with the ‘I can’, anticipating 
unrealised possibilities and the realisation thereof. However, that reflection 
or to practice meditation, one should obtain the guidance of a qualified 
teacher (Varela et al, 1992b, App. A). I have sometimes heard people say 
that they went completely nuts without such guidance. Somehow a unity, 
which is discussed in this section, broke up. 
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 It is Varela et al’s conviction that consciousness and the mind either 
amount to the same thing or there is an essential or necessary connection 
between them (1992b, p. 49).  
According to Maturana & Varela (1989) the brain is not necessary for 
mind to exist. The simplest organisms are capable of perception and thus of 
cognition. They do not see, but perceive changes in their environment, like 
plants perceive light and darkness. According to Varela in all cognitive 
processes perception and action are inseparable. Mind and world arise 
together (Capra, 1997). Knowing is regarded by Maturana & Varela as a 
producing continuously of a world (not the world) by the process of life 
itself.  
Merleau-Ponty distinguishes between many consciousnesses, 
although they form a unity (see appendix 3). “In short, this capacity or this 
function (called projection power, an abstract unity that enables us to 
envision possibilities in situations, the ‘I can’, HL) consists of placing 
something unvarying behind the stream of impressions that installs a 
reasonable order, and so giving the matter of experience a form. Now one 
cannot say that consciousness has such a capacity, but rather that it is this 
capacity itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 166).  
 
In cybernetic terms one would say in consciousness there is an 
invariant, a factor in a complicated situation that is unaffected by all the 
changes surrounding it (Beer) or some statement can be made that, in spite 
of the incessant changing, is true unchangingly (Ashby). 
The existence of any invariant over a set of phenomena implies a 
constraint for it implies that the full range of variety does not occur. The 
theory of invariants is part of the theory of constraints (Ashby, 1971). 
Anticipating the discussion on proverbs in appendix 2, we also end up with 
looking for an invariant. In trying to understand meaning and how metaphor 
and proverb ‘work’ it boils down to an implicit common element as the 
relation between things, the invariant.  
 
What so far can be said about consciousness is consciousness and 
mind (and soul, a word Merleau-Ponty also uses) either amount to the same 
thing or there is a necessary connection between them. Consciousness 
provides itself, as acquisitions, with a world that itself as a certain style is an 
invariant, because in Merleau-Ponty’s words, it stays the same my entire life. 
Consciousness installs a reasonable order behind the stream of impressions.  
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 This capacity is the forerunner for what is called the intentional arc that 
makes possible that we are situated in all our relations. 
 
The life of consciousness – the life of knowing, desiring or 
perceiving – is subtended by an intentional arc, that projects around about 
us our past, our future, our human environment, our physic situation, our 
ideological situation and our moral situation, or rather which results in our 
being situated in all these respects. Thanks to this intentional arc there is an 
inseparable unity of powers of sensory organs, comprehension, sensibility 
and motility. In the arc unity of our life comes into being, according to 
Merleau-Ponty. And it is this which ‘goes limp’ in illness. As Bakker (1965) 
puts it, it is unity-establishing meaning. “Our pre-theoretical, everyday 
conviction, however, is that cognition and consciousness – especially self-
consciousness – belong together in the same domain” (Varela et al, 1992b, 
p. 50).  
Cognition is directed toward the world as we experience it, the 
lived world. We consciously experience the world (Varela et al, 1992b, p. 
52). One’s experience is discontinuous – a moment of consciousness 
arises, appears to dwell for an instant, and then vanishes, to be replaced by 
the next moment (1992b, p. 73).   
With regard to consciousness and self-consciousness Merleau-Ponty is not 
unambiguous. In appendix 4 it is stated he uses the words synonym and 
simultaneous, but I am inclined to say he means simultaneous, because he 
only uses the word synonym once and because of what will be said under 
section 2.7.  
Breakdowns or disorders in human beings are the result of the 
relaxing of the intentional arc, thereby losing that unity one way or 
another. The ‘patient’ Schneider for instance experiences the present as a 
sequence of incoherent ‘now’ moments with a ‘shrunken’ extension of the 
present to the future. It is like hearing separate tones without experiencing 
a piece of music. The music then doesn’t ‘say’ anything by itself by 
spreading its meaning; instead such a ‘patient’ has to put his own meaning 
in it. In one word, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, for the patient the world has 
no physiognomy anymore, being according to Van Dale ‘a face or 
appearance of someone, considered as a mirror of his nature and character; 
expression or look’. In general for the patient the world does not suggest a 
single meaning anymore and in turn the meanings that he sees are not 
being embodied in the given world. The structure ‘world’ with her double 
moment of sedimentation and spontaneity is situated in the centre of the 
consciousness.  
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 Patients with disorders have a levelling out of this ‘world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 
1997). 
Dreyfus (1996) wonders how we have to understand this intentional 
arc. An intelligent network must be able to generalize. The question here 
would be ‘which situations count as similar’? According to Dreyfus there are 
three ways the body constrains the space of possible generalizations.  
The first is due to the brain; the other two are due to the actual body 
structure, the latter Merleau-Ponty pays little attention to. The innate brain 
architecture accounts for phenomena such as the perceptual constants that 
are given from the start by the perceptual system as if they had always 
already been learned.  
The second is the order and frequency of the inputs. This order is 
determined by the trainer in what is called supervised learning, but if the 
network is to learn by itself, that is if its connection strengths are to be 
allowed to adjust themselves on the basis of the input-output pairs it 
encounters, then the order and frequency of inputs will depend on the 
interaction of the structure of the embodied network and the structure of the 
world. For example what affords reaching will be experienced early and 
often, while what is too big or too small or too far away will not. The 
interaction of structures is structural coupling in the class of living creatures 
that will be discussed in chapter 3. 
The third constraint depends on what counts as success. For an 
organism in the world, success would depend on some measurement of 
satisfaction. Merleau-Ponty claims that this satisfaction is not defined most 
generally by the pain-pleasure feedback of the behaviourists. Rather the 
satisfaction is defined by the sense of equilibrium (balance, stable, HL) 
experienced when an organism is able to cope successfully with its environ-
ment. It is, what was called in chapter 1 making the indeterminate more 
determinate or relieving the tension partly. 
According to Dreyfus (1996) these three body functions – the brain 
architecture, structural coupling and the sense of balance in perception- may 
be all that is needed to explain why all human beings generalize in roughly 
the same way and so acquire the skills necessary for getting around in the 
human world whose affordances their self-moving bodies both constitute 
and reproduce. According to Varela et al (1992b, p. 203) affordances mean 
the most significant properties consist in what the environment affords for 
the animal. Affordances consist in the opportunities for interaction that 
things in the environment possess relative to the sensorimotor capacities of 
the animal.  
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 Trees are climbable or afford climbing to certain animals. Dreyfus argues it 
seems we must supplement Merleau-Ponty’s account of ‘I can’ by an 
account of these aspects of body-structure if we are finally to understand 
how human beings are able to project a shared world around them selves 
in an intentional arc. However, ‘which situations count as similar’ and 
‘significant properties’ also seem to relate to the decision as mentioned 
earlier in the motive context. The decision is the accepted meaning of the 
situation. ‘The sense of balance in perception’ would also have to include 
the decision. Moreover, in terms of the operational closed brain there are 
no input-output relations. The brain uses its own output as its input. 
Deyfus’ inputs are in my view perturbations or triggers as mentioned in the 
next chapter. 
 
I have long doubted whether the intentional arc is our worldview 
or whether these two concepts are related. But unity-establishing meaning 
is not the same as bringing further order in our life through a worldview, 
how we see our self, the other and the world. Moreover, we are not 
constantly conscious of our worldview. An answer may lay in the 
discussion of time. Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 470) goes on to say that we 
must consider time in itself and that means that by following its inner 
dialectic (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) we will be brought to it to review the 
idea of the subject profoundly. That is the focus of the next section. 
 
2.7  Duality in true time experience 
 
In order to be able to indicate how a Weltanschauung originates we 
must discuss our true time experience and the role memory plays therein. 
The act of transcendence, the subjectivity, implies that which is surpassed 
and that which is surpassing towards. It is the past and the future. Having a 
past and a future means there must be a present. In this section we will see 
what that present is. So here comes the time element or the temporality 
into play. It is the primordial experience of time that gives the underlying 
direction to our life. “We see in consulting our own experience that the 
future slides ‘into the present and on into the past’. We experience the 
future as being ahead of us and the past as being behind us as we pursue 
our present task” (Langer, 1989, p. 127).  
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 In the time dimension of being Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 391– 480, 
513) distinguishes between various forms of time. First, objective time closed 
in historical or general time that aims at past and future.  That is for me the 
objective way we speak about history with the accompanying historical dates 
and possible future developments as a mere science fiction. Second, natural 
time, the time of itself elapsing, the time of the things without subjectivity. 
That for me is the clock time. And ‘true’ time as primordial experience that 
we are discussing here. “Unfortunately, as is often the case with Merleau-
Ponty, these pages on time are imaginative, suggestive, well informed 
concerning various traditional approaches, but entirely unclear as to their 
final outlook on the puzzling nature of time and temporality” (Moran, 2001, 
p. 427). Although I can partly agree to this statement we will make the best 
out of it. It will be done in the form of a part song by Merleau-Ponty (1997) 
and Langer (1989) coupled with my imaginations. The italics are mostly 
mine. 
 
May be the best way to approach the subject is to imagine for a 
moment there was no time experience at all. That seems impossible to do. 
But what would it mean? We would have lost our anchor, direction and unity 
structure. There would be neither past nor future. We would just live 
between sunrise and sunset. Our experiences in our life so far could get no 
place due to a lack of a steppingstone. It is like having a photo album but not 
knowing how and in what order to glue the pictures. If you would glue them 
instantly after the printing you would already have a time experience. How 
would you otherwise know what ‘instantly’ is. In short, we would by far not 
be the same human being we are. In a certain way our life would be 
pointless; we would just be wandering without unity in our life. In the words 
of Weick life would be empty (not meant as Varela et al refer to it as 
groundlessness; that is a different discussion). It illustrates the importance of 
the concept of time. 
 
According to Merleau-Ponty “time originates from my relation with 
the things”. That relation is being-in-the-world. His emphasis on my must 
mean we all can experience temporality in a different way. That indeed is the 
case. What ‘present’ is for someone can deviate from someone else’s 
experience. It has to do with time demarcations and the related meanings as 
will be seen. […] “We carry the meaning of the past with us. The past left an 
impression in us. The time is already thought by us before the division of 
time”. 
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 This cryptic formulation is in my view no other then that we are ‘situated’ 
in time from our birth on; we never choose a moment ‘to step in time’. 
The fact we know we were born but cannot experience it is what Merleau-
Ponty calls (anonymous) pre-personal (knowledge), a thinking older than 
me. 
“The relations of time make possible the events in the time”. This 
means in my view that if we could not distinguish between past, present 
and future we were unable to use time as a steppingstone in order to 
classify events. “Time is no given of the conscious, but more precise, that 
the conscious unfolds or constitutes the time. Time is a dimension of our 
being”. It is, as Langer says, the single movement, which is a project of a 
life in process of unfolding. 
‘Presence’ means being simultaneously present to our selves and 
involvement in the world (Langer, 1989, p. 131). That involvement in the 
world is being-in-the-world. The question then remains how we are 
present to ourselves. “Subject and object are ‘abstract moments’ of a 
unique concrete totality, which is ‘presence’ ”(Langer, 1989, p. 130). We 
have seen earlier that Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the concreteness of 
being-in-the-world as a phenomenal body. The tacit cogito is pre-
conscious thinking or to exist that only knows it self in the border 
situations wherein it is being threatened. The concrete hold on the world is 
recognized and affirmed tacitly. It seems having the experience or 
impression of loosing that hold is equal to threatening. It links up with 
what Weick says about the interruption of events with regard to emotions. 
So we also must be present to our selves in different layers and different 
ways. In the example of the man who treats leather he ‘simply is his body’, 
unconsciousness of, not present to himself. He ‘just’ acts in concrete 
movements. 
 
In a ‘field of presence’ the three time dimensions, being the 
immediate past, present and future form a unity. We are not severed from 
our past; it remains potentially retrievable. It is perception that offers us a 
‘field of presence’ according to Merleau-Ponty. The future is an impending 
present, which will become past in due course; the present is ‘an 
impending past and a recent future’; and ‘the past is a former future and a 
recent present’ (Langer, 1989, p. 127). According to Merleau-Ponty “only in 
our ‘field of presence’ in the broad sense, that moment on which we move 
on to working, with the extending horizon of the past day behind it and 
the before it lying horizon of the evening and night, we come in contact 
with the time, we learn to know the course of it”.  
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 So this relates to the events in the time. Earlier we said the body is there 
where it has something to do. It relates to working out intentions as tasks, 
habitual or not. These are in my view other intentions than going out fishing, 
so to speak, an event aimed at being unaware of time, doing ‘nothing’ and 
having nothing on our mind, enjoying nature (or the skill). 
“Everything refers us to this field of presence as field of the 
primordial experience wherein the time and its dimensions appear in person 
or alive and well without distance in between and in a last evidence. This is 
the place where we see slip a future in the present and in the past. These 
three dimensions are not given us by separate acts: we do not represent the 
day but the day presses on us with its full weight (hence in person, HL), it is 
continuous there and we do not call up for the mind any special peculiarity, 
but we have that power directly, we still keep it in our grip (a retention, HL). 
In the same way we do not think of the coming evening and yet it is ‘already 
there’, like the background behind a figure”. 
 
In figure 4 we can see how this primordial time experience as a 
picture at a given moment in time works. Only the past, the retentions, is 
shown. For completeness one could add the symmetrical image of the grip 
on the future, the protentions.  
The figure 4 is only for illustrative purposes; in reality it does not 
work this way, as will be seen. The picture is too static. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Husserl’s silhouettes 
 
The horizontal line is a sequence of ‘now’ moments, in the sense of 
repeated ‘fresh’ presents. The slashes are the same ‘now’ moments seen from 
a later ‘now’. This is the first puzzling formulation. It is the other way around 
as will be seen two sentences further on. The ‘seen from a later now’ refers 
to re-opening the past. 
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 Husserl called these retentions ‘Abschattungen’, silhouettes or 
shadows. The vertical lines are successions of one and the same ‘now’ 
moment. From A to B, A goes to A’. From B to C, A’ goes to A’’ and B to 
B’. “What is given me, is A seen as transparent through A’, then this unity 
(A’ + A, HL) through A’’, and so further, roughly like I see the pebble 
bottom itself through the across streaming mass of water”, as Merleau-
Ponty puts it. So A is the pebble bottom. “The past and the future 
announce themselves through the silhouettes”. The future in the way 
described here and the past by re-opening time. “The retentions and 
protentions do not radiate from a central I but in a certain sense from my 
field of perception itself that pulls along behind it its horizon of retentions 
and with its protentions grasp in the future” (1997, p. 476).  
So in figure 4 in ‘the time experience’ we look from under to 
above; the future is ahead of us. In other words we experience through the 
immediate past (a recent present) the present and the future. “There are 
identifying syntheses but only in the distinct memory and only in the 
deliberate calling up of the further past, in the forms that have been 
derived from the conscious of the past”. That conscious of the past had its 
own field of presence with the accompanying immediate past, present and 
future. “If we doubt about a certain date the memory has lost it’s 
anchoring. Then we can come to an intellectual identifying”. For instance, 
it must have been before that date, because these things did not exist at 
that time. “But in that case (the intellectual identifying, HL) it is not the 
past itself I come across. When I find back the concrete origin of the 
memory I rejoin myself again with the lost time and the chain of retentions 
and the fitting together of the horizons assure a continuous continuation 
from that past moment to the present”. This can be related to the 
operational closure of the nervous system, including the brain. Why would 
a ‘conscious state’ we had in the brain in the past, or in Merleau-Ponty’s 
words immediate properties of the past disappear or be impossible to be 
called up? Alas, the answer is far beyond the scope of this thesis but in the 
next chapter we will come back on the memory. If we would know a lot 
more of the workings of the brain there could have been more precise 
answers. “The new present (the pebble bottom, HL) is the transition of a 
future to the present and of the former present to the past”. The mass of 
water must then be the entire transition from future to present to past, as it 
is later on called a fountain. “These ‘fields of presence’ form a 
(interlocking, HL) chain of fields, each with its own horizon of immediate 
past, present and future” (Langer, 1989, p. 129).  
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 “[…] Just as the perspectivity of perceptual consciousness precludes our ever 
perceiving everything simultaneously, so that of our temporal consciousness 
rules out our ever having an all-encompassing grasp of time […] while 
preventing our simultaneously inhabiting other fields of presence” (Langer, 
1989, p. 128). 
That is why Merleau-Ponty speaks of only in the deliberate calling up 
of the further past. The question whether this temporal consciousness is the 
equivalent of memory or that memory is part of temporal consciousness is 
still to be answered. But I am inclined to say it is the latter, because in 
memory we are not conscious of the present and future; only of the past 
(with the accompanying immediate past, present and future). 
 
However, this is not given in reality. Time is no line of ‘now 
moments’ but rather a network of intentionalities, a network of retentions and 
protentions. So time is a network of  “being conscious of’s”. “The principle 
activities of brains are making changes in themselves” (Minsky in Varela et 
al, 1992b, p. 139). “On each moment that comes the preceding moment 
undergoes a change; I still keep it in my grip, it is still there, but yet it sinks 
already under the line what is repeatedly present. When a third moment joins 
the first moment undergoes a new change; it becomes retention of retention 
and the layer of time condenses itself still further between this and me”. It is 
another puzzling formulation. The retention of retention, say from the unity 
A’ + A’’ to A’’’, to become the unity A’+ A’’+ A’’’ to A’’’’, is a condensed 
layer of time between A’’’ and me. But who or what is ‘me’? It must be the 
repeatedly present. ‘Condenses’ means ‘narrowing down’. We are close to the 
dense relations as mentioned with regard to emergent properties in this 
chapter.  
“What is given in reality is not the suddenly appearance of a new 
present that brings about an accumulation of the past and a coming nearby 
of a future by fits and starts. The new present is the transition of a future to 
the present and of the previous present to the past. In one go time sets itself 
in motion in its full extensiveness as a single stream. The moments A, B and 
C are not successive; they differentiate from each other; A transforms in A’ 
and from there in A’’. They come to an outburst; a disintegration of B to B’ 
and A’ to A’’; C begins already to loose its substance as soon as it came to existence. At 
each moment the system of retentions includes in itself what was just 
therefore still the system of protentions.  
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 Time is the single movement that in all its parts corresponds to 
itself, like a gesture encloses all muscular contractions that are necessary for 
the execution thereof. The moment B and C are distinguishable; otherwise 
there would be no time. But they switch over, shade to each other and B 
becomes to C, because B has never been anything else than the anticipation 
of C as already present and of its own switch over to the past. We do not 
think the switch over of the present to another present; we are not the 
observer of it, but rather we execute it. In the present, in the perception, 
our being and our conscious coincide completely; having conscious is 
being-to. Only by communicating with a world we communicate with our 
selves”.  
“The present is not closed in upon itself; rather it ‘outruns itself’ in 
both directions” (Langer, 1989, p. 127). The present transcendences to the 
past and to the future. Time establishes itself in one go. I am time myself, a 
time that is ‘lasting’ and that not ‘goes by’ or ‘changes itself’. Hence the ‘I 
remain’ in the poem at the outset of this chapter.  One says that there is 
one time, like one says there is one jet of water or a fountain. The water 
changes whereas the jet of water or fountain remains because the form 
remains in tact. The world has a certain time style”. In chapter 1 we said 
the natural world has a certain style.  
That is why the world remains the same our entire life. In the same 
vein “[…] the new present and the whole chain of preceding fields of 
presence are but a single comprehensive movement, which is a project of a life 
in process of unfolding” (Langer, 1989, p. 129). “In comparing it (time, 
HL) to a fountain in which there is a single thrust of water instead of a 
series of separate waves, common sense recognises the essential unity of 
time. Ironically, common sense congeals time in making it into a being 
comparable to a river or fountain existing in-itself” (Langer, 1989, p. 124). 
So time does not exist in itself because we execute time and time originates 
from our relation with the things, as was said earlier. 
“Transcendence, or surpassing, implies that which is being 
surpassed and that towards which the project is surpassing; the former is 
the past and the latter is the future; moreover, the past and the future are 
always those of a certain present. “[…] We see in consulting our own 
experience that the future slides ‘into the present and on into the past’. We 
experience the future as being ahead of us and the past as being behind us 
as we pursue our present task” (Langer, 1989, p. 127) in a field of presence. 
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 As Langer (1989, p. 126) puts it “[…] it is in our ‘field of presence’ 
broadly speaking that we learn the interrelation of the temporal dimensions 
(of past, present and future, HL). When we remember an incident that 
happened some years ago, […] we do not call up an idea or image of it (that 
would be intellectual identifying, HL); rather we ‘re-open time’ and carry 
ourselves back through the chain of intervening years to the time when it 
was part of our field of presence. As such, that field had its horizons of the 
future and the immediate past; but subsequently, of course, that future 
became present, the incident itself became part of an immediate past and 
what had been the immediate past become more remote”. In Hollywood 
films there is always an apparatus involved in ‘going back in time’. Someone 
switches the big handle. That apparatus turns out to be superfluous.  
 
“Time must be understood as subject and the subject as time. The 
present (in the broad sense with its original horizons of past and present) has 
a priority position because it is the zone in which being and conscious 
coincide. So the conscious is rooted in being and the time”. In short, as Merleau-
Ponty argues, because being and passing are synonym in time, that what 
becomes past does not quit to exist”.  
Langer argues: “Time is neither undergone nor constituted by us, 
because it is itself our living relationship with the world. Consequently, we 
can no more encompass time than we can circumscribe our own life; and by 
the same token we can never be sealed into any single temporal dimension, 
but always exist as a living synthesis of all three. […]  
Time is therefore not a sequence of ‘external events’ or ‘internal states’ but 
rather a chain of interlocking ‘fields of presence’. So in a sense we can 
ultimately say the present is today or our entire life. We also demarcate 
phases or stadiums in our life, for instance all that maintains a relation of 
meaning with our activities of the moment as part of our present; implicit we 
recognize time and meaning always form a unity”. So time is in perception an 
executed condensed chain (or network) of interlocking fields of meaningful 
simultaneously occurring consciousnesses and self-consciousnesses. 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s puzzling remarks relate to the subject to be 
‘identified with temporality’ (subject is time vice versa) and the subject is 
situated in time (Langer, 1989, p. 129). Self-positing is of the essence of 
primordial temporality: time as a projecting (‘thrust’ as a single movement) 
affects itself as time already unfolded.  
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 Time is according to Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 486) ‘an affecting of itself 
by itself’; that what affects (by itself, HL) is time as thrust and transition to a 
future and that what is being affected (of itself, HL) is time as developed 
series of ‘now-moments’, or in Langer’s clearer words, ‘time already 
unfolded’. “They form a unity because thrust is nothing other than the 
transition from a present to a present. Moreover, it is essential of time to 
be streaming time and having a knowing of itself, because the suddenly 
bursting out of the present to the future is the archetype (primal) of the 
relation of itself with itself and already gives a sketch of a self” (according to the 
Van Dale dictionary: the abstract understanding of the own I ). It is 
because the subject is time and the subject executes time. This ‘dehiscence 
of the present towards a future’ is subjectivity (the act of transcendence, 
1989, p. 124). The self is both affecting and affected – it is self-affecting, 
rather than unchanging self-identity (Langer, 1989, p. 129). 
At this point it becomes clear why Maturana and Merleau-Ponty link up. 
Maturana says further on we are no fixed point of reference but we are in a 
process of becoming. 
“Here the being is no longer a resting with itself but rather with a 
being of which the entire nature is to show, as that of a light”. Here 
Merleau-Ponty refers to Heidegger’s Gelichtetheit von Dasein” (human 
embodied existence, Varela et al, 1992b, p. 19, 127). But one could also say 
it is the openness to the world in the act of transcendence in being-in-the-
world. “Through the temporality there can be the self, sense and reason. 
We demarcate phases in our life as was said above; we consider all that 
maintains a relation of sense with our present activeties as part of our 
present. We acknowledge implicitly that time and sense form a unity. The 
transition from a present to a present, this projection of an undivided 
power in an end point that is ‘presence with it’ is the subjectivity” 
(Merleau-Ponty). “The subjectivity is not the unmovable identity with 
oneself; like as for the time it is essential for the subjectivity to open itself 
(being-in-the-world) to the other and to step out of itself to the outside. 
Therefore we cannot imagine the subject as constituting and the variety of 
his experiences as constituted. Because then it could close on itself in 
constituting out of time and time would be ‘blown up’.  
In chapter 3 we will pay more attention to the concept of 
constitution, a concept less elucidated. I would say with regard to ‘close on 
itself’ it means here ‘put together’ or ‘coincide’ in the sense that an aspect 
of a duality is lost.  
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 “The transcendental I does not admit to be treated as the true subject and 
the empirical I not as its shadow or its trace left behind” (Merleau-Ponty). 
 “The consciousness is the movement of the temporality; it is an I that thanks 
to the time ‘manages all variety’ “ (Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 330).  
“The most exact consciousness discovers itself in a duality as 
affected by itself or given to itself” (Merleau-Ponty). ‘Affected by itself’ is the 
thrust (from present to present), the act of transcendence, the subjectivity, the 
transition to a future, the project of a life in process of unfolding, the 
openness, the being (in-the-world)’ aspect’. ‘Given to it self’ is the pre-personal 
project already in process, the temporality already temporalizing itself, time 
already unfolded, the time’ aspect’. Conscious is rooted in being and the time, 
we said. “We can never coincide with ourselves and yet we are present (nice 
word with that double-meaning, HL) to ourselves precisely because we have 
the distance of non-coincidence”. That distance must be the duality of 
affected by it self (unfolding) or given to itself (already unfolded). “To make 
the subject into an ego which constitutes its experiences is to eliminate that 
crucial distance and hence, to destroy consciousness” (Langer, 1989, p. 129). 
“[…] There is an inherent duality at the heart of conscious-ness which is not 
to be confused with dualism”.  
“Consequently, our reflection on time is itself situated in time (the 
given to itself, HL); our reflection on subjectivity is itself part of our 
subjectivity (affected by itself, HL)  (Langer, 1989, p. 129). Without that 
duality, consciousness is meaningless, according to Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 
487). “Temporality not only establishes the essential non-coincidence of 
subjectivity, but by the same token, ensures its openness to others and its 
participation in the common creating of meaning” (Langer, 1989, p. 129). 
“Temporality is the basis of our spontaneity –rather than vice versa- because 
we are given to ourselves as a pre-personal project already in process, that is, 
as a temporality already temporalizing itself. Our existence as temporality 
precludes our being an absolute consciousness; rather our own temporal 
perspectivity opens the way for other equally perspectival subjects and for 
the genesis of meaning in our inter-subjective experience. ‘Genesis’ means 
‘becoming’. 
 
Once we identify subjectivity with temporality, we moreover rule out 
a meaning created by an absolute reason. Temporality is inseparable from-
being-in the world; and meaning is inseparable from the primary 
directionality, which that primordial inherence in the world implies.  
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 Having identified temporality as subjectivity, we can therefore go on to 
identify these with meaning and thus to declare that temporality is the 
meaning of our existence” (Langer, 1989, p. 130).  
Bakker (1965) argues the solipsism cannot, as Merleau-Ponty 
thinks, be denied entirely. Each situation, each engagement has to be 
experienced by me in order to recognize her as such. In this experience the 
moment of truth of solipsism is reflected: the loneliness of ‘I’. Or as Langer 
argues the kernel of truth in the solipsist position is that of non-
coincidence – I am unable ever to coincide with others, to experience their 
experiences as they themselves do. But on the other hand, I never entirely 
coincide with myself either, because self-awareness on principle implies a 
distancing and because my own experiences are continually remade by 
time. The ‘distancing’ in self-awareness means that we can oversee our own 
situation. This is exactly what Maturana & Varela say about the observer in 
a second order consensual domain (a meta domain) with other observers in 
language in chapter 3. 
 
Langer argues we can never coincide with ourselves – and yet we 
are present to ourselves precisely because we have the distance of non-
coincidence. Merleau-Ponty seeks, according to Langer, to awaken us to 
the awareness of our fundamental involvement in a natural-cultural-
historical milieu. It stresses that we are not neutral observers, but rather, 
situated participants in an ongoing, open-ended, socio-historical drama. He 
claims that truth comes into being in our concrete co-existence with others 
and cannot be severed from language and history. Perception is ‘believing’ 
in a world; the understanding being anchored in a world. In the experience 
of a perceived truth I assume that the till then experienced similarity 
(between what I think what an object is and what it really turns out to be, 
HL) also will be maintained at a more closer observation. Absolute 
certainty there is of a world in general, but not of a single thing particularly. 
The consciousness of the world is not founded on the self-consciousness, 
but they are strictly at the same time. Her remark also made me think the 
consciousness and self-consciousness are simultaneously and not synonym. 
 
Re-opening of the past could even be more complex. Some people, 
like my wife, can have a ‘lousy day’ not knowing why and where it comes 
from. At the end of the day it turns out it is the same date as some years 
back on which date something unpleasant happened. The condition is that 
you are ‘date sensitive’ on the intellectual level as a reference frame, which I 
for instance am not. This means certain dates have a meaning.  
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 It is a different experience than to say (intellectual identifying) ‘today it is 
three years ago that and that happened’ accompanied by miserable or sad 
feelings. In the first case it looks like something cyclic or rhythmic is going 
on in the fields of perception, maybe accompanied by triggering sensations 
of season, light, temperature, the position of the sun or whatever 
phenomenon in nature, ‘in the forms that have been derived from the 
conscious of the past’.  
This process is not deliberately going back in time in the memory but 
rather would origin in a certain neuronal ‘state’ of the brain, mind or 
consciousness. Whatever is the case, it illustrates the true time experience is 
present. ‘I remember as if it were yesterday’ we say. Only the word 
‘remember’ is off track, because in the true time experience there are no 
contents as recollections, images or ideas in between. ‘I experience as if it 
were yesterday’ would be a better expression.  
 
Weick (1995, p. 96), in discussing uncertainty organisations face, 
takes a similar stance in discussing time if we replace his words ‘reconstruct a 
history’ by ‘re-open time’. “Faced with news as an outcome, people ask, what 
history might have generated this outcome and what should I do presuming 
that the history I have constructed is plausible? Uncertainty about the actual 
future is replaced by more certainty about the present, which itself was an 
actual future just a short time ago. The greater certainty about the meaning 
of present news is created because people reconstruct a history that serves as 
a plausible explanation for how it got there. Complicated as all of this may 
sound, it simply asserts that news can stimulate an occasion of sense making 
because it stimulates people to write an account of how the news got there. 
And how the news got there often implies what the organization should do 
next”. 
We have developed here quit a different picture in how human 
beings perceive reality. The things carry out their meaning themselves and 
lend their first meaning in an ambiguous way for which we are prepared for, 
tuned into and susceptible. Perception and action are linked together as 
successively emergent and mutually selecting patterns. The world and the 
subject form a comprehensive system. The brain lays the ground for 
perception. That is the reason we will deal with the human nervous system in 
chapter 3. Now that we have seen what a duality in phenomenology is we 
will see in the next chapter what a duality in neurobiology is. We will build 
up the uniqueness of the observer from scratch. The observer also never 
coincides with himself completely and yet is present to him self. 
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 In the West you are so sure about things.  
 
In China it all depends, context dependent.  
 
    Kaj Sheng 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. THE UNIQUENESS  
                          OF THE OBSERVER 
 
3.1  Introduction  
 
In this chapter we start to discuss the lines connecting perception – 
particularization of the uniqueness of the observer in figure 1 in chapter 1. 
Thereafter we deal with the line connecting meaning – particularization of 
Weltanschauung in figure 1. In this chapter the concept of operational 
closure is central. Operational closure is defined as a network of dynamic 
processes of which the influence remains within the network. In this case 
processes change themselves, there is no separation of producer and 
product and neither input nor output. The own output of the system is it’s 
own input. “The principal activities of brains are making changes in 
themselves” (Minsky in Varela et al, 1992b, p. 139). It is also the basis of 
what life is, producing itself, labelled by Maturana & Varela as autopoiesis. 
Together with structure-determined systems and structural coupling this 
will be discussed in section 3.2. In section 3.3 we briefly deal with the 
consequences of operational closure for communication. In section 3.4 we 
will elaborate on the memory that plays such an important role in our true 
time experience. In section 3.5 we will deal with the self. Here we come 
across the Abhidharma school in Buddhism. The other (human being) will 
be discussed in section 3.6. Here it becomes clear why Maturana claims 
that the most central question humanity faces is the question of reality. 
Mutual acceptance constitutes social phenomena and negation of the other 
destroys a social system. We will also briefly touch on the Gaia hypothesis. 
In the sections 3.7 and 3.8 we will try to find out more about the 
Weltanschauung as related to the first key question in chapter 1.  
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 3.2  The duality of the observer 
  
Maturana (1988) argues: “As living systems we exist in two non-intersecting 
phenomenal domains; the domain of our realisation in our body hoods (the 
domain of physiology; principles of phenomena of life, HL) and the domain 
of behaviour (the domain of our interactions as totalities). Although these 
two domains do not intersect, they are coupled in their realisation through 
the manner of operation of the living system as a structure-determined 
entity”. So we have to find out first what structure-determined and structural 
coupling are and in order to do that we need to take a running start.   
 
Reproducing necessarily produces a historical system, as opposed to 
replicating and copying, whereby the latter might be a historical system, if we 
use each time the last copy as a model for the next copy (Maturana & Varela, 
1989). In replicating, the produced entities are historical independent of each 
other. The lot of my car will neither affect similar cars of the same 
trademark, nor the factory. A historical system can be understood in terms of 
the concept of ‘structural coupling’, either direct as in the mother-child 
relation or indirect as membership in the same society.  
 
A whole, a unity or a system may among other things be defined as being 
simple or as composite. If a system is defined as simple, the properties 
assigned to the unity are supposed to be constitutive (essential, HL) and no 
question about their origin arises. If a system is defined as composite it is 
assumed that it has components that may be specified through additional 
distinctions. It is realized as a unity by an organization that determines its 
properties through determining those relations between its components that 
specify the domain in which it can be treated as simple (Maturana, 1978).  
 
The concept ‘organization’ means the presence of certain relations, 
which are necessary for the existence of something (Maturana & Varela, 
1989). Organization refers to the relations between components that define 
and specify a system as a composite unity of a particular class and determine 
its properties as such a unity (Maturana, 1978). Our cognitive action is no 
more or less than generating all sorts of classes. This will also be seen in 
appendix 1, where we will see how this works in more detail in metaphor. In 
the human realm cognition also includes language, conceptual thinking and 
all other attributes of human consciousness (Maturana & Varela, 1989).  
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 In terms of Merleau-Ponty (1997) the ‘human space’ encompasses also 
dreams, emotions and reflection.  
 
The class of living creatures, literally, produces itself, which 
Maturana & Varela labelled as autopoiesis. That is what life is all about. 
(Re) producing it self. In cell reproduction no external power is necessary; 
it is the own dynamics of autopoiesis that is responsible. An autopoietic 
system is a closed dynamic system in which all phenomena are 
subordinated to its autopoiesis and all its states are states in autopoiesis 
(Maturana, 1978).  
The creation of novelty, resulting in development and evolution, is 
an intrinsic aspect of autopoiesis. A subtile but important point in the 
definition of autopoiesis is it is a set of relations among processes of 
production of components (Capra, 1997). Maturana (1978) argues: there is 
a class of dynamic systems that are realized, as unities, as networks of 
productions […] of components that 
-  recursively participate through their interactions in the realization of the 
   network of  productions […] of components that produce them, and  
-  by realizing its boundaries, constitute this network of productions [..] of  
   components as a unity in the space they specify and in which they exist. 
 
Those people familiar with organizational cybernetics understand 
the concept of recursiveness as (sub) systems embedded in each other in a 
hierarchy (not in an authoritarian sense) of a logical order. That is 
comparable with the Russian dolls effect. These (sub) systems represent 
structural levels to be distinguished, which can be seen as ‘system in focus’. 
Recursively, as used above, can also be understood as recurrent (repeating) 
or interacting, terms used also by Maturana. Space in terms of orientation is 
important for human beings. Let alone as status symbol, for instance a big 
room, or personal distance in a conversation; up to 60 cm is being near; 
further away is being far (Schein, 1992). Or as Merleau-Ponty puts it, there 
is a tension around a norm; there is an optimum distance from which an 
object, like a painting, would like to be seen. The example of Schein 
indicates that human beings also have an optimum distance from which 
they would like to be seen. Interactions are defined by Maturana (1978) as: 
whenever two or more unities, through the interplay of their properties 
modify their relative position in the space that they specify – a domain, HL 
- there is an interaction. 
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 According to Achterbergh & Vriens (2002) two relations are 
prominent in autopoiesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is a set of interacting components that, at a specific moment, 
realize the network of processes of production that produces these 
interacting components at a next moment (Achterbergh & Vriens). This is 
Maturana’s first remark ‘recursively participate’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is Maturana’s second remark ‘by realizing its boundaries’. 
According to Achterbergh & Vriens autopoietic systems have four 
properties, being autonomy, individuality (identity), unity and operational 
closure (neither input nor output). These concepts will be dealt with below. 
According to Von Krogh & Roos (1995, p. 37) characteristics are: 
autonomy, simultaneously open and closed, self-referential and observing. 
With regard to open and closed they state: “Because the environment can 
never determine, direct or control these changes, the autopoietic system 
knows its environment in knowing itself”. Moreover, as they say, Maturana 
& Varela’s original discussion of strict operational closure has subsequently 
been loosened by for instance Jantsch and Luhmann. Maturana speaks of a 
closed dynamic system. 
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 “Self-reference means that the knowledge accumulated by the system about 
itself affects the structure and operation of that system. Self-referentiality is 
prepared by self-organization […]” (1995, p. 39). With regard to observing 
they (1995, p. 40) cite Varela: “It is we who observe the event. The leaf, the 
wind, the frog and the shadows are all part of our experience. […] We 
cannot step outside [our cognitive domain] and see ourselves as a unit in an 
environment…what the observer now takes to be his own environment is 
still part of his experience and by no means lies beyond the interface that is 
supposed to separate the knower from the world he gets to know”. The 
property of autonomy makes autopoietic systems distinct from self-
organizing systems. “Systems first have to be self-organized before they 
can become autopoietic. It follows that autopoiesis is not synonymous with 
self-organization” (1995, p. 38).  
We can conclude Achterbergh & Vriens and Von Krogh & Roos 
come up with three out of four the same characteristics although a bit 
more loosened by the latter. They differ in unity and observing although 
these concepts are in my opinion both correct. It is a unity because of the 
boundaries and the class of living systems observes even when they have 
no brain, like plants perceive light and dark. 
 
According to Maturana & Varela (1989) ‘structure’ means the actual 
components and actual relations that in fact form an entity and give the 
organization thereof reality. Structure does not determine the properties of 
a unity. An example might clarify the difference between organization and 
structure. The class ‘chair’ has among seat, legs and arms certain relations. 
That is organization. However, the seat, legs and arms can be made of 
metal, wood and/or aluminium. That is structure. There is also a class of, 
for instance, deck chairs with a different organisation and structure. 
Living creatures are equal in their organization, but differ in their 
structure. This is obvious if we think of the way the structure of a mouse 
differs from the structure of a lion. A system is autonomous, if it is able to 
specify its own regularities (patterns, HL); that what is characteristic of it. 
Autonomy is one of the most striking features of living creatures. 
Autopoiesis is the mechanism that makes living creatures to autonomous 
systems. What distinguishes living creatures is that they themselves are the 
only product of their organization. There is no separation between 
producer and product.  
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 A separation will result in reproduction, if the structure realizes the 
organization in a distributive way and not in an isolated way. If you tear up a 
dollar-note two debris remain contrary to two unities of the same class as the 
original, like if you separate a bunch of grapes (Maturana & Varela, 1989).  
Minsky, in Varela et al, 1992b, p. 139, discusses the brain. In 
comparing a car manufacturer to the brain, he states: “The difference is that 
brains use processes that change themselves - and this means we cannot 
separate such processes from the products they provide. In particular, brains 
make memories, which change the ways we’ll subsequently think. The 
principal activities of brains are making changes in themselves”. So here 
again we see a notion or mechanism where the producer cannot be separated 
from the product.  
“It reflects the necessity of understanding cognitive systems not on 
the basis of their input and output [the latter seen as behaviour, HL] 
relationships [processing or computation of information as re-presentations, 
HL] but by their operational closure. A system that has operational closure is 
one in which the results of its processes are those processes themselves” 
(Varela et al, 1992b, p. 139). The key point is that such systems do not 
operate by representation (1992b, p. 140) of a pre-given world ‘out there’. 
From these formulations it is clear Varela et al think in different terms than 
Dreyfus does with regard to cognitive science. Dreyfus‘ second constraint 
mentions input and output relations. “These are autonomous networks, 
contrary to heteronomous systems or networks that are driven from the 
outside. Instead of representing an independent world, they enact [bringing 
forth, HL] a world as a domain of distinctions that is inseparable from the 
structure embodied by the cognitive system” (1992b,  p. 140). Maturana 
thinks in the same way although he does not use the word ‘enact’. Instead he 
uses for instance the word ‘create’. 
Brains make memories, which change the ways we’ll subsequently 
think. According to Merleau-Ponty (1997) memory can only be understood 
as an immediate property of the past without sliding in between contents 
(like recollections, HL). Memory becomes founded step by step on the 
continually transition of the one moment to the other and on the sliding of 
each moment with its complete horizon (of past, present and future, HL) in 
the density of what still will follow. 
  
In the characterization of the organization of living systems nothing 
is stipulated about their structure, which can be any form that satisfies it.  
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 Also nothing is said about the medium in which an autopoietic system may 
exist, which can be any that satisfy the constraints imposed by the actual 
structure through which the autopoiesis is realized (Maturana, 1978). 
Identity is determined by a network of dynamic processes of which the 
influence remains within the network. This is what is meant by operational 
closed (Maturana & Varela, 1989).  
 
The concepts of organization, structure, autonomy, recursion, 
identity and (pathological) autopoiesis will come back in the organisational 
theory context in chapter 5. In organisational cybernetics the same 
definitions are used. For instance, it is supposed that the organisation of 
the class University differs from the class Hospital. The presence of 
relations in the organisation will differ. 
 
 Structure-determined systems undergo only changes determined by 
their organization and structure, that are either changes of state, defined as 
changes of structure without loss of identity or disintegration with loss of 
identity. These systems may undergo only interactions that perturb them by 
triggering in them structure changes that lead to changes of state. The 
changes of state they undergo as a result of perturbing interactions are not 
specified by the properties of the perturbing entities, which only trigger 
them (Maturana, 1978).  
The organization and structure of a structure-determined system 
continuously determine  
- the domain of states of the system by specifying the states that it may  
  adopt in the course of  its internal dynamics or as  a result of its  
  interactions;  
- its domain of perturbations by specifying the matching configurations of  
  properties of the medium that may perturb it;  
- its domain of disintegration.  
Every organism (including human beings) does, what it does and 
what it is […] whether or not it disposes of a nervous system (Maturana & 
Varela, 1989). We will deal with these kind of systems in the remainder of 
this chapter. This characteristic that these autonomous systems undergo 
only changes determined by their organization and structure and are only 
triggered, is a fundamental defect from what we normally think in the 
taken-for-granted position about human beings. In other words, human 
beings are much more closed systems than is normally thought of. 
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 ‘Ontogeny’ is the history of structural changes a unity undergoes, 
without loss of organization. If the unity would lose its organization and 
thereby its identity, it disintegrates or may become a member of a different 
class with a different name. This continual structural change takes place in 
the unity uninterrupted, either as a change resulting from interactions with 
the environment or resulting from the own internal dynamics of the system. 
Each ontogeny is as an individual history of structural change a structure 
drift, taking place with the preservation of organization and adaption 
(Maturana, 1978).  
 
If the structure of the medium that matches the domain of 
perturbations of the structure determined-system is redundant or recurrent, 
the structure-determined system undergoes recurrent perturbations. 
If the structure of the medium is in continuous change, the structure-
determined system undergoes continuously changing perturbations.  
If the matching structure of the medium changes as a result of the 
operation of the structure-determined system, then the structure-determined 
system undergoes changing perturbations that are coupled to its own state 
trajectory.  
If a structure determined-system undergoes changes of state that 
involve structural changes in its components – and not only in their relations 
- then Maturana (1978) says that the system has a second-order plastic 
(expressive, HL) structure. When this is the case, the plastic interactions that 
such a system undergoes select in it trajectories of second-order structural 
changes that result in the transformation of both its domain of states and its 
domain of perturbations. The outcome of the continued interactions of a 
structurally plastic system in a medium with redundant or recurrent structure 
may be the continued selection in the system of a structure that determines in 
it a domain of states and a domain of perturbations, that allow it to operate 
recurrently in its medium without disintegration. That process is called 
structural coupling (Maturana, 1978).  
 
Varela et al (1992b, p. 164) give an example of structural coupling. They cite 
a case described by Sacks and Wasserman. By the way, it is striking with 
regard to the example Merleau-Ponty gives ‘I see a tone’. Due to a car-
accident, an artist known for his especially colourful, abstract paintings 
became completely colour-blind. He lived in a black-and-white world. He 
could not enjoy various things anymore and became a ‘night-person’ in the 
end.  
 
         66 
 “His appreciation of music was impaired, for he could no longer 
experience musical tones by synestheticly transforming them into plays of 
colour. […] Our coloured world is brought forth by complex processes of 
structural coupling. When these processes are altered, some forms of 
behaviour are no longer possible. One’s behaviour changes as one learns to 
cope with new conditions and situations. And, as one actions change so 
too does one’s sense of the world. If these changes are dramatically enough 
[…] then a different perceived world will be enacted. In this case his habits, 
behaviour, actions and world or reality, in short his entire life, changed 
dramatically. 
 
The two interacting domains, physiological and behavioural, 
mentioned earlier in this section by Maturana, operate recurrently in this 
way. Maturana (1988) claims that the most central question that humanity 
faces is the question of reality. This question can only be properly answered 
according to him if observing and cognition are explained as biological 
phenomena. He distinguishes between two explanatory paths. The first is 
existence takes place independently of what an observer does and things 
exist independently of whether he knows them. The observer can know 
them through perception or reason and uses a reference to some entity 
such as matter, energy, mind or ideas. In the second path explanations are 
not reductionist and there is no search for a single ultimate explanation for 
anything. Thus there can be equally legitimate domains of reality. An 
explanatory disagreement is an invitation to a responsible reflection of 
coexistence and not an irresponsible negation of the other (Maturana, 
1988). Also for Merleau-Ponty there is no absolute truth. As soon as one 
claims that, violence will occur (Vlasblom & Tiemersma, 1997). Equally 
legitimate domains of reality can also be coupled to what has been said 
about the motive earlier. The meaning the similar situation lends and the 
decision that makes it the accepted situation as legitimate. 
 
With regard to the mind–body question Maturana argues: “[…] 
these two phenomenal domains appear to an observer as of entirely 
different character: the domain of behaviour appears as organismic, not 
mechanistic (local material movement, HL), and the domain of physiology 
appears as molecular, and mechanistic (Maturana, 1988).  
For Merleau-Ponty (1997) a stimulus (trigger or perturbation, HL) 
always has a meaning for an organism in a situation.  
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 All that which has to do with behaviour exhibits a biological, contrary to 
mechanistic, order that goes back to a principle that constitutes the order 
contrary to being submitted to it. For human beings this principle is 
consciousness, but this remains rooted in the biological order (Vlasblom & 
Tiemersma, 1997, p. 16). “The behaviour is always a lived relation to the 
world…consciousness is not contrary to nature”. 
 
Maturana (1988) proceeds: “[…] in the lack of understanding of the 
relation between these two phenomenal domains, and in the belief from the 
perspective of the [first, HL] explanatory path that a scientific explanation 
realises a phenomenic reduction, where the mind-body problem arises as a 
paradox through the supposition that we have to explain the interaction 
between incommensurable entities. Maturana does not refer here to a 
phenomenological reduction, which means setting free oneself as much as 
possible of one’s individual one-sidedness; being unprejudiced or amazement 
in the presence of the world. “Yet if, as we reflect from the perspective of 
the [second, HL] explanatory path, we recognize that there are phenomena 
like language that depend on the operation of our body hoods but do not 
take place in it, we can escape this paradox and recognise that there are many 
other phenomena of a similar kind, like the mind, […] and spiritual 
phenomena in general”. Language is an intangible system of meanings and 
linguistic structures. “Thus we find not only that these phenomena do not 
take place in the head, but that they are distinctions made by an observer of 
the different manners of operation of the living systems in their different 
domains of interactions […]”.  
According to Merleau-Ponty (1997) the use we make of our body is 
transcendent in relation to the body as a pure biological given. Merleau-
Ponty is not talking about non-intersecting domains. He tries to overcome 
the dichotomy between physiological and psychic. The biological sensory 
organs, motility and behaviour are, as we have seen, part of the unity or 
totality the body-subject is. Instead, Merleau-Ponty speaks about a phenome-
nological field we live in. A field because we can never oversee and reflect on 
the entire world; we have a limited sight and a restricted ability. Therefore 
phenomenology is the study of the appearance of the being to the conscious-
ness, without already presupposing the anterior given possibility thereof.  
 
When two or more organisms interact recursively as structurally 
plastic systems, each becoming a medium for the realization of the 
autopoiesis of the other the result is mutual ontogenic structural coupling 
(Maturana, 1978).  
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 The domain of interlocked conducts –behaviours, HL - that results from 
this structural coupling is the consensual domain (Maturana, 1978). The 
consensual domain is closed with respect to the interlocking conducts that 
constitute it, but is open with respect to the organisms or systems that 
realize it, as long as the novel organism or system has the same structure as 
the replaced one. The presence of a structurally plastic nervous system in 
animals makes possible a recursive mapping of all the interactions of the 
organism and its nervous system. All the changes of state of the organism, 
including its nervous system that perturb the nervous system, regardless 
how they arise, map in the same domain of relations of relative neuronal 
activities. The result is the ontogenic recursive structural coupling of the 
structurally plastic nervous system to its own changing structure through a 
process in which the sequence of structural changes is determined by the 
sequence of structural perturbations generated either by these same 
structural changes or by the interactions of the organism in its medium 
(Maturana, 1978). In other words, at a certain level of complexity a living 
organism couples structurally not only to its environment but also to itself, 
and thus brings forth not only an external world, but also an inner world. 
In human beings the bringing forth of such an inner world is intimately 
linked to language, thought and consciousness (Capra, 1997). 
According to Langer (1989) in Merleau-Ponty’s work the 
dichotomy between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ experience disappears and, with 
it, the conception of ‘mental life’ as a mysterious ‘inner’ counterpart of 
‘outer’ behaviour. The immediate is no longer a meaningless atom of 
psychic life, but rather the very structure of behaviour – our own and 
others’ – which is a whole saturated with immanent significance. Others’ 
‘mental life’ thus becomes immediately accessible in the unfolding of their 
behaviour, rather than having to be inferred by introspection. Langer 
(1989) argues the meaning of gestures for instance is understood rather 
than being given; any intellectual clarification comes later. These are not 
separate acts but rather two aspects of the single act of perception. 
Understanding, as Merleau-Ponty states, is not to say that we place the 
sensority perceived under the aspect of an intelligible idea. Understanding 
is experiencing a similarity between what we have in mind and what is 
given, between our intention and the realisation thereof. This similarity is 
being mediated through the body. The body is always body in situation. 
Therefore it never coincides with itself. 
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 It is always directed to the surrounding reality. Instead, Merleau-Ponty (1997) 
comes up with the concept of horizon; it stresses infiniteness (Bakker, 1965). 
A horizon opens and closes up and gives meaning to the encompassing 
reality. Outer horizons of for instance a house located in a street, where the 
street is the outer horizon and the inner horizons of the house enabling our 
gaze to explore the interior of the house from a variety of positions or 
perspectives. 
 
The magnitude of the recursive ontogenic structural coupling in any 
particular organism depends both on the degree of structural plasticity of its 
closed nervous system and on the degree to which the actual structure of its 
nervous system permits the occurrence of distinct relations of relative 
neuronal activity that operate as internal structural perturbations. When this 
takes place, even in the slightest manner, within the confines of a consensual 
domain, so that the relations of neuronal activity generated under consensual 
behaviour become perturbations and components for further consensual 
behaviour, an observer is operationally generated (Maturana, 1978). For the 
observer the behaviour can also be determined by the structure-determined 
structure of the nervous system at the moment at which the behaviour is 
enacted. Adequate behaviour is only the result of a structural matching 
between organism and medium (Maturana, 1978). 
 
As observers we generally take the observer for granted (Maturana, 
1978). An observer is a human being, a person, a living system that can make 
distinctions and specify which he distinguishes as a unity that can be 
concrete, conceptual, dynamic or static. According to Checkland (2000) 
dictionaries give 15 different definitions of the concept ‘system’. I will use 
Espejo’s (2000) definition: ‘a system is a viewpoint’s construct of a set of 
interrelated parts constituting a whole’, because a viewpoint and an observer 
match. To understand things systemically, literally means to put them into a 
context, to establish the nature of their relationships. The properties of the 
parts are not intrinsic properties, but can be understood only within the 
context of the larger whole. It is the whole that determines the behaviour of 
the parts (Capra, 1997).  
 
What is significant for an observer in a consensual domain is that the 
observed organisms can be described as simultaneously existing as composite 
and simple unities. Thus the observer is defining two non-intersecting 
phenomenal domains.  
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 In the domain of simple unities the observer describes them as interacting 
through their properties as unities. In the domain of composite unities the 
observer can describe the organisms as interacting through the properties 
of their components. In both cases the interaction of the organisms can be 
described in strictly operational terms, without recourse to semantic 
notions as function or meaning (Maturana, 1978). Up till here we have an 
operationally (ready for use, HL) generated observer that can describe 
interactions of the organisms in strictly operational terms.  
 
Third-order structural coupling, the structural coupling between 
systems with a nervous system, is social behaviour. Maturana & Varela 
(1989) call observers communicative, when it takes place within a social 
coupling; the coordination of behaviour that they see as a result of that, 
they call communication (Maturana & Varela, 1989). So their concepts of 
cognition and communication are broader than these are expressed in daily 
life.  
Behaviour can be instinctive (inherent), independent of the course 
of action in social interactions, or dependent of the course of action, 
labelled acquired behaviour, such as imitation. Acquired, communicative 
behaviour is a language domain; it forms the basis for language, but is not 
identical to it (Maturana & Varela, 1989). The linguistic repertoire of 
behaviour is the, in general not fixed, language domain. The origin of 
domains of language goes off without a determined plan in advance, as a 
culture drift within a social system. It is a process of changes in behaviour 
in the maintaining of the social system, by the behaviour of its 
components. Ontogenetic behaviour that origins in the structural coupling 
of which an observer can give a semantic description is called linguistic by 
Maturana & Varela. The area where the ontogenetic behaviour and the 
communicative behaviour meet is linguistic, behaviour in language. 
Maturana (1988) calls the basic consensual co-ordinations of actions that 
are operationally prior to language linguistic co-ordinations of actions and 
the domain thereof the first-order linguistic domain. Language is a second-
order linguistic domain.  
 
When an observer communicates with another observer, he defines 
a meta domain – a second order consensual domain in which observers 
operate - from the perspective of which a consensual domain appears as an 
interlocked domain of distinctions, indications or descriptions according to 
how the observer refers to the observed behaviour.  
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 An observer sees as behaviour the changing relations and interactions of an 
organism with its environment. An observer can describe any given 
behaviour in purposeful – functional or semantic - terms that reflect the 
value or role.  
 
Maturana (1988) claims that with languaging observing and the 
observer arises. Observing as a second-order recursion in consensual co-
ordinations of actions that constitute the phenomenon of distinction. This 
second order consensual domain is related to the presence of a structurally 
plastic nervous system in animals, that make possible the recursive mapping 
of all the interactions of the organism and its nervous system, as well as of 
most (if not all) of its internal processes (Maturana, 1978). The result is the 
ontogenic recursive coupling of the structurally plastic nervous system to its 
own changing structure through a process in which the sequence of 
structural changes is determined by the sequence of structural perturbations 
generated either by these same structural changes or by the interactions of 
the organism in its medium. The behaviour of the organism becomes 
indistinguishable from the behaviour of the observer. The second order 
consensual domain that the organism establishes with other organisms 
becomes indistinguishable from a semantic domain. If an organism is 
observed in its operation within a second order consensual domain, it 
appears to the observer as if its nervous system interacted with internal 
representations of the circumstances of its interactions and as if the changes 
of state of the organism were determined by the semantic value of these 
representations. Yet, all that takes place in the operation of the nervous 
system is the structure-determined dynamics of changing relations of relative 
neuronal activity proper to a closed neuronal network. As a closed neuronal 
network the nervous system with the organism as its medium operates only 
by generating relations of relative neuronal activity determined by its 
structure, not by the environmental circumstances that may trigger changes 
of state in it. Representation, description and meaning are notions that apply 
only and exclusively to the operation of living systems in a consensual 
domain and are defined by an observer to refer to second order consensual 
behaviour. These notions have no explanatory value for the characterization 
of the actual operation of living systems as autopoietic systems, even though 
they arise through structural coupling (Maturana, 1978).  
 
Observer in the third-order recursion in which there is the distinction 
of the operational realisation of observing in a body hood.  
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 When languaging and observing take place, objects take place as 
distinctions of distinctions that obscure the co-ordinations of actions that 
these coordinate (Maturana, 1988). In observing distinctions are 
constituted and in languaging this happens again; hence distinctions of 
distinctions. The language sets in the stream of repeating social inter-
actions, as soon as operations within a domain of language end in co-
ordinations of behaviour, relating to the behaviour belonging to the 
domain of language itself. With the origin of language also objects origin, 
like the word table, linguistic descriptions of objects in the environment of 
the user of language. These objects are linguistic distinctions of linguistic 
distinctions that veil the behaviour they coordinate. The word ‘table’ 
coordinates the behaviour with regard to the handling of tables. However, 
the concept of ‘table’ veils the behaviour that by its determined character in 
the making of distinctions creates the table (Maturana, 1978). An advert of 
the tax authorities runs: ‘which accountant is already at the table in a 
company before there is a table’? (FD, 04.25.2002) When languaging, 
observing and objects take place, the phenomenon of self-consciousness 
may take place in a community of observers as a fourth recursion of 
consensual co-ordinations of actions in which the observer distinguishes 
his body hood as a node in a network of recursive distinctions (Maturana, 
1978). In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, the body is the node of relationships.  
 
Maturana & Varela (1989) state: “What we say reflects our 
experience and perception, supposed we do not lie and not what happens 
from the view-point of an independent observer. The language was never 
invented by someone to absorb the outside world. That is why language 
cannot serve as a mean to fathom that world. Rather the world is being 
created in the action of knowing – knowledge is effective action - in the 
usage of language that is embedded in co-ordinations of actions. We give 
form to our life in a mutual exchange of language; not because language 
offers us the possibility to unveil ourselves, rather because language forms 
us in a continual process of becoming, that we together with others create. 
In this co-ontogenetic coupling we are no fixed point of reference, but a 
continual transformation in the process of creating the language building 
we construct with other people (Maturana & Varela, 1989). We are no fixed 
point of reference but rather are formed in a process of becoming as a 
continual transformation link up with Merleau-Ponty’s position.  
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 What is unique to each observer and makes each observer stand 
alone is, on the one hand his experience which remains necessarily secluded 
in his operational closure, and on the other hand the observer’s ability 
through second order consensuality (the defining of a meta domain, HL) to 
operate as external to the situation in which he is and thus be observer of his 
circumstance as an observer. Everything said is said by an observer to 
another observer, who can be him self (Maturana, 1978). Metaphorical 
speaking, the observer is like the Baron of Münchhausen pulling himself out 
on his own hair. In the words of Von Krogh & Roos (1995, p. 37) the 
system knows its environment in knowing itself. According to Maturana & 
Varela (1989) the nervous system creates itself a world, because it records 
which influences from the environment affect on it and which changes it 
produces in the organism. Also here the observer is always situated. We 
cannot live separated from a world.  
 
Winograd & Flores (1994, p. 71) state, in comparing Heidegger’s and 
Maturana’s insights, Maturana arrived in a different way at a remarkable 
similar understanding. “He (Maturana, HL) states that our ability to function 
as observers is generated from our functioning as structure-determined 
systems, shaped by structural coupling. Every organism is engaged in a 
pattern of activity that is triggered by chances in its medium and that has the 
potential to change the structure of the organism (and hence to change its 
future behavior)”. I do not know Heidegger’s insights because I did not read 
him. But I would say Maturana, Maturana & Varela, Varela et al and 
Merleau-Ponty also arrive at a similar understanding. 
3.3 Communication 
 
The uniqueness of the observer explains why in communication listeners are 
not instructed by a speaker but rather are at most triggered. According to 
Maturana (1978) it must be understood that the current view of communi-
cation as a situation in which the interacting systems specify each other’s 
states through the transmission of information is either erroneous or 
misleading. If that view assumes that instructive interactions take place, it is 
erroneous. If that view is only meant as a metaphor it is misleading because it 
suggests models that imply instructive interactions. Such errors frequently 
occur in attempts to explain the semantic (meaning development of words, 
HL) role of language. 
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 By this he means the speaker is of the opinion he ‘instructs’ the listener in 
terms of ‘there is only one understanding possible of what I mean’.  
Brooks (see also chapter 2) decided to skip levels in evolution and 
to build robots with more human characteristics. His robots have eyes, 
ears, eyebrows and lips. Although one of his robots, called Kismet, does 
not understand what is being said, and the robot is only babbling nonsense, 
test subjects were communicating half an hour effortless with Kismet. 
“This enfeebles another classical dogma in AI, namely that the purpose of 
a conversation is exchanging information”. It underpins Winograd & 
Flores’ (1994, p. 176) remark that communication is not a process of 
transmitting information or symbols but one of commitment and 
interpretation. Varela et al (1992b, p. 208, 212) also refer to Brooks. They 
argue: “We believe that this fully enactive (bringing forth a world, HL) 
approach to AI is one of the most promising avenues of research today”. 
 
3.4  The memory 
 
Memories are not stored but rather the connections between 
‘neurons’ are modified by successful behaviour in such a way that the same 
or similar input will produce the same or similar output. The hidden nodes 
of the most sophisticated networks are always already in a particular state 
of activation when input stimuli are received and the output that the 
network produces depends on this initial activation (Dreyfus, 1996). This 
confirms Skarda’s position in chapter 2. This might be said to correspond 
to the expectations and perspective that the expert brings to the situation 
in terms of which the situation solicits a specific response. This would be 
the neural basis of the intentional arc (Dreyfus, 1996).  
 
Beer (1990a, p. 96) also discusses the memory. “[…] We went into 
a room, spoke to someone, and came out. What colour were the walls in 
that room? Everyone has had the experience of dredging his unconscious 
mind […] for facts, which he had not consciously registered at all. They 
can often be retrieved. But at the micro-situation level, it seems certain that 
each individual neuron must […] store at least its last state. If it does not, 
we cannot make the logic of neural networks undertake the simplest 
computation. Between the first, very general, remark and the second, very 
specific, lies the whole problem of memory.  
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 We know very little about it. Surely it is almost incredible that the brain, with 
its ten thousand million neurons, should be capable of re-establishing all the 
states it ever had. Sums can be done to determine the dimensions of such a 
storage problem; suffice it to say it looks daunting. And yet no one has 
managed to prove that the brain ever totally forgets anything and certainly 
there is much evidence to show that it can often retrieve information, which 
it appeared to have forgotten. Feats of recall under hypnosis, or under drugs 
[…] or in dreams, or for no apparent reason, are often very surprising. But 
here again we are in ‘the wrong dimension’. There is no memory site in the 
brain –unless perhaps every neuron has a long-term as well as a last state 
memory; there may be memory circuits – facilitated pathways through net-
works of neurons, but perhaps we are again talking about something that 
goes on in another plane. For example, it is not absurd to postulate that the 
mediators of memory are biochemical; the whole memory business may be 
going on at the molecular level, residing, that is, in structures smaller than the 
neuro-physiological structures under discussion. Some evidence for this 
hypothesis has been found in studies of learning made with flat-worms”. To 
get a feel for how fast the neuron and the brain work Beer says the ‘rate’ of 
an individual neuron is about thirty microseconds (millionths of a second) 
and the brain as a whole operates in the milli-second (thousandths of a 
second) range. However, at that time (1972) computers were two thousand 
times faster than the brain. 
 
Psychologist Draaisma (FD, 06.21.2003) argues our autobiographical 
memory is in top condition between our tenth and fifteenth year. One 
remembers personal experiences that made an impression and ‘first-time-
experiences’ at best throughout our life. They leave the best lasting 
impression. What we experience thereafter mostly is some kind of form of 
repetition. Our memory deteriorates after our twenty-fifth year. With regard 
to how we experience time he comes to two conclusions. Time ‘expands’; a 
week’s holiday with many impressions can look like a month when being 
home again. And time ‘contracts’; the years of which one remembers nothing 
go very fast. This is much in line with what we said earlier, the unity of 
meaning and time. It is also my experience that in most cases the return trip 
goes ‘faster’ than the journey out, even if the route is known and even if the 
foreseen meeting will be pleasant. But I had no explanation for the 
phenomenon so far. Could it have something to do with ‘the task is done’, 
‘the body was there where it had something to do’?  
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 The return trip is a waste of time anyway (has less meaning) and is the 
transition to a new field of presence, the moment we move on to a new 
task. If we get a new assignment that looks puzzling and complicated out 
of the meeting the return trip normally looks like longer. Then the meaning 
of the task is involved. So it looks like meaningful moments expand and 
less meaningful moments contract. That could be the explanation for, first, 
the layer of time condenses itself still further, and second that we do not 
(have to) remember everything which makes the task for the memory, in 
the words of Beer, less daunting. 
 
What is of interest in the article is that Draaisma not only 
acknowledges the unity of the sensors but rather couples the different 
places where these sensory impressions are being processed in the brain 
implicitly to the memory. In other words, we would need to ‘grasp the 
graspability’ again in memory. A smell can ‘let us go back’ to the complete 
scene in the past with the accompanying colours etc. or we could only ‘go 
back in time’ partly without accompanying parts such as smell. In order to 
stop or slow down the process of deterioration of the memory chemical 
‘particles’ will not do the job. “In fact you cannot manipulate with that”. 
On the other hand, alcohol can intensify the process of deterioration. 
Alcohol, drugs, hypnosis, dreams, narcosis (and may be meditation, HL) 
have in common that they have a (un) natural influence on the entire (or 
global) state of the human system. If we think of emergent properties, may 
be the ‘mutually satisfactory’ aspect changes (see Beer, 1990a, figure 26, p. 
146). 
 
The peak in volume of the ‘grey mass’, the brain cells, of different 
parts of the cortex comes at different moments (NRC, 06.28.2003, p. 45). 
Thereafter the decrease in volume is a process of reorganization and 
restructuring. Smaller volume means better equipped a higher efficiency 
and better specialized. Babies have redundant brain cells and connections, 
the cable network. Only the connections that are used intensively last. In 
this way the brain adjusts to the environment. “The cortex5, we said, has to 
do with intellect; it is the seat of consciousness. Its functions are incredibly 
complex, but they all seem concerned with one thing: pattern” (Beer, 
1990a, p. 102). “It is important to know that this apparatus has no direct 
connection with the outside world at all –nor even with the body of which 
it is the brain” (p. 92). 
 
 5The outer, grey part of the brain mass; in Dutch: hersenschors 
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 The temporal lobe, second in volume, resides horizontally as the lower part 
of the lobes just above the ear. In this temporal lobe emotions and the 
memory ‘reside’. The average peak in volume is reached at 16 years for males 
and 17 years for females. The peak for rationality (attention and planning), 
the highest volume, and sensory perception is reached earlier, on average 12 
years for males and 10/11 years for females. It explains why females are 
earlier mature in these years. However, according to the tables the visual 
centre at the back of the cortex increases for males as of 10 years and 
decreases for females as of 16 years. At the age of 22 years the difference in 
volume can be 25 cm². In various respects the developments of the brain of 
females differ from the development of the brain of males. According to the 
tables in general it is highly likely that females are better equipped in the 
visual centre, sensory perception, emotion / memory and attention / 
planning / motivation (motivation as in everyday language). First, one would 
expect the visual centre to reside next to the eyes and not in the back of our 
head. But Varela already made clear how we experience, for instance, colours. 
Second, there must be an explanation for the difference in volume in 
evolution. The article does not give the explanation. Why are females better 
specialized in these respects? A speculative answer in the article is: it has to 
do with reproduction and finding the right partner. This is the neuronal 
foundation for the rest of our life. One could say this process of finding 
one’s own way in a complex society happens twice, as a baby and as an 
adolescent. That could explain what is often heard that human beings are 
formed in their first four years.  
We seem to be a kind of two-stage rocket. In Ashby’s (1971, p. 272) 
words, it has to do with amplification of the regulator. “Let no one say that it 
cannot be done, for the gene-patterns do it every time they form a brain that 
grows up to be something better than the gene-pattern could have specified 
in detail”. 
 
The first question is: how do we have to imagine Merleau-Ponty’s 
network of intentionalities? Merleau-Ponty gives no clue whatsoever apart 
from the interlocked fields of presence with their own properties of past, 
present and future, whereby the memory is an immediate property of the 
past. So it is the transition from one simultaneous consciousness and self-
consciousness to another in one single movement. To illustrate this one 
could say the discontinuous consciousness is a step ‘further’ (affecting itself) 
than the self-consciousness (given to itself), which gives the distance of non-
coinciding with one self.  
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 The discontinuity of these consciousnesses can be understood in terms of 
what Merleau-Ponty says elsewhere: “She (reflection, HL) pays out the 
intentional threads that connect us with the world in order to let them 
appear” (1997, p. 33) and “We can pick up the thread with the world that 
we let fall, but that thread was not broken” (1997, p. 386). If we stop 
listening while thinking we can pick up the listening again by making 
contact with these threads. Once established, they can never be rectified. 
One cannot think of a subject without a world; one can think of a subject 
without a field of vision (the blind) but he will always still have a world. I 
think the word ‘network’ is a bit misleading. It is more in a metaphor like a 
roof of interlocking roofing tiles. We can climb up (the future) and climb 
down (the past) the roofing tiles. We are always on a tile (the present) with 
one foot on the one above (the future) and with one foot on the one below 
(the past). You can always roll down the roof (the past). Moreover, what do 
we have to imagine by ‘intentional threads’, in my words ‘lines of being 
conscious of ’? Does he mean patterns in the brain (threads) that contract 
and expand (pays out) as in the time experience with regard to meaning?  
 
According to Dreyfus in discussing simulated neuronal models, 
memories of specific situations are not stored. According to Merleau-Ponty 
memory can only be understood as an immediate property of the past without 
sliding in between contents (like recollections, images or ideas, HL). 
Memory becomes founded step by step on the continually transition of the 
one moment to the other and on the sliding of each moment with its 
complete horizon in the density of what still will follow. That ‘still will 
follow’ is the future dimension in the field of presence with its accom-
panying present and past. We already spoke of a density or condensation in 
the past. Now we are also talking about a future density. These densities or 
layers of time make clearer what is meant by time as a single movement. 
The present is the transition and dehiscence of these densities. Memory 
must then be part of the temporal consciousness. 
 
What do we have so far with regard to meaning? A picture, that 
deviates from the taken-for-granted view as given in figure 2 in the 
previous chapter. Things and world exist lived through us as a phenomenal 
body that knows and understands on a pre-reflective level. We perceive, 
live and experience our world that is full of immanent, latent or inner 
meaning. Cognition and conscious life is the entire process of life. 
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 The kingpin of cognition, the process of knowing, is its capacity for bringing 
forth meaning. In perception we express immanent meaning through 
perceptual guided actions. Factual situations and phenomena lend their 
meaning. Consciousness of the world and self-consciousness arise 
simultaneously; the one is not founded on the other. They arise in a field of 
presence, offered by perception, the moment on which we move on to do 
something (being-in-the-world; perceptual guided action) as an experience 
(transcending) and not as impressions, sensations or vague thrills. Only in a 
field of presence we come in contact with time. Through the temporality 
there can be a self and sense. We live in a duality of given to our self or 
affected by it self. Temporality and meaning are a unity. Temporality 
(direction) is the meaning of our life. We execute time and it looks like 
meaningful events can expand because less meaningful events contract. 
Moreover, time that is unfolded (given to itself) condenses. Ambiguity in 
perception is essential and everything we experience or think always has a 
plural meaning. We carry around our self a system of implicit meanings. It is 
we who express immanent meaning in phenomena for which we are 
prepared for and tuned into by the brain. In this chapter that is called being 
triggered. Or things (piece of music) and objects (paintings) carry out their 
meaning itself; they really say something for which we must be or can be 
susceptible. That can also be called an open mind; being open to the world.  
 
Sense making is more than an activity what noticed cues mean. On 
the pre-reflective level the cues or data already have an ambiguous, plural, 
first, implicit (immanent) meaning for the phenomenal body in perception as 
tension of powers, fields of forces and forces of attraction. Words already 
contain multiple references to the kernel of dimensions of characters 
(properties) of people. The world already suggests meanings as distinctions. 
Patients have a levelling out of these structures we said, meaning to remove 
or to take away distinctions or differences. Also with regard to thoughts we 
said they offer us a meaning but we give them that meaning our self. We 
perceive distinctions or differences as first meanings. Indeed, a wooden 
wheel laying on the ground is for the seeing quite something different than a 
wheel bearing a load. In this sentence the field of forces and the difference 
come together. Meaning is also the difference that makes the difference. 
Information, as discussed briefly in chapter 4, takes away (a part of) 
uncertainty. Meaning makes ambiguity in immanent meaningful cues in a 
context less indeterminate. 
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 First meanings are transformed in second meanings, are transformed etc. 
We can perceive changes without knowing which. Something in the field of 
forces with which we are accustomed has changed. In My Fair Lady 
Higgens already said it: “I have grown accustomed to her face”. The world 
and others have a certain style or physiognomy. How many times have we 
heard someone saying: “But I thought you were already wearing 
spectacles”. Or:  “I hope I recognise him”. That explains the satisfying 
balance in perception. The face was determinate enough for us but not 
accurate enough. In this sense the phenomenal body is attached to the  
(life-) world, encloses it, whereby they form a unity. This is what happens 
on the pre-reflective level before any reflection on the reflective level is 
involved. A lot of others, the world and situations are already understood 
before any understandable meaning as Merleau-Ponty called it comes in the 
picture. This ongoing sense making in perception and cognition precedes 
the reflective level. 
 
Although I do not know anything about (the effects of) meditation, 
it seems there are some similarities between Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology and a school in Buddhism. The point of departure is 
amazement of a world. There are some similarities in mental states and 
mental forces. The mindful reflection has similarities with the ‘I can’. They 
end up in ‘we are companions perceiving the same world’ and ‘compassion 
for the world’. But there also seem to be many differences that go beyond 
the scope of this thesis. However, anticipating chapter 8, it is striking that 
manager 2 mentions amazement, is interested in Eastern insights (although 
Buddhism was not mentioned), is more collectivism orientated, wants to be 
of significance for others (compassion) and has the same true time 
experience in her/his worldview. So these theoretical concepts can be 
found back in reality in one personality. 
 
The duality of the most exact consciousness has much in common 
with the uniqueness of the observer. The being aspect (affected by itself) 
has much in common with being observer of his own situation as observer 
and the time aspect (given to itself) with the operational closure of the 
nervous system. The observer does also have the distance of non-
coincidence, but is present to him self. The consciousness of the world is 
not founded on the self-consciousness but they are strictly at the same 
time, simultaneously. This distance between the two consciousnesses 
makes possible that we can oversee our own situation. 
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 Van Krogh & Roos said affected by it self means the knowledge of the 
system about itself affects the structure and operation of the system in the 
context of self-reference. Beer (1990, p. 260) argues: “Closure is the talisman 
of identity. […] By ‘closure’ I mean a self-referential process and not the 
isolation of the system within a […] shell”. Seen in this way it can be the 
transition in affected by it self or given to itself in the duality of Merleau-Ponty. 
It is their (and Beer’s) loosened ‘operational closure’ concept in terms of the 
reciprocal nature of duality.  
Both phenomenology and neurobiology end up in a duality. We 
never coincide completely with our self but are at least present to our self. In 
every day life we talk about an (big) ego, I, myself or ‘If you ask me’. If 
someone wants to know what our identity is, we know what is meant: name, 
year and place of birth, nationality and residence. That is ‘me’. ‘Me’ also has a 
personality or character or how it may be labelled with habits or even many 
different ‘me’s’. The problem is that practitioners of meditation, investigators 
of the mind, have never found a self in consciousness (Varela et al, 1992b, p. 
69). Varela et al go on to discuss many viewpoints and end up in ground-
lessness, the path laid down in walking. “We feel, therefore, that the solution 
for the nihilistic alienation in our culture is not to try to find a new ground; it 
is to find a disciplined and genuine means to pursue groundlessness, to go 
further into groundlessness” (1992b, p. 253). We can react on all this in 
several ways. Ignore it, question ‘what has a school in Buddhism to do with 
meaning?’, to go along with their view but that would be the subject of a 
different thesis and the like. But if there is no self who then is involved in the 
process of sense making apart from the phenomenal body as an intermediary 
to the world as discussed? If there is no actual self than there also is no self-
consciousness. And without that duality consciousness is meaningless. If I 
ask managers to tell something about their self and their Weltanschauung 
they answer the questions uncomplicated. It also looks like Merleau-Ponty 
qualifies Husserl’s standpoint with regard to ego. As will be seen both 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty end up in the time experience. It is worth 
elaborating a bit more on the subject without pretending to have found ‘the’ 
answer. In both Eastern and Western insights the word ‘disposition’6 is 
mentioned. It is a feel of continuity in the temporal consciousness.  
 
 
6 In Dutch: ordening, aard, karakter  
 
 
 
         82 
 3.5  The self 
 
Do human beings have an ego, the ‘I’? In the footnote on page 330 
(1997), Merleau-Ponty speaks about ‘a relative, pre-personal I’. In that 
paragraph the transcendental ‘I’ is rejected. He speaks about ‘a sketch of 
the self’, ‘not the unmovable identity with oneself’, ‘there can be the self’ 
and as Langer puts it ‘we are present to ourselves but never coincide 
entirely with ourselves’ and ‘to make the subject into an ego is to destroy 
consciousness’. Merleau-Ponty said earlier that through temporality there 
can be the self, sense and reason. So at most there is a ‘self’, an abstract 
understanding of the ‘I’. However, all children confuse in the same period 
of their life the ‘I’ and ‘you’, even deaf children that only live in sign 
language. One would say it is easy to point to oneself and to the other. 
Correcting the ‘I’ and ‘you’ is not of help. All children must go through 
that period (NRC, M, March 2003, p. 30). So it seems the ‘I’ is not innate 
but learned on the reflective, conceptual level. 
 
In the Buddhist (Abhidharma) school was unanimous agreement 
on the more experientially direct claim that each of the senses, eye, ear, 
nose, tongue, body (tactile, HL) and mind (mental, HL) had a different 
consciousness […] that is, at each moment of experience there was a 
different experiencer as well as a different object of experience (Varela et 
al, 1992b, p. 70). This makes other cited cognitive scientists in Varela et al 
say consciousness is a dis-unity. Please note that mind is also a sense in this 
Buddhism school; they distinguish a mental consciousness. Langer (1989, 
p. 74) argues Merleau-Ponty asserts that the self which sees or the self 
which hears is in some way a specialized self. 
A basic element is a phenomenon, something that in the ordinary 
sense occurs, arises or is found in experience. The interesting remark is that 
each element, each moment of consciousness, consists of the 
consciousness itself (called the primary mind) and its mental factors 
(among others feeling, perception, attention, HL). For consciousness is the 
third link in the circular chain of causality, called the Wheel of Life and the 
Wheel of Karma with its past (2 links), present (8 links) and future (2 links) 
(Varela et al, 1992b, p. 112). This Wheel of Karma is a kind of ‘pointer’ for 
the meditation practitioner; the definitions of many mental factors should 
not be taken too compulsively, according to Varela et al (1992b, p. 121). 
The circle can be used to describe events of any duration from a single 
moment to a lifetime or, in the Buddhist view, to many lifetimes.  
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 Apart from the many lifetimes, this is comparable to Merleau-Ponty’s 
primordial time experience in relation to meaning. Present can be today or 
our entire lifetime dependent on how we demarcate, we said. However, the 
difference is in true time we always live in the field of presence of past, 
present and future, whereas in Buddhism the Wheel ‘spins’ from past to 
present and future. Future is the birth, the becoming of new moments and 
situations that end or die, the latter being the last link and the link to the next 
cycle of the chain. Moreover, as Varela et al say (1992b, p. 115) “nothing 
could be done about the past; one cannot go back and remove past 
ignorance (the first link, HL) and volitional actions”, the latter being the 
second link in the past. In Merleau-Ponty’s opinion we can go back by re-
opening the past, which is of course not to say we are able to remove actions 
in the past. Each link conditions and is conditioned by each of the others 
(1992b, p. 110). Metaphorically, we could say that these motifs have a fractal 
character: the same patterns seem to appear even when we change the scale 
of observation by orders of magnitude (1992b, p. 111).  
The first link of the Wheel in the past is Ignorance. Varela et al go on 
to say that it could also be rendered as bewilderment (1992b, p. 111). If 
bewilderment is here referred to as amazement with regard to the world, the 
best description according to Merleau-Ponty of the incomplete transcend-
dental or phenomenological reduction, then one could say the ‘starting point’ 
is the same in both insights; it is the phenomenon. For instance, 
concentration on breathing is sometimes used as an aid for the novice in 
meditation. 
 
“And of course there was agreement (in that school, HL) that no actual self 
was to be found in consciousness, either in the experiencer, the object of 
experience, or the mental factors binding them together” (1992b, p. 70). If 
there is no experienced self, then how is it that we think there is? What is the 
origin of our self-serving habits? What is it in experience that we take for the 
self? (1992b, p. 63). The answers go beyond the scope of this thesis; I will 
just give two sentences. Virtually the entire Buddhist path has to do with 
going beyond emotional grasping to ego (1992b, p. 129). Instead of being 
embodied (more accurately re-embodied moment after moment) out of 
struggle, habit and sense of self, the goal is to become embodied out of 
compassion for the world (1992b, p. 252). In this context Varela et al give an 
example of this abstract notion, as they call it (1992b, p. 249). “We usually 
read books like this with some heavy-handed sense of purpose. Imagine for a 
moment that you are reading this solely in order to benefit others. Does that 
change the feeling tone of the task?”  
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 Consciousness […] always refers to the dualistic sense of 
experience in which there is an experiencer, an object experienced, and a 
relation (or relations) binding them together (1992b, p. 67).  The mental 
factors are the relations that bind the consciousness to its object and at 
each moment a consciousness is dependent on its momentary combination 
of mental factors like the hand (the emergent) and its fingers (1992b, p. 68). 
If ‘dualistic’ refers to ‘duality’ we are talking about the same insight with 
regard to consciousness although it seems in Buddhism with a different 
time experience, whereby the dualistic sense refers to the experiencer, 
objects and the relation. 
“More important, it is not the abstract idea of an emergent self that 
we (human beings, HL) cling to so fiercely as our ego; we cling to a ‘real’ 
ego-self (1992b, p. 70). In the mindfulness/awareness tradition, the attitude 
is to hold the puzzle of this momentariness vividly in mind by considering 
that the grasping toward a self could occur within any given moment of 
experience (1992b, p. 71). “Ego-self, then, is the historical pattern among 
moment-to-moment emergent formations”. Emergent formations, because 
it is the emergence of the interplay between consciousness and various 
present or omnipresent mental factors. “To make use of a scientific 
metaphor, we could say that such traces (karma) are one’s experiential 
ontogeny […] as a process of becoming that is conditioned by past structures 
while maintaining structural integrity from moment to moment. On an 
even larger scale, karma also expresses phylogeny, for it conditions 
experience through the accumulated and collective history of our species” 
(p. 121, my emphasis).     
How interesting Varela et al’s insights may be, I do see little further 
interaction between Buddhism and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, also 
witness sentences like “Indeed, we do not say ‘I am a body’ but ‘I have a 
body’ (1992b, p. 66). For Merleau-Ponty experience is the process of 
transcendence. For Varela et al experience is what it means to be human in 
everyday, lived situations (1992b, p. xv). “We would say that the inten-
tionality of cognition as embodied action consists primarily in the directed-
ness of action. Here the two-sidedness of intentionality corresponds to 
what the system takes its possibilities for action to be and to how the 
resulting situations fulfil or fail to fulfil these possibilities” (Varela et al, 
1992b, p. 206). Here they refer in a footnote to the ‘considerable echo’ of 
Heidegger; they could have also referred to Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
‘I can’ too, meaning anticipating unrealised possibilities in perception; the 
intention and the realization thereof. 
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 Perception as, what is called the third aggregate (heap) as part of the 
fifth, being consciousness, is a mental factor coupled with three root 
impulses (also called the poisons), passion/desire (desirable objects), 
aggression/anger (undesirable objects) and delusion/ignoring (neutral 
objects). Poisons because they are the beginnings of actions that will lead to 
further ego grasping (1992b, p. 66). Perception normally arises inseparable 
with feeling (1992b, p. 120). This feeling corresponds to the poisons. This is 
a different way of describing perception than Merleau-Ponty does. More-
over, as we have seen the time experience differs. Their insights have helped 
us in the, as they call it, problematic relations among consciousness, mind 
and self (1992b, p. 51). But our self as an abstract understanding of the ‘I’ has 
gone up in smoke. It is a bit childish to say: No wonder they have not found 
a self. It is difficult to find something abstract (not imaginable as form). One 
would say there simply is no way out. But there seems to be a way out. It is a 
feel of continuity. It will be discussed under 3.7. And, as can be seen in 
appendix 4, ‘the act of perception is pre-occupying me’. That ‘me’ can be 
different me’s as in Buddhism there are different experiencers. For instance, 
if you have seen a James Bond film you are a match for the world.  
 
3.6  The other 
 
The other is part of the body image (see Glossary) and is 
understood prior to any reflection (Langer, 1989, p. 101). We all will have 
the experience in a mass of people, like a platform, that if you do not feel 
‘very well’ or are shaky on your legs, it looks other people ‘feel’ or ‘notice’ 
that immediately within a split second and consequently pay less attention 
to where you walk. Also in sport it is known that the awaiting team player 
gets more injuries than the player who dives in the scrimmage. These 
phenomena can be explained by not being-in-the-world ‘optimally’ in the 
inter-subjectivity the social world is. These examples illustrate how ‘bodily’ 
we are orientated. 
Apart from the mystery of meaning inhibiting cells (1997, p. 409), 
Merleau-Ponty also sees the other human being as a mystery in his later 
work. Husserl struggled his entire life with the question of the other. 
Merleau-Ponty follows him much in the same wording.  
As Moran (2001, p. 432) argues: “The other is not an offspring of my 
spirit, Merleau-Ponty says, but my twin or flesh of my flesh”. On page 429, 
Moran explains how Merleau-Ponty interpreted ‘flesh’.  
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 “The fact that the body is both perceiver and perceived is expressed by our 
experience of flesh. Things are encrusted in the flesh of the body, just as 
the body is part of the fabric of the world. The term flesh is to indicate a 
certain experience of a surface which has an inside and yet where the inside 
and outside meet, Merleau-Ponty’s way of overcoming the traditional 
subject-object dichotomy”. In biological terms one could say he means a 
kind of membrane. “The other’s body is an unexpected response I get 
from elsewhere”. Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 284) quotes Herder: “The 
human being is a continuous sensorium commune, that again and again is 
hit from another side”; that sensorium is the primordial layer of perceiving. 
“The other and myself are like two nearly concentric circles (a mutual 
central point in the middle, HL), but the other’s dwelling elsewhere 
deprives me of my central location. […] Merleau-Ponty sees the mystery of 
the other as really nothing more than the mystery of my relation to myself, 
my own ability to adopt perspectives other than mine. […] The experience 
of the other is always that of a replica of myself, of a response to myself. 
The solution must be thought in the direction of that strange (af)filiation 
which makes the other forever my second, even when I refer him to myself 
and sacrifice myself to him. It is in the very depths of myself that this 
strange articulation with the other is fashioned. The mystery of the other is 
nothing but the mystery of myself. A second spectator on the world can be 
born from me”. In Merleau-Ponty’s own words, a philosopher is also 
always situated. I cannot avoid the impression that in this formulation also 
much of his life comes together (religious, a strong bond with his mother, 
recapturing his happy childhood, looking for accompany but later on living 
as a recluse). However, it is clear this formulation does not bring us any 
further. 
 
Merleau-Ponty ends his work (1997, p. 517) with the words of De 
Saint-Exupéry “The human being is nothing than a node of relations; it 
only are the relationships that count for a human being”. Earlier (1997, p. 
40) Merleau-Ponty said human beings are a node of relations of experien-
ces. According to Moran (2001, p. 429) Merleau-Ponty said in later works 
we belong to ‘a system of exchanges’. “Colours, sounds and things are the 
focal points and radiance of being”. The beginnings of the insight of a 
‘system of exchanges’ are also visible on page 39:” The phenomenological 
world is no pure being. It is the meaning that becomes visible on the 
crossing of my experiences and on the crossing of mine and those of the 
other because they grasp in each other.  
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 That is why the world does not allow being separated from the subjectivity 
and inter-subjectivity. They form a unity […]”. For Merleau-Ponty social 
means mutually being-in-the-world. In Langer’s words: “The hold (or grip, 
HL) on the world which others have – and which they are – enriches me by 
enabling me to achieve a more comprehensive view of the world than is 
offered by my own hold alone. Far from being mutually exclusive, these 
multiple modes of being-in-the-world are internally related and form a social 
world”. Our perspectives ‘slip into’ each other and are brought together in a 
shared social world. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, we know that we are 
companions perceiving the same world.  
From a biological point of view, at the basis of living creatures is 
interaction, also seen as cooperation and coordination of actions. This is the 
historical basis of living creatures, as opposed to competition and ‘laws of the 
jungle’ (Maturana & Varela, 1989). They emphasize Darwin used the term 
‘natural selection’ metaphorically. According to Hoogerwerf (NRC, 03.21.02) 
‘survival of the fittest’ stems from H. Spencer, a railway engineer and 
philosopher and not from Darwin. ‘Natural selection’ should not be 
interpreted as ‘instructive interactions from the environment’, because that 
would mean all instructable systems would adopt the same state under the 
same perturbations and would be indistinguishable to an observer (Maturana, 
1978). It is the differential – in mathematical terms the infinite small growth, 
HL - effectiveness of the actual operation of different structures of different 
organisms that constitutes the process of selection in living systems. 
Maturana (1978) gives a technical, biological example in vertebrates, the long 
and the short of it is some substance selects, through differential triggering, 
which substances, capable of something, multiply. Cooperation is exactly 
what the Gaia hypothesis presupposes with regard to evolution. From the 
perspective of the Gaia hypothesis, as developed by Margulis & Lovelock, 
simply stated, the surface of the Earth, which we always considered to be the 
environment of life, is really part of life. The blanket of air - the troposphere 
- should be considered a circulatory system, produced and sustained by life. 
Life actually makes and forms and changes the environment to which it 
adapts. That ‘environment’ feeds back on the life that is changing and acting 
and growing in it. There are constant cyclical interactions (Capra, 1997). It is 
a matter of finding a balance with an environment in a structural coupling, 
the history of constantly repeating interactions, which lead to a structural 
congruence between two or more systems, second order unity or 
metacellulair unity. If two autopoietic unities operate by repeated interactions 
in a domain of structural coupling, the structural coupling can go into two 
directions.  
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 One goes in the direction of enclosing each other’s boundaries, which is 
called symbiosis. Perren (in Oswick & Grant, 1996) argues it is possible to 
juxtapose the characteristics of natural symbiosis with the relationships that 
exist between small firms. In older biological classifications the term 
symbiosis was used for mutually beneficial associations only; recently it has 
been used more generally to cover three types of association: 
-  Parasitism: the parasite obtains benefit while causing harm to the host, as  
   for example owner-managers use their old employer’s contacts and  
   resources to help set themselves up; 
-  Commensalism: the commensal gains without harm to the host, as for  
   example a referral system between a bank and an accountant where  
   referrals only go one way; 
-  Mutualism: both gain from the relationship, as for example buyer- 
   supplier  relations. 
Maturana & Varela (1989) are, as we have seen, more interested in the 
second direction, the structural coupling, whereby the cells (or organisms) 
maintain their individual boundaries. 
 
Maturana (1988) speaks of social phenomena in a very strict sense. 
When he speaks of love he speaks of a biological phenomenon; he speaks 
of the emotion that specifies the domain of actions in which living systems 
coordinate their actions in a manner that entails mutual acceptance 
(contrary to negation, HL), and he claims that such operation constitutes 
social phenomena. Emotions have a biological foundation; they are as 
biological phenomena proper to our body hoods. Culture does not 
constitute our emotions, but the course of our emotioning is mostly 
cultural. Maturana argues it is constitutive of social systems that the 
components that realise them should be living systems. This means that 
any operation in a social system that denies or destroys the living condition 
of its components denies or destroys it. This, of course also applies to 
human social systems. Without the prevalence of sincerity the primate 
evolution that gave origin to humanity would not have taken place. As I 
interpret this, ‘sincerity’ would mean ‘fairness’ in the sense of sharing and 
caring, also in light of his remark that our concern for the other is 
emotional, not rational. Maturana & Varela (1989) argue that the biological 
basis features are still present in us as human beings, although we have 
blurred them by competition and war-likeness.  
Social systems are conservative systems. The new members of a 
social system learn the behaviour proper to them in it as they contribute to 
its constitution through their participation in it.  
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 If this does not occur, the new member-to-be does not become a member, 
or the new member is dropped out. At the same time, a member of a social 
system that begins to behave in a manner that is not proper to it stops being 
a member of it, and is ignored or treated as alien, or its behaviour is adopted 
and becomes an innovator”.  
Non-social communities can for instance be working communities or 
hierarchical communities. It depends of the emotion involved that give rise 
to co-ordinations of actions that an observer sees as the behaviour of, in 
these cases, fulfilment of a task or obedience.  
Maturana & Varela (1989) argue: “knowing that we know is 
obligatory”. It obliges us to realize that the world we live in is not the world, 
rather a world, which we together with others call into being. It obliges us to 
recognize that in coexistence with others certainty (in the sense of prejudices 
and assumptions, HL) is no guarantee for truth. Coexistence with others 
demands the awareness, that certainty of the other –however objectionable it 
may seem in my eyes- is even legitimate and valid as mine. 
 
3.7 Ideal meaning of the intentional act  
 
What follows here is not only illustrative for the way Merleau-Ponty 
is influenced by Husserl. Husserl’s ‘ego’ is only to be substituted by Merleau-
Ponty’s ‘most exact consciousness’. That consciousness is both ‘affected by it 
self’ or ‘given to itself’. It is also a route to find out more about the 
Weltanschauung. In this section I quote Moran until it says ‘Unquote’. 
Husserl disagrees with Frege’s idiosyncratic (curious, HL) termino-
logical distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung and continues to use the two 
interchangeable. Frege held the strange view that all true sentences have the 
same reference, namely the true, whereas for Husserl the references of 
sentences will be the state of affairs that they affirm as holding. […] States of 
affairs are that which is said to be the case or to hold if a sentence is true. 
Sentences are truth bearers, whereas states of affairs are truth makers,  which 
makes the sentences true (Moran, 2001, p. 112, my italics). It refers to what 
Beer says: the convention and what is to count as a fact. 
For Husserl expressions in so far as they have senses also have 
intended references, but these intended references may be quite vague and 
general until they are specified by context, and for some expressions (e.g. 
round square) the reference is incapable of being fulfilled. 
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 In general a meaning has a ‘range of possible fulfilment’. Unquote. So the 
fulfilment of a meaning in expressions (written or uttered) can be the state 
of affairs, the intended references and the intended references specified by 
context. Here we see again the figure – background setting. 
“Husserl is at pains to stress that we must recognise, besides real 
existent things in the world, such as stones and horses, with their causal 
powers and interactions, another domain of object-hood, which contains 
such ‘irreal’ or ‘ideal’ objectivities as the “Pythagorean theorem’ or the 
number ‘4’. Such irreal or ideal objects are, in their numerically identical 
singularity, substrates7 of true or false judgements just as real things are; 
conversely ‘object’ in the most universal logical sense means nothing else 
than anything at all concerning which statements can be made sensefully 
and in truth (Moran, 2001, p. 99). 
“For Husserl, different expressions in the same language may 
express the same meaning. Meanings are ideal self-identical unities (e.g. that 
the three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point, p. 111, HL), 
which are the correlates8 (one of two related phenomena) of the expressive 
acts (e.g. written or uttered sentences, p. 110, HL). As such they (meanings, 
HL) are to be distinguished from the objects referred to through our 
expressive acts of meaning. Or to put it another way, meanings are not 
ontological (theory of being; theory of general features of things, HL) items 
in the manner in which ideal objects are (Moran, p. 101). Unquote. So the 
general features of the ideal object ‘2 + 2 = 4’ have to be distinguished 
from the related phenomenon what it means. It will become clearer in the 
following examples where Husserl distinguishes between the matter of the 
act (content) and the quality of the act (judgement) and the unity of the 
matter and quality of the act (semantic essence) and ideal meaning. 
 
What follows is a 1½  page summary of Moran’s 19 pages account 
of Husserl’s concept of constitution, a central notion and one of the least 
explained. This is certainly not to say that ‘it could have been told shorter’. 
To the contrary, but we will not need it all. Husserl explored, refined and 
revised his insights frequently. The concepts of ‘noesis’ and ‘noema’ can be 
found on the pages 155 – 160; the rest on the pages 164 – 178 (2001). 
Gradually we will descend to what might be a self and Weltanschauung.  
 
 
7 In Dutch: grondslag 
8 In Dutch: wisselbegrip 
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 Constitution refers to the manner in which objects are ‘built up’ for 
consciousness out of a synthesis (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) of sensory 
intuitions (Anschauungen) and various categories, which are applied 
according to rules. Objectivity is constituted out of subjectivity. Constitution 
should perhaps be thought as a kind of setting out or ‘positing’, ‘as a giving 
of sense’, ‘sense-bestowing’. Unquote. This is Bakker’s (1986) explanation, 
giving meaning. Perhaps, Moran continues, because it is a concept Husserl 
employs rather than elucidates. Constitution can mean ‘putting together’ in 
the sense of ‘constructing’, ‘producing’, ‘making’ or even ‘creating’. He 
distinguishes between a kind of passive production (in the case of natural 
objects) and production which presupposes ‘genuine activity, an operation’. 
The grasping of something as ‘collectivity’ or ‘part’ is produced by an act of 
syntheses. 
Static constitution considers the noetic and noematic structures, 
which make it possible for objects to be intuited in consciousness. Noesis is 
‘the act of thinking’; it includes the quality of the act (judgement, HL) that 
which all acts of hoping, or remembering have in common. It is responsible 
for bestowing sense. The noesis is considered in its essence to contain within 
it something like a sense. Unquote. Here I see a parallel with Merleau-Ponty’s 
immanent meaning. 
Correlative to the noetic element of the act there is the ‘noematic 
content’ or noema and even perceptual acts have a ‘sense’ in this wide sense. 
Noema is ‘what is thought’. Noesis and noema are correlative parts of the 
structure of the mental process. It is about the relation of sense and 
reference, the notion of ‘object which is intended’ and ‘object as it is 
intended’. The noema is that through which the object is grasped; it is the 
route to the object. It is not the object. To examine the structure of the 
‘perceived as perceived’ is to examine the noema. Noema is what makes the 
underlying ‘sameness’ of an object, experienced in different ways (now actually, 
then in memory, but the object stays the same). Noema is ‘all that features of 
the act in virtue of which it has the object it has’.  
 
‘The object which is intended’ and ‘object as it is intended’ deserves 
some illustration. Moran (2001, p. 115) states complex acts are best 
understood as part-whole structures, where the wholes are founded on the 
parts.  
Husserl distinguished between the quality and the matter of an 
intentional (being conscious of, HL) act.  
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 “Thus when I judge that ‘2 + 2 = 4’ the act-quality is one of judgement and 
the matter of the act is the prepositional content ‘2 + 2 = 4’ (Moran, p. 
116). Unquote. This distinction comes nearby Merleau-Ponty’s description 
of the motive in chapter 2. The factual situation (the content; sameness) 
and the decision (the act, judgement and something of a sense).  
Husserl also distinguished between ‘the object which is intended’ 
and ‘the object as it is intended’. He gives the example that we can think of 
the German Emperor (object which is intended) as ‘the son of Emperor 
Frederick III’ or as ‘the grandson of Queen Victoria’ (Moran, 2001, p. 118).  
The interesting conclusion is two people may make the same judgement 
and employ the same matter and still end up with two distinct and differing 
meaning conceptions. “To articulate this, Husserl makes a distinction 
between semantic essence and the ideal meaning of the act. […] The 
semantic essence is the unity of the act’s quality and matter”. In the 
example it is ‘the German Emperor’. Unquote. So it looks like Husserl 
combines the noesis and noema as the semantic essence and distinguishes 
the ideal meaning of the act. 
 
I will give another example of how this actually can work in 
practice. The semantic essence is ‘coach’. My wife winds up her training 
and orders by telephone a posy for her female trainer at the flower shop, 
which has to re-order it somewhere else. The accompanying card reads 
‘Thanks coach, regards Karin’. Someone in one of the flower shops thinks, 
by hearing the word coach ‘must be a man instead of a woman’ (the ideal 
meaning). The posy is delivered for the attention of Mister X, indeed a 
dedicated football coach. Due to his circumstances, he can use some 
support. He thinks ‘at last, I do not know Karin, but once in a while I 
deserve flowers’. The female trainer, coming home, is unable to convince 
him that the flowers are hers. The sister of X, on visit, attracted by the 
flowers and reading the card, compliments X. Nobody is happy anymore. 
It illustrates meaning conceptions often are the source of 
misunderstandings (in business).  
 
But there is lot of unclearness among authors of what noema really 
is (Moran, 2001). Static constitution sees things in their types and arranges 
them in a synchronic (a certain period, HL) hierarchical order. Static 
constitutional analysis did not fully capture the diachronic (historic, HL) 
layering of our experience of objects and of ourselves as historical beings. 
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 Genetic (from genesis, becoming, HL) constitution examines the 
manner in which objects appear within the temporal flow of our experience, 
the temporal approach being crucial to our understanding of human beings 
and cultural objects. That genesis belongs to a totally different transcendental 
world than does the natural (every day) and natural-scientific genesis.  
Passive genesis refers to the structuring of objects in layers sedimented 
upon one other like before we had an adult perception of things in the world 
we saw them as children. Passive synthesis refers to the manner in which we 
experience sense-contents already structured and laid out before us. Unquote. Both 
passive genesis and passive synthesis have to do with how our 
Weltanschauung comes into being (genesis in history) and how we experien-
ce past meanings (synthesis). That would explain why a Weltanschauung is 
not ‘carved in marble’ forever because our experience of past meaning might 
change (slightly) over time. 
Moran continues passive genesis is, as it were, the history of a series 
of acts of passive synthesis, as used above. Unquote. In other words, the 
structuring (of objects; anything at all) in layers is the history of how we 
experience sense already structured. In still other words, Weltanschauung is a 
layered concept based on how we experience past meanings. Weltanschauung 
is not past meaning but rather how we experience past meaning. 
The basic eidetic (essential, HL) law or principle of passive genesis 
(the layers, HL) is called ‘association’ (involuntary, unconsciously connection 
of related impressions, HL). Association is a set of laws determining why it is 
that one experience points forward to something similar. It is a primitive 
feature of all sense bestowing. Unquote. Here ‘the meaning it lends’ comes 
back. According to Moran its key characteristic was to produce a sense of felt 
belongingness between the two contents, which are connected together. 
Unquote.  
That ‘felt belongingness’ has striking similarities with what Merleau-
Ponty says with regard to metaphor, the analogy (similarity, HL) in its 
function it refers to, and what Crépeau says with regard to proverbs. The 
‘mechanism’ is the same. According to Crépeau the basis for analogy 
formation is a given opposition. There is an implicit ‘common term’ between 
the two oppositional terms, which represents the ‘key of the analogy’. And 
closing the loop, that are invariants as discussed in appendix 2. This all relates 
to how a Weltanschauung comes into being (genesis; history). 
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 But may be of more interest is the word ‘felt’ in a sense of felt 
belongingness. In Buddhism “Feeling has, as its basis, one of the six senses 
(one sees, hears, tastes, smells, touches and thinks, HL). At the point of 
feeling, one is actually struck by the world - in phenomenological language, 
one could say we find ourselves thrown into the world” (Varela et al, p. 
113).What that means we have discussed. It also means they are implicit or 
tacit. As such they have to be distinguished from emotions as arousal. In 
Buddhism feeling or the feeling tone is a mental factor; the relation to the 
object or in Moran’s words Husserl’s route to the object (noema). In the 
structuring of objects in layers sedimented upon one other there is now a 
feel involved like before we had an adult perception of things in the world 
we saw them as children. That would mean that a Weltanschauung is a 
coherent whole based on a sense of feelings. 
Moran continues the ego itself is only understandable through ‘the 
phenomenology of genesis’. On the other hand, there appear to be some 
elements in the ego, its self-presence, its self-givenness in the present, which are 
absolutely originally given and hence not constituted. The self is experien-
ced as something constantly being generated in a temporal manner. 
Unquote. The ‘self-givenness’ and ‘constantly being generated in a 
temporal manner’ is identical to Merleau-Ponty’s duality of ‘given to itself’ 
or ‘affected by itself’. The self-consciousness is the ‘given to itself’, the time 
unfolded, the past. The simultaneously occurring consciousness is the 
‘affected by itself’, time in a process of unfolding in a field of presence. 
According to Husserl, the ‘given to itself’ is absolutely originally given and 
not constituted. Here we come across the same problem we had before 
with regard to ‘close on itself’ in constituting out of time. This then in my 
view means that in the given aspect (the time aspect) feeling is involved in 
sedimentation (felt belongingness) and in the affected aspect (the being 
aspect) sense bestowing or sense making is involved in time experience. 
Husserl revised the characterization of the ego frequently. Later on 
he thinks the ego also can be passively affected by its experiences. The ego is 
not empty of content; it is full of attitudes, beliefs, it has character 
(properties, HL) made up of ‘convictions’ and ‘habitualities’ that have accrued 
to it, stances which are not necessarily articulated in occurrent acts of 
believe. Convictions come together into layers to form the ‘spiritual (the 
whole of opinions, ways of thinking, principles, HL) ego’, which has its 
free moments and its moments of being caught up in habitual modes of 
behaviour. The ego has a set of abilities, of ‘I can’s’. 
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 The embodied ego is a particularisation of the general transcendental ego. 
Later on Husserl saw the ego as built up from habitualities, which attach to it 
in a manner, which can only be investigated by genetic phenomenological 
analysis. Thus when I come to have a conviction, that conviction becomes 
part of myself, of my character, even if I am not consciously alluding it. The ego acquires 
abiding properties. Husserl now recognised that he needed to treat of dispositional 
mental states as well as occurrent mental acts, to have an account of how the ego 
comes to have contentful personal character, to be an ego which believes 
that the earth is round, and so on. When I decide something, that act-process 
of deciding quickly vanishes but the decision persists, attached to the ego, 
even in sleep. I am in a state of being ‘thus and so decided’, which should not 
be misunderstood as a stream of decisions actively going on. There is actually 
no process at all going on, for Husserl; rather the ego by his own active 
generating constitutes itself as a fixed and abiding personal ego. In a sense, 
the constitution of the ego is a self-constitution, an active genesis of the stable, 
abiding ego on the basis of its own convictions. More and more Husserl saw 
the problem of the constitution of the ego as deeply related to the source of 
time consciousness. The flow of time is a connectedness that makes the unity of 
one consciousness. Time is the universal form of all egological (Husserl’s 
term for phenomenology, based on the ego, HL) genesis. Perhaps Husserl 
thought of a transcendental ego as having a life of its own. Till so far the 
quotations of Moran.  
3.8  Weltanschauung and self 
 
Husserl’s ‘acquired abiding properties’, dispositional mental states, 
the ‘thus and so decided’ state and ‘even if I am not consciously alluding’ is 
of interest with regard to Weltanschauung. In Buddhism (Varela et al, 1992b, 
p. 63) categories serve on the one hand as simple descriptions of experience 
and on the other hand as pointers toward investigation as a framework. One 
that is common to all Buddhist schools is known as the five aggregates or 
heaps. One is material and the rest is mental. All five together constitute the 
psycho-physical complex that makes up a person and that makes up each 
moment of experience. They are: forms (material as the six senses including 
mind-thoughts), feelings / sensations, perceptions, dispositional formations 
and consciousnesses. The fourth aggregate (heap) is called dispositional 
formations.  
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 They refer to habitual patterns of thinking, feeling, perceiving and acting. 
This aggregate is embedded in the fifth, being consciousness. The fourth 
heap, dispositional formations, is a feel of continuity, as if there were a self, 
distinct from changes over time in our habits, motives and emotional 
tendencies. Varela et al (1992b, p. 69) wonder: Perhaps the self is an 
emergent property of the aggregates? This idea is even plausible as they 
state but of no help because such a mechanism is not evident in experien-
ce. More important, it is not the abstract idea of an emergent self that we 
cling so fiercely as our ego; we cling to a “real” ego-self as they said.  
The temporal relationship between a consciousness and its object 
was the subject of great dispute among the Abhidharma schools (1992b, p. 
68). East and West would meet, if there is a feel of continuity (or feel of 
self) in time consciousness. That would relate to the ‘given to itself’ aspect 
in the duality of the consciousness. A sense of continuity embedded in 
consciousness corresponds to Merleau-Ponty’s ‘time (or self) that is 
lasting’, ‘that not goes by’ or ‘not changes itself’. Husserl’s dispositional 
mental states (thus and so decided) and dispositional formations (habits) in 
Buddhism match if we take time consciousness into consideration. What 
this means is human beings also have a style, like the world and time. The 
entire process of life, cognition or conscious life, is subtended by the 
intentional arc that gives unity to our life and takes care we are situated in 
ideological situations, moral situations and the past. Weltanschauung must 
then ‘reside’ in the self-consciousness that coincides with the given to itself 
aspect of the duality of consciousness. The layers in Weltanschauung are 
based on the felt belongingness in the sedimentation that we implicit (tacit) 
experience as given (to itself in self-consciousness). Weltanschauung is a 
distinct part of self-consciousness. Like the world and time have a style, 
human beings have a style of how they stand in situations and view reality 
or the world. Like the intentional arc, Weltanschauung brings further order 
in our life. “It is continuous there and we do not call up for the mind any 
special peculiarity, but we have that power directly, we still keep it in our 
grip. […] It is ‘already there’, like the background behind a figure”.  
 
With regard to the mental states, whether there are contents, 
abiding properties, patterns or emergent formations in consciousness or 
the mind cannot be answered here due to my lack of knowledge of the 
brain and the lack of knowledge of the brain in general.  
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 With regard to Weltanschauung in the structuring of objects in layers 
sedimented upon one other (passive genesis) there is a sense of felt 
belongingness between contents, which are connected together. That means 
a Weltanschauung is a coherent whole, which gives further order to our life 
based on feelings. That relates to our history. How we experience sense-
contents already structured (passive synthesis) relates to the interviews with 
the managers in chapter 8. 
Meaningful events, whether or not accompanied by emotions, are 
structured based on felt belongingness, which we can experience by re-
opening time as discussed at the end of chapter 2.  
One would say there are more or less opposites, not always in terms of bad 
and good, related by an implicit common term, like in the proverb ‘a child 
without father is like a house without a roof’ where the implicit common 
term is protection. That implicit common term as a purpose or inner drive 
seems to be leading in our perceptual guided actions the rest of our life.  
 
In the next chapter we go to sense making again on the reflective 
level. We will re-adjust a few of Weick’s insights, especially where he is in my 
view mixing up Weltanschauung and sense making. The difference is for 
Weick Weltanschauung is a meta-level (over and above) whereas for me it is 
that deep level in time experience (given down under) as discussed so far, 
whereby they presuppose each other in a circular relation. Meaningful events 
form our Weltanschauung whereby Weltanschauung is the ‘playing field’ in 
sense making. Is that playing with words? I do not think so. Like in the true 
time experience, the Weltanschauung has a priority position over sense 
making. But Weick’s insights are valuable and they are mostly in line with 
what has been said so far. 
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 What sense making is not is a metaphor 
 
K. Weick 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. THE REFLECTIVE LEVEL 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we go from the pre-reflective level to the reflective 
level. We will further discuss the line connecting meaning– action in figure 
1 in chapter 1. We will discuss the process of sense making in the sections 
4.2 and 4.3. It will turn out that common sense has nothing to do with the 
sense making process we discuss here. There is a subtle difference between 
‘it makes sense’ and ‘sense making’. Common sense will be discussed in 
section 4.4. In sense making and common sense background or context 
play an important role. That is also the case with information. With infor-
mation will be dealt in section 4.5. In the previous chapter we discussed 
feelings, the feeling tone and felt belongingness. In section 4.6 we will 
briefly deal with emotions. The human being is what he is in language. That 
is the reason we will touch on language, metaphor and proverb in section 
4.7. Proverbs reflect our Weltanschauung pre-eminently. In section 4.8 we 
will cast doubt on rationality. The question will be: can human beings be 
rational at all given that so much precedes thought as we have seen in the 
foregoing chapters. This chapter will end in section 4.9 where a definition 
of sense making is given based on the most salient features we came across 
so far.  
In my opinion Weick is right in stating that sense making is not a 
metaphor. In essence, metaphor is more restricted. In the words of Ricoeur 
(1978) ‘seeing as’ defines the resemblance and not the reverse. We see or 
we do not see, but if we see the image is tied (or defined). The ‘seeing as’ in 
metaphor is half thought and half experience. For further arguments the 
reader is referred to appendix 1. With proverbs will be dealt in more depth 
in appendix 2. 
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 4.2  It can’t be, thus it isn’t (Weick, 1995) 
 
In chapter 2 we said ambiguity is unclear meaning. Weick argues that 
ambiguity may among other things trigger sense making. One would say here 
again we talk about circularity. On the pre-reflective level sense making in 
perception leads to ambiguity whereas on the reflective level ambiguity 
triggers further sense making. Following McCaskey’s, Weick (1995, p. 83) 
mentions characteristics of ambiguous situations in organizations and we will 
elaborate a bit more on these characteristics. These characteristics are: 
- Messy problems. According to Checkland & Scholes (1998) messy 
problems are: stakeholders fail to agree on whether or not there is a 
   problem and if so, what the nature is, how it should be solved and by 
whom. For these problems Checkland & Scholes (1998) developed 
Soft Systems Methodology (“SSM”) whereby Weltanschauung, that 
makes meaningful the Transformation (what we do) in context, plays 
an important role. Hard systems are according to them where the ‘what 
to do’ is already defined and one looks at ‘how to do it’. In soft systems 
the ‘what’ and ‘how’ are not yet defined. Weltanschaaung is directed to 
the question of effectiveness, do we do the right things? The addition 
‘in context’ means that Weltanschaaung, like meaning, is a layered 
concept. SSM is one of the five steps in Viplan as developed by Espejo. 
If we supplement Checkland’s CATWOE, being Customers, Actors, 
Transformation, Weltanschauung, Owners (who can stop T) and 
Environmental constraints (constraints outside the system) by Espejo’s 
TASCOI, T (same), A (same), Suppliers, C (same), O (who ensure T is 
carried out) and Interveners (influence T from outside the system), we 
can bring all the relevant stakeholders into the rich picture. From here 
we can define the root definition, do X, by means of Y, for the purpose 
Z and construct the conceptual models. Checkland & Scholes (1998) 
emphasize that changes to improve the situation must be systemically 
desirable and culturally feasible and not the other way round. 
- The amount and reliability of information is problematical. As Weick 
said earlier, the problem is that information may not resolve misunder-
standings. Information is also embedded in a context or the set of all 
the possibilities, which gives the message meaning. In section 4.5 we 
will elaborate a bit more on the subject and the relation between 
information and action. 
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 - Multiple conflicting interpretations. This makes clear that sense  
 making is a higher abstraction that includes among other things the 
 class of interpretive activities. 
- Different value orientations, political/emotional clashes. This has to 
 do with Weltanschaaung. It emphasises that meaning and 
 Weltanschauung presupposes each other. 
- Goals are unclear, lack of time/money/attention. Creation of 
 meaning is according to Weick a social and attentional process (1995,  
 p. 25). A lack of time and money are environmental constraints. We  
 will come back on the issue of social in this section. 
- Paradoxes appear. Paradox will always result when one formulates a  
 set that contains itself, like ‘All…are…’ or someone is both observer  
 and the person being observed (Web Dictionary of Cybernetics and  
 Systems, HL);   
- Vague roles. 
- Success measures are lacking 
- Poor understanding of cause-effect relationships, metaphors used  
 instead of precise definition.  
- Participation in decision-making is fluid. Hence a participative  
decision making method without a chairman like Team Syntegrity. 
Mindful of what has been said about emergent properties, there is 
prove enough that we can also often do without a chairman as the 
central processing unit in meetings. There is a condition: a few simple 
rules we keep up to and facilitators/logisticians who place themselves 
in service of participants. 
 
Most so-called Large Scale Interventions like Team Syntegrity are 
directed towards these situations. Homan (I think it was 1997) lists 16 
Large Scale Interventions. He distinguishes clusters such as ‘trawling’, 
‘creating the learning space’, ‘problem solving’, ‘telescoping’ or ‘building’. 
Homan argues as regards function Team Syntegrity can be placed in all 
clusters with the exception of ‘trawling’. I can only agree. In one of these 
sessions, aimed at strategy (telescoping) in a big company, participants of 
different departments spoke interchangeable about flexibility, variable and 
custom made. It appeared these ambiguous concepts had no meaning for 
them. They decided to define these concepts where after they decided 
never to use the word variable again in the company. It only led to 
misunderstandings.  
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 The commitment of people, also to their employer, in these processes can 
best be illustrated by an e-mail a participant sent afterwards: ‘I had a 
headache and slept badly. But I would not have missed it not for all the tea in 
China’. Another participant said: ‘I got the chance to have my say. From that 
I made full use of’. In another session a dominant, rather emotional manager 
(a Basque living in the U.S.) wrote afterwards ‘I learned a lot about myself’. 
These processes are powerful if done well. It is not only about learning 
together but also about sense making together in an effective, structured way.  
It is here already interesting to note that what Leonard (in Beer, 1994, 
p. 122) refers to is outdated since a few years ago. So she could not know this 
at the time of writing. In the most difficult part in the process, called The 
Hexadic Reduction, say 30 statements (or topics) of the participants must be 
‘divided’ over 12 ‘junctions’ by themselves. The question thereby is not ‘do 
these topics relate to marketing or logistics?’ but ‘in what sense do these 
topics relate’? Thus the outcome can be that one ‘junction’ gets one state-
ment on a ‘stand-alone’ basis whereas another ‘junction’ gets four statements. 
Leonard states: “Kelly found that most individuals used only 20 or 30 basic 
distinctions to evaluate all the people and events in their lives. It is not 
surprising then, that a group, focused on a list of topics on a single theme, 
will usually begin to repeat themselves somewhere around ‘The Magical 
Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two’ (Miller, 1967) and that the identification 
of twelve topics according to six distinctions is typical of grids used in many 
settings. This small number of constructs may also reveal some, which 
appear to be core constructs or to imply other sub constructs. It may be 
expected that these core constructs will prove to be most central to questions 
of identity and therefore most resistant to change”. In a NRC article 
(07.04.2004) Hurford says that Cowan refuted Miller’s argument of 7 minus 
or plus 2. Cowan showed that the short-term memory does not come further 
than The Magical Number of 4. If it is apparently more than 4, it is almost 
always chunking; the items are not remembered separately but in 4 small 
groups at a maximum. We can easily remember a pin-code like 7324. A 
telephone number 2367324 is, often unconscious, remembered as 2-36-73-
24. Moreover, what Hurford says about mathematics confirms what is said in 
appendix 1 with regard to Euler’s formula and language. “Language is a 
prerequisite for counting. And all mathematics that has arisen from that is 
also unthinkable without language”. Some participants, sometimes 
overwhelmed by the complexity, often say to the facilitator(s) at the start of 
this part of the process: “You will never succeed in that”.  
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 But we always do in say 2 ½ hours (we have confidence but sometimes 
much to our own surprise). The even smaller number of constructs, 4 
instead of 5 to 9, may explain this. 
 
In Merleau-Ponty’s words (1997, p. 199, 351) there is neither 
absolute sense nor absolute nonsense; there is only sense. “Each sensation 
is already pregnant of a sense”. “Sense and non-sense always go hand in 
hand” as Vlasblom & Tiemersma (1997, p. 15) put it. This corresponds 
with Husserl’s view. “Expressions like ‘round square’ do not lack meaning, 
they are not meaningless, but they lack referential fulfilment. Referential 
fulfilments are acts which confirm meaning (Moran, 2001, p. 92). They are 
absurd or counter-sensical rather than non-sensical” (Moran, 2001, p. 112).  
The problem is that there are too many meanings, not too few 
(Weick, 1995, p. 27). Sense making matters. A failure in sense making is 
consequential as well as existential. It throws into question the nature of 
self and the world. […] The basic question is: is it still possible to take 
things for granted? (Weick, 1995, p. 14). The answer is up to the reader but 
in my opinion it is not. The following properties of sense making have 
been mostly discussed in the foregoing. Sense making (Weick, 1995, p. 17) 
is understood as a process that is: 
 
1) Grounded in identity construction. Identities are constituted out 
of the process of interaction. To shift among interactions is to shift among 
definitions of self (1995, p. 20). We already said the ‘selves’ are part of a 
feel of continuity. “The more selves we have access to the more meanings 
we should be able to extract and impose in any situation. A mutable self 
may cause problems for consistency of one’s self-conceptions unless 
flexibility, mutability and adaptability are themselves central elements in 
that self-conception” (1995, p. 24).  
 
2) Retrospective. “Accordingly, if ‘memory’ is defined as 
‘experience of the past’ then all perception…is a form of memory by this 
definition of the word” (1995, p. 24). “We are always conscious directly 
only of sensory processes, never of motor processes” (p. 26).  
These formulations run counter completely to the insights of 
Merleau-Ponty. First, Merleau-Ponty said perception is no memory. 
Memory is an immediate property of the past. Second, Merleau-Ponty 
describes ‘consciousness’ among other things as ‘being with the things 
through mediation of the body’.  
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 Third, according to Merleau-Ponty, perception is ‘suddenly seeing the spring 
out from an immanent meaning in a constellation of data’. It ‘becomes’ 
instead of being developed in retrospective. So there is reason to leave out 
this property of retrospective with regard to meaning. 
Weick (1995, p. 76-82) refers to a case study in the cashmere sweaters 
industry in Scotland wherein he highlights the several sense making 
properties. “Retrospect as a sense making process is implied rather than 
discussed explicitly in the Hawick study. It is implied by the observation that 
the mental representations in the mental models used by the strategists are 
imperfect and simplified versions of the material world (1995, p. 400). “I 
assume that they have this character in part because they are constructed on 
the basis of hindsight, which conveniently edits out the complex, flawed 
causal chains by which outcomes were actually produced”. Furthermore, the 
outcomes themselves can only be known after the fact, which necessarily 
restricts these people to a backward glance. There is a distinct flavor of 
retrospective sense making in Porac et al’s (1989) discussion of the ‘focus 
strategy’ of these manufacturers, namely ‘to sell premium quality, expensive 
garments through specialist distribution channels to a limited number of high 
income consumers’ (1995, p. 404). […] Having developed over several 
decades in response to problems encountered in the market place”.  
I do not think these arguments speak in favour of retrospect. 
Actually, in my opinion Weick is mixing up here meaning and 
Weltanschauung. In chapter 2 we saw in the section on time Weltanschauung 
relates to the past, the retentions and memory. In this sense Weltanschauung 
is retrospective or ‘implied’ in Weick’s words. Sense making is not in 
retrospective; it ‘becomes’ or to use Merleau-Ponty’s words it is about the 
phenomenology of genesis. 
  
3) Enactive of sensible environments. “I use the word enactment to 
preserve the fact that, in organizational life, people often produce part of the 
environment they face” (1995, p. 30). “Whereas other discussions of 
enactment usually equate it mistakenly with selective perception or with 
action that meets no resistance” (1995, p. 78). Varela et al use the word 
‘enact’ in an extended form as ‘bringing forth a world’ and not restricted to 
organizational life. Bringing forth a world is as we have seen always restricted 
to a limited perspective. “[…] An air traffic controller put five aircraft in a 
holding pattern on a clear day, and between […] there were 10 near misses 
among those five aircraft. […] People created their own environments and 
these environments then constrained their actions” (1995, p. 31).  
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 Weick refers to Follett and states “To remain alert to the ongoing 
codetermination that occurs during sense making we need to be especially 
careful of how we portray process”. This codetermination refers to the 
process of meeting each other and the interwoven-ness of relations in 
terms of “I-plus-you” reacting to “you-plus-me” (1995, p. 33). Weick refers 
here also to Varela et al (1995, p. 37, 38). Throughout this thesis the word 
‘enact’ is understood as Varela et al use it. However, Weick, Varela et al and 
Merleau-Ponty all agree to this co-determination, inter-subjectivity and 
circularity. The extension in the process with ‘I-plus-you’ is certainly some-
thing to keep in the back of our mind in talking about communication.  
 
4) Social. Of interest here is the quote “Naming seems to be a 
satisfying process, like any decision-making” (1995, p. 42). Moreover it is 
not necessary that we share meanings as long as we have workable relations 
(1995, p. 43). Weick distinguishes three levels of sense making in organi-
sations ‘above’ the individual level. Inter-subjective (‘I’ gets transformed 
into ‘we’), generic-subjective ((interchangeable roles) and extra-subjective 
(culture). These three levels are all present in the cashmere case mentioned 
above. “This suggests that the phrase ‘individual sense making’ is some-
thing of an oxymoron” (1995, p. 80), meaning a style figure that comprises 
a narrow link of two opposite notions, like a youthful old man. It makes 
clear how Weick is emphasizing the social aspect in sense making. Of 
course we are formed by our social milieu – the proverb ‘He that touches 
pitch shall be defiled’ was already present in the Old Testament (Van Dale, 
2000, p. 415) - but I see no reason why ‘individual sense making’ would be 
something of an oxymoron, certainly not on the pre-reflective level. Our 
bodily and social history influences us and leads to (common) sense on the 
individual level. 
  
5) Ongoing. “Sense making never starts. The reason it never starts 
is that pure duration never stops. […] Flows are the constants of sense 
making […]” (1995, p. 43). People are in the middle of projects and what 
they see in the world are those aspects that bear on their projects (1995, p. 
45). Merleau-Ponty also uses the concept of projects frequently. Also in his 
formulation of time sense making is ongoing. In this context Merleau-
Ponty cites Bergson’s term ‘La durée’ (1997, p. 518) meaning much the 
same as Weick’s duration. “Words approximate the territory; they never 
map it perfectly. That is why sense making never stops” (Weick, 1995, p. 
107).  
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 However, sense making is broader than sense making in words, as we have 
seen. But this paragraph illustrates again the unity of meaning and time. 
 
6) Focused on and by extracted cues. This confirms Merleau-Ponty’s 
description of perception. 
 
7) Driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. This is also influenced 
by filters human beings have in noticing cues and the need for speeding up 
actions as a trade-off. This confirms Merleau-Ponty’s position. Furthermore, 
Weick mentions: pragmatics, coherence, reasonableness, interesting, 
attractive, emotionally appealing and goal relevant. Interesting, attractive and 
emotionally appealing relate to pay attention to something. Goal relevant 
refers to purpose, what the human being (or organization) does in the view of 
observers. 
 
If we leave out ‘Retrospective’ and do not over-emphasize ‘Social’ 
Weick and Merleau-Ponty agree with each other on the pre-reflective and the 
reflective level. So what is important for the process of sense making of 
human beings is a coherent / consistent, although flexible, identity in a 
changing social milieu, thereby working out projects, whereby human beings 
are not accurate, also due to satisfying, in ‘representing’ what is the case in 
situations, events and how they relate to that social milieu, which can be and 
often will be organizations. Also from these formulation follows rationality 
of human beings in decision-making, problem solving or how it may be 
labelled can be and will be seriously questioned.  
 
Merleau-Ponty refers to frames, where he says each of the frames in 
which we alternately live appears on the moment that we gain a firm 
foothold in a certain ‘milieu’ that poses to us. Weick also uses the word 
frame in the context of substance of sense making. A frame is shorthand for 
the structure of context. Frames and cues can be thought of as vocabularies 
in which words that are more abstract (frames) include and point to less 
abstract words (cues) that become sensible in the context created by the 
more inclusive words (frames) (p. 110).  
This formulation is the same as Merleau-Ponty’s and Lakoff & 
Johnson’s formulation of background-figure structure and Husserl’s remarks 
about fulfilment. But as Weick makes clear it is a reciprocally influencing 
background-figure structure. What is common among the vocabularies of 
organizational sense making is that all of them describe either past moments, 
present moments or connections (Weick, 1995, p. 111). 
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 For Maturana & Varela ‘meaning’ also is ‘two things (or linguistic 
distinctions) and their relation’. Sense making can ‘start’ with either of 
these three.  
Here are some embodiments of frames (1, 2) and frames that take 
the form of paradigms (3, 4, 5, 6). Frames 1, 2 and 3 relate to 
Weltanschauung.  
 
1) Ideology: Vocabularies of Society. Ideologies are defined as a shared, 
relatively coherent interrelated set of emotionally charged beliefs,  
values and norms that bind some people together and help them to  
make sense of their worlds. People naturally tend to simplify what 
they perceive; ideologies act to structure that simplification. In this 
thesis ideologies are seen as part of Weltanschauung (Junkkarinen,  
2000). He states (2000, p. 3): “…the concept of world view is 
psychological whereas ideology is sociological”. We all have a  
worldview but not always an ideology.  
2) Third-Order Controls: Vocabularies of Organization. Third order 
 control or premise control or unobtrusive9 control consists of  
 assumptions and definitions that are taken as given. These deep  
 assumptions are the foundations of culture (1995, p. 114).  
 Unobtrusive reminds us that influences on sense making are often  
 implicit, tacit, preconscious and taken for granted. Weick (1995, p.  
 117) lists some U.S. premises, like competitive achievement,  
 individualism, materialism and ethnocentrism. “Problems arise  
 because the premises they invoke ignore collective interest and 
 highlight self-interest”. Espejo (2003) in citing Bauman distinguishes  
 between the individual and the citizen. “The citizen is … inclined to 
 seek…his own welfare through the well-being of the city. The 
 individual tends to be…sceptical…about common good…or just  
 society”. The accounting scandals have shown how right Weick is  
 and Beer, Noordzij and Wijffels say the same in the next chapter.  
 These deep assumptions also relate to Weltanschauung. Self-interest  
 (habitual ego grabbing) and collective interest (compassion for the 
 world) was the subject of Varela et al’s discussion with regard to  
Buddhism in previous chapters. 
 
 
 9 In Dutch: onopvallend  
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 3) Paradigms: Vocabularies of Work. “By paradigm we refer to those 
 sets of assumptions, usually implicit, about what sorts of things make 
 up the world […]. In actual practice, such paradigms function as a  
 means of imposing control […] (1995, p. 118).  
4) Theories of Action: Vocabularies of Coping. ”Theories of action are 
 for organizations what cognitive structures are for individuals. They are  
 meta level systems that supervise the identification of stimuli and the  
 assembling of responses” (1995, p. 121). From what has been said so  
 far, specially in light of the working of the nervous system, it will be 
 clear I do not believe in these stimulus-response models. In such a 
 model (1995, p. 122) in the box ‘meta level that selects and interprets 
 stimuli’ it says ‘World view, definition of the situation’. In the  
 individual cognitive structure I do not see a world-view or 
 Weltanschauung as a meta-level that defines a situation. In the context  
 of the motive in chapter 2 we have seen how the definition of the  
 situation is decided. In my opinion Weick is again mixing up sense  
 making and Weltanschauung. Weick continues, in theory of action,  
 theory is a set of inter-connected ‘if…then’ forms. Theories of action,  
 by definition, Weick argues, are abstractions that simplify in the interest 
 of action. The content of the abstractions derives from socialization  
 experiences that reflect the relatively coherently interrelated set of  
 emotionally charged beliefs, values, and norms that bind some people  
 together and help them make sense of their worlds. This formulation is  
 much the same as ideology. There is reason to leave this frame out.  
5) Tradition: Vocabularies of Predecessors. 
6) Stories: Vocabularies of Sequence and Experience.  
 
We will elaborate a bit on frames 5 and 6. These are the connection 
between the past and the present. Weick (1995, p. 127) stresses the 
importance of stories for sense making. “The importance of stories for sense 
making is evident in Robinson’s observation that given mankind’s propensity 
for inductive generalization (from the special to the more general, HL), 
noteworthy experiences will often become the empirical basis for rules of 
thumb, proverbs and other guides to conduct”. According to Simon, in 
discussing the sources of selectivity in problem solving, other guides to 
conduct are heuristics, experience and reproduction.  
“Thus, telling stories about remarkable experiences is one of the ways 
in which people try to make the unexpected expectable, hence manageable”.  
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 “Their (narratives, HL) power to clarify derives from some other means 
than that of belief-driven argument” (1995, p. 140). Stories are sequential, 
one event at the time. Varela (1992a, p. 243) argues sequential rules are far 
from biology. “The most ordinary visual tasks, done even by tiny insects, 
are done faster than is physically possible when simulated in a sequential 
manner […]”. So the question seems to be to what extent inductive 
generalization is sequential and/or parallel processing. Merleau-Ponty 
(1997, p. 178) offers a way out.  “For the normal person the story has thus 
an essence which emerges as it is told without express analysis as the story 
proceeds and that will lead the reproduction of the story later on. The story 
is for him a certain human event, recognizable by the style, and the subject 
‘understands’ here because he has the power to live the through the story 
indicated events, beyond his immediate experience”. For patients stories 
are sequential; for normal persons stories have an essence, which is the 
equivalent of parallel processing. My initial doubt of the importance of 
stories in Weick’s view is herewith overcome.  
 
From the general to the specific is called deductive logic. Varela et 
al (1992b, p. 102) argue: “Their argument later on in the article seems to 
require that deductive logic be the paradigm of human thought and hence, 
presumably, of cognition in general. We simply see no reason to give in to 
this narrow conception of cognition. There are many classes of systems, 
such as the neural networks […] whose behaviour should be seen as 
cognitive and yet their abilities do not encompass these highly systematic 
and productive features. In fact it is even possible to argue that there are 
non-neural networks that display cognitive properties –immune systems, 
for example”. Weick stresses the importance of inductive logic but he also 
comes up with deductive logic. With regard to inductive logic he (1995, p. 
139) states: “Of more help for sense making are people who provide 
explanations rather than appreciations, descriptions or classifications. 
Explanations create sense by connecting experience and more general 
concepts. These connections tend to be inductive operations”. Van den 
Bosch (2001, p.17) comes to the same conclusion with regard to education. 
“Students remind information better the more it links up to knowledge of 
which they already dispose”. That is in a nutshell the problem professors 
and lecturers have in teaching System Theory. Thinking systemically is 
contrary to what most of us learned at home and in our schools. With 
system theory will be dealt in the next chapter. 
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 With regard to deductive logic Weick (1995, p. 133) states: “Sense 
making is about the enlargement of small cues. It is a search for contexts 
within which small details fit together and make sense. It is people interacting 
to flesh out hunches. […] It is about confidence as the particulars begin to 
cohere and as explanation allows increasingly accurate deductions. On page 
51 Weick says: ”A specific observation becomes linked with a more general 
form or idea in the interest of sense making, which then clarifies the meaning 
of the particular which then alters slightly the general and so on”. So we use 
both inductive and deductive logic reciprocally in sense making. 
 
It was already stated in chapter 1 all authors emphasize action. Action 
is strongly related to perception, sense making and as will be seen to beliefs 
and information. However, ‘doing nothing’ deliberately is also a strategic 
option under the motto ‘time works wonders’, ’time will tell’ and ‘time is a 
great healer’. With hindsight we will never be able to say what the best option 
was, because one will never be able to know what would have happened 
under the other option. The situation could have been (less) worse, the same 
or (much) better. But as long as the new situation is satisfying or meets a goal 
we just judge that the best option was chosen. In playing chess, ‘doing 
nothing’ if you do not know what the best move is, or in other words if you 
are unable to recognize a pattern, you strengthen your own position. In 
replaying the game you can see whether you were right. But in real life it does 
not work that way.  
 
Also with regard to frame 5, tradition, Weick (1995, p. 126) makes a 
distinction, where he argues with regard to tradition in the sense of ‘lessons 
learned’ as articulated symbolic products: “It is a neat twist that people who 
pride themselves on a can do, no-nonsense, action-orientated stance towards 
the world are only as good as their right brains and that of their predecessors. 
Too much success at banishing symbols of action leaves them with little 
more than primitive trial and error […]. Cultures that have a well-developed 
folklore of action should survive longer than those that do not”. The right 
brain seems to be involved in non-analytical activities. However, Weick’s 
remarks seem only to hold as long as the environment stays rather stable or if 
one can discover invariants, being factors that are unaffected by all the 
changes surrounding it in the environment. It seems, also here, looking for a 
balance between the original (tradition) and the new repertoire of action is 
important or in other words, the original is the anchor after which the boat 
can roll as is appropriate given the circumstances.  
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 Just to give one example that illustrates much about what can be said on 
the subject, how important tradition and citizenship are as a basis for 
further action in communities and organizations. 
 
I know a lovely Swiss winter sport village that is one big ‘family’ 
enterprise. ‘Family’ because a few family names dominate the place. The 
village has its own radio station and a small museum regarding their 
history. It is called Saas Fee, the ‘Pearl of the Alps’ as they promote them 
selves. Due to its height in the mountains it is sunny and certain of snow-
fall, being some invariants. The village could only be reached by foot and 
on donkeys until 1951. In that year a small road was built and the 
inhabitants decided to leave the agriculture and cattle breeding businesses 
in order to enter the tourist business. Now, only 50 years later, the conver-
tible black and dark blue Porsches, white of salt, of the owner-occupiers 
are parked in the parking garage underground. A restaurant is rotating at 
3000 meters. From the dale you see many lifts and gondolas, but they are 
not constructed as really interfering in the landscape. But the atmosphere, 
among other things due to the conserved wooden stores and houses in the 
fashionable scene, the pedestrian zone and the restfulness after 7.00 p.m. 
on the small streets (not in the restaurants and bars) with hardly any police, 
the innovative attitude (they brought forth the first skier in 1841, the first 
ski-school in the Alps and world champions with their own ski-style), the 
cooperation due to severe weather conditions (which they set to their 
advantage) and the decision making process based on the interest of the 
community are more or less still the same. Being a ski instructor outside 
the big ski school is no problem; these instructors are only not allowed to 
wear the flashy ski suits of the school. The place has been autonomous for 
600 years. This is in my view an important observation. They are in good 
consultation with three lower located surrounding villages; this cohesion is 
pure self-interest. There was only one way through these villages to reach 
Saas Fee. Each village has taken advantage of their own strong point. Their 
innovative actions are grounded in tradition and identity. A guide wrote: 
“Doch die Berge verlangen und verdienen Respekt. Lasst uns die 
gewaltigen Berge besteigen und nicht erkämpfen, denn was wir besiegen, ist 
letztlich nur uns selbst”. An Indian could have said it, although in a 
different language. But the latter are regarded as the losers, whether that is 
true or not. If you have attended a Pow-Wow you are impressed by their 
manners, the manners of their children and the atmosphere. During a 
performance it is quiet as a mouse. 
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 Also, many people in the Netherlands laugh pitying about the mores 
in (former) fishing villages like Katwijk aan Zee, I experienced as a former 
inhabitant. A former colleague in the 1970’s dared not to say his family 
originated in Katwijk. The village was also relatively isolated for a long time, 
a few family names dominate the place and it has its own museum. But I 
could tell a similar story about Katwijk as about Saas Fee. In both cases the 
consequent measures taken do not attract people they do not like to see. The 
rest of the people are more than welcome and soon you feel at home as 
being part of the system that is worth to be maintained. A necessary 
condition is people feel proud of their tradition and identity.  
A museum is such a sign. If people are proud of their tradition and 
identity you only need a few rules (in the Viable System Model called 
‘corporate intervention; if we do it, we do it that way’) instead of a great 
number of do’s and don’ts that nobody is keeping to. The reasons for not 
keeping to are simple ones. The first I already gave. It is evidently not worth 
to maintain the system. The second is rules often make no sense, are 
contradictory or outdated and the regulator (let us say the police) has by far 
no Requisite Variety, Ashby’s law Weick is also an adherent of. The law says 
‘only variety can destroy variety’ which means in short that the variety of the 
regulator must at least match the variety of the disturbances that threaten to 
drive the values of the essential variables outside their assigned limits. So 
communities and organizations with a lot of do’s and don’ts seem to lack a 
tradition and identity.  
 
I have elaborated a bit more on the subject because the story shows it 
is possible to live in a system ‘with desirable features’ as Espejo regards it as 
the big challenge for system theory. How can we design systems with 
desirable, contrary to undesirable, features? A necessary condition is that 
people have clear views of and agree to what is desirable. For that a necessary 
condition is participation and communication. In the places mentioned 
above communication is vital. I could illustrate that with many examples. A 
next condition is we do not need consensus but rather consent. ‘We do not 
fully agree, but we can live with it’. It saves time for action and it helps deci-
sion making in the interest of a community. We have seen from a biological 
standpoint the foundation for a social system with desirable features is at 
least mutual acceptance (or companionship in Merleau-Ponty’s words). 
Maturana (1988) does not talk about respect or tolerance. The latter can also 
be a dangerous aspect in relatively closed communities, as was seen many 
times. 
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 It seems there is also a balance between relative isolation and interaction 
with the environment of communities with regard to tradition and identity. 
“[…] An organization develops a self-referential appreciation of its own 
identity, which in turn permits the organization to act in relation to its 
environment”, as Weick (1995, p. 23) puts it. Human beings also need 
some kind of privacy and isolation once in a while. There is also a need for 
a balance between autonomy and cohesion in organizations, communities 
and human beings. 
 
An example of a running start to the design of ‘a system with 
desirable features’, that is related to Weick’s characteristics of fluid 
participation, vague roles and poor understanding of cause-effect relations, 
is the use of Viplan and Team Syntegrity to support decision processes for 
nuclear waste management in Europe with the participation of regulators, 
implementers, experts and local stakeholders originating from various 
European countries. This is still in process but some examples of the 
application can be found in Espejo’s (2003) ‘Footprints of Complexity’. In 
one case, the delivery team was supported in the background by consul-
tants, who made their own notes. Few remarks of participants were in this 
way left unattended. And certainly the local stakeholders knew this. In one 
of the sessions a from the outset sceptical environmentalist, of the opinion 
that her voice would not be heard among experts, although being an expert 
herself, said in the evaluation “It is fantastic”. Afterwards all these notes of 
four consultants and flip-over sheets of four facilitators during three days 
per session were analysed by the consultants and their conclusions were 
reported. It highlights the importance to really involve the ‘not in my 
backyard’ local stakeholders. People want to be really heard but also be 
informed. Sometimes you ‘see them change’ during the process, in their 
attitude (e.g. body language) and in their opinion. The musical evening, for 
relaxation and fun, enables people to show different, almost always 
unexpected talents. And your view of someone is almost always (slightly) 
adjusted. So the more perspectives we have of people, the better, in this 
double meaning. Ashby already said it: Everybody is a world champion. We 
most of the time do not know yet wherein. 
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 4.3 Beliefs and actions 
 
Sense making derives in great part from one of two structures: beliefs 
and actions (Weick, 1995, p. 133). Here we would say beliefs relate to 
Weltanschauung that influences sense making ‘in the background’. “Both 
arguing and expecting represent regularities in sense making, that starts with 
beliefs” (1995,  p.134). We would say the start is normally at the pre-
reflective layer, the layer Weick pays no attention to. “The sense making 
starts with actions rather than beliefs”. Sense making processes that originate 
in action involve committing and manipulating. Committing involves 
interpretations focused on explaining behaviours for which people are 
responsible. And manipulating involves stabilizing an otherwise unstable set 
of events so that it is easier to explain them. Manipulation involves 
simplification of the perceived world by operations on the world itself rather 
than on the perceiver. Sense making is an effort to tie beliefs and actions 
more closely together. In each of these cases sense making involves taking 
whatever is clearer, whether it is a belief or an action and linking it with that 
which is less clear. These are fundamental operations of sense making. Two 
elements, a belief and an action, are related. The activities of relating are the 
sense making process. The outcome of such a process is a unit of meaning, 
two connected elements, […] tied by socially acceptable implications (1995, 
p. 135). In the linking of beliefs and actions and acts, which confirm 
meaning, we see not only the interconnectedness of beliefs, action and 
meaning but also the importance of actions. 
 
With regard to arguing, or ‘debative cooperation’ in a thesis-antithesis 
fashion, Weick (1995, p. 136) refers to other authors who say: “People have 
confidence that they can eventually make sense of almost any situation 
because they can” (1995, p. 137). In citing Brockriede, who suggests 
arguments are distinguished by five generic characteristics, he sees these 
properties as interrelated dimensions that form a gestalt (1995, p. 138). 
Expectations are more directive than are arguments, because they tend to 
filter input more severely (1995, p. 145). “The nervous system stores models 
of the world”. From what has been said so far it remains to be seen whether 
models are indeed stored. The gestalt, a meaningful whole, is a concept 
Merleau-Ponty also often uses. “Let input violate (interrupt) expectancy and 
the system is put on alert.  
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 Any input, then, must be conceived of as being made up not only of 
environmentally produced stimulation but also of accompanying markings 
of its conformity with or discrepancy from what the nervous system is 
expecting. […] The study of human perception reveals how powerfully 
constrained our perceptual system is by this deep principle. The more 
expected an event, the more easily it is seen or heard. When a cue is 
connected to an expectancy, a unit of meaning is formed. If the expec-
tations are accurate enough (satisfying), people gain confidence in their 
situational assessment and treat it as the definition of the situation” (1995, 
p. 146). This formulation confirms much of what has been said with regard 
to the motive in chapter 2, although in a different wording. Merleau-Ponty 
(1997, p. 467) says “all things go along with their still undetermined contact 
with it full of expectations”. However, in line with what has been said so 
far I would like to keep out the concept of ‘input’ and replace it by ‘trigger’. 
“What is crucial about expectations and their role in sense making is that 
they can be self-correcting (Jussim, 1991). When events seem to diverge 
from expectations, both the expectation and the event itself can be 
adjusted […]. But the point that people keep missing is that self-fulfilling 
prophecies are a fundamental act of sense making. Prophecies, hypotheses, 
anticipations – whatever one chooses to call them – are starting points. 
They are minimal structures around which input can form as the result of 
some kind of active prodding10. That prodding is often belief driven and 
the beliefs that drive it are often expectations” (Weick, 1995, p. 148).  
After having discussed commitment (is about cunning) and 
manipulation (more robust sense making; is about boldness) Weick (1995, 
p. 161) states: “People can cope with change in one of two ways. They can 
adapt to the change by weakening their commitments and changing their 
actions, or they can manipulate the change by reaffirming their commit-
ments and strengthening their actions. Weick’s commitments make it easier 
for the organization to accommodate to the environment; strong commit-
ments make it easier for the environment to accommodate to the organi-
zation. Thus commitment is a liability only when environments are intrac-
table. Even that qualification has its limits because the perception of 
intractability may itself create a self-fulfilling prophecy. […] People over-
look the possibility that environments seem intractable only because they 
made no sustained effort to change them”. 
 
 
10 In Dutch: aansporen  
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 Finally, top managers are manipulators of the organization’s environment, at 
least to a degree (1995, p. 164). 
“Manipulation is an operationalization of the advice ‘leap before you 
look’ or the advice ‘ready, fire, aim’. Manipulation is about making things 
happen, so that a person can then pounce on those created things and try to 
explain them as a way to get a better sense of what is happening. Both 
commitment and manipulation represent sense making that starts with 
action. Commitment makes sense by focusing on the question, ‘why did the 
action occur?’ Manipulation makes sense by focusing on the question, ‘what 
did occur?’ Sense making starts either with the action or the outcome, but in 
both cases, beliefs are altered to create a sensible explanation for the action 
or the outcome” (1995, p. 168). This description of manipulation has much 
in common with heuristics. 
 
“[…] Background is a pervasive and fundamental phenomenon. 
Background is the space of possibilities that allows us to listen to both what 
is spoken and what is unspoken. Meaning is created by an active listening, in 
which the linguistic form triggers interpretation, rather than conveying 
information. The background is not a set of propositions, but is our basic 
orientation of ‘care’ for the world. This world is always already organized 
around fundamental human projects and depends upon these projects for its 
being and organization. World is the background of obviousness because we 
always already live in it. That what is not obvious is made manifest through 
language. What is unspoken is as much part of the meaning as what is 
spoken” (Winograd & Flores, 1994, p. 57). To be human is according to 
Winograd & Flores to be the kind of being that generates commitments, 
through speaking and listening. Commitment is here more meant as 
engagement. 
  
One does not multiply meanings beyond necessity (Searle, 1981, p. 
40). Although Searle (1981, p. 55) is right in stating one can perform an 
indirect illocutionary (making statements, asking questions etc. in speech 
acts) act by asserting, but not by querying one’s own psychological states, the 
exception is children. The question ‘Do I like it here’? was asked by a girl to 
her mother on holidays.  
Searle (1981, p. 42, 77) distinguishes many meanings, such as literal 
meaning, figurative meaning, word or sentence meaning, speaker’s utterance 
meaning, ironical meaning, metaphorical meaning and indirect speech acts 
(speaker means what he says, but means more as well). 
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 That is the reason we will restrict ourselves just to the word ‘meaning’ that 
catches all these meanings. Meaning is tied to our notions of truth condi-
tions, entailment, inconsistency, understanding and a host of other seman-
tic and mental notions (Searle, 1981, p. 132). “For sentences in the 
indicative11, the meaning of the sentence determines a set of truth condi-
tions; that is, it determines a set of conditions such that the literal utterance 
of the sentence to make a statement will be the making of a true statement 
if and only if those conditions are satisfied. Sometimes the meaning of a 
sentence is such that its truth conditions will vary systematically with the 
contexts of its literal meaning” (Searle, 1981, p. 118). Without some set of 
background assumptions the sentence does not determine a definite set of 
truth conditions at all. The background assumptions are so fundamental 
and so pervasive that we don’t see them at all (1981, p. 133). 
4.4 Common sense 
  
In order to see how language and common sense originated we go 
again back to the evolution. Common sense (savvy) is according to the Van 
Dale dictionary ‘unspoiled, natural sense, reason or mind, often contrary to 
learned knowledge’. Where do we go from here? What is unspoiled, natural 
reason? Unspoiled, natural reason or mind seems to have to do with innate 
properties or in terms of Merleau-Ponty a kind of foreknowledge. Varela et 
al use the words ‘background know-how’ (1992b, p. 147). “Such common 
sense knowledge is difficult, perhaps impossible, to package into explicit, 
prepositional knowledge –‘knowledge that’ in the philosopher’s jargon – 
since it is largely a matter of readiness to hand or ‘knowledge how’ based 
on the accumulation of experience in a vast number of cases” (1992b, p. 
148). They give the example of what a robot would need to know when 
driving a car in a city. Does the robot need something to know about 
weather conditions and if so, which? “Such a list of questions could go on 
forever. The driving world does not end at some point; it has the structure 
of ever-receding levels of detail that blend into a non-specific back-
ground” (1992b, p. 147). We could also say there is too much variety in 
never ending recursive levels and the robot cannot have requisite variety. 
But human beings have in general requisite variety in the world.  
 
 
11 In Dutch: aantonende wijs, aanwijzend  
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 So common sense is among other things the background of (motor) skills in 
a social non-specific setting. In this example and in this context, in the 
Netherlands it is common sense to drive on the right side, to slow down in 
the fog or snow, to stop for a ‘red’ traffic light, not being a ghost-rider and so 
on. In organisations it is common sense not to kick your boss and so on, 
although that is nowhere written. Common sense is thus a broader concept 
than (traffic) rules. It is clear that the Van Dale description is not much of 
help and is this time rather inaccurate. It is also clear that common sense has 
nothing to do with the sense making process we discuss. But there is reason 
to pay some attention to it. 
 
Our predecessors seem to be the prosimians, pre-monkeys that 
looked somewhat like squirrels. The prosimians’ fear for enemies, constant 
running and hiding and active night life encouraged cooperation and led to 
the social behaviour that is characteristic of all higher primates. In addition 
the habit of protecting themselves by making frequent loud noises gradually 
evolved into vocal communication (Capra, 1997). 
On the four basic units within the purview of linguistics: 
- The phoneme (the tone in relation to the entire tone system); 
- The morpheme (smallest unit, like ‘late in ‘latest’); 
- The word and 
- The locution (sentence) 
it is the word that defined the lexical (vocabulary, HL) level of linguistics 
(Ricoeur, 1978, examples HL). The word matters, as Weick puts it. Unlike 
other animals, the prosimians were not anatomically specialized and therefore 
were always threatened by enemies. They made up for their lack of speciali-
zation of developing greater dexterity and intelligence (Capra, 1997). That 
dexterity lays at the basis of our habits and skills. Capra argues the very 
essence of intelligence is to act appropriately when a problem is not clearly 
defined – a messy problem– and solutions are not evident. Intelligent human 
behaviour in such conditions is based on common sense, accumulated from 
lived experience (Capra, 1997). Whittaker (2003, p. 21) tells that no one had 
yet given Beer a satisfactory definition of what intelligence actually is. Indeed, 
the Van Dale dictionary comes no further than intellectual powers or clever-
ness, the latter related to quick, sharp and apt. Capra’s intelligence is herewith 
not explained, but it makes clear that it partly is non-specific background 
know-how. You not only learned the skill of driving a car (the motor skill) 
but you ‘combine’ other know-how gained or experienced in other domains.  
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 For instance, you learned to drive a car in the summer but you are 
nevertheless able to drive on icy roads in the next winter because you have 
experienced ice and snow in other domains or under other conditions. 
According to Spinosa et al (1997) common sense is the widely 
accepted, taken-for-granted way of dealing with things and people in many 
domains. By the time people come to self-awareness shared common sense 
practices determine how things and people show up and what it makes 
sense to do. We are indebted to this common sense understanding for 
without it our practices would lack coordination and our lives would lack 
meaning and direction. We are simply in tune with the dominant style 
(Spinosa et al, 1997). Or as Weick (1995) puts it, without common sense 
life does not become senseless; instead it becomes empty. Varela et al, 
1992b, argue human beings desire an absolute, ultimate ground –the 
project of foundationalism- as a foundation for the ego-self and a pre-given 
or ready-made world. That is the habitual tendency to grasp and the 
tendency to cling to that ground, a deep root for suffering and frustration. 
“The realization of groundlessness as non-egocentric responsiveness, 
however, requires that we acknowledge the other with whom we 
dependently co-originate” (1992b, p. 254). “Groundlessness, then, is to be 
found not in some far off, philosophically abstruse analysis but in everyday 
experience. Indeed, groundlessness is revealed in cognition as ‘common 
sense’, that is, in knowing how to negotiate our way through a world that is 
not fixed and pre-given but that is continually shaped by the types of 
actions in which we engage. […] Living cognition [contrary to problem 
solving in a pre-given task domain, HL] consists in being able to pose, 
within broad constraints, the relevant issues that need to be addressed at 
each moment. These issues and concerns are not pre-given but are enacted 
from a background of action, where what counts as relevant is contextually 
determined by our common sense (1992b, p. 144). Common sense is the 
context of our actions. To some extent it has to do with our expectations 
of what others will do and how it is a constraint of our own actions. It is 
the counterpart of doing something absurd, acts that lack meaning. In the 
words of Husserl these absurd acts lack referential fulfilment; they do not 
confirm meaning. Common sense not only relates to meaning but also to 
Weltanschauung. Common sense also constrains our Weltanschauungen. 
When I am of the opinion that mankind is bad, I will not expect all the 
consequences of this badness. Some consequences, I expect, will not 
happen. Until they do happen in reality, which is the moment I might 
adjust that opinion (slightly). Weltanschauung is also not absolute, but 
rather relative or ambiguous. 
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 The importance of background or context also comes back in 
information. 
 
4.5  Information 
 
The nervous system does not receive ‘information’ from the outside 
world (Maturana & Varela, 1989). According to Capra (1997), the conven-
tional view is that information is somehow ‘lying out there’ to be picked up 
by the brain. However, such a piece of information is a quantity, name or 
short statement that we have abstracted from a whole network of relation-
ships, a context, in which it is embedded and which gives it meaning. 
Whenever such a ‘fact’ is embedded in a stable context that we encounter 
with great regularity, we can abstract it from that context, associate it with 
the meaning inherent in the context and call it ‘information’. We are so used 
to these abstractions that we tend to believe that meaning resides in the piece 
of information rather than in the context from which it has been abstracted. 
For instance, there is nothing ‘informative’ in the colour red, except that, 
when embedded in a cultural network of conventions and in the technolo-
gical network of city traffic, it is associated with stopping at an intersection 
(Capra, 1997). One could however make a distinction, maintaining the colour 
red is ‘informative’ for a too big category of people, the illiterate. They know 
red on the package of milk in a supermarket is buttermilk. They recognize 
the form of the package, also outside the context of the refrigerated display. 
It is their only way of knowing in action, apart from help from others.  
 
Another angle to approach the subject is the variety concept. Ashby 
(1971, p. 121) says: “The fact, that it is the set [of possibilities] that science 
refers to, is often obscured by a manner of speech. […] So we get references 
to […] objects in the singular, when the reference is in fact to the set of all 
such objects […] Let us then accept it as basic, that a statement true about a 
set may be either true or false (or perhaps meaningless) if applied to the 
elements in the set”. We already discussed the word ‘meaningless’. 
With regard to an example about a prisoner, to be visited by his wife, 
who is not allowed to send him any message however simple, and a warder, 
Ashby (1971) states: “What is noteworthy, is that at each possibility he [the 
warder, HL] intuitively attempts to stop the communication by enforcing a 
reduction of the possibilities to one”. 
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 For instance, the prisoner is only allowed to get his coffee in one way, 
excluding a message such as ‘with sugar means yes’ and ‘without sugar 
means no’. “As soon as the possibilities shrink to one, so soon is commu-
nication blocked […]. The transmission (and storage) of information is 
thus essentially related to the existence of a set of possibilities […]. 
Communication thus necessarily demands a set of messages. Not only is 
this so, but the information carried by a particular message depends on the 
set it comes from. The information conveyed is not an intrinsic property of 
the individual message. […] We must turn our attention from any indivi-
dual message to the set of all the possibilities”. Ashby (1971, p. 124) 
illustrates this as follows. ”Two soldiers are taken prisoner by two enemy 
countries, A and B, one by each; and their two wives later each receive the 
brief message ‘I am well’. It is known, however, that country A allows the 
prisoner a choice from 
 
   I am well 
   I am slightly ill 
   I am seriously ill 
 
while country B allows only the message 
     
I am well 
 
meaning ‘I am alive’. (Also in the set is the possibility of ‘no message’).  
 
The two wives will certainly be aware that though each has received the 
same phrase, the information that they have received are by no means 
identical”. Because in the second case the wife knows nothing of the 
condition under which he is alive. It highlights again the importance of 
context. 
 
Espejo & Watt (1988) discuss how successful managers are in 
converting information into effective action. The variety (the possible 
number of states of a system or a situation as a measure for complexity, 
HL) of the relevant tasks is larger than that of the manager himself. This 
imbalance suggests that any manager naturally (by chance) attenuates 
(decreases, HL) the variety of the tasks to match his own variety and 
amplifies his own variety to match the variety of the tasks. In terms of 
Beer, these are two sides of the same coin.  
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 Espejo & Watt (1988) (and Beer) advocate design instead of chance (or sheer 
ignorance), which can achieve a better matching of the different com-
plexities. Information is closely intertwined with action. Information is that 
which reduces a manager’s uncertainty about relevant situations in the world 
(1988, p. 8). For more information about uncertainty I refer the reader to 
Achterbergh & Riesewijk (1999, p. 125).  However, even if managers manage 
their information adequately (by design) they may still fail to be effective 
because of their inability to distribute the necessary organisational action (and 
information). A manager’s concern is only with the residual complexity 
(relevant to his purposes) left unattended by the organisational structure. It is 
the same mechanism as given by Espejo elsewhere, that car dealers absorb 
some or much complexity for a car producer in the environment. The car 
dealers have in first instance the contacts with (potential) clients with their 
preferences. The car producer’s concern is only with the residual complexity 
left unattended by the car dealers. Here the organisational structure absorbs 
some or much complexity for the manager. This residual complexity defines 
the manager’s information needs whereas the more interruptions 
(breakdowns) in interaction and communication (conversations) occur the 
larger are the information needs. In the next section we will deal with 
interruptions and emotions. 
Strategy one of design is adjustments to the organisation structure. 
The Viable System Model that will be discussed briefly in the next chapter is 
a tool here. Strategy two is adjustments of organisational conversations as the 
fine mesh of the structure. Conversations are two-way commitments, either 
as a class of the world is changed to fit the words (a world-to-word-fit. “Do 
this”. “Yes”) or on a view on the world (the word-to-world-fit. “A is true”. 
“Yes”). This strategy is about increasing meaningful commitments, 
decreasing weak commitments and the style of management in order to avoid 
responses hostile to the viability of the organisation. Strategy three is the 
manager-to-tasks-fit. This is about the manager’s cognitive and personal 
capabilities and selection of the ‘right’ manager for the tasks.  
In chapter 7 and 8 of part 2 of this thesis we will come back on these 
issues. In these adjustments and communications emotions, as distinguished 
from feelings, play an important role. That is the reason we will pay some 
attention to emotions.  
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 4.6  Emotions 
 
With regard to the nervous system, Weick (1995, p. 45) argues: 
”The relation between sense making, emotion and the interruption of 
ongoing projects can be understood using ideas proposed by Berscheid 
(1983) and Mandler. They argue that a necessary condition for emotion is 
‘arousal’ or discharge in the autonomic nervous system. And arousal is 
triggered by interruptions of ongoing activity. Arousal has physiological 
significance because it prepares people for fight-or-flight reactions. […] 
The perception of arousal triggers a rudimentary act of sense making. It 
provides a warning that there is some stimulus (or trigger, HL) to which 
attention must be paid in order to initiate appropriate action. […] An 
important property of arousal is that it develops slowly. Arousal occurs 
roughly 2 to 3 seconds after an interruption has occurred, and this delay 
gives time for an appropriate action to occur. Thus the autonomic system 
is a back-up system that is activated if direct action fails. […] Arousal leads 
people to search for an answer to the question “What’s up?” Their answers 
differ depending on socialization. […] A key event for emotion is the 
‘interruption of an expectation’. It makes good evolutionary sense to 
construct an organism that reacts significantly when the world is no longer 
the way it was. […] Emotion is what happens between the time that an 
organized sequence is interrupted and the time at which the interruption is 
removed, or a substitute response is found that allows the sequence to be 
completed. Until either event occurs, automatic arousal increases. […] If 
there are many different ways in which an interrupted sequence can be 
completed, then arousal is not likely to build very much. This suggests that 
generalists, as well as people who are able to improvise, should show less 
emotional behaviour and less extreme emotions. […] If we can describe 
this (where are interruptions likely to occur, HL), then we can predict 
where sense making will be especially influenced by emotional 
experiences”. After explaining how negative or positive emotions occur, 
Weick concludes: ”Autonomous people are hard to interrupt, but they are 
also hard to help, which should mean that autonomous people report less 
emotionality in their organizational experience”.  
 
For Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 130) being emotional means being 
involved in a situation which one is not managing to face, and from which 
one does not want to escape.  
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 Rather than to accept the failure or retrace one’s footsteps the subject lets in 
such an existential impasse explode the objective world that bars his way 
(abandoning real action, HL) and seeks symbolic satisfaction in magic acts (a 
kind of autistic, introverted escape, HL). This has also to do with our true 
time experience. For instance, the phantom arm phenomenon, like a 
suppressed experience, is an earlier present that refuses to become past, 
according to Merleau-Ponty. This means one is not accepting ‘the failure’. 
The next eye-opener for me is, that we know we suppress an experience. 
Otherwise we would not be able to avoid the suppressed experience so well.  
 
If it would be true, as often is heard, that female managers are more 
emotional than male managers, female managers would be likely to be 
specialists, possessing less capacity to improvise, are less autonomous in their 
work, are managing more interruption sensitive activities or expect too much 
and too easily. Not so. In chapter 8 all interviewed managers, male and 
female, consider them self to be a generalist, can (reasonably) improvise and 
expect (rather) much of others. The own work processes of female managers 
are more easily interrupted, but they found a solution for that. Three of the 
four managers state to be more emotional than rational so Weick’s claim 
could not be tested. But I think he is right. A cautious conclusion can be that 
female managers are not more emotional than male managers but rather are 
more flexible in coping with work interruptions, which they sometimes or 
often allow to happen.  
 
For Merleau-Ponty emotions are equivalents of being-in-the-world. If 
the emotion chooses to express itself by means of aphonics (inability to 
speak, HL) that is because of all the bodily functions speech is the closest 
linked to co-existence. Winograd & Flores (1994, p. 77) describe break-
downs as the interrupted moment of our habitual, standard, comfortable 
‘being-in-the-world’ in Heideggerian sense. Speech (and thinking as we have 
seen) we do in language. 
4.7  Language 
 
Maturana & Varela (1989, p. 171) and Maturana (1978) emphasize 
that in our culture for a long time the dogma has dominated, that the 
capacity of using language is only reserved to the human being; that we are 
far superior in talent above other animal species.  
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 Although gorilla’s and chimpanzee’s have a much smaller language domain, 
they were learned to express themselves in a sign language used by deaf-
and-dumb people. Maturana & Varela (1989) are of the opinion, that the 
monkeys in the experiment are real users of language. Although one of the 
monkeys knew the sign for a refrigerator, she preferred the sign ‘open-
drinking-eating’. They were also capable of generalizing, putting things in 
the classes / categories ‘edible’ and ‘not-edible’. So following their 
argument, communication, as the result of coordinated behaviour, includes 
sign language.  
 
However, Petitto, who lived three years with a chimpanzee, called Nim, 
together in a house using sign language, comes to a different conclusion. 
Monkeys cannot speak due to a lack of larynx12. After monitoring all the 
video material (the best documented of all these projects the article reads) 
she says: “Thus how great he was in imitating, how smart he was in 
transferring his intentions and feelings, Nim missed a crucial part of the 
language capacity of human beings. […] Can a monkey build a sentence? 
The unanimous answer of the project team was ‘No’. […] Even in the eyes 
of trained linguists such an animal seems to be able to much more in a fast 
way than is the case in reality” the warning was (NRC, M, March 2003, p. 
28). After more research she came to the conclusion that a part in the 
human brain, called the planum temporale, is in a certain frequency 
sensible for building blocks, syllables13. That building with the blocks is 
what the monkeys cannot do. She expects monkeys do not have that 
sensibility. So it seems to depend on the validity of the 1969 research 
Maturana & Varela base themselves upon. There is every appearance in this 
case the dogma with regard to language is correct. 
 
The basic feature of language is, that it changed radically the human 
repertoire of behaviour, through which new phenomena became possible, 
such as reflection and self-consciousness. One can describe oneself and the 
circumstances by means of linguistic distinctions of linguistic distinctions. 
In the together with other observers using of language this creature creates 
itself and its environment as linguistic distinctions of his participation in a 
language domain. 
 
 
12 In Dutch: strottehoofd 
13 In Dutch: klankgroepen 
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 In the same way meaning origins as a relation between linguistic distinctions 
and becomes part of the domain, in which our adaptation maintains itself 
(Maturana & Varela, 1989). However, in chapter 2 we have seen that 
meaning origins on the primordial, pre-reflective level in perception. 
Maturana & Varela (1989) argue further that this is what it means to be a 
human being. We make descriptions of our descriptions, as happens in this 
sentence. We are observers existing in a semantic domain that is created by 
our usage of language subservient to a remaining adaptation. Only in 
language the human being is, what he is. The social cohesion of insects is 
founded on the exchange of chemical substances and food. In case of human 
beings it is linguistic exchange, a domain of language built out of ontogenetic 
co-ordinations of behaviour. Because we dispose of language, there are no 
limits to what can be described, imagined or combined (Maturana & Varela, 
1989).  
Words are distinctions of consensual co-ordinations of actions in the 
flow of consensual co-ordinations of actions. In daily life we say a human 
being is eccentric, mad or alienated when we see him performing the actions 
proper to languaging outside a domain of recursive consensual co-
ordinations of actions. I suppose many writers of Ph. D’s classify for these 
qualifications! We kill or elate with words because, as co-ordinations of 
actions, they take place through body interactions that trigger in us body 
changes in the domain of physiology. 
For Merleau-Ponty the meaning of words are existential in the first 
place; secondly on virtue of this, a conceptual meaning originates (Vlasblom 
& Tiemersma, 1997). According to Merleau-Ponty (1997), naming objects 
does not come after the recognition of it, but rather is the recognition itself. 
The word itself carries already the meaning and by taking this meaning across 
the object we are conscious to hit the object itself. “Because naming an 
object means distance oneself from the individualism and uniqueness thereof 
in order to be able to see in it the representative of an essence or of a 
category”, Merleau-Ponty (1997) argues. For children, objects are only 
known when they are being named; the name is for them the essence of the 
object and belongs as much to it as the colour and form.  
 
Coming back to what was said in the last section in chapter 3 with 
regard to structuring of layers, we learn children first in language that it is a 
‘bowwow’, then ‘a dog’ where after it turns out that four to six year old 
children in a school class have difficulty to bring forth the ‘bowwow’, 
‘miaow’ and ‘grunt’ sounds again.  
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 Three children in a class were appointed a dog, a cat and a pig. In round 
one these children had to play an instrument the moment they heard the 
words dog, cat or pig among other animal names. In round two the other 
children had to give the sounds (like ‘bowwow’) and not the words. The 
other children were unable to bring forth these sounds. There seems to be 
no ‘key of the similarity’, no implicit ‘common term’ or ‘felt belongingness’ 
anymore between the word and the sound. It makes clear how complicated 
‘the structuring of objects in layers as the history of the manner in which 
we experience sense-contents already structured’ is.  
In a Dutch television programme, in which four-year-old children 
perform, called ‘Boasters’, two associations slipped my sides laughing. 
According to one of the kids ‘Jesus’ means ‘missing the bus’. For another 
child life after death is of course perfectly possible. ‘I am a (sea) gull, 
thinking of fish’. Here the association was more complex. The kid liked 
fish, as he said, and associated fish with a vehicle to catch fish, which he 
himself could only do in another life as a (sea) gull. ‘The wish is father to 
the thought’ as we say. It is fascinating to see these kids have no clue for 
words like ‘brother-in-law’ or ‘womb’.   
What I have done here is wrong-footed the reader. In the first 
example we cannot talk about association. For the kid it is the literal 
meaning. In the second example we can talk about the process of 
association. This process is what Searle refers to as ‘call to mind’. 
 
For those who speak the word is not the translation of an already 
ready thought, but rather it executes this in authentic speech that formu-
lates something for the first time, contrary to the secondary expression, 
talking about something that has already been said. As Langer (1989) puts 
it: “In short, most of us tend to think that to speak is to translate our 
thoughts into words, while to hear is to interpret the words of another so 
as to arrive at an understanding of the thoughts lying behind them. We 
allegedly attempt to ‘figure out’ what others ‘have in mind’ by inference 
based on the words, which we hear them say. It is evident that this sort of 
position rests on a fundamental mind-body dualism. […] For Merleau-
Ponty (1997) the word has a meaning. […] The consideration of authentic 
speech thus alerts us to the existential significance, which underlies the 
conceptual significance of language. The existential significance permeates 
the words themselves and is imparted by them, just as the musical 
significance of a concerto inhabits the sounds, which bring that significance 
into being for the concert goer. […]  
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 That which we commonly consider silence or ‘pure thought’ is in fact replete 
with words”. Merleau-Ponty comes to this existential significance because 
some patients can read a text ‘striking the right note’ without having an 
understanding of the text. So the spoken and the words contain a first layer 
of meaning that belongs to them and that express the thinking as a style, as 
emotional value (connotation, HL), as existential sign language than as 
conceptual significance.  
Words, gestures, even fatherhood have become institutionalised, 
developed. Because different cultures have different languages, different 
gestures mean different things, cultures have been found where fatherhood, 
as we know it, does not exist and so on. This is the real meaning of Merleau-
Ponty’s nature-culture-history milieu unity, whereby the cultural or ‘mental’ 
world derives its structures from the natural life. The word realizes a certain 
structuring of the experience both for the speaking subject as well as for his 
listeners; the thinking subject must have its foundation in the embodied 
subject. Language is based on layered intellectual and motility powers that 
can be regarded relatively apart. 
For Merleau-Ponty (1997) the authentic or originating speaking is the 
thinking. Speech is thought and listening is thinking. Speech is phonetic, 
emotional gesticulation that reveals, manifests, shows or expresses the 
subject. The word is really linguistic gesture and carries its meaning in it like 
the gesture contains its meaning. This is what makes communication 
possible. The word is a linguistic gesture and it’s meaning a world. There are 
different layers of meaning: of the visual meaning of the word via 
understanding of the word to the conceptual meaning thereof. 
Communication executes itself when our behaviour finds its own way in the 
indicated direction. It is a confirmation of each other, according to Merleau-
Ponty (1997). Communication is the result of coordinated behaviour, as 
Maturana & Varela say, is indeed in line with what Merleau-Ponty says. And 
‘mutual acceptance’ and ‘a confirmation of each other’ means the same. 
 
Searle (1981, p. 29), also cited by Winograd & Flores in the context 
of coordination of actions and commitment, concludes in a for a non 
linguistic philosopher ‘funny symbolic’ language, we have five basic purposes 
we do with language: 
i)             We tell people how things are; 
ii) We try to get them to do things; 
iii) We commit ourselves to doing things; 
iv) We express our feelings and attitudes; 
v) We bring about changes through our utterance. 
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 “Often, we do more than one of these at once in the same utterance”. As 
long as we realize we do not specify each other’s state. 
 
In the next two sections we will pay attention briefly to metaphor 
and proverb as part of our language building. Maturana (1978) claims we 
are the human beings we are in language, whereas Lakoff & Johnson (1999) 
claim we live in metaphor. Proverbs reflect our Weltanschauungen pre-
eminently. 
 
4.7.1  Metaphor 
 
What follows here is a summary of appendix 1 where metaphor is 
discussed in more depth. Mooij (1973) distinguishes with regard to 
metaphors between monistic- and dualistic interpretations. According to 
Van Dale monistic means to assume one principle as an explanation of 
phenomena. Dualistic means to assume two principles as opposed to each 
other or independent of each other. In the dualistic interpretation it is 
assumed that metaphorically used words also still refer to their literal 
extension (denotation or literal meaning, HL). Dualistic interpretations 
allow for a double reference or double meaning. Monistic are the classical 
substitution- and connotation interpretations. According to Searle (1981) 
there is no single principle or rule with regard to metaphor but rather 
various steps and principles. He alleges there must even be more principles. 
So entering the field of metaphor is entering a minefield. 
According to Mooij (1973), shortly summarized, a word or 
expression W in a sentence S is used metaphorically when there is a subject 
of discourse such that which is said about that (would be said!) with the 
assistance of W on the ground of its literal meaning and the context, is 
absurd, irrelevant or untrue, whereas still the sentence S has an usable 
content. Mooij recognizes this notion is workable, although it is still too 
comprised. We could say this is nothing else than Searle’s first step. For 
Searl (1981) the speaker says ‘S’ is ‘P’ when he means ‘S’ is ‘R’, like Sally ‘S’ 
is a block of ice ‘P’; Sally is unemotional, cold ‘R’. 
 
Poetics means according to Ricoeur (1978) the art of composing 
poems, principally tragic poems. Poetics, as far as its function and its 
situation of speaking are concerned, does not depend on rhetoric, the art of 
defence, of deliberation, of blame and of praise.  
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 Poetry is not oratory. Persuasion is not its aim […] Metaphor, however, has a 
foot in each domain. The poetic function means the ways in which we 
perceive the world. According to Ricoeur, the metaphorical expressions 
‘speak of the world, even though they may not do so in a descriptive fashion, 
but at a deeper level. The idea of virtues of ‘lexis’, a concept in Aristotle’s 
philosophy, is so important […] those that concern metaphor most directly 
are: ‘clarity’, ‘warmth’ opposed to coldness, ‘facility’ (talent, HL), 
‘appropriateness’ (in the sense of harmony, HL) and above all, ‘urbanity’ or 
‘elegance’. Metaphor, he [Aristotle, HL] says, sets the scene before our eyes 
(Ricoeur, 1978). The sole criterion of metaphor is that the word presents two 
ideas at once in interaction. Every word that gives us two ideas at once is a 
metaphor (Ricoeur). “And that, I take it, is what Dr. Johnson meant when he 
said metaphor gives us two ideas for one” (Searle, 1981, p. 116). Thinking in 
poetry is a picture thinking. Now this ‘pictoral’ capacity of language consists 
also in ‘seeing an aspect’. To read a metaphor is to establish a relationship 
such that X is like Y in some senses, but not in all.  
In the case of an ambiguous figure, there is a Gestalt (a meaningful 
whole or a whole we regard more fundamental than the parts) B that allows a 
figure A or another figure C to be seen. Thus the problem is, given B, to 
construct A or C. In the case of metaphor, A and C are given in reading. 
What must be constructed is the common element B, the Gestalt, namely, 
the point of view in which A and C are similar’ (Ricoeur, 1978). ‘Seeing as’ 
contains a ground, a foundation, that is, precisely resemblance – no longer 
the resemblance between two ideas, but that very resemblance the ‘seeing as’ 
establishes. ‘Seeing as’ defines the resemblance and not the reverse. The 
priority of ‘seeing as’ over the resemblance relationship is proper to the 
language game in which meaning functions (Ricoeur, 1978). So the common 
element in metaphor is not the resemblance of two ideas but rather the 
defined resemblance or the tied image by ‘seeing as’.  
 
Lakoff & Johnson (1999) argue: ‘Precisely the principle through 
which we understand an aspect of the one concept on the basis of another 
concept makes that other aspects of the one concept remain hidden. The 
following concepts as defined concepts represent true-to-nature sorts of 
experience: love, time, ideas, understanding, discussion, labour, happiness, 
health, control, status, moral etc. These concepts require a definition, because 
they are not clearly enough outlined in order to satisfy our daily functioning.  
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 Concepts that are defining other concepts are also true-to-nature 
sorts of experience: ways of bodily orientation, objects, substances, seeing, 
journeys, war etc. The defining concepts are only conceptually better 
structured (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Lakoff & Johnson pay some 
attention to aesthetical experience, where they state the metaphor is not 
only a language issue. It is a matter of conceptual structure. All natural 
dimensions of our experience play a role in our conceptual system, 
including colour, form and sound. 
In her Natural Semantic Meta-language Theory, Wierzbicka has 
identified 61 semantic concepts (words), called primitives. A potential 62 
candidate is ‘long’. With these primitives all other words and words that 
express emotions can be defined in all languages so far checked the last 40 
years. The primitives themselves cannot be defined; there are no concepts 
that are more fundamental. Wierzbicka sometimes uses non-primitives, if a 
definition with only primitives would be too long. In appendix 1 we also 
pay some attention to the primitives. 
We end up appendix 1 with the question: Now is this journey 
satisfactory? Do we have an answer to the question of what metaphor is? 
We have certainly gained insight but we do not have an answer, let alone a 
definition of metaphor. Everybody argues with everybody or we do not 
know what we are talking about in the last 2000 years. Maybe Morgan 
(1992) is right in just stating ‘A is seen as B’. The funny thing is that the 
same goes for proverbs in the next section. 
 
4.7.2  Proverbs 
 
Even the definition of a proverb forms an insurmountable 
problem. "The definition of a proverb is too difficult to repay the 
undertaking. [...] An incommunicable quality tells us this sentence is 
proverbial and that one is not. ..." Let us be content with recognizing that a 
proverb is a saying current among the folk (Taylor, 1996 a). More precisely 
determined, a proverb, as folk, community-sanctioned wisdom, is stated in 
the present time, although it may lack a verb, in an unchanging form with 
rhythmic and/or poetic quality, sometimes using (internal) rhyme. It 
contains a general valid character within a context, reflecting the partiality 
of the speaker in terms of his/her world-view [Based on Apeldoorn (1999), 
Taylor (1996) and Mieder (1995)]. Although I would not call this a 
definition, it summarizes most features in a workable form.  
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 Proverbs are sometimes contrasting. ”You are never too old to learn” 
/ ”You can’t teach an old dog new tricks” and ”Justice goes before power” 
dueling with ”Justice goes with power”, the latter characterized as it’s anti-
proverb, are examples of contrasting proverbs. These are sometimes heard 
during a heated argument in conversations, many times concluded with the 
saying ”The truth will probably lay somewhere in between”. ”Such 
contrasting proverb pairs are rather common in folk speech and they indicate 
once and for all that proverbs have no claim at being universal truths. On the 
contrary, proverbs reflect the partiality and contradiction of life itself, but the 
appropriate proverb used at the right time and in the fitting context will hit 
the proverbial nail on the head” (Mieder, 1995 c). In the same paper Mieder 
states ”Proverbs contain the knowledge, experience and observation of 
generations of people and this distilled wisdom gives them their generally 
valid character and claim to authority”. 
  
In the Netherlands and the Flemish part of Belgium there are some 
8.000 proverbs, proverbial expressions, phrases and sayings. The Van Dale 
Proverb Book contains some 2.300 proverbs. Many deal with money, 
ordinary food and beverages (egg, bacon, beer) and parts of the body. Lords 
are often jeered at in proverbs. One may assume not publicly, as a kind of 
low profile verbal resistance. On learning by experience many proverbs can 
be found. That may have to do with the Guilds system in the past. One 
would say this a nice mirror image of the Dutch culture in the past centuries. 
 
In appendix 2 a rather technical explanation follows based on the 
work of Grzybek and Permyakov. In the end Permyakov is looking for 
invariants. His work should be the basis for a consistent system of organizing 
a proverb collection. Permyakov’s system was based on the analysis of 50.000 
proverbial sayings in 200 Oriental cultures!  
Now that we have paid attention briefly to concepts that are related 
to meaning there is still one important issue open for discussion. We have 
touched on it briefly several times but we will now discuss it in more depth. 
It is the question whether human beings are rational. 
4.8  Rationality 
 
In this section I argue that we as human beings are not rational or at 
least are less rational than we pretend to be in the Boardrooms. May be the 
question whether human beings are rational should be replaced by the 
question: can human beings be rational at all?  
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 Before any thought there is so much that precede it as we have seen. But in 
what follows I make a distinction between one top manager or a few top 
managers in the Boardroom and the results produced by many informed 
people. I am of the opinion that under certain conditions the results of 
many informed people are better if checks and balances are built in during 
enough available time than the results produced by one or a few top 
managers. But that is not to say that the process is only a rational one. In 
these processes I have seen many emotions, clashes, secret agenda’s, 
misunderstandings, asocial behaviour or behaviour aimed at dominancy 
(which is quickly suppressed). Intuition, as a conviction of truth not based 
on reasoning, is in this respect not only a powerful concept but also an 
interesting one. But I have decided to refrain from the concept because I 
feel it is the subject of a different, complete thesis. The book ‘Intuition’ 
(2004) did not bring me much further. So the word ‘intuition’ is used 
without explaining what it could be or how it ‘works’. On the other hand I 
think if we would like to have a rather complete understanding of the 
human being, it is an indispensable concept. That also means that I do not 
pretend to have given the complete picture. I gave the initial impetus to a 
different thinking about management, human beings and the humane scale 
by combining various disciplines. In my opinion, that is the fruitful way to 
make progress in organisation theory. 
 
Because the concept of satisfying seems to be so crucial, not only in 
evolution but also for human beings (as Dreyfus, Moran, Merleau-Ponty, 
Searle and Weick said) Varela et al’s analogy of evolution is given (1992b, 
p. 194). 
 
John needs a suit. In a fully symbolic and representionalist world he 
goes to his tailor who produces a nice suit according to the exact specifi-
cations of his measurements. Another possibility that does not demand so 
much from the environment is to go to department stores. These suits are 
good enough. In buying a suit he considers how his looks will affect the 
responses of his environment. The decision to buy a suit is constituted by 
the global situation of his life. His final choice has the form of satisfying 
some very loose constraints (e.g. being well dressed) but does not have the 
form of a fit – and even less so of an optimal fit – to any of these 
constraints.  
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 The decision can be coupled to what has been said about ‘the motive’ 
in chapter 2. The global situation is the factual situation and the very loose 
constraints are the meaning or the motive. For some people the meaning, e.g. 
being well dressed, has less meaning, because being well dressed is irrelevant 
for them. 
Already in the 1950’s March & Simon came up with this concept of 
satisfying with regard to ‘bounded rationality’. But now it becomes clear the 
concept of satisfying has also to do with our own evolution. We have been 
gradually shaped in this way; it must be deeply rooted. It seems we have no 
bounded rationality, but rather our decisions satisfy some very loose con-
straints. As we saw, decisions are the accepted situation, which in turn has to 
do with legitimacy and effectiveness; the meaning a factual situation lends. A 
fact is according to Beer ‘that what is the case’ (for us). We could also say 
‘the state of affairs’ that what is encountered in the perceiving consciousness. 
This is an approach from the other angle, so to speak. In rationality, decision 
making, is now included meaning creation and the experience of truth or the 
meaning the factual situation lends preceding the decision that declares the 
meaning as legitimate in the accepted situation. In other words, before we 
can speak of rationality a lot of meaning creation and truth experience has 
already taken place in the perception. Or in still other words, rationality is 
based on meaning creation in being-in-the-world. Since we all differ in our 
being-in-the-world we lend different meanings to phenomena in the world. 
In that case we cannot talk of ‘objective’ rationality, bounded or not, 
objective in the sense we all do it in the same manner. Common sense is not 
the same as rationality because common sense is not ‘well-thought-out’. 
Common sense is our bodily and social history, as was stated before. 
Moreover, “thought itself is never ‘pure’ but rather presupposes perceptual 
consciousness and remains inseverable from it” (Langer, 1989, p. 123). So 
seen from various angles we could question rationality seriously. 
 
Also, Beer said that first we have to agree on the nature, the 
boundaries and the purpose of the system before we can agree on what 
counts as a fact. It is apparent that we seldom do this. For instance, in 
discussions for years and years about the airport Schiphol many participants 
said in interviews in the newspapers parties involved were, whether 
deliberately or not, talking at cross-purposes. Is the boundary of Schiphol the 
fence or the airspace of Amsterdam? Weick said naming seems to be a 
satisfying process, like any decision process.  
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 Sense making is driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. Moreover, in 
third order control much is taken-for-granted in organisations. 
 
The former CEO and ‘founder’ of Getronics says in a interview 
(NRC, 04.03.2003) that by big decisions 55% is figures and 45% is the 
heart, what the emotion says. Moreover, we do all know figures can –and 
often are- manipulated one way or another. They show us what someone 
wants us to show; there is much resemblance with what Husserl prefers to 
say ‘in which the object gives itself, though, of course, always under an 
aspect’. Figures, and their counterpart, the stock markets, do not actually 
always reflect the health, the real assets, and the profitability of a company. 
And we all know the irrational behaviour of investors, often leading to 
‘buying sky high, selling low’, what is also called the ‘lemming effect’, ‘if 
they do it, they will have thought about it seriously’. It is the same as 
gambling. It is often based on common scrambling or other ‘basic animal-
like instincts’. 
In Grinwis (p. 123) only one (out of 30) interviewed manager says 
that instinct or intuition, ‘here’s hoping for the best’ play a role in 
decisions, “It is a deep truth. But it must of course not happen too often”. 
Koot & Sabelis (2000) sketch a picture of the disconcerted role power plays 
in organisations. It underpins Maturana’s remark at the start of chapter 1 
that we are no rational animals. If we would be rational, life with others, 
the inter-subjectivity, would be of a higher quality.  
In discussing the models, do we talk about the factual situation, 
where people could ask ‘what counts as a fact?’ or about the accepted 
situation?  
Gaines (2000, p. 17) refers to Bourdieu (1990), who builds on 
analyses of well-known philosophers, among others Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty. “I am talking about dispositions acquired through experience, thus 
variable from place to place and time to time. This ‘feel for the game’, as 
we call it, is what enables an infinite number of ‘moves’ to be made, adap-
ted to the infinite number of possible situations which no rule, however 
complex, can foresee. Action guided by a ‘feel for the game’ has all the 
appearances of the rational action an impartial observer, endowed with all 
the necessary information and capable of mastering it rationally, would 
deduce. And yet it is not based on reason”. On the same page Gaines 
refers to Saul (1993). “Among the illusions which have invested our 
civilization is an absolute belief that the solutions to our problems must be 
a more determined application of rationally structured expertise. The reality 
is that our problems are largely the product of that application”.  
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 Gradually I have come to the conclusion Maturana is right. That of 
course does not mean to say human beings are unable to reflect. However, 
for a long time consultants emphasize managers should reflect 5 to 10 
minutes daily on what happened that day and on the decisions they took. The 
advice would not be given if most managers would do that. However, the 
interviewed managers in chapter 8 are of a different opinion. It would mean 
most of the managers are absorbed completely in the day-to-day affairs 
without ‘keeping any distance’. Being absorbed by the day-to-day affairs in 
the social world means there have been a continuous flow of experiences, 
sensations, perceptions, transient meaning creations and phenomenal 
understanding prior to any intellectual understandings, thinking or reflection. 
The latter are according to Merleau-Ponty only an extract of the former. The 
former base the latter. Moreover, in decisions meaning creation already plays 
a role. We have already decided whether something is true. That can be and 
often will be misunderstandings. 
‘The winner takes it all, the looser standing small’ (Abba). It is often 
rationality with hindsight. It is about explaining and justifying our actions as 
Maturana says. If things are going well, it is thanks to the top manager(s). If 
not, the market or another aspect of the environment is to blame. Let us stop 
fooling ourselves that intuition, instinct, emotions, superstition or whatever 
one would choose to call it, must of course not happen too often, as the 
interviewed manager out of 30 managers said. It is like ‘keeping up 
appearances’. But at least he is honest.  
 
The question is: does it matter that many, if not most, decisions in 
Boardrooms are not made rationally or at least less rational than we pretend? 
There are at least two reasons to answer the question with ‘No’. The first is 
the dictum of Von Foerster, one of the founding fathers of cybernetics (in 
Achterbergh & Vriens, 2002, in discussing Luhmann). ‘Problems that can be 
decided do not need a decision and problems that cannot be decided require 
a decision’. There exists a class of problems that can be solved fully by means 
of calculation. We can make a decision, i.e. select an option from a range of 
options by means of calculation. The problem can be decided, but a decision 
is not needed. Mere calculation suffices. This of course relates to decisions of 
an economical or financial nature in organisations. There is no rationality 
involved in calculations and that could explain why we are so fond to stress, 
solve and emphasize the importance of these problems in organisations. 
Another class of problems cannot be fully solved by means of calculation, 
neither in principle nor due to a lack of time. Achterbergh & Vriens phrase 
this in Ashby’s terms.  
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 Every true decision involves a jump (a transformation) from a set of 
selectable options (the operand) into a selection that could have been and 
can be different (the transform). So it also depends under which conditions 
the transformation takes place.  
The second reason is Weick’s advice and Beer’s work. If you want 
to know everything in planning, by the time you know it (small chance) the 
situation has changed in the meantime and you can start again. No deci-
sion and no action took place. So if you do not know what to do “what the 
leader has to do, when faced with this situation, is instil some confidence in 
people, get them moving in some general direction, and be sure they look 
closely at cues created by their actions so that they learn where they were 
and get some better idea of where they are and where they want to be. This 
exactly is a heuristic” (Weick, 1995, p. 55). That is what the reconnaissance 
unit did with the wrong map. “Managers keep forgetting that it is what they 
do, not what they plan, that explains their success”.  
As Weick (1995, p. 36) says, action is a key aspect of sense making 
and as Merleau-Ponty (1997, p. 228) says, a painter has only one means at 
his disposal to make an impression of the piece of art he is working on: he 
must produce it. I will end this section with pay homage to Beer (1990a, p. 
53). “Algorithms, that describe heuristics, determine the definitive 
revelation of a strategy, which strategy cannot be worked out in advance. 
Did a representative body of lizards pass a resolution to fly? […] But the 
birds are flying this evening outside my window. This is because heuristics 
work while we are still sucking the pencil, which would like to prescribe an 
algorithm. […] Nature is simply using its algorithms to specify heuristics. 
[…] Heuristics explain the adaptation to a changing world”. 
 
4.9  Sense making definition 
 
We have seen that there are many meanings distinguished and a 
semantic essence (content + judgement) and ideal meaning. We have just 
limited ourselves to meaning. If we take into account only the most salient 
features of the process of sense making we can come to a definition of 
sense making.  
 
In itself invisible meaning, as a layered concept in specialized 
interlocked fields with a Weltanschauung in the background, originates in 
perception on the pre-reflective level as suddenly seeing the spring out of 
immanent meaning of cues in a context and their relations and direction as 
a figure-background setting full of ambiguity.  
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 On the reflective level, using inductive and deductive logic reciprocally, sense 
making is an ongoing, on the basis of expectations, self-fulfilling prophecies 
and (emotionally charged) beliefs, whereby beliefs and actions are tied 
together, individual and social process of heuristic actions by the selves in a 
feel of continuity, whereby balance, plausibility and satisfying are the success 
factors.  
 
Well, I have seen shorter ones but not more encompassing. Sense 
making is dynamic (spontaneity) whereas Weltanschauung is more static 
(sedimentation). While the intentional arc brings unity in our life, an implicit, 
tacit Weltanschauung that can be evoked brings further order in our life. 
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 What is the purpose of a tiger? 
¾            to be itself 
¾ to provide tiger-skins 
¾ to perpetuate the genes 
of which it is the host 
 
Beer 
 
CHAPTER 5. STRUCTURE 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter we will discuss the line connecting action – 
structural acting in figure 1 in chapter 1. We will also pay attention to the 
line connecting meaning – particularization Weltanschauung in figure 1, in 
particular how organisations can be viewed. The latter will be discussed in 
the sections 5.2 and 5.3. In this context we will discuss briefly some main-
stream theories, which are relevant in designing a questionnaire in order to 
measure Weltanschauung as will be done in chapter 7. In section 5.4 we 
will discuss organisational cybernetics, of which the Viable System Model 
and Viplan form part. Instead of giving a repeat performance of the 
operations of Beer and Espejo, we will only summarize some insights 
related to this thesis. They published extensively and the reader is referred 
to their work, some of which is included in the bibliography. In section 5.5 
the functions for viability in the Viable System Model are mentioned. The 
pro and cons of the Viable System Model are discussed briefly in section 
5.6. We end with a brief discussion of Viplan in section 5.7. The Viable 
System Model is included as appendix 8. 
 
In chapter 3 it was mentioned that many concepts as defined by the 
neurobiologists Maturana and Varela come back in organisational 
cybernetics. We will repeat these definitions here. Organisation is the 
presence of certain relations, which are necessary for the existence of 
something. Structure means the actual components and actual relations that 
in fact form an entity and give the organisation thereof reality. Espejo’s 
definition (2002) of structure as given in chapter 1 is based on this 
definition. It reads: Structure is defined as the relations constituted by the 
specific resources producing the organisation’s relationships. The same 
relationships (more abstract) may underpin different relations (concrete 
individuals). 
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 Identity is determined by a network of dynamic processes of which the 
influence remains within the network. That was called operational closed. 
Operational closure can also be linked to organisations. “At the same time 
that an organisation is open to energy and other resources, it is operationally 
closed, that is, the connectivity of its components produces a closed network, 
which is, and can be, differentiated from its background, medium or 
environment. This is what makes them units with their own identity” 
(Espejo, 2003).  
 
5.2 The correctness of theories  
 
“Each action of a manager –as strategist, planner, organisation 
builder, daily leader or helmsman- is based on a view concerning human 
being and society. May be often unconscious and unspoken. […] Therefore 
reflection on the correctness and the sense of reality of theories about human 
being and society seems a first requirement” (Keuning & Eppink, 1982, p. 
209). I once had to learn parts of this Dutch standard work on management 
and organisation. We did not have to deal with this chapter, so this statement 
came for me quite as a surprise. They go on to discuss various notions, 
concepts, developments and schools in management. In each of these 12 
schools, to start with Taylor and Fayol, the emphasis is on different issues. 
System Theory is one of these schools and Beer is one of the representatives. 
According to Keuning & Eppink (1982) the emphasis of system theory is on 
the totality idea and the interrelation idea. In some of these schools the 
humane side of the employee is emphasized. However, authors contribute 
merely aspects of human beings. These aspects are, for instance a sense of 
belonging (Mayo), Theory X and Y (McGregor), the pyramid of needs 
(Maslow) and the (dis)satisfiers (Herzberg). In Theory X the style of leader-
ship is autocratic and in Theory Y the style of leadership is participative 
(1982, p. 318). Autocratic means authoritarian. This style can be characterised 
by (Oldendorff, 1979, p. 147): a) the leader takes all the decisions, b) each 
step in a group activity is described by the leader, c) the leader orders and d) 
the leader praises or rebukes personally. Participative can best be 
characterised by the leader is a member of a group as the primus inter pares. 
If we total up all these aspects we still do not get ‘the big picture’. 
These aspects are much related to work behaviour and motivation (how to 
get someone on the move).  
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 The human being is considered to be a needs fulfilling creature by 
psychologists. The work or task and the style of management must fit with 
these needs. Human beings are considered to have a bounded rationality. 
In chapter 4 we already discussed rationality. We have seen that human 
beings are also purposeful in contrast to purposive. That distinguishes us 
from other mammals.  
 
5.3  Organisation 
 
Weick (1995, p. 166) discusses ephemeral organizations, an 
organizing phenomenon in its most primeval form. They ‘work’, mostly 
following a disaster or catastrophe. Even dogs are then often forming 
packs. “Ephemeral organizations are simply what people do when nobody 
tells them what they should do”. People take initiatives. As Beer (1990a, 
1990b) also says, people are inventing their environment and/or future. In 
doing so human beings form social systems. In chapter 3 we have already 
seen what Merleau-Ponty and Maturana regard as social. Organizations are 
a special form of social systems. In organizations the employer has the 
right to command and employees have the duty to obey (Christis, 1998). So 
now somebody tells people what to do. Here comes the boss or the 
manager in the picture. However, the right to command can be done in 
various ways. The traditional, taken-for-granted way of thinking about 
organization and management runs counter to the way human beings 
‘work’. It will be advocated that the traditional way is unnatural (e.g. 
separation of thinking and doing) and therefore counter-productive, 
leading to chaos as the word is used in everyday language. The key words 
here are autonomy and self-organization. Human beings are autonomous 
systems. The question becomes how we could deal with this autonomy for 
the benefit of human beings and the organization considered as a system. 
Beer’s first Principle of Organization is among other things managerial 
varieties should be designed to do minimum damage to people and to cost. 
Variety is the number of possible states of a system and variety is the 
measure for complexity. Beer criticized the traditional way of commanding 
and controlling sharply. “The orthodox notion of control is frankly fascist; 
it is mandatory; it is bully. Orders are issued and it is expected that they will 
be carried out” (1964, p. 284). Beer defined autonomy as the freedom of an 
embedded subsystem to act on its own initiative, but only within the 
framework of action determined by the purpose of the total system (1991, 
p. 105).  
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 Maturana & Varela said a system is autonomous if it is able to specify its own 
regularities; that what is characteristic of it. Autonomy is one of the most 
striking features of living creatures as was seen. 
Wierdsma (2000) distinguishes between Positional organising and 
Transformational organising. Positional organising is characterized as 
pedantic, more of the same, standardisation, separation of thinking and 
doing, training for a relay race by directing all energy to racing and not to 
handing on the baton, in short the traditional, hierarchical, authoritarian way 
of organising we know for more than 100 years. This way of organising is 
known as for instance functional diversification and the line organisation. All 
the other is Transformational organising with an emphasis on individual and 
organisational learning as long as it is no cosmetic change or deviation from 
the Positional organising (Wierdsma in conversations). Transformational 
organising is a perspective wherein the emphasis is on contributions of 
individuals and groups to the realisation of transactions within and between 
organisations in environments. It is the receiver who is of essential 
importance, since ultimately the receiving party must value the transaction, 
service or product. I like Wierdsma’s distinction because he is not 
dichotomising in contrast to for instance Theory X and Theory Y mentioned 
above or the next distinction, being Theory E and Theory O. Wierdsma’s 
distinction is not ‘either…or’ but rather ‘this and all the other’. All the other 
can manifest itself in various forms. 
 
Beer & Nohria (2000; a different Beer than discussed below) come up 
with Theory E and Theory O with regard to change in organisations. The 
orientations of the management with regard to purpose, leadership, focus, 
planning, consultants and time differ. In Theory E the orientation of the 
management is on to maximize economic value, top-down, structure & 
systems, programmatic planning, large knowledge driven consultancies and 
short term shareholder value. In Theory O the orientation of the manage-
ment is on to develop organisational capabilities, participative, culture, 
emergent planning, small process driven consultancies and long term 
stakeholder value. They advocate a ‘and / also’ approach, the hardest 
approach, that requires great will, skill and wisdom. Of the sequencing 
strategies they prefer the simultaneous E and O variant. Not explicitly 
mentioned is the necessity to have two CEO’s, one with an E word-view 
and one with an O world-view, due to the fact that a CEO with both 
world-views is hard or impossible to find, according to Beer & Nohria.  
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 As someone at a U.S.A. company (Asda) said, headed by two CEO’s with 
two world-views, the people respected the Theory E CEO and loved the 
Theory O CEO. Also here we can speak of a duality or what Beer & 
Nohria call the management of paradox. They emphasize that a half-
hearted mixing of E and O is extremely confusing and debilitating to an 
organisation.  
  
5.4 Organisational Cybernetics 
 
Organizational cybernetics is concerned with effective action. 
Action and behaviour come back in sentences like “Cybernetics is 
interested in what a system does, ways of behaving, not what it is” (Ashby, 
1971, p. 1). “If making distinctions is not supported by actions, they are 
wasted distinctions” (Espejo, 2000, p. 951). “The purpose of a system is 
what it does” (Beer), because it would be absurd to say that the purpose of 
a system is what it continuously omits to do. This motto led to amusing 
letters for instance to the Chairman of British Rail for which he was not 
thanked (or never got an answer). This also make people (e.g. Ackoff, De 
Leeuw, 1990) say Beer is an inspiring, creative, profound thinker on the 
subject of management, but also provocative. 
And although Merleau-Ponty criticized cybernetics as was seen in chapter 
1, he said the same as Ashby (1971, p. 1) does. “Things define themselves 
by their behaviour (what it does, HL) in first instance and not by static 
properties (what it is, HL)” (1997, p. 329).  
  
In cybernetics, the traditional 1st order cybernetics (Ashby etc.) 
means the cybernetics of observed systems, whereas the 2nd order 
cybernetics (Von Foerster etc) relates to observing systems. This thesis is in 
line with the latter. Beer did not like the term cybernetics but this time he 
did not have a better alternative. “[…] The customs officer asked what he 
was a professor of: ‘Cybernetics’ said Stafford, ‘I know what that is’ replied 
our official with pride ‘it is when you freeze dead bodies to be brought 
back to life at some future date…” (Whittaker, 2003, p. 24). 
De Geus (1989) distinguishes three organization concepts and 
discusses various authors related to these concepts comparable to what 
Morgan (1992) does with the metaphors. De Geus distinguishes the 
rational organization concept, the integral organization concept and the 
libertarian organization concept, the latter restricted to the left wing. 
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 On page 193 he states: “It is fascinating, that Beer and Toffler without 
explicit references to the tradition of political theories, almost seamlessly link 
up to the libertarian thoughts about freedom, control and organisation. And 
this while they base themselves on the most modern theoretical insights of 
cybernetics and systems theory and not on a radical anarchistic ideal of 
freedom”. So he places organizational cybernetics in the libertarian 
organization concept.  
 
Apart from the Large Scale Intervention Team Syntegrity, as mentioned 
earlier, part of organisational cybernetics is the Viable System Model 
(“VSM”) and Viplan. In section 5.7 Viplan will be discussed briefly. It 
suffices here to say, that the VSM is the systemic basis of Viplan. With regard 
to the VSM, we will elaborate a bit on the words viable, system, model and 
recursion. Viability was defined in chapter 1 as: able to maintain a separate 
(or independent) existence; not in isolation but rather in (vital) interaction 
with the environment. 
A system is a viewpoint’s construct of a set of interrelated parts 
constituting a whole (Espejo, 2000). As was said, there exist many more 
definitions of a system such as a set of variables (Ashby, 1971) and the 
relations between parts that form a whole whereas the whole has properties 
the parts have not (Checkland, 2000). As Checkland & Scholes (1998) quote 
one of their students saying to another student: ‘You are certainly more than 
the sum of your parts. You are an idiot’. No part is an idiot. As Beer told in a 
lecture in Liverpool in 1996 at the occasion of his 70th birthday, his publisher 
consequently deleted his word ‘systemic’ and replaced it by ‘systematic’ 
meaning ‘according to a certain method’. That obviously is not the same. 
Systems may also emerge from purposeful design as well as self-
organisation. It is one aspect of social organisation (Espejo, 2003). Purpose, 
what a system does, relates to meaning, what it does for what purpose. 
Espejo distinguishes between meaning creation in the informational domain 
(ideas and mental models) and meaning production in the operational 
domain (moment to moment experiences). Producing a meaning is in the 
operational domain, the domain in which ‘we bump into each other’ in 
contrast to creating a meaning, which we do in the informational domain, the 
domain of ideas. Producing a meaning is the emergent and evolving meaning 
of the myriad communications ‘on the ground’ as experienced and 
appreciated by the relevant stakeholders. Creating a meaning relates to an 
espoused purpose sometimes independent of what is happening ‘on the 
ground’, but it affects these people.  
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 “Hence the same organisation may produce many different products or 
services over time; as long as it maintains its identity (what it is, HL) it is 
the same organisation”. The interrelation idea is in the operational domain. 
“Organisations are constituted by individual’s moment-to-moment inter-
actions in their operational domains. It is through these interactions […] 
that organisational structures supporting people’s actions are formed”. 
Produced meanings are eigen-values, stable self-referential, self-producing 
meanings, independent of individuals. Or in the eigen-value example of 
Beer (1994, p. 216) the square root of 1 in an infinite recursion is 1. In 
human beings these domains are linked and at the same time decoupled 
due to purposefulness. The concern is how these two domains can be 
connected in social systems by structure. 
Models are conventions -a way of talking about something in a 
manner that is understandable and useful in a community of observers 
(Espejo & Harnden, 1992, p. 445). Von Krogh & Roos (1995, p. 180) end 
up their journey stating: “The model (another model than the VSM, HL) is 
based on organizational management replicating individual management. 
Thus, the model used to manage oneself is the same model used to manage 
the organization”. In my opinion the VSM is also such a model. Also in my 
view organizing should not differ in features human beings have. As 
Husserl said, institutions are personalities of a higher order. 
Recursion is sometimes compared to the Russian Dolls effect or the 
Droste nurse effect. A similar doll or nurse is embedded in a similar doll or 
nurse over and over again. On each level of recursion in the Viable System 
Model the five functions as mentioned in section 5.5 appear again.  
 
At the core of the Viable System Model is seeking balances 
between for instance autonomy and cohesion and among systems in their 
relations. The Viable System Model is also based on how the human 
nervous system including the brain works. Organizational cybernetics is 
much indebted to neurophysiology especially to McCulloch and Maturana 
& Varela. Beer spends 75 pages on the human nervous system in ‘Brain of 
the Firm’, followed by ‘Now this book can really begin’. “Our nervous 
system is a most powerful recursive learning system. Learning how this 
system manages complexity should give a powerful heuristic for social 
problem solving. This is what the VSM offers” (Espejo, 2003). “Its (the 
VSM, HL) connection to the human nervous system has to be understood 
only as an attempt to learn about successful regulatory processes in nature 
[…] and not as an organistic view of social systems”. 
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 Morgan (1992) places Beer under the organism and brain metaphor. There is 
a case for a flux metaphor. “The VSM’s capacity to map hugely complex 
social situations is given by its recursive nature, which allows that mapping to 
be made in multiple embedded systems, from the global to the local […]” 
(Espejo, 2003). 
 
In the VSM the emphasis in management is on minding your own 
business, anticipating operational essential variables that threaten to go 
beyond physiological limits, variety engineering as design and creating the 
right conditions for the people who actually do the work (the autonomous 
operational units as primary activities). Management is neither extinguishing 
fires in being not-up-to-date clumsy nor minding the shop, as a popular 
Dutch politician is fond to say. Managers should also place themselves in 
service of their company and employees, as a few managers say (Noordzij, 
FD 06.20.03, ex TLN/NS and Wijffels, FD 12.14.02, ex Rabobank; SER 
chairman) instead of thinking of themselves and (their) shareholder value (in 
terms of options). Beer already pointed in the same direction some 30 years 
ago. To fully understand his statement an explanation of the cybernetic 
concept of ‘constraint’ follows. A constraint is a relation between two sets, 
and occurs when the variety  that exist under one condition is less than the 
variety that exist under another condition (Ashby, 1971, p. 127). A traffic 
light has a variety of 8 whereas we only use 3 possibilities in the Netherlands 
and 4 in the U.K. If a light ‘on’ is ‘1’ and ‘off’ is ‘0’ we get 000, 100, 110, 111, 
001, 011, 101 and 010. So constraint exists, because the set of 3 (100, 010, 
001) is less than the set of 8. “These things (financial ratio’s, HL) are 
abstractions, and very useful ones too, if we want to manipulate successfully 
our economic constraints. […] Can the organization actually survive – 
assuming that the financial constraints are met?” (Beer, 1985, p. xi). 
‘Manipulate abstractions’ is obvious. The Dutch Stock Exchange Supervisor 
AFM raises ‘serious questions’ on 46 out of 50 researched annual reports 
2002 of Stock Exchange listed companies (FD, 12.5.2003). When a 
constraint exists, predicting that many situations will never be found to 
occur, advantage can usually be taken of it, is Ashby’s (1971, p. 130) 
important message (for managers). 
Managers are also not more ‘important’ than anyone else in the 
organization. They all contribute to the system. That is what is meant by the 
non-hierarchical nature of the VSM. If managers think they are more 
‘important’, Beer speaks of pathological autopoiesis, meaning producing 
themselves morbidly, as we have seen in chapter 3.  
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 These managers are said to have a big ego. We have come to see that 
human beings do not have an ego at all. 
 
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety states that ‘only variety destroys 
variety’. Only variety in the regulator, the management, can destroy the 
variety in the outcomes of the essential variables due to disturbances. If V 
is variety, E the outcomes in the essential variables, D the disturbances and 
R the regulator, the minimum variety in the outcomes is  
VE  = VD : VR. If that number in VE must decrease for whatever reason, 
the variety of the regulator must increase. De Sitter’s Sociotechnics (1994) 
is for instance based on the reformulation of this formula. If you decrease 
the regulatory needs (VD) in the production structure by installing parallel 
streams, you can increase the regulatory possibilities (VR) by decentrali-
sation in the regulatory structure by installing (semi-autonomous) self-
steering teams. The VSM is also based on this formula, although the 
working out is different.  
In organisations there is a paradox, called the complexity paradox. 
The variety in the environment is more than in the operations (primary 
activities), which in turn have more variety than its management. The 
management has no Requisite Variety by definition. This paradox is 
overcome by variety engineering, also called design. Variety in the low side 
is increased (amplified) and variety in the high side is decreased 
(attenuated). An example is market research (attenuate variety in the 
environment because you now know what they want) and making an offer 
(amplify variety, ‘Buy a white car now and pay next year’) whereby the loop 
as two sides of the coin is closed. According to Beer (1990a, 1990b), 
management is not managing ‘stuff’ but rather also variety. And variety has 
the objectionable habit of proliferating exponentially by the increase of 
elements, components or relations. That is what is called complexity. Then 
the question comes: ‘Do we not have to manage people?’ The answer is: 
‘Yes, the employee is the Heart of Enterprise’, Beer’s companion volume 
to the earlier mentioned book ‘Brain of the Firm’. People who have met 
Beer know that this is his central concern. His steps via ‘technical’ or 
‘abstract’ issues in order to deal with this central concern are mainly not 
understood. But we will come back to criticism on his insights in due 
course in this chapter. 
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 5.5  The functions in the VSM 
 
According to Beer (1990a, 1990b, 1991) there are functions needed 
for viability in organisations. The first function is called System 1, 
Implementation. These are the primary activities. They produce the 
organisation’s products and services and are the activities with which the 
money is earned. They are the ‘raison d’être’. For instance, in the case of a 
clinic we get the Care Centres Orthopaedics, Rheumatism and Rehabilitation. 
These Care Centres are managed by managers respectively, the System 1 
management. The second function is System 2, Coordination. It is an anti-
oscillation device that must stabilize the interactions between the primary 
activities. Coordination sees to it that essential variables stay within assigned 
limits. In this sense management is anticipating. Coordination is a service to 
the System 1 management, like a timetable is in a school. The third function 
is System 3, Control. Control stands in relation with the System 1 
management by two mechanisms, Corporate Intervention and Resource 
Bargaining. Corporate Intervention means ‘If we do it, we do it this way’ in 
order to avoid (legal) claims or comply with (safety) laws. The System 1 
management is partly deprived of their autonomy by these orders. Resource 
Bargaining consists on the one hand of bargaining what System 1 will do in 
the next period. For Control this is a so-called variety attenuator (decreasing 
variety in System 1). Control now knows what System 1 is supposed to do. 
On the other hand, the management of System 1 is accountable. They report 
on a periodical sequence to Control. That is for Control a so-called variety 
amplifier. In the VSM there are hundreds or thousands of these variety-
engineering loops, as variety attenuators and amplifiers. However, Control 
can be led up the garden path, whether deliberately or not by the System 1 
management. In order to avoid misunderstandings in communication, 
Control has the System 3*, Monitoring mechanism at its disposal. Control 
has direct access to the operations (primary activities). It makes use of this 
channel sporadic and unannounced. It can also be used for audits and 
building mutual responsible (contrary to naïve) trust in the words of Espejo. 
The senior management is paying attention to and showing an interest in 
what is happening. The fourth function is called System 4, Intelligence. This 
function oversees the environment of the organisation on new develop-
ments. System 5, Policy, sees to it, that Control and Intelligence are in strong 
interaction.  
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 Control is responsible for efficiency, doing things right. Intelligence is 
responsible for adaptation or effectiveness, doing the right things. Policy 
cuts the knots; it only has to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the proposals of Control 
and Intelligence. Policy is also responsible for the ethos, the moral attitude. 
System 2, 3, 4 and 5 are called the senior management. 
One mechanism in the VSM is so far not yet mentioned. It is the 
so-called algedonic (pain-pleasure) loop. The loop goes from the System 1 
management directly to System 5, Policy, on each level of recursion. It is a 
cry for help. In traditional organisations one is not allowed ‘to go beyond 
one’s boss’.  However, that boss, in the VSM System 3, Control, can be a 
blocking filter in communication. In an anticipated crisis situation one 
must be allowed ‘to do something’. It will be clear that also this mechanism 
is used as an exception. 
 
This is the VSM in a nutshell on the ‘highest’ level of recursion. We 
can now unfold the complexity of the organisation. For instance, in the 
case of the clinic, Rheumatism can be further unfolded on the next ‘lower’ 
recursion level in Outpatient and the Public Pharmacy. This level of 
recursion also has the functions as mentioned above. Each level of 
recursion has these functions, so that each level of recursion has a long-
term view and a short-term view. 
The drivers for this unfolding are (a combination of) process (the 
transformation), customers, geography and time. If we would unfold the 
complexity of a University, Professors come only in the picture on the 
fourth or fifth level of recursion. “Is there anyone in this room who 
believes that Professors have nothing to say in a University?” Espejo asks 
his students. It emphasizes that no level of recursion is more important 
than any other level. A ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ level is a relative issue. 
 
5.6 The pro and cons of the VSM 
 
Then how is it that some structures can offer better opportunities 
for coordination of actions, i.e. communication, than others?  What is in 
this framework the significance of the VSM? In order to address the last 
question we embark from a few notions made by Jackson in Espejo & 
Harnden (1992). “Beer’s VSM can legitimately be seen as a sophisticated 
working out of the implications of Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety in 
organizational terms” (1992, p. 414).  
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 “…The source of control is spread throughout the architecture of the 
system… Problems are corrected as close as possible to the point where they 
occur.” (1992, p. 417). “Existing organizational systems will, naturally, already 
exhibit characteristics of viable systems. But, to use Beer’s phrase, some of 
them ‘creak’ ” (1992, p. 419). “However, specific mechanisms aimed at 
achieving shared values and beliefs appear, from the phenomenological point 
of view, to be absent, since Beer clearly cites the source of viability of a 
system (its ‘organization’) in its structural arrangements for handling com-
plexity and concentrates on these, viewing corporate culture as a secondary, 
emergent property” (1992, p. 427). And this is the case against the VSM, 
apart from power, which is dealt with later on in this section. Espejo & 
Harnden (1992, p. 454) state that an application of the VSM requires the 
interpretation of the expression of various distinct viewpoints within the 
system-in-focus, and this is where it is different from most other models. 
The system-in-focus is the level of recursion we pay attention to. 
In the function Monitoring on each level of recursion the senior 
management is the listener ‘on the ground’ in the operational domain in the 
embedded primary activities. The managers of these primary activities are 
aware that this can happen, they need to give their consent but if they 
struggle against such a visit by the senior management, they incriminate 
themselves of course. So throughout the whole system there is an interlocked 
chain of interested listeners, so to speak. These listeners might question 
habitual, unconscious behaviour. Questions can be: what are you doing right 
now, why are you doing it this way and what is the purpose of doing it? This 
channel has nothing to do with supervision but rather with to show an 
interest in people and what is happening.  
Misunderstandings among managers of primary activities with 
sequential or reciprocal relations can easily be established. An anti-oscillation 
device is System 2 or Coordination. This is our adrenaline in the nervous 
system. Together with the Monitoring loop they form the inner, tempering 
dialogue loop. ‘Run hard to catch the train’ (S 2) and ‘Calm down, it is no 
good for you in your condition’ (S 3*). Coordination is a service for (the 
managers of) the primary activities. If managers are offered a service, they 
will highly likely be more prepared to listen than in the case of given orders 
or instructions from the Staff.  
This brings us to the question of autonomy in the operational 
domain at each level of recursion. According to Beer (1991, p. 89, 98, 102, 
103) autonomy is a computable function of the purpose of a viable system. 
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 When we know what the purpose is, we may also know the criteria of 
relevance for distinguishing possible states (has the change of state bearing 
on the purpose?). This will then tell us how much variety must be handled 
by Control, because the vertical variety of Control must equal the 
horizontal variety disposed by the primary activities. It will determine the 
minimum variety on the vertical command axis (earlier called Corporate 
Intervention) that guarantees cohesion. Autonomy means the freedom 
remaining to the horizontal management of the primary activities. It is this 
duality of autonomy and cohesion on each level of recursion that makes 
the VSM valuable and a useful arranging framework. 
The primary activities are as autonomous as possible given the 
extent to which their purposes and thus meanings are aligned with the 
whole system. We already said that meanings do not necessarily have to be 
shared. There must be at least a workable situation. But the purposes of the 
primary activities must be within the identity of the whole system. If we 
have decided after consultation that we form a football club and all of a 
sudden someone wants to play hockey, he better does that elsewhere. 
 
By definition autonomous systems are more intra-related than 
interrelated, whether in semi-autonomous teams or autonomous systems. 
In semi-autonomous teams the aim is to get multi-skilled workers by 
demonstrating and learning. That makes possible a team ‘culture’ where 
people are allowed and even stimulated to ask what is meant. The relations 
get denser. In autonomous systems, be it teams or individuals, the commu-
nication needs in whatever form coming from the senior management are 
less. Goals, targets, norms, together the desired outcomes, and resources 
are negotiated by the senior management and the management of the 
primary activities. This is a powerful variety reducer (or attenuator) in the 
sense that we now all know what is expected for a certain period.  
For the accountability of the management of the primary activities 
and focus on essential variables an ingenious accountability system was 
developed (1990a, p. 162). It is beyond the scope of this thesis. We will 
confine to mention that the measurements Actuality, Capability and 
Potentiality, coming together in a performance index between 0 and 1, go 
in aggregated form via regulatory centres and Coordination to the senior 
management. If a gap between desired and actual outcomes is anticipated, 
all systems know what and when to do. It also is an accountability system 
that shows short term ‘gains’ at the cost of long-term interests. It prevents 
the exploitation of parts of the organisation. This exploitation deprives the 
system of its viability. 
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 All this is to avoid the ‘control dilemma’. By that is meant that a part 
of the senior management, Control, gets overloaded with information. 
Normally Control has a feel not to have a full grip on what is happening and 
thus requests more and more information. In the end a lot of noise gets in 
the communication channels. In the words of Achterbergh & Vriens (2002b) 
relevant knowledge is knowledge that contributes to viability. In their words, 
specific knowledge has two functions. It serves as a background for 
perception and action, which is called a knowledge domain. 
 
The VSM is criticised for not paying enough attention to power 
relations or that it can be misused. Jackson (in Espejo & Harnden, 1992, p. 
434), after discussing the pro and cons, states: ”While cyberneticians eschew 
a semantic-pragmatic criterion of good management, they will continue to 
battle fruitlessly with paradoxes […] and theoretical development will be 
constrained. Meanwhile, in the ‘real world’, no such problem exists. The issue 
of how much autonomy to grant to the parts is settled as a matter of 
‘managerial’ convenience -in the interests of those who possess power. The 
managerial significance of the VSM with regard to ‘purposes’ can therefore 
be portrayed as slight. When it comes to bringing about change in social 
systems we need…” Among other things he mentions Checkland’s Soft 
Systems Methodology (see chapter 4). “Once it is understood that the VSM 
is a generative mechanism (or a pointer for understanding and action, next 
page, HL), rather than some descriptive or prescriptive tool, it is a contra-
diction in terms to accuse it of being inherently totalitarian” (Espejo & 
Harnden, 1992, p. 458). The latter is clear. I think this thesis proves that 
cyberneticians do not eschew a semantic-pragmatic criterion for good 
management, as Jackson admits in his conclusion (1992, p. 436). “In this way 
the ‘phenomenological’ and ‘structural’ positions can be seen as complement-
tary rather than contradictory” (1992, p. 436). Second, the outcomes of the 
interviews in chapter 8 show that there is a deeper felt inner ‘drive’, called 
purpose in the Weltanschauung, behind ‘managerial’ convenience. Most 
interviewed managers are low power orientated or want to have an influence 
instead. In Viplan both Soft Systems Methodology and the VSM are present. 
 
It will also be clear that these insights run counter completely to the 
‘taken-for-granted’ insights in management and organisation. It is all based 
on cybernetic principles and laws. This is also one of the reasons the VSM is 
rather unknown in organisational theory. First one has to learn (some) of 
Ashby’s insights before one is able to understand Beer’s insights. So, yes, also 
this understanding requires hard work.  
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 5.7  Viplan 
 
The first step in Viplan, as developed by Espejo, is establishing the 
organisation’s identity. In chapter 4 this was discussed under section 4.1 
with regard to messy problems. The second step is structural modelling; 
offering criteria to break the primary transformation into smaller tasks. The 
third step is modelling structural levels. The primary activities define the 
organisation’s unfolding of complexity. The fourth step is modelling 
distribution of discretion. This step was used in the interviews so we will 
elaborate on this step in this section. The fifth step is modelling the organi-
sation structure. This is mapping the allocation of resources onto the VSM 
and identifying structural issues. 
In the fourth step regulatory functions, such as legal and finance, 
are attributed to primary activities. In order to this the Discretion 
Recursion Function Table is used. In this table horizontally the regulatory 
functions are mentioned. Vertically is mentioned the system-in-focus, the 
recursion level we pay attention to, and the mentioned function in section 
5.5, being Policy, Intelligence, Resource Bargaining, Corporate 
Intervention, Coordination and Monitoring. The systemic meaning of the 
regulatory functions may change from situation to situation. So for instance 
Finance may have the functions Policy, Intelligence (focus on the financial 
markets), Resource Bargaining, Corporate Intervention and Coordination 
(accountability formats desired by the System 1 management). On another 
recursion level it may have, for instance, only the functions Intelligence, 
Resource Bargaining and Corporate Intervention. These functions on each 
recursion level are mapped onto the VSM. Structural issues may then be, 
for instance, that regulatory functions are overdeveloped or under-
developed. Then the question to the management is: Why is this done this 
way? There may be good reasons to do so. Or a regulatory function is 
represented on recursion level 1 and recursion level 3. Then the question is: 
Why is this function not represented on recursion level 2?  
Granted, it is a lot of work certainly in bigger organisations with 
many levels of recursion. On the other hand it is possible to only use three 
levels of recursion whereby the level in the middle becomes the system-in-
focus. Anyway, it delivers a richer picture than the rather ‘poor’ 
organisation chart, which only shows the formal, hierarchical relations 
without a directly related environment of the system-in-focus.  
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 The mystery of meaning inhibiting cells 
 
    Merleau-Ponty 
 
CHAPTER 6. THE HARVEST 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
We have dealt so far with nearly all the lines connecting the various 
concepts in figure 1 of chapter 1. Together with the definition of the most 
salient features of sense making in section 4.9 of chapter 4, the central 
question and the first key question in chapter 1 are answered. We have added 
to sense making the pre-reflective level that precedes the reflective level as 
two aspects of the act of perception, whereby the latter is only an extract of 
the former. And on that reflective level we have added differences in nuance 
or denied utterances, like for instance that sense making is understood as a 
process that is retrospective, that perception is a form of memory, that 
individual sense making is an oxymoron and that a Weltanschauung is a meta 
level that defines a situation. Weltanschauung has been separated from sense 
making although they presuppose each other and stand in a circular relation. 
So to a large extent it depends what is meant by Weick’s words ‘extract’ and 
‘impose’. If the words are used in the sense of the definition and this chapter 
they are fine with me. In this chapter we will summarize the main findings 
and discuss the relevance of these insights. Chapter 5 will not be summarized 
here. It would be a summary of a summary and it is a means of finding out 
more in the second part of this thesis related to the second key question in 
chapter 1. 
 
6.2 Meaning 
 
The world is full of meaning. One could say that much like the living 
creature and the environment codetermine each other reciprocally in 
structural coupling, sense making is codetermined with the world. Each 
sensation of the human being is already pregnant of a sense. The cues already 
lend their immanent meaning to be formed by a context. The world has a 
physiognomy, a style, which remains the same throughout our entire life. 
That is the reason we form together with the world a unity, a system, in 
dialogue in communication, interaction and inter-subjectivity.  
         154 
 Perception is our inseparable concrete connectedness with the things. We 
cannot exist separated from the world; we are always situated and orient-
tated in the world. We are attached to the world in every meaning of the 
word. Perception and action are linked together as successively emergent 
and mutually selecting patterns. The subject of perception is the 
phenomenal body as an experiential structure and the context of cognition 
mechanisms. The phenomenal body is essentially an expressive space and 
incorporates, for example, spaces of instruments into the bodily space. We 
need a lot of practice and the body takes over. We are our body and the 
body is our general means through which we have a world. The body is 
there where it has something to do. Our awareness of that phenomenal 
body is no idea. The things spread their latent meaning themselves. Factual 
situations and the stream of phenomena lend their (immanent) meaning. 
Meaning and direction go hand in hand. We are a project towards 
movement (in the world). Indications have no intrinsic meaning; the 
indicative relation is conventional. Perception is suddenly seeing the spring 
out of immanent meaning in a constellation of data. The brain lays the 
ground for perception. We are prepared for and tuned into the 
phenomena. The sensors translate themselves in each other without the 
need of an interpreter. It is tacit transposing and a transition synthesis. The 
seeing is already inhabited by a meaning that allocates it a function, both in 
the spectacle of the world as well in our existence.  
Cognition, the process of knowing and our conscious life as the 
entire process of life stand in an exact relation. The kingpin of cognition is 
its capacity for bringing forth meaning: information is not pre-established 
as a given order, but regularities emerge from a co-determination of the 
cognitive activities themselves. The cortex is the seat of consciousness and 
has no direct connection with the outside world at all – not even with the 
body of which it is the brain. 
Ambiguity as unclear meaning is essential for the human existence 
and everything we experience or think always has a plural meaning. 
Ambiguity on the pre-reflective level triggers sense making on the reflective 
level. Thing and world only exist lived through us because they are the 
chaining up of our perspectives. Just as perspectivity of perceptual 
consciousness precludes our ever perceiving everything simultaneously, so 
that of our temporal consciousness rules out our ever having an all-
encompassing grasp of time while preventing our simultaneously inhabiting 
other fields of presence. No single explanatory hypothesis is clearer than 
the act itself, which is being-in-the-world.  
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 Human beings as structure-determined beings do, what they do and 
what they are. These autonomous systems undergo only changes determined 
by their organisation and structure and are only triggered in structural 
coupling, a domain of states and a domain of perturbations that allow it to 
operate recurrently in its medium without disintegration. As our actions 
change so too does our sense of the world. Our entire life, habits, behaviour, 
actions and world or reality change. Perception and actions are inseparable. 
Observing is a particularization of perceiving. The observer’s experience 
remains in a duality secluded in his operational closure and on the other 
hand, in a meta-domain, is able to operate as external to the situation in 
which he is. Operational closure makes that the listener in communication is 
at most triggered. We are a parliament of selves with a feel of continuity, 
thus-and-so decided, a time (or self) that is lasting. To shift among 
interactions is to shift among definitions of self. People create (or choose) 
their own environments and these environments then constrain their actions. 
That is why a failure in sense making is consequential as well as existential. 
 
Our life is a process of becoming (affected by itself), bringing forth a 
world or worlds, whereby the nervous system creates itself a world. The 
system knows its environment in knowing itself. Human beings are what they 
are in language. Speech is thought and listening is thinking. Language 
changed the human repertoire of behaviour and made possible reflection and 
self-consciousness. The existential significance of language, which underlies 
the conceptual significance, permeates the words themselves and is imparted 
by them. The word has a meaning, just as the musical significance of a 
concerto inhabits the sounds, which bring that significance into being for the 
listener. This makes up the layers of meaning: of the visual meaning of the 
word via understanding of the word to the conceptual meaning thereof. 
Communication executes itself when our behaviour finds its own way in the 
indicated direction. 
The other is part of a pre-personal awareness of the phenomenal 
body polarized by the world of its habitual tasks. What that means we saw in 
chapter 2 in the example of the man who treats leather. The mystery of the 
other is nothing but the mystery of our self. We never coincide with the 
other and we never coincide completely with our selves. The ‘I’ stands alone 
or in other words, it is the loneliness of the ‘I’. That is the truth of solipsism 
that cannot be denied.  
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 Only relationships count for a human being. Our concern for the other is 
emotional, not rational. At the basis of living creatures is interaction, also 
seen as cooperation and coordination of actions. Mutual acceptance and 
not negation of the other constitutes social phenomena. We know we are 
companions perceiving the same world. Communication is a confirmation 
of each other. We cannot be rational because so much precedes rationality, 
as an extract of our pre-reflective being-in-the-world. For instance, the 
motive is an antecedent (similarity) that is only active by its meaning and 
the decision (the accepted situation) declares that meaning as legitimate. 
 
The discussion of Buddhism was no deliberate choice. I simply 
came across Buddhism in reading a certain book. But because it turned out 
that interviewed managers in chapter 8 are interested in Eastern insights it 
got a double layer. In Buddhism the goal is to become embodied out of 
compassion for the world. That compassion can change the omnipresent 
feeling tone of what we do. A graduated Chinese Master student (at the 
outset of chapter 3) said in a discussion about the Chinese culture: “In the 
West you are so sure about things”. It stresses the often heard ‘Sure is!’ “In 
China it all depends, context dependent”. That may explain that in his view 
in the West people are so slow whereas in China people are always in a 
hurry. He concluded that it is hard to understand Chinese people. Trust 
also here is the key word in discussing the important social networks in 
China. “They trust their family and their bank account. There is hardly 
anything beyond that”. In sense making, information and common sense, 
context is indeed essential.  
Besides that the concept of emergent properties permeates this 
thesis. There is no need for a central processing unit to guide the entire 
operation. In our traditional, hierarchical thinking about organisations we 
still think there is such a need. The Viable System Model makes clear 
through its recursive nature the working of components in local 
environments leading to global operation. I have never seen it better 
worded than by a former manager of a Swiss bank (UBS) in 1997: “It is just 
not possible any longer to ‘figure it out’ from the top, and have everyone 
else following the order of the ‘grand strategist’. The organisations that will 
truly excel in the future will be the organisations that discover how to tap 
people’s commitment and capacity to learn at all levels in an organisation”.  
The taken-for-granted picture of what a human being is in a pre-
given world and how reality is faced has been challenged in the foregoing 
chapters. This taken-for-granted picture can still be found in textbooks and 
popular accounts. 
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 6.3  Weltanschauung 
 
In order to be able to understand the scheme in figure 5 (see 
hereafter, p. 159) as a visualization of what has been said so far, for the 
reader it was necessary to follow our journey in the foregoing chapters. The 
life of consciousness, of knowing, desiring and perceiving is subtended by an 
intentional arc that takes care that we are situated in all our relations. The arc 
is unity-establishing meaning. Thanks to this arc there is an inseparable unity 
of powers of sensory organs, comprehension and motility. The brain 
architecture, structural coupling and a sense of balance in perception may be 
all that is needed to explain why all human beings generalize in roughly the 
same way. For patients the world has no physiognomy anymore. The world 
does not suggest a single meaning anymore for them. Temporality is the 
meaning of our existence.  
Our true time experience and mind are supposed to take their own 
direction. Time expands (meaningful events) and time contracts (less 
meaningful events). The most exact consciousness discovers itself in a duality 
as affected by itself (time unfolding) or given to itself (time already unfolded). 
We never coincide with ourselves – and yet we are present to ourselves 
because we have that distance of non-coincidence. Only in our field of 
presence, being simultaneously present to our self and involved in the world 
as being-in-the-world, we come in contact with time, we learn to know the 
course. Only in the distinct memory, as an immediate property of the past 
without sliding in between contents, and only in the deliberate calling up of 
the past we come across the past itself and rejoin our selves with the time 
unfolded. One remembers personal experiences that made an impression 
(were meaningful) and first time experiences (also meaningful) rather early in 
life at best throughout our life. Our Weltanschauung originates here. The 
structuring of objects in layers is the history of a series of acts in the manner 
in which we experience sense-contents already structured. It is a matter of 
felt belongingness as an implicit common term.  
 
This all brings us to the scheme in figure 5 on the next page. 
Descending the temporal consciousness, the given to itself aspect in duality, 
the self-consciousness that simultaneously arises with consciousness, we ‘end’ 
in the Weltanschauung (W) that gives further order to our life in circularity 
with sense making. In this scheme the two dualities, unity and order in our 
life have been made visible. 
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Figure 5. A scheme as a visualization. The W stands for Weltanschauung. 
 
6.4  The relevance 
 
Besides the question in chapter 1 ‘Why bother?’ there is the 
question of relevance. Why is all this of relevance for organisational theory? 
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 First, we can have a better understanding of meaning, 
Weltanschauung, the processes involved and how human beings perceive 
reality, also in combination with inseparable actions. In addition to what has 
been said so far in this chapter, I would like to emphasize that words used 
such as ‘one of the orders of significance can be regarded as dominant’ and 
‘priority position’ make the human being even still more complex. 
Second, many existing theories in organisational theory are in my 
opinion too one-sided and/or partial. The human being as employee or 
manager in organisations is more complex, layered and operational closed 
than many theories suppose. Moreover, the many dichotomies in these 
theories such as Theory X and Y and Theory E and O do not reflect how it 
actually ‘works’ in practice. That will be seen in Part 2, chapter 8. It also 
confirms Merleau-Ponty’s view that nothing is absolute or either/or.  
Third, the rather unknown theories in organisational theory used in 
this thesis deliver relevant insights. The insights will be confirmed for a great 
deal by managers in Part 2, chapter 8. It turns out that managers use these 
insights in practice without referring to the underlying theories. Some of 
these managers are also interested and influenced by Eastern insights. On the 
other hand, the insights can make clear why ‘things do not work’. On first 
sight these insights may be labelled as ‘soft’ by ‘die-hards’. On a closer look it 
turns out that managers responsible for thousands of employees sometimes 
‘live their life in these insights’. I must confess this was much to my surprise 
although I have a working life of many years in organisations behind me. In 
other words, I have met many managers as my clients in banking on 
comparable levels as the interviewed managers. But with hindsight we 
seldom discussed issues on a deeper level as is done in these interviews.  
Fourth, meaning and Weltanschauung are concepts we hardly pay 
attention to in organizational theory. In dealing with Soft Systems 
Methodology many third year Bachelor management science students 
wondered what a worldview is. Even after having given examples they stayed 
puzzled behind. In my lectures I sometimes left the straight and narrow in 
discussing some of the concepts dealt with in this thesis. Many students in 
the theatres looked at me incredulously14 to say it euphemistic.  
 
 
14 In Dutch: ongelovig  
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 It was impossible to get a conversation going again because many students 
just plainly denied it. There was simply nothing to discuss. You see colours 
with your eyes and that is it. It is really like you tell people again that the 
world is flat and that the sun spins around the earth. That closes the loop. 
We were learned to believe that…(fill in as you please) meant…(fill in as 
you please).  
Fifth, these insights offer a better understanding of change 
problems and the related communication processes in organisations. With 
that will be dealt in chapter 9. 
 
Here part 1 ends. Hereafter we go to part 2, the chapters 7 
(methodology), 8 (the findings of the interviews) and 9 (conclusions and 
recommendations). 
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 The master orders his farmhand 
     The farmhand his cat 
     The cat her tail 
 
 
CHAPTER 7. METHODOLOGY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The subject matter in the chapters so far is broader than the empirical 
research will be. The empirical research is no verification of the theory. Only 
a part of the theory will be tested. It will be an explorative voyage of discove-
ry to see whether we can link meaning and the Weltanschauung of a manager 
to the structure of his/her organisation. In this part 2 the second key 
question in chapter 1 will be answered: How do these Weltanschauungen 
affect the unfolding in time of the structures underpinning the creation and 
implementation of the manager’s organisational tasks?  
 
I had two hypotheses I wanted to work in. The first was that 
Weltanschauungen of female managers differ from that of male managers. 
This was partly based on what has been said in section 3.4 and partly on the 
discussions with regard to, for example, the glass ceilings. In other words, 
one would say there must be reasons why, as is often heard, it is so difficult 
for women to get at the top, besides practical or trivial reasons. The second 
was that Weltanschauungen of managers employed in co-operatives differ 
from that of managers employed in non-co-operatives. It was assumed that 
in co-operatives the cooperation among people plays a more important role. 
So I wanted to form four clusters of managers, two female and two 
male in co-operatives and two female and two male in non-co-operatives. 
That would mean 12 managers in total. Preferably these would be managers 
originating in as few as possible organisations enabling me to go in some 
depth in the structure of these organisations. It would enable me to cross 
check these formed clusters in various ways. The condition was that these 
managers are responsible for the structure of their organisation. 
Based on a database (the Top-50 most powerful women in the 
Netherlands) and interviews/articles in the newspapers and magazines I 
approached several (bigger) companies and/or managers.  
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 The answers were on a scale from ‘what’s in it for us’ via ‘we want to 
protect our female managers; currently there is a research running’ to 
‘interested but no time’. Indeed, there was a research running as one of my 
supervisors confirmed and even after half a year there was still no time 
available for some of these managers. So it was missing out. It simply was 
impossible to get 12 managers at the table for interviews during two to two 
and a half hours each. 
 
So in the empirical work I had to restrict myself to four interviews. 
Interviews with four managers in the Care Sector were held, two female 
and two male. Two managers, one female and one male, are employed in a 
co-operative. For more details about these last two managers the reader is 
referred to appendix 7. We limited ourselves to the Care Sector out of 
sheer necessity. One of my supervisors arranged interviews with two 
managers whom I did not met before. These managers are responsible for 
some 2.500 employees at a maximum. The interviewed managers are in the 
age category of 45 to 60 years and they are responsible for the structure of 
their organisations. The interviews were held on a semi-structured basis at 
their offices. The managers were guaranteed anonymity. 
 
It was considered to observe these managers for a certain period of 
time by students after the interviews. But in light of what is said above we 
decided to refrain from this idea. We already could count our blessings by 
the willingness of these managers to co-operate in the interviews. 
 
The questionnaire was developed in order to measure and make 
visible the Weltanschauung. The structure was discussed with the managers 
1, 3 and 4 separately in the second part of the interview. The structure was 
not discussed with manager 2 due to a lack of time. It was decided not to 
‘translate’ an existing organisation chart (if any) directly in Viable System 
Model (“VSM”) terms outside the scope of the interviews or beforehand, 
because such a chart is a poor model of the structure and can easily lead to 
misunderstandings. I was able to prepare myself in the cases of the 
managers 3 and 4 by reading a book, (consolidated) annual reports and on 
the Internet. 
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 7.2 Questionnaire 
 
I have nowhere found a questionnaire in order to measure 
Weltanschauungen. I had to produce my own questionnaire. This 
questionnaire is included as appendix 4. The questionnaire has the following 
structure: 
 
The self  Upbringing (Q1)  Hobby’s (Q5)  
   Education (Q2)  Religious (Q12) 
   Character (Q3)  The self (Q19) 
Way of life (Q4)  
  
The other  Events in life (Q6)  Partner (Q21) 
   Friends (Q8) 
Humankind (Q19) 
   Family (Q 11) 
W:  
 
The organisation Mng. Courses (Q2) Orientation (Q19)  Bond (Q26) 
Colleagues (Q9, 10) Generalist (Q23)  Proverbs (Q22) 
   Principles (Q16)  Improvise (Q24)  Metaphor (Q27) 
Redo life (Q17)  Work processes (Q25) Orientation (Q28-34) 
 
 
The world  Travel (Q7)  Concerts (Q20) 
   Ideology (Q13)  Proverbs (Q22) 
   Motto of life (Q14) 
Principles (Q15) 
 
Two articles of Gaines (2000) and Junkkarinen (2000) were useful to 
determine the framework. Gaines is working in the broad field of Artificial 
Intelligence at the University of Calgary (Canada) and Junkkarinen is working 
in the domain of history at the Joensuu University in Finland. Gaines does 
not talk about Weltanschauung; Junkkarinen does this explicitly. In a way it is 
strange that cognitive science and history are involved instead of the 
expected disciplines such as psychology, sociology or cultural anthropology. 
The model of Gaines is an evolving model that they have used at some 30 
KAW’s (Knowledge Acquisition Workshops) and over thousand papers in an 
attempt to capture the entire conceptual framework for human psychology, 
sociology, action and knowledge. 
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 Junkkarinen (2000) comes up with a model wherein the influential factors 
of Weltanschauung are: personality (way of life), immediate contacts, 
ideologies, status, religion, upbringing, education and experience world 
(residence, travelling). The questions more in general, 1 through 17 and 
20/21, are based on these two models supplemented by early-in-life-events 
(question 6). These questions relate to upbringing, education, the character 
in key words, the way of life, hobbies, friends, religion, ideology, motto in 
life, principles, visiting concerts, the partner and the like. Question 6 is: 
which events in your life have affected you especially? 
 
Question 18, ‘Do you think body and mind are separated or do 
they form a unity?’ is based on Merleau-Ponty (1997) in chapter 2 of this 
thesis. In question 19, the ‘fundamentals’ in the Weltanschauung, 
‘naturalism-idealism-harmony’ and ‘doing-being in becoming-being’ as 
defined in the questionnaire are remarks of Checkland (2000) with regard 
to section 4.2 in discussing Dilthey. Dilthey attributed these characteristics 
to well-known authors of the past, for instance harmony (aesthetic) to 
Goethe. It is striking that system thinkers emphasize the aesthetic aspect of 
models. For instance, Beer uses it in his Model of a Reading List (1990, p. 
570) and Checkland & Scholes (1998, p. 42) mention it in their proposal to 
use ‘5 Es’ as criteria instead of ‘3 Es’. 
In question 19 the scale of the extremes in the profile is based on 
Wierdsma’s (1999) Positional and Transformational Organising (section 
5.3) The first four questions relating to the other are based on Theory X 
and Theory Y (section 5.2). These questions are: ‘How do you see human 
kind, ranging from bad to good?’ ‘How do you see human kind, ranging 
from fatalistic to proactive?’ ‘How do you see human kind, rational or 
irrational?’ and, ‘How is human kind best be served, punishment or 
reward?’ 
 
The other extremes in the scale as a profile in question 19 are: 
 
Authoritative  Participative 
Individualistic  Group-orientated 
 
These extremes in the scale are based on Theory X and Theory Y and the 
self-steering teams in Sociotechnics (1990, 1994). 
 
Served   Serving 
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 These extremes in the scale are based on the remarks in section 5.4 that 
managers should place themselves in service of their company and 
employees. 
 
Power orientated  Low power orientated 
 
These extremes in the scale are based on remarks in section 4.8 with regard 
to the disconcerted role power plays in organisations (Koot & Sabelis, 2000). 
 
Rules are rules  Subversive 
 
These extremes in the scale are based on bureaucratic tendencies Positional 
Organising has, Herzberg’s dissatisfiers (current general orders) and 
Morgan’s machine metaphor (1992, p. 26). 
 
Pragmatist  Moralist 
 
These extremes in the scale are based on Morgan’s (1992) machine 
metaphor. “They were all interested in practical management…” (1992, p. 
25). It is also the separation of ‘doing’ and ‘thinking’. In the VSM (section 
5.4) System 5, Policy as part of Transformational organising is also called the 
ethos or conscience (Beer, 1990b, p. 299). 
 
Rational   Emotional 
 
These extremes are based on section 4.8 with regard to rationality (Grinwis) 
and Morgan’s machine metaphor (1992, p. 29). 
 
Expect much  Not expect much 
 
These extremes are based on Morgan’s machine metaphor (1992, p. 36) and 
what is said in section 4.6 with regard to emotions. 
 
The question with regard to time orientation ‘present-future-past’ is based on 
section 2.7, the true time experience. In the traditional (Positional) organising  
is an emphasis on short-term shareholder orientation (the present or very 
near future). As a nuance, Transformational organising is more historical 
aware which is not to say that adherents live in the past. With hindsight it 
perhaps would have been better to leave this question out of the scale of 
extremes and treat it as a separate question. 
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 The questions with regard to proverbs and metaphors relate to the 
sections 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 and the appendixes 1 and 2. Morgan’s (1992) seven 
metaphors are completed with some of my own. The chosen proverbs 
mainly relate to co-operation. It is striking that there exist no proverbs in 
both the Dutch and the English language that can be related to the 
concepts used in this thesis with the exception of ‘Seek and ye shall find’ as 
a heuristic.  
 
The questions 23 through 27 relate to section 4.6 with regard to 
emotions. These questions are Weick’s (1995) remarks. The questions are: 
‘Do you consider yourself to be a generalist or specialist?’ ‘Can you 
improvise?’ ‘Are your work processes or the processes you are responsible 
for likely to be interrupted?’ and ‘Do you feel an emotional bond with your 
employer/company?’ With the exception of manager 3, all interviewed 
managers say to be (also) emotional. All managers are generalists, can 
(reasonably) improvise, processes are interrupted in different ways and they 
all have at least a bond with the company. The conclusion would be that 
these managers would not react too emotional. But what if they say they 
are (also) emotional? That makes it difficult, not to say impossible, to draw 
a conclusion here. It would be necessary to observe these managers during 
some time.  
 
The questions 28 through 34 originate in Beer & Nohria’s (2000) 
Theory E and Theory O as discussed in section 5.3. The first issue in an 
orientation relates to Theory E and the second one to Theory O. These 
questions are also a check of question 19. It was assumed that it is highly 
unlikely that a manager is in question 19 on the left (Positional) side of the 
scale and in question 28 through 34 an adherent of Theory O. With regard 
to incentives Beer & Nohria (2000) somewhat put into perspective the 
‘incentives lag’ in Theory O. That is the reason I have left out the 
‘incentives lag’ in the questionnaire. This Theory E & O is combined with a 
device of Gross & Grambsch (1974) in a paper of Gross & Etzioni (1985) 
in the NSM (2001) Reader System Theory. This device makes it possible to 
visualize what a manager thinks what is of importance now and in the 
(near) future in the questions 28 through 34. 
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 7.3  Structure 
 
In unfolding complexity, the embedding system (e.g. the parent 
company, the holding), the system-in-focus (the system the interviewed 
managers manage) and the embedded subsystem(s) were mapped on the spot 
together with the managers with the aid of the organisation chart.  
That is not to say that there was no preparation. In one case I had the 
disposal of in-depth information. These three recursion levels are the 
autonomous primary activities, also called Implementation. If possible in 
terms of time available, for each three levels of recursion the Viplan 
Recursion Function Table was used to map this Table onto the VSM. The 
filling in of the three Recursion Function Tables was done on the spot; the 
mapping onto the VSM was done outside the interviews. Conclusions were 
drawn together with the managers in the interviews with regard to the 
relation Weltanschauung and structure.  
 
There are pitfalls with regard to the use of the VSM and the 
Recursion Function Table. With regard to the use of the VSM one has to be 
careful not to mix up levels of recursion. The only way to avoid this was my 
being on the alert and to visualize as much as possible during the interviews. 
I would have to explain where the VSM mechanisms stand for in order to 
avoid misunderstandings. But also due to a lack of time I wanted to avoid a 
kind of lecture during the interviews. These considerations had the following 
consequences. I only questioned the VSM mechanisms in general terms as: 
 
Policy:    policy  
Intelligence:    to look at the environment  
Corporate Intervention:  prescribe rules  
Resource Bargaining:  to bargain on resources  
Coordination:   coordination  
Monitoring:    to communicate informally, audits  
Primary activity:   the activity with which the money is 
earned 
 
In this set up I did not have to explain the difference between 
Control and Policy. I always started with the system-in-focus and the 
Recursion Function Table. Dependent on the still available time I also did 
the rest, to start with the embedded subsystem(s). 
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 In the interviews I discussed the structure with the managers 1, 3 
and 4. I did not discuss the structure with manager 2 due to a lack of time. 
The organisations and their structures are discussed in the appendixes 5, 6 
and 7. 
7.4  Various 
 
With regard to question 19, I had a try-out with four consultants in 
the framework of an OOA (Order of organisation experts and –advisors) 
Inter-colleague Consult (ICC) meeting years ago. It made clear that our 
Weltanschauungen differed considerably whereby the Weltanschauungen 
of two system thinkers or at least two adherents of Transformational 
Organising, my colleague at that time and myself more or less converged 
with a bias towards the right side of the scale in the profile. A partner in a 
big knowledge driven consultancy had a bias towards the left side of the 
scale. A female interim manager and an IT consultant were more in the 
middle with some peaks to the left side of the scale. The profiles confirmed 
in general our discussions over the years, although at that time I did not 
distinguish between ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ in the questions, which 
sometimes led to confusion. 
 
My Dutch supervisor knows two interviewed managers and my 
wife knows one of the interviewed managers. They recognised the given 
profiles plus the text completely.  
 
The horizontal lines in the questionnaire are 12 centimetres long 
and in the profile 6 centimetres long. In the profile it is the lower line of 
the boxes, connecting for instance the boxes ‘bad’ and ‘good’. The 
questionnaire (see appendix 4) was filled in by the interviewed managers 
and handed in with me at the end of (the first part of) the interview. 
Thereafter it was possible to copy the questionnaire electronic exactly. If 
the stripe is on 4.8 cm the score is 4.8 : 12 = 40% and in the profile on 2.4. 
The managers got a copy of the worked out version including their text 
together with the question whether they were understood correctly. Two 
managers reacted, whereas one manager did not react and one manager 
reacted in a different way. He/she sent me information afterwards. ‘Silence 
means consent’ as the proverb goes.  
One of my supervisors read this worked out copy in the Dutch 
language. Because of the fact that the profile is compressed we have to take 
into account that it gives a somewhat distorted picture. 
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 Beforehand I wrote the managers a letter in which the general outline was 
explained and what I expected from them. They were asked to think in the 
meantime which metaphors and proverbs they use frequently in the 
organisational context. And then it turned out the variety is still there. One 
manager said: “I hardly use proverbs. That was bashed down in the past by 
my parents. I always mixed up the words. Is it the monkey coming out of the 
sleeve or the other way round? I store the meaning, not the form”. But this 
manager relied much more on metaphors.  
 
Before the interviews I told the managers that the given categories in 
the questionnaire were not meant ‘to steer them’ but rather must be seen as 
‘stimulators in their pondering over’. In general there was not much 
pondering over, because most answers came instantly. The managers were 
guaranteed anonymity. That of course has consequences for the production 
of the findings. I had to leave out more specific, interesting details or the 
subject of their study. Due to the limited number of interviewed managers it 
was also not possible to mention whether it is the Weltanschauung of a male 
or female manager. I had to leave out small, but telling typical female words. 
So also in this sense the entire picture is somewhat distorted and lacks some 
richness.  
 
Anticipating the coming chapters in part 2, all interviewed managers 
with whom the structure was discussed, said that they could see aspects or 
parts of their Weltanschauung back in the structure of their organisation. 
That will be discussed in chapter 9, the conclusions. It seemed also possible 
to predict who could work well together with whom in a Board of Directors 
and why. Here the layered concept of a Weltanschauung came into the 
picture. Private ‘fundamentals’ in a Weltanschauung and/or (political) 
ideology do play a role in the organisational context as follows. In manifest 
behaviour both explicit and tacit assumptions and opinions play a role tacitly. 
These tacit assumptions and opinions may become explicit under certain 
conditions. Such a condition is for instance when the behaviour is made a 
subject of discussion. However, in my view many ‘fundamentals’ are 
normally not discussed in organisations among managers and employees. 
People’s private ideology might influence tacitly the way they relate to others. 
I did hardly discuss this with the managers. Political ideology boils down 
practically to the extent one is prepared to share (future) property and 
income with others, which also has to do with, for instance intolerance and 
pension schemes.  
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 Or it is dictated by a religious persuasion that also hardly plays a role 
anymore in the organisational context, and it does not dictate the choice 
for manager 3.  
Manager 1 has a duality in the combination of political left wing 
and right wing ideas. The sharing of income was discussed briefly but in 
the end it has no consequences for the relation with the secretaries. 
Manager 2 does not like the ideology of manager 3, although manager 3 
says his/her liberal ideology is a heavy word. Manager 2 spoke in general 
terms mentioning the political party involved. Yet, manager 2 and 3 are 
supposed to work together well. Manager 4 has no ideology. Manager 2 
was sent the message with him/ her in the religious upbringing that the 
environment is of importance. His/ her choice for a political party is 
dictated by the fact that in her/his view there is only one (somewhat 
liberal) party that pays enough attention to the environment. That is also 
the reason he/she prefers cycling. But would any colleague or employee 
ask him/her: Why do you come per bike and not by car? I do not think so. 
But his/her partner will know the reason why she/he takes the bike. 
Moreover, no colleague in many settings has ever asked me: What 
are you going to vote tomorrow? It is not for nothing, for instance, that the 
Freemasonry has a ‘secret’ code for recognising each other. That means 
one is unable to recognise someone’s private ideology in his/her behaviour 
towards others (in organisations). In other words, our physiognomy does 
not tell anything about our private ideology. In general someone will do 
things or leave things in the relation with others based on the private 
ideology in the Weltanschauung. For instance, the truth score on the 
‘competitive’ proverb ‘Attack is the best defence’ as given at the end of 
chapter 8 differs considerably among the managers. But that in my opinion 
reflects more, what is called the character (properties), personality, style or 
identity of someone. It is a ‘pre-given’ constraint and if someone is very 
consequent in his/her actions an invariant. In other words, with regard to 
the private fundamentals in the behaviour others may have no clue why 
and are most of the time not interested in that why in the organisational 
context. 
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 Seek and ye shall find 
 
A heuristic proverb 
 
      
 CHAPTER 8. THE FINDINGS 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter four Weltanschauungen of four interviewed managers 
will be measured. Due to the guaranteed anonymity their organisations 
cannot be mentioned here. These organisations are discussed in the 
appendixes 5, 6 and 7, not necessarily in the same order. As discussed in the 
previous chapter these managers are responsible for up to 2.500 employees 
on Board of Directors level. Two managers are female and two managers are 
male. Moreover, the second key question in chapter 1 with regard to the link 
between Weltanschauung and structure will be discussed in this chapter. In 
section 8.3 we will comment on the findings. Conclusions will be drawn in 
chapter 9. 
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 8.2  Four Weltanschauungen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Manager 1 
 
This is the Weltanschauung of manager 1. The manager had a bad 
upbringing, missed warmth and missed social capabilities. He/she did more 
than one university study and quite some management courses 
(“sometimes too instrumental”). One of these studies would give the 
manager power and enable him/her to help people. The manager plays an 
instrument and likes to read. He/she reads Dutch literature and studies 
spirituality, psychology and management. “There is more that cannot be 
explained but that does not mean that it thus isn’t there”. Classical music 
and nature are pauses. The manager likes to visit the Concert Hall 
Orchestra. The bad upbringing led also to the good thing that the manager 
could fill in a lot her/himself. The manager is on the way from ‘doing’ to 
‘being in becoming’ and emphasizes self-development.  
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 What is needed is more self-reflection; the environment must facilitate you, 
but you have to do it yourself. The bad upbringing also makes that the 
manager can better stand awful remarks than nice remarks. The manager is 
both rational and emotional. That is the reason the stripe is in the middle.  
The manager has an emotional bond with the organisation that is 
being managed. With regard to ‘punishment’ or ‘reward’ the answer was: 
depends on the development of someone. The manager can be characterized 
as a spontaneous, open, individualistic bon vivant who lives in the present 
with a long-term stakeholder orientation. Power and ‘the top’ are important 
issues. In another life the manager would also like to be a top-economist or 
top-lawyer. “Top is excitement”. The manager feels half manager and half 
governor. The framework is freedom, adventure, dynamics and flexibility. 
The manager thinks in roles rather than in function (descriptions). Thinking 
in functions and not in roles is almost dogmatic. Roles mean dynamics and 
flexibility. 
The manager lives in more than one duality, also with regard to left 
wing and right wing political ideology. It is a two-pole character, as was said. 
The manager started at high school in Communism, became later on actively 
involved in local politics as a Socialist and to some extent Liberal insights 
appeal to him/her at the moment. On the one hand the manager thinks 
analytical, quite black and white. On the other hand “can this all be the 
case?”. Yet, the manager is decisive. In ‘introvert’ organisations you do not 
always know what people think. Taking decisions is also a way to draw 
people out. Afterwards these decisions can be readjusted. So, in my words, 
decision-making gets a function here; people react and you get to know what 
they really think. In the relation with the work counsel the manager often 
says: we go in that direction. At the first crossroad you can give advice. At 
the next crossroad we will follow the same procedure. This confirms what 
Weick said in chapter 4 with regard to heuristic actions. 
The connection with others is based on mutual respect. Respect is to 
treat people like you would be treated yourself. The manager wants to settle 
things in a chic way. The manager goes at it hard with others in a mutual 
demanding way. “I work fucking hard”. The relationships with colleagues on 
the management level were on the dividing line neutral/bad. It took the 
manager quite some time in the meeting to reach this conclusion. It went 
from pleasant via good to neutral/bad. The manager really went back in time 
as was discussed in chapter 2, the retentions. The manager started to doubt 
after she/he had answered the next question with regard to the relationships 
with colleagues.  
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 It initiated more reflection on the questions with regard to ideology, motto 
in life and principles. These issues turned out to be dualities. In daily life 
the manager has no principles; in organisational life the more. It became 
clear that ‘the heart is with the colleagues’ and not with colleagues on the 
management level. One of the reasons will be mentioned at the end of this 
description.  
The relationships with other colleagues (never called subordinates) 
were and are more than pleasant, based on loyalty and connection. The 
manager has many friends but sees this also as a burden. However, after a 
boring dinner, visit or meeting in the end something valuable always 
remains. “Then I think: go on”. The manager likes to be alone; it is not 
lonely at the top. The motto in life is ‘delicious and nice’ which leads to 
‘become silent’ (in Dutch: verstilling; a word difficult to translate because it 
only exists in the Dutch language in the verb form; it is becoming less 
exuberant ending in silence). In metaphors it is the music of Monteverdi 
(“pure silence and emotion”) and paintings of Monet.  
With regard to people it is more than ‘it clicks’. Half a word is 
enough. This ‘silence’ and being alone comes nearby what Maturana said in 
chapter 3 about the uniqueness of the observer: on the one hand his 
experience remains necessarily secluded in his operational closure. It comes 
nearby Merleau-Ponty’s ‘given to itself’. We could say it is the poetic 
variant. The relationship with a brother is good; the relationship with the 
family is bad. The partner of the manager is little involved in decision 
making in the organisation. The partner is a confidant(e) (my word), 
because he/she is smart. “Why did that thought not occur to me?” The 
manager travels moderately frequent for pleasure. “Last year I travelled a 
lot but I do not experience it that way. Actually outrageous to say it this 
way, don’t you think so?” 
 
Half of the time the manager thinks issues of Theory O is of great 
importance. These are development of organisational capabilities, 
participative, long-term stakeholder value and process driven consultancy, 
although the manager does not like consultants. “I will find it out myself”. 
We think too easily that we cannot do it or cannot cope with it. The 
manager wants to bring down somewhat the importance of top-down 
leadership, structure & systems and culture in the organisation. They are all 
of medium importance. The manager does not belief in performance 
incentives. The reason ‘absolute top’ is nowhere filled in is, that we do not 
say ‘absolute top’ in the Netherlands. 
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 The manager sees and likes to see the organisation as an organism. It 
has a form of appearance, growth, development, hierarchy and connection. It 
stands for something, colour and form. In our words: it isn’t, it becomes. 
Morgan (1992) placed among other things under this metaphor: attention, 
needs, systems and early Sociotechnics. To show interest to people the 
manager mentioned. The manager is a good communicator and listener. In 
change processes the manager uses and monitors careful communication 
whereby a solid laid basis (“transfer logic”) is built up in layers. “Convincing 
is noise” as was said. “If necessary I put on an extra broadcast”. In my 
words, here the emphasis is clearly on the listener as was emphasized in 
communication throughout this thesis. Or in still other words, the listener is 
triggered with logic in first instance. 
 
In chapter 5 we said that a CEO with both Theory E and Theory O 
worldviews is hard or impossible to find. Well, it looks like we have found 
one. Practice is subtler than the theoretical dichotomy. On first sight one 
would say the manager is on the Positional side with an accent on the left 
side of the profile. If we take more issues into consideration it turns out the 
manager is on the Transformational side, also in view of the willingness to 
co-operate with others, that the proverbs made clear. The Weltanschauung 
consists of the profile and the given clarifications. 
 
The answers were consistent. There was only one discrepancy. The 
manager said humankind is more irrational (80%) than rational (20%). The 
manager him/herself is both rational and emotional. It slipped my mind on 
the spot. The balance between authoritarian (63%) and participative (37%) is 
a relative one. The proverbs reflect the Weltanschauung. For instance, the 
‘truth score’ on ‘Despots seldom rule long’ was 67% with the comment ‘I 
wish it was that way’ (subversive). ‘Rather eating dry bread than begging 
cheese’ was 92% (I will find it out myself), ‘Carpe diem’ 100% (bon vivant) 
and ‘He that hears much and speaks not at all, shall be welcome in bower 
and hall’ 79% with the comment ‘I wish I could do that too’ (spontaneity, 
openness). The manager is a generalist, can improvise and processes are not 
easily disrupted due to the built in flexibility by the manager. One would say 
it could be expected that the manager will not act emotionally. However, the 
manager is also emotional so this could not be checked. The meeting lasted 2 
¼ hours in total. 
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 We can conclude that the dichotomy and their characteristics in 
organisational theory do not reflect reality. A Weltanschauung is more 
complex and subtle. Human beings admit and live in duality. The 
theoretical concepts in the chapters 2 and 3 are confirmed and extended in 
this Weltanschauung. The picture is also subtler than the pictures of 
managers in, for instance, Grinwis and Koot & Sabelis. Power is confirmed 
but not in a disconcerted way. Rationality is confirmed but less obvious. So 
what we have researched in organisational theory is correct but the 
representation seems to be too biased. We must look for the shades of 
meaning. Or in still other words, we reduce complexity too much and 
forget to build it up again. Or to build it up simultaneously, like in the 
Viable System Model as two sides of the same coin. 
 
This picture makes also clear that early events in our life and first 
time experiences influence the Weltanschauung or even make it up. In the 
words of the manager the bad upbringing relates directly to freedom (the 
manager was kept on a tight rein in the upbringing) and adventure. That in 
turn seems to lead to ‘I will find it out myself’, self-reflection and self-
development. ‘Seek and ye shall find’ scores on the truth scale 83%. The 
first political left wing ideology during high school ‘sits in it’ as the manager 
said. A more recent right wing ideology sits less ‘in it’. Authenticity is ‘to 
beat up picket poles’; according to Van Dale these are fixed marks/signs in 
carrying out a survey. The manager combined authenticity and ‘the top’ in 
an example. The manager had attended a meeting of top scientists of 
various disciplines showing authentic behaviour who had to define a 
concept. These are the meetings the manager really likes. In this context 
what follows can be understood. The manager mentioned one proverb. 
‘No pride like that of an enriched beggar’, meaning people who earn quick 
promotion despite lack of good qualities often show unbearable behaviour. 
That the manager detests. That, in my words, must also be based on 
unpleasant earlier experiences, which confirms in turn the neutral/bad 
experiences with colleagues on the management level. During the interview 
the ‘juicy’ use of language increased. It may have to do with a bias on 
emotional rather than rational. On the concluding question whether 
Weltanschauung had anything to do with structure, the manager said 
“Everything”.  
 
I think the richness of the two poles and the duality has been made 
visible enough. The picket poles are a kind of ‘attractors’.  
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 In my words in summary, the manager is (emphatic or wants to be) the first 
among equals but to a more or lesser extent wants to share and care, based 
on mutual respect, loyalty, stylishness, careful communication, ideology and 
(self-) development (but you can get it as you like). This reflects the duality in 
the mentioned ideology as part of the Weltanschauung. It makes also clear 
that an ideology and a Weltanschauung are not forever carved in black 
marble.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Manager 2 
 
This is the Weltanschauung of manager 2. The manager was raised in 
a strictly Calvinistic family with 16 children. The upbringing can be 
characterized as dogmatic, consequent and working hard. The family was 
rather poorly off so that the children had to earn their own money by way of 
sidelines. This gave way to do things conditionally. The manager learned to 
discover the darn in the net and to negotiate. The manager was the favourite 
of his/her father, also due to his/her intelligence.  
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 The fact that the family in their complete black outfit looked like a fool in a 
big city led to it that the manager is not very much concerned anymore 
about what other people think of him/her. The manager will only fight 
prejudices about him/her if they have a damaging character. The 
environment was and still is an important issue with all kind of 
consequences. With regard to cars and building materials; the manager 
prefers the bike. The manager would have liked to learn playing the piano 
but there only was an organ present. The manager likes classical music and 
likes to sing along with it on full blast.  
The manager likes literature, poems, film, architecture and to visit 
museums. The latter inspires the manager (among other things Jugendstil) 
and gives way to discoveries.  
The manager did not suffer terribly under the upbringing; on the 
contrary. The love of his/her father and being in love hefty were events 
that influenced the manager most. The manager is both rational and 
emotional. According to the manager, mankind think to be rational and 
especially the group of managers therein. The manager is convinced that 
this is only for a small part the case. Because the manager is conscious of 
the irrational factors he/she will try to decide on something more than a 
sum of emotions alone. This explains his/her affinity with scientific 
research.  
The manager has an emotional bond with the present (and former) 
organisation that is being managed. The manager enjoys having many 
friends and each organisation he/she worked for yielded a friend to which 
the manager is loyal. “I have always difficulty in closing the door”. The 
manager can be characterized as an open, spontaneous, optimistic, 
enjoying, inquisitive bridge builder who lives going from the past, 
experiencing the present with a view to the future. Reflection and the ‘pair 
of scales’, originating in the upbringing, play an important role. ”If you cut 
down your roots, you are dead”. The manager does and did things with 
heart and soul. In another life the manager would like to be the same, 
although he/she has some entrepreneurial traits. Most of all, the manager’s 
inner drive is being significant for other people. An internal struggle rages 
between on the one hand being consequent and independent and on the 
other hand justice accompanied by a reasoned out exception. The manager 
is an impatient, trotting through horse, slightly tempered by his/her 
partner. In the work the manager is team orientated but the manager likes 
to be alone. The manager likes silence (not expressed in the way manager 1 
did) and nature. Amazement is the keyword.  
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 The manager likes to work in the middle of the night when there is complete 
silence (“also good for your concentration”). The manager walks an hour in 
the evening (“sniffing the wet ground”). “I need it. If I would not do that I 
become restless”. But the manager prefers to walk along the tide line 
barefoot on an empty beach at the seaside. The partner originates from a part 
of the country that lies far away from the seaside. He/she preferred the hills. 
This gave many clashes with regard to the holiday destinations. The manager 
thinks independently, unorthodox and likes to keep outside the beaten track. 
The manager expects a lot from her/himself and others, but not easily. If 
people are too entwined in a certain pattern (of behaviour in situations) it is 
important to raise the matter. It often gives the person involved new insights 
in communication and relationships. This is what the manager means by 
thinking on a meta-level. The relationship with colleagues on the manage-
ment level is very good, pleasant and nice. The relationship with colleagues is 
good and pleasant. The relationship with the family is good. The partner is 
little involved in decision making in the organisational context. 
 
The manager is not religious but rather spiritual in the sense ‘there is 
more’. The manager is interested in the wisdom and ‘being open to’ of 
Eastern religions. The manager did many studies, among which on the 
university level, and many top-level management courses. The manager is 
eager to learn. The manager started up a Ph.D. but dropped this the moment 
a child was born. The subject would be knowledge policy and how to achieve 
transparency in responsibilities. Having the child had a big impact on the 
manager. “It makes you vulnerable”. The manager does also things that 
he/she would not have done before and is more aware of the fact that it can 
all be over tomorrow. He/she likes to write articles, also with others without 
having to talk an evening beforehand and dives in the books. Speeches are 
mostly ended with ‘the moral of the story’ or a quote of a great author. ‘Seek 
and ye shall find’ has a truth score of 96%. “It is from the bottom of my 
heart”. 
 
The manager’s ideology is a vision on the human being. It is about 
human rights and no discrimination whatsoever. “The art of management is 
to find the human scale”. The motto in life is threefold. ‘Never put off till 
tomorrow what you can do today’. ‘Carpe diem’, also in the sense of to utilize 
optimally. The transition to a more Catholic milieu stimulated taking more 
distance and more enjoying but the manager always already disposed of it.  
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 The background of the manager and sense making came together 
in a lovely way in the proverb ‘One must be a servant before one can be a 
master’. In Dutch it is about an abbot (master) and a monk (servant). The 
manager did not know who of them was ‘the higher’. And to be honest, I 
did not know it either; I always assumed it is the abbot. The third motto in 
life is ‘Know thyself’. “I can be hot-tempered and oversee a lot 
simultaneously. I always tell that a new secretary in an interview. Then it is 
up to her”. The principle in daily life is ‘The concreter, the better’. “If 
something is abstract and I miss the feeling of ‘both feet on the floor’ I 
loose interest. I must be able to make translation turns and building 
bridges”. If people are busy with an affair that does not fall apart in the 
short run, the manager’s remark is “What do you think you are up to?” The 
principles in organisational life are ‘strategic management, the books of 
Weick’. It is a structuring framework in an ongoing process; a direction. 
Among other things, processes of becoming, to give direction (“I am more 
directive than authoritarian”) and to facilitate are emphasized by the 
manager. ‘Change is the only constant’ reflects his/her interest in change 
processes. Moreover, servant leadership is the third principle. “If the 
chauffeur of the Board car holds the door open to me, it actually is a step 
too far for me”. The score on ‘serving’ is 65%. The manager likes the 
power game, but dislikes power games. Power must only be used for the 
good things. 
 
With regard to proverbs the manager often uses ‘Fear is a bad 
advisor’, ‘The tender surgeon makes a foul wound’ and ‘No thing is as 
practical as good theory’. The preferred metaphor is the fleet contrary to 
the super tanker. The fleet is manoeuvrable. The organisation is seen as an 
organism, a culture and a flux. Morgan (1992) places under the flux 
metaphor biology (autopoiesis), cybernetics (circular relations) and 
opposites (Tao). The first two we already came across; the manager is 
interested in Hinduism and Tao. Yin (earth, female) and Yang (heaven, 
male) are a continuous cyclic movement (Morgan, 1992, p. 256). They are 
the primordial opposites guiding all change. As Morgan (1992) states: 
“everything being in the process of becoming something else”. Yin is the 
quiet, contemplative stillness of the sage, Yang the strong, creative action 
of the king. The manager would like to see the organisation as a 
community, sharing life’s joys and sorrows with each other; you belong to 
it. This is what Morgan (1992, p. 114) discusses under the culture metaphor 
with regard to the rise (and rice) of Japan.  
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 It can even be seen back in the Weltanschauung of the manager in the seven 
(1992, p. 115) “spiritual” values of a company called Matsushita. These values 
are among other things: Fairness (games), Harmony (between idealism and 
harmony), Gratitude (for friends) and Cooperation (teams). Morgan (1992, p. 
136) argues: “In viewing leadership as the management of meaning, the 
culture metaphor leads us to understand old styles in new ways”. It was 
already said that the manager thinks in an unorthodox way and the manager 
says to be interested in meaning. An executive of Matsushita says: “It’s like 
we are all a community”.  
  
With regard to the questions 28 through 34 all items are of great 
importance, except top-down leadership, programmatic planning, 
performance incentives and big knowledge driven consultancies, although for 
big projects you need the latter. It looks like we have found a manager who 
combines the Theory E and Theory O world-views for the second time. This 
manager 2 is more obvious on the Transformational side than manager 1.  
The proverbs reflect the Weltanschauung. For instance, ‘Proffered 
service stinks’ scores on the truth scale 21% (community, I dislike pushy), 
‘Attack is the best defence’ 17% (human rights and the love range), ‘Enough 
is as good as a feast’ 67% (Calvinistic influence, environment) and ‘We can 
live without our friends but not without our neighbours’ 8% (gratefulness for 
friends who are in the heart).   
The meeting lasted 1 ¾ hour. We only discussed the 
Weltanschauung. In the answers to the questions the manager was consistent. 
The duality in manager 2 is less obvious or can be made less visible. An 
internal struggle is not the same as a duality. Duality was mentioned in the 
learning process; the manager learns better in the alternation practice and 
theory. It was not mentioned with regard to religion. It seems possible to 
start in a strict Calvinistic milieu, to work in a more Catholic environment 
and to be interested in Eastern religions, while not being religious (anymore). 
It looks like ‘to keep the good things’. Know thyself and the pair of scales. In 
summary, the manager is as a steward the mayor or mayoress of the 
community. 
 
Manager 1 and manager 2 have a lot in common with regard to age, 
subject of education and they both like the good things of life. Despite what 
they had to go through in life they both remained open and spontaneous. 
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 They both liked to do the interview and they were very open and 
spontaneous. Also, their upbringing is the red line through their life, be it 
in a different direction. Yet, the proverbs they have in common are ‘Rather 
eating dry bread than begging cheese’, ‘Despots seldom rule long’, ‘Carpe 
Diem’ and ‘Seek and ye shall find’. They are both rational and emotional, 
they like to be alone, they mention ‘silence’ in a slightly different meaning, 
they enjoy nature, they like reading and classical music, they mention the 
word spiritual but are not religious, they have many friends, their own work 
processes are easily disturbed but they found a way to deal with it 
(flexibility, emphasis on process, working hard), they both stress (self) 
reflection and they are on the way to or beyond ‘being in becoming’, 
developing capabilities in order to reach the perfect unity with the 
environment. But I think the most striking is they both demand much of 
themselves and others. The one goes at it hard and the other is an 
impatient, trotting through horse. Flexibility comes close to manoeuvrable. 
One would say: enough topics of conversation and mutual recognition for 
a nice dinner. However, my advice would be: don’t put them together in 
the Board of Directors; they will have a row. In this co-operation in the 
Board it is assumed by me that these managers will have shared fields of 
attention in responsibilities. In other words, the co-operation is quit close. 
The question to be answered then is ‘Why’? 
 
Where do these managers differ significantly in their 
Weltanschauung? Overall, manager 2 is more ‘moderate’ than manager 1. 
Manager 1 is a bon vivant and manager 2 enjoys life. For manager 1 the 
word is ‘excitement’ and for manager 2 ‘amazement’. They differ in the 
events of life that have influenced them. Manager 1 could fill in a lot 
him/herself in terms of freedom and adventure. Manager 2 says it is love. 
They differ in their relationships with colleagues on their own level. They 
differ in their portrayal of mankind, although they both say mankind is 
irrational, 82% respectively 67%. Also, respect for people and human rights 
come nearby. Yet, for manager 1 mankind is bad (71%) and for manager 2 
it is good (73%). They deal in a different way with power. Manager 1 wants 
to get at the top and manager 2 has a drive to be of significance for others. 
Manager 1 also said that one of the drives to choose a specific study was to 
help people. One of the drives and the drive differ in passion with regard to 
others. Manager 1 is individualistic with a willingness to co-operate. 
Manager 2 is in the work team orientated.  
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 Manager 1 wants to manipulate nature to his/her own benefit 
(naturalistic) and for manager 2 the environment is of utmost importance 
(between idealistic and harmony).  
 
They differ in their time experience. Manager 1 lives in the present 
with a long-term orientation. Manager 2 lives going from the past, in the 
present to the future.  
Manager 1 says emergent planning is of low importance whereas for 
manager 2 it is of great importance. Manager 1 likes to see the organisation as 
an organism. Although manager 2 mentions this metaphor too, for manager 
2 the organisation is a community. Flexibility and thinking in roles are not 
the same as an emphasis on processes of becoming and the emergent. Their 
political orientation in ideology differs. Most striking is of course the proverb 
‘Enough is as good as a feast’. For manager 1 it is “Calvinistic bull shit” with 
a truth score of 0% whereas for manager 2 the truth score is 67%. Although 
these managers have much in common, the differences in how they view the 
world and the organisation are subtle ones. Mutual irritations and clashes 
would lie in wait in my opinion. In popular terms one could say that it is both 
football; the difference is Ajax or Feyenoord (or the other way round). 
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Figure 8. Manager 3 
 
This is the Weltanschauung of manager 3. The manager was 
brought up in a family with 8 children of whom he/she is the eldest. The 
manager’s parents had a shop. The upbringing was pleasant. The manager 
was given elbowroom, a sense of responsibility and was offered full scope 
to develop his/her talents. When the manager was 12 years his/her father 
died. The manager had to go to a boarding school for 4 years. This was 
experienced as neutral but the good thing was that the manager learned to 
study there. Twice the manager was given the wrong study advice, far 
below his/her capabilities and talents. These advices were given at the 
elementary school and by a well-known psychological institute later on. 
The manager did a university study wherein he/she specialised in the 
direction he/she is working at present. The specialisation serves a useful, 
social purpose, according to the manager. The manager did not take many 
management trainings.  
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 The manager can be characterised as a cautious, open, busy, rational 
and an enjoying autodidact who is future orientated; in his/her own words “a 
pleasant person” and a late-bloomer. The latter is also the case with her/his 
children. “Private study is more effective and I do not have the patience for 
outdoor courses and trainings. I learn more and better this way”. The 
manager must have something to do; if there is nothing to do the manager 
will search for work. That explains she/he is always busy. The emphasis on 
‘doing’ and not on ‘becoming in being’ (self-development) is also because 
‘harmony with nature’ does not appeal and ‘perfect unity with the 
environment’ is woolly. The manager likes to read and has a broad interest. 
Daily the manager reads 3 to 4 newspapers during one and a half hour. The 
manager likes to sport (among other things volleyball). Moreover the 
manager learned him/herself to paint and to sculpture. It is done at night and 
the style is rather abstract. “All of a sudden I thought: I can do it”. The 
manager loves to travel for work and pleasure. The manager has seen many 
continents. The manager has a broad interest in all forms of music and visits 
concerts regularly. Museums are less visited. The manager has one college 
(girl) friend. The relationships with colleagues at the management level are 
good, pleasant and even more than that. The relationships with colleagues 
and the family are good and pleasant. The manager is religious and has a 
political ideology, although the latter is a heavy word. Principles in daily life 
are reliability and honesty. Principles in organisational life are to give 
elbowroom, to give and take responsibilities but they have to be fulfilled. The 
manager would do the same in another life. The partner is not involved in 
decision making in the organisation. 
 
The manager is a generalist, can improvise and working processes are 
not interrupted, certainly not on headlines. “But I am accessible for people”. 
This would mean the manager does not act emotionally. The bias is indeed 
strong on rational; not on emotional. The manager has a bond with the 
organisation rather than an emotional bond. The manager does not expect a 
lot from others and not easily. In metaphor the organisation is a culture, a 
political system (“cannot be denied”) and a flux. The manager prefers the 
flux. “Stabilisation is standstill”. Morgan (1992, p. 148) states: 
“Organisational politics arise when people think differently and want to act 
differently. This diversity creates a tension that must be resolved through 
political means”. And also (1992, p. 195): “The metaphor also helps to 
explode the myth of organizational rationality. […] But rational…for whom? 
Who benefits?”  
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 The manager has difficulty with the distinction in the questions 28 through 
34 because he/she is future orientated. Of great importance is everything 
except maximizing economical value, emergent planning and consultancies. 
Economical value is a basic condition but no purpose. The manager’s 
vision is that the importance of performance incentives and short-term 
orientation will increase socially. 
 
The proverbs reflect the Weltanschauung. ‘Despots seldom rule 
long’ scores on the truth scale 15%. This reflects the present great 
importance of top-down in change processes in a changing environment, 
although the manager emphasizes the medium importance on the longer 
run and the great importance of ‘participative’ (“Utility of co-operation and 
sharing before you decide”). The score on the scale ‘authoritarian’ and 
‘participative’ is 58% participative and 42% authoritarian. The score on the 
power scale is low. ‘What you can do alone, don’t call in the help of others’ 
scores 18%. ‘Rather eating dry bread than begging cheese’ scores 88%. 
‘Carpe diem’ scores 88%, ‘Enough is more than much’ scores 88% and 
‘Seek and ye shall find’ scores 91%. ‘He that hears much and speaks not at 
all, shall be welcome both in bower and hall’ scores 21% (“It sounds 
negative”). 
 
The meeting lasted 1 ¾ hour in total. It was useful for the manager 
because there is always something to think over. Being asked whether there 
is a link between Weltanschauung and structure the manager said: “You 
cannot round about it”15. “But I do not do it alone”. The manager could 
see his/her being practical and a natural ascendancy on the basis of 
knowledge (the broad reading) back in the structure. This can be related to 
a remark. “Professionals are cocky”. What is it the manager would like to 
change in the structure ideally? “Nothing. That would have been done 
already”. In summary, the manager is the well-read, pleasant, many-sided, 
busy autodidact with a future orientation, who is subtle in her/his answers. 
 
Manager 1 would have the same or highly likely less problems with 
manager 3 and vice versa as mentioned earlier with regard to manager 1 
and 2. ‘I will find it out myself’ and ‘being an autodidact’ is much the same.  
 
 
15 In Dutch: je kunt er niet omheen 
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 To name a few issues that they have in common: mankind is more bad than 
good, they are both naturalistic, being served, practical, more doing (although 
manager 1 is on his/her way to ‘being in becoming’) and ‘attack is the best 
defence’ with a truth score of 79% (manager 1) and 65%. They share to some 
extent the same ideology. From the three ‘fundamentals’ in the 
Weltanschauung, the mankind-, naturalism- and doing lines, they have all 
three more or less in common. Yet, their profiles differ. Manager 3 has more 
deflections to the right, Transformational side. Their reaction on the proverb 
‘he that hears much etc’ differs. “I wish I could do that’ and ‘it sounds 
negative’ speaks volumes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Three Weltanschauungen 
 
These are the profiles of manager 1(small dots), 2 (uninterrupted) and 
3 (bigger dots) taken together. Between manager 2 and manager 3 there 
would be less problems in my opinion. Why?  
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 The profile of manager 2 is almost the outside connection line of 
the six sharp points of manager 3. They ‘touch’ six times. Where they 
deviate is on bad mankind (and good), rationality (and emotional), 
naturalism (and beyond idealism), being served (and serving), pragmatism 
(and some moralist) and doing (and beyond ‘being in becoming’). In the 
‘fundamentals’ mankind is bad-good, naturalism-idealism and doing-‘being 
in becoming’ they deviate. 
The profile of manager 2 is also almost the connection line of three 
sharp points of manager 1. However, they only ‘touch’ two to three times. 
Manager 2 and manager 3 have more or less the same drive in manage-
ment. ‘Being of significance to people’ and ‘serve a useful, social purpose’ 
has much in common. They both enjoy life and are open persons. For 
manager 2 this also means an open mind. They both like to do discoveries. 
Manager 2 discovers in museums; manager 3 loves to travel. They view the 
organisation much the same. The emphasis is on the flux and ‘change is the 
only constant’. Their bias is on the collective (community) and participative 
side, although the authoritarian (or directive) style belongs to the job, as 
they both say. Otherwise nothing can be done. But they are not power 
orientated and if so only for the good case. The ‘concreter the better’ and 
‘woolly linguistic usage’ match. They share the interest in and emphasize 
the importance of responsibility. They both like to play games as long as it 
is fair play (don’t like power games and reliability and honesty). For 
manager 3 ‘the game’ can also be filled in by ‘the approach’. They have the 
same ‘rhythm’ in life, being impatient and like to work at night. They both 
like to read and to find out things in the books. They like to know what 
they are talking about (this does not mean that it is not the case with 
manager 1, but it was not emphasized). The one is a constructive builder 
and the other is an optimistic bridge builder. This is also a difference with 
manager 1. Manager 1 can ‘enjoy’ the job of breaking off the organisation 
fast in a reorganisation. Last but not least, both scores on ‘Enough is better 
than much’ are high. It also might have to do with the upbringing in big, 
religious (be it not the same) families that have to work hard in order to 
keep their head above water. However, they also deviate with regard to 
many issues. For instance, the issues of great importance differ and their 
(political) ideology differs. The ‘haggle, nibble, (next word untranslatable), 
who touches my cottage’ (in Dutch: knibbel, knabbel, knuisje, wie komt er 
aan mijn huisje) stuff does not appeal at all to manager 2. 
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 The preliminary conclusion can only be that the ‘fundamentals’ in the 
Weltanschauung and (political) ideology in organisational life are less beyond 
the point. These fundamentals and ideology would be more important for 
the private life; how you deal with nature, the milieu and society. ‘Harmony 
with nature’ does not appeal to manager 3 and he/she does not use the word 
elsewhere. A good and pleasant private life is of course of importance for 
organisational life. For the rest you can live with ‘rational and emotional’ and 
‘being served and serving’ if you are both practical and if there is a balance 
between these concepts. That and what deviates might only require 
communication as an investment in time and the relationship, if you have 
other inner drives in common. The above given figure lays bare what the 
playing field would be for manager 2 and 3. 
 
This is the third time we found a manager who combines Theory E 
and Theory O worldviews. It can be stated that the Weltanschauung of 
manager 3 is ‘in between’ manager 1 and manager 2. I cannot see a duality or 
we cannot make it visible. It must be stated that this interview was the 
shortest with regard to Weltanschauung. Or it must be sought in being 
authoritarian and participative. All three managers say that being authoritarian 
is part of the job in changing environments. Manager 1 is authoritarian for 
63%, manager 2 for 42% (more as directive) and manager 3 for 43%. At the 
same time they emphasize the great importance of participative. Top-down is 
for all three managers (in the longer run) of medium importance.   
 
What do these three managers have in common for the rest? Quit a 
lot. They are open and enjoy life. They (like to) work hard. They did at least 
one university study. Self-development is an important issue. Overall they 
believe more in reward than punishment. They like to read in their field and 
outside of it. They like music. They are religious or spiritual. They have an 
ideology but not the same one. They need their pause in nature or art. They 
have good and pleasant relationships with colleagues as subordinates. They 
are practical. They feel at least a bond with the organisation. They have a 
long-term orientation. They like to develop organisational capabilities. 
Consultants are at most a necessary evil (we can put that in our pipe again 
and smoke it). They are generalists and can improvise. They all show a (great) 
willingness to co-operate. They all say body and mind are a unity.  
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 They emphasize reflection. So the remark made often by consultants that 
managers should reflect more seems to be superfluous. In another life they 
want to do the same, although manager 1 can see a different profession. 
They share three proverbs. ‘Rather eating dry bread than begging cheese’, 
‘Carpe Diem’ and ‘Seek and ye shall find’. The scores on ‘one must be a 
servant before one can be a master’ is 58% (“more often than not”), 52% 
(“it has something”), 41% reflect that these managers do not very much 
believe in ‘climbing the organisational ladder’. They all also believe in 
‘climbing their own ladder’. And, in my own words they all are indeed 
pleasant persons to talk to. Yet they differ considerably. What then makes 
the difference? The upbringing, early events that affected them, different 
study, not taking courses equally, the hobby to travel, friends, contact with 
colleagues on the same level, leading to a motto in life, principles and 
metaphors. This is what leads to different profiles. On the basis of what 
overcomes to you rather early in life, you want to or have to make choices. 
Not the other way round. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Manager 4 
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 This is the profile of manager 4. Not all the scales have been filled in 
on the questionnaire. With regard to rules are rules/subversive the manager 
wrote something above the line which emphasizes the humane side. With 
regard to pragmatist/moralist the manager wrote down ‘clumsy’. It is meant 
in the sense that the manager performs nothing outside the work. The profile 
represents the key words: I am open, inimitable and complex. The manager 
gave me two internal memos, the organisation chart, a book as a present and 
sent me a magazine after with regard to the culture change in the 
organisation. From a hierarchical structure, thinking in money and no trust to 
a humane structure in meeting the client and each other. In the magazine half 
of the 22 interviewed managers are mentioned in the organisation chart. In 
general all interviewed managers are more or less positive about the manager. 
The middle management not mentioned in the chart is the most critical. They 
do not know well enough what is going on, the direction is not clear or they 
feel ‘left out’. The interview with the manager in the magazine has as title: I 
can be silent impressively.  
 
The manager wrote me a poem under the motto of life: 
 
LET IT BE 
BE FREE 
HAVE NO FEAR 
BE CLEAR 
 
‘Let it be’, the song of the Beatles, is ‘All is, nothing must’. In my 
interpretation ‘Let it be’ also has to do with the power of fate in the book 
‘Book of Changes’ written by the Chinese I Tjing (or as Morgan, 1992, p. 
257, writes the Taoist I Ching). This comes back in the high score on 
‘fatalistic’. The manager is an expert on I Tjing and gives courses. “The 
Taoist I Ching formulates a way of thinking in terms of opposites, codifying 
archetypal patterns of the Tao found in the natural and social worlds. […] 
It’s true function as to provide a means of understanding the tendencies 
inherent in the present. As such, it is a document that has much in common 
with modern attempts to understand the dynamics of transformation and 
change” (Morgan, 1992, p. 257). I Tjing combine the power of fate with the 
power of female/male, something like Ying/Yang. The book has 64 images; 
in variety terms 2 (f/m) to the power 6, because you throw with 3 coins 6 
times.  
 
 
         192 
 ‘Be free’ has to do with the teachings of Krishnamurtri. In a book of Reich, 
Jung was helpful in the transcendence from the Catholic religion to 
Krishnamurtri around the manager’s 35 year. Krishnamurtri was for the 
manager recognition. Krishnamurtri repudiates following and authority; he 
is a kind of anti-leader. Meditation was for Krishnamurtri attentive 
perceiving what is going on around us and in our selves. In the magazine 
the manager says: “I do not give direction. I do not give answers. I want 
that people think”. And “I do not pay attention to content, form and 
process, but to the effect I produce with others as an intervention”. At that 
moment transparency in communication decreases and confusion can 
increase. “It is the twilight and I am no classic example”. ‘Be clear’ is meant 
in the sense of ‘clear thinking’ and be careful what you take in with regard 
to food and ideas. “Food is important”. The manager practiced a sport and 
gets him/her self into condition by running an hour in the morning. 
Besides that the manager likes to bridge, to paint and loves architecture, 
especially in the sense how buildings fit in their environment. The manager 
visited Gaudi’s La Sagrada Familia cathedral in Barcelona several times. 
The ‘not being finished’ of everything fascinates the manager. “The power 
of the exception” And the manager declares him/herself impatient (the 
third in row). He/she has no ideology. 
 
The upbringing was pleasant in an area with a special culture in a 
big city. It was the Rich Catholic Life. That area and the city are known in 
general as unruly and for solidarity. It was not discussed but it might have 
to do with the mentioned recognition of Krishnamurtri. “It was already in 
me”. He/she mentioned the city and area in first instance as something 
that influenced him/her especially. The manager finished a study in 
economics. The manager did not follow many management courses. The 
manager likes to travel (“but it is the hobby of my partner”) and has seen 
many continents, among which China. The manager has many friends (“is 
only pleasant”). The relationships with colleagues on the management level 
are pleasant and with subordinates good. The difference is that subordi-
nates always have an interest. “They are nice to you by nature”. The 
relationship with the family is very good. The manager is religious in a 
cosmic sense, apart from the content and without images. He/she has no 
principles in life apart from mutual respect for people, animals, the milieu, 
the divine and the irreversible. “There is no I”. An organisational principle 
is ‘from the specific to the general’. This is ultimately sense making. The 
‘specific’ is the meeting from human to human and the ‘general’ is the 
policy that sinks in.  
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 “From the specific to the general accommodates the human measure and 
relationships. Through this relevant content develops”. The manager initiated 
a monthly meeting of many managers without agenda, who sit in a closed 
circle. “In these sessions we make the organisation visible to each other. I 
myself am visible. We are visible and through this the organisation is visible. 
It touches me”. The manager lives by the moment in the present. 
 
What the manager would like to do in another life is answered with a 
big question mark. “For that I have no context. It is too abstract; not 
concrete enough”. Mankind is bad because somewhere mankind turned into 
the wrong road. “It is the thinking. Thinking in pictures, wishes, ambitions, 
envy and distance. It puts itself above intuition. That is arrogant. Thinking is 
a sincere function within an intuitive mature life. It is about depth: intuition, 
emotion, memory, the feeling we have lost as human beings”. This comes 
close to what Merleau-Ponty said in chapter 2, although thereafter they turn 
into different roads. Punishment does not help much and “people do 
experience me as authoritarian. In a context that authoritarian sometimes 
occurs”. An interviewed manager in the magazine calls the manager ‘direct’. 
Power is seen as influence. “I feel a bit like a monk, aimed at continuity”. 
The manager is not engaged in power very much, but is able to play the 
power game. He/she does not like power games. The manager has never 
applied for a job and has never asked for a raise in salary. The proverb 
‘enough is more than much’ scores 100%.  
 
“I would have liked to finish my previous job in the full 
consciousness that nothing is ever finished”. The care sector is regarded by 
her/him as lifework. It is a nearly religious experience. This is the fourth 
manager in row who has an inner drive. It is based on the Catholic charity, 
the meaning of life, to break through structures (of power of professionals 
and insurers) and to bring up for discussion self-power. The manager had 
many ‘clashes’ with the Board of Directors. “I always got done with it 
without conflict, based on respect for the Board and the result”. He/she 
thinks in wholes (the harmony in the profile). The manager is demanding, 
also for him/herself, but the latter is denied. The manager likes to visit 
museums with regard to modern art and concerts with regard to classical 
music. The partner has much influence on decision-making in the 
organisational context. “I love him/her; he/she is practical, serving, plain and 
honest. We are pals”. 
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 The manager is a generalist, is able to improvise reasonable and the 
work processes are hardly interrupted. “In that I am rather dogmatic”. The 
manager has an emotional bond with the organisation. “I feel at home in 
the organisation for a long time”.  
Of great importance are developing capabilities, participative, 
culture (absolute top), emergent planning, process driven consultancies and 
long term stakeholder value. Top-down goes from medium (now) to little 
importance (future). Structure & systems and big consultancies are of little 
importance.  
The manager hardly uses proverbs. “I am more prepared for 
metaphors”. ‘Proffered service’ does not stink. With regard to ‘despots’ it is 
about the yield. The manager has a track record in downsizing Boards of 
Directors. ‘One must be servant before one can be master’, to start at the 
bottom of the ladder, is beautiful. The organisational ladder and the self-
development ladder go hand in hand. The comment on ‘The monkey 
throws etc’ is “it happens”. For the rest the proverbs score (nearly) 100% 
on the truth-scale. It is difficult to say whether the proverbs are an 
expression of the world-view pre-eminently in the case of manager 4. For 
instance, ‘what you can do alone, do not call in the help of others’ scores 
92%. One would say this contradicts the strong participative, group-
orientation in the profile. Is this an example of being inimitable and 
complex? Or is this a confirmation of the fact that the manager hardly uses 
proverbs? Is it because of the one-sidedness of proverbs? 
 
With regard to metaphor, it is in both cases the organisation seen as 
flux. In the previous job 60 managers chose out of 50 metaphors the 
‘whale’ and ‘water’. The whale is big in the water, is intelligent and offers a 
lot for human beings, like cod-liver oil. Ultimately they chose the water 
metaphor. It has an occurrence in different shapes (sea, river), has a purify 
capacity and is feeding. But it can also evaporate and pollute. The present 
culture change is ‘a journey through the river’. Morgan (1992, p. 223) places 
Jung under the ‘psychic prisons’ metaphor. “At the most basic levels 
archetypes (literally meaning original pattern) are defined as patterns that 
structure thought and hence give order to the world”. The manager says: 
“What you perceive you are yourself. Any attempt to escape is a 
limitation”. 
 
With regard to management and breaking through structures and 
patterns, the manager writes to his/her managers: “The employee defines 
the client outside him/her self.  
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 Then he becomes scared and uncertain. Management promotes this 
development and gives answers by means of hierarchy, instruction or refusal. 
Dependency creates dependency. The vicious circle is there. In the relation 
with the client the answer lies. The action is learning. The outcome is to 
know. The employee acts in the relation with the client. Managers are 
strangers in the land of acting”. And “from the general (policy in the heads 
of people) to the specific (human relations) creates distance, power and 
discord”. In the meeting the manager says: “Strategy is to look from the 
outside to the inside. Outside is almost your organisation as solidified 
reality”. In strategy the organisational principle is reversed in a different 
meaning. First the Management Team must agree on headlines (the general) 
where after it can be specified in the various disciplines (the specific). From 
these quotes it is clear how the manager is at work (“how do I break through 
that?”). Step by step in the meeting among human beings (meaning, 
connections, utterances, relevant content, strategy, policy) in forming the 
whole. In my words, the client must sit in the employee, the employee must 
sit in the manager, the manager must sit in the Management Team and the 
MT must sit in the chairman. It is recursiveness in a different meaning and 
setting.  
 
It will be ‘clear’ that the ‘in summary’ of manager 4 is impossible; 
apart from the fact that he/she is an interesting, warm personality. A 
colleague once called the manager ‘elusive’ and ‘hard’. It is this remarkable 
combination of being a reorganiser (result, yield, medium importance of 
economical value) and emotionality, the connection, a nearly religious drive 
and the emphasis on the human being (as employee). It would be a duality if 
we could explain why these issues are complementary. However, that is 
infeasible in the given time of the interview. May be it is best to end with a 
(anti) proverb used by a Jesuit (they brought I Tjing to the West in the 
Middle Ages, according to the manager): ‘The end justifies the means’ and 
‘The ends do not justify the means’. The meeting lasted 1 ¾ hour. We 
discussed both the Weltanschauung and the structure.  
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Figure 11. Four Weltanschauungen 
 
Is there anything to be said about the possible co-operation among 
manager 1, 2, 3 and 4. I would not dare. Apart from the fact that manager 4 
has most in common with manager 2 and differs most from manager 1. 
Manager 3 and 4 have a comparable background, they have more things in 
common, but they still differ in their Weltanschauungen. Having things in 
common ‘does not do the job’ and manager 4 breaks open a lot of 
commonness as mentioned at the end of the world-view of manager 3. To 
name a few, enjoying life was not mentioned (which is not to say that it is 
not done; Carpe Diem scores 100%), working hard was not emphasized 
(same), not being practical (clumsy) and process driven consultancies are of 
great importance (second time mentioned). As manager 4 rightly said: “I 
have the feel that I can still teach you a few things”. Is the manager 
him/herself the power of the exception? But this is the fourth manager 
that combines Theory E and Theory O worldviews. This manager also 
confirms most the (layered) complexity of managers as human beings.  
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 8.3  Weltanschauung and structure 
 
Human beings not only fulfil needs, but they have purposes. These 
individual purposes are part of a Weltanschauung. For instance, the purpose 
is to reach the top or to be significant for people. The interviewed managers 
sometimes call this an inner drive. Acts are based on these drives (or 
purposes). For others these purposes may have less meaning or a different 
meaning. In chapter 4 we already said that in the process of sense making 
goal relevance refers to purpose. The distinctions and practices in the 
operational domains constitute the world we live in and interact with. “The 
distinctions we ascribe to ourselves in self-reflection and to others as 
observers belong to our informational domain” (Espejo & Reyes, 1997, p. 
165). So Weltanschauung, how we see our selves, others and reality, has a 
foot in both domains, although with an emphasis on the operational domain. 
It is the same as the pre-reflective and reflective layers are two aspects of the 
act of perception. 
In organisations the concern is connecting the informational and 
operational domains of the collective bootstrapped16 by the meaning yet to 
be formed and produced. It is structure, i.e. a network of resources and their 
relations, that is required to link the informational and operational domains 
(Espejo, 2003). The outcome of interactions in the operational domain, an 
emergent identity, has a deeper meaning than the purpose ascribed to the 
organisation as an outcome of conversations (Espejo & Reyes, 1997, p. 162). 
It is this layer of deeper meaning we looked for in the foregoing chapters. It 
is the ‘multitude of references to the kernel of references’ and ‘the primordial 
world that base the first meaning’. That ‘kernel of references’ shows itself in 
the concrete relation with colleagues. For each colleague we have a different 
‘kernel’, many times full of prejudices, unless we come to know each other 
better. When I read a review of a Ph.D. of a colleague in a journal, I do that 
‘knowing’ how we say hallo to each other in the corridor (and much more). 
There is a ‘world’ behind reading the name, a certain style. The act of reading 
can set in a stream of acts by my self and my colleague or not. The many 
‘nodes of relations’ or ‘systems of exchanges’ make up that emergent identity. 
It makes clear why organisations are immense complex. 
 
 
16 In Dutch: zichzelf opwerken  
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 In the operational domain where we have concrete relations with 
others, where we act habitually, unconsciously, we form the organisational 
structure. The (phenomenal) body is there where it has something to do. 
That ‘something’ can be a need or a purpose, like I walk to the room of a 
colleague to discuss a problem someone else has. By saying (Espejo & 
Reyes, 1997, p. 165) that our distinctions in the operational domain are 
orders of magnitude larger than the ones we make in the informational 
domain, Espejo & Reyes link up with Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the 
reflective layer is only an extract of the pre-reflective layer, the being-in-
the-world, where the phenomenal body takes over. These needs and 
purposes originate in the operational closure of the nervous system. So 
change in organisations means for the most part triggering the operational 
closed nervous system of its actors by making them conscious of their 
habitual behaviour in various concrete relations with each other and other 
agents in the environment. And that is something that managers’ 
communications and leadership can produce for the good or ill of the 
organisation. Leadership then is theoretically more seen as developing 
vision, initiatives and purposes, whereas management is more aimed at 
order and stability. In practice these roles more or less overlap. We saw 
that especially the managers 2 and 4 mention this ‘making people 
conscious’ without mentioning these theoretical concepts.  
 
What we say reflects our experience, perception and thinking. The 
proverb ‘None so deaf as those who will not hear’ reflects the operational 
closure of the listener who can only be triggered by these disturbances but 
not determined by them. With the exception of one manager all 
interviewed managers give a high truth score on this proverb. So in a way 
we know in communication the emphasis is on the listener. This 
contradicts the ‘two-way traffic’ and ‘feedback’ under the Communication 
& Information School, as mentioned by Keuning & Eppink (1982). 
Cyberneticians never used the word ‘feedback’ in this context. Moreover, 
in the examples given in chapter 3, meaning conceptions often are the 
source of misunderstandings. So the problem in communication is 
threefold: is the listener prepared or interested to listen and if so, does he 
give the same meaning to utterances? Moreover, is the culture in 
organisations such that people can ask what is meant without being taken 
for a fool? That in turn has to do with building trust. It is mutual trust with 
which Keuning & Eppink (1982, p. 244) end their chapter. In the case of 
manager 4 ‘trust’ is the key word. “In order to manage such a revolution, 
trust is necessary” as manager 4 says in the magazine. 
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 Do we see the VSM functions, channels, relations and insights back 
in what was said by the managers in the interviews? We can conclude: only 
partly and not in a coherent way. For instance, manager 4 has a kind of 
Monitoring channel for the entire organisation. The organisation is seen as a 
whole without levels of recursion. Manager 1 is also a listener: “Let the air 
out of them”. Manager 2 and 4 bring habitual, unconscious behaviour up for 
discussion. Manager 2 mentions explicitly that ‘meta-level’. Manager 3 sets 
out protocols and frameworks to be filled in at ‘other levels’. It can be seen 
as a form of Corporate Intervention. Managers or Management Teams see 
Coordination in a different meaning as their responsibility or task. They see it 
more as ‘all activities must be geared to one another’ and ‘all people involved 
must be informed in time’. Coordination in this form needs much more 
communication (and meetings) with all the accompanying risks. To forget to 
inform someone (in time), interpreting memo’s wrong or not at all, ad hoc 
decisions and so forth. It is in contrast with anticipating situations. 
Regulation in this way is more done error-controlled than cause-controlled. 
Error-controlled can work because there is mostly time to correct the error. 
However, sometimes the ambulance is too late. The organisation ‘creaks’ or 
comes apart at the seams.    
 
Interaction among people in the operational domain through which 
structures are formed is based on a Weltanschauung in the background. And 
how we ‘see’ the world is our espoused intentionality in the informational 
domain. As manager 4 puts it in a memo to his/her managers, quoting 
various sources, “the only limit is the limit of our imagination” and “if we 
can dream it, we can do it”. It is an explicit invitation to act in a certain way 
in the hope that this (inter) action in the operational domain can be 
mobilized. But how many managers will think ‘no words, but deeds’ or will 
not even be triggered by what is said? To try to change people in the 
informational domain is less effective than to try to change them in the 
operational domain. It stresses the importance for managers to set an 
example to others in the concrete relations in the operational domain. 
Manager 4 is both active in the operational and informational domain. 
 
In appendix 5 on the St. Maartenskliniek it will be seen that for the 
management an activity not (yet) profitable is a primary activity. It has to do 
with possess charisma, image and the state-of-the-art within the clinical 
identity. 
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 The Sport Centre was established a few years ago. It would have to grow 
out as another specialism nationwide and would generate references for the 
clinic. Sport is seen as a phenomenon in society. The manager is very much 
orientated on (near) future trends in society. The manager sports him/her 
self. One would say ‘smart thinking’ if the motto is ‘strong in movement’. 
But so far it turned out that it was harder to reach this position than 
thought before. We now go a bit more in depth about meaning, 
Weltanschauung and the connection with structure. For this manager to 
maximize economical value is of medium importance. Long-term 
stakeholder value remains essential and is of great importance. The 
manager knows about organisation structures, because it was the subject of 
his/her thesis. Structure & Systems are of great importance, now and in the 
future, “due to the complexity of the process”. He/she emphasizes the 
word ‘constructive’. ‘Enough is more than much’ has a high truth score. 
Could it be that the manager, based on this combination, thought 
something like ‘You can tell me what you consider to be primary activities, 
but for me primary activities have a different meaning in a different 
context. Anything can still happen. Why would I follow your line of 
reasoning? I know what I am talking about’. It looks like this is an example 
of being prepared to listen in first instance (the manager mentioned not 
cost-effective by him/her self to start with), then a meaning ‘clash’ (money 
is not the whole point), where after the manager became ‘secluded in 
his/her own world’ arguing the reasons to open the Centre and why it is a 
primary activity within the structure. But this is all with hindsight.  
 
Whether the interviewed managers use models I do not know 
because I did not ask them but they all have organisational principles as 
part of their Weltanschauung underpinning their actions in the relations 
with others. These principles are mutual respect, servant leadership, to give 
and take responsibility and meeting people face-to-face. In their dealing 
with people they also want to break through existing patterns and patterns 
of behaviour of people. Management is for a great part breaking through 
patterns in the concrete relations with others in the operational domain. 
For instance, breaking through the power of professionals (the pattern) or 
their own power (the pattern) is for them part of the structure. The 
managers 3 and 4 are themselves in their Weltanschauung not power 
oriented, so why would they allow others to exercise power. Their tacit 
views about power produce the organisation’s structure.  
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 The other is a response to our self, whereby we know we are 
companions. At the basis of living creatures is interaction, also seen as 
cooperation and coordination of actions in a manner that entails mutual 
acceptance. Our concern for the other is emotional, not rational. The 
organisational principles of the interviewed managers even go further than 
mutual acceptance. It is striking that all interviewed managers formed or are 
part of a Management Team, which reflects their group- and participative 
orientation, with the exception of one individualistic manager who still is part 
of a Management Team. Nearly all relations with others are good or even 
more than that. The truth score on a ‘competitive’ proverb ‘Attack is the best 
defence’ is for manager 1 to 4, 79%, 17%, 65% and 100%. The truth score 
on the proverbial expression ‘If you can do it alone, don’t call in the help of 
others’ is 25%, 96%, 16% and 88%. Manager 4 is the most participative, 
group orientated, emotional, serving and outspoken manager. This alone 
makes clear how complex people can be; even inimitable as the manager says. 
A colleague says in the magazine that this manager often changes tack17.  “It 
sometimes produces beautiful surprises”. In cybernetic terms this is 
amplifying your own variety, at the same time amplifying the variety of those 
concerned. That is certainly not meant with the term variety engineering in 
the VSM. But to change tack alone certainly has much to do with to attack. It 
highlights the meaning of the verb ‘to attack’. To attack is more meant as an 
intervention by the manager. If meaning comes into play the manager 
becomes a bit less inimitable. 
 
We can conclude that many VSM functions and relations as 
described in chapter 5 are missing in the organisations of the interviewed 
managers. Does this mean that their organisations ‘creak’? The clinic does 
not ‘creak’ and is a financially sound organisation. On level 1, the system-in-
focus, there is no or hardly interdependency among the primary activities. 
The Coordination in place by RDE and frameworks is satisfactory. The 
management of the primary activities are very much steered on protocols and 
frameworks that are filled in locally.  
 
 
17 In Dutch: de bakens verzetten  
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 This is a form of Corporate Intervention and gives the ‘lower’ management 
some kind of freedom or autonomy, although these terms were not 
mentioned. The management makes use of the Monitoring channel. “I 
make remarks that you must not put a glass on the side of the bed where a 
patient has a one-sided palsy”. The management does not think in 
recursion levels, although the complexity of the clinic could be easily 
unfolded together in that way. And can one insist that there is a fragmented 
Intelligence in place if the clinic is worldwide one of the six state-of-the-art 
hospitals? Big knowledge driven consultancies (of medium importance, 
context bounded) with their (fiscal) expertise are seen as part of 
Intelligence, done by the Management Team. “They are of importance in 
macro- or strategic projects”.  
Policy, the Board of Directors, is very much concerned with the 
tension between the statutory, individual responsibility of professionals and 
the end responsibility of the Board. This is what Beer calls the ethos, the 
moral attitude that is anchored in Policy. So we can now conclude that 
either functions or relations are in place although not arranged in the 
coherent ways as described in the VSM or are in place differently due to 
the absence of interdependency of primary activities on the system-in-
focus. This does not undermine the theory of viability. It only says that on 
some levels of recursion some functions for viability can differ from those 
on other levels. The same goes for autonomy. There may be reasons for 
allowing more or less autonomy on different levels of recursion.  
With regard to the Business Unit Private the interdependency 
among CB, FBTO and Damage on level 2 will highly likely be more than in 
the case of the clinic. Due to a lack of time we did not discuss this. Here 
CB and FBTO are given more autonomy (in the words of the manager: 
more independence) than before, at the same time striving for more 
coherence in the sense that people feel themselves part of one Business 
Unit as a whole. Cohesion is here more psychological than systemically. 
The revolution with which manager 4 is dealing has to do with culture and 
not with a structure that ‘creaks’. Whether the financial position is sound 
could not be traced because I have only seen the consolidated figures of 
the company.  
 
“To become a better human is done in one second. You are not 
that because you think about it how that would be or because you set 
yourself goals for it, but because you get even with the future and turn the 
button in the here and now”.  
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 It intrigues manager 4 excessive that you can in this way change the nature of 
relations and the structure of society. It means distance one self from 
religion, directions, goals, future, planning and time. “After all, we ourselves 
can see what it is all about; what causes problems humans face”. This is the 
influence of Krishnamurti who kept to the facts. Another manager agrees 
with him/her with regard to the revolution but has a feel “that the 
philosophy has not yet landed completely now”. This ‘not yet landed’ is in 
the informational domain. This living in the present is in contrast with 
Merleau-Ponty’s true time experience. It is striking that only manager 2 lives 
‘from the past, in the present to the future’. For manager 4 Structure & 
Systems is of little importance. Culture is of absolute top. “Probably in the 
inner of people much happens”. It is a challenge for the manager to make 
people conscious of certain patterns. We can only agree to some of these 
statements and it is clear that the emphasis is on the human being in this 
organisation. But it will also be clear that we will not see much back of the 
VSM insights in the structure of this manager, apart from the Monitoring 
channel on all levels of recursion in building trust.  
 
In the choices made (or decisions) by the managers with regard to the 
interviews we can see back the Weltanschauung, sometimes in more than one 
aspect of it. My supervisors dispose of all the aspects, but I will give one 
aspect. One manager got a choice and preferred to discuss the present 
function (lives in the present; emotional bond). Another manager did not 
want to postpone the interview, although the manager was very busy (a 
motto). Beforehand the time limit was decreased, but we overshoot that time 
limit again during the interview (negotiations). Another busy manager took 
his/her time relaxed during the interview and did only mention that busyness 
at the end of the interview (reliability). Another manager planned the meeting 
very short after I had contacted him/her (face to face). It is striking that the 
two female managers reacted on the worked out version of the interview. 
However, if I would mention one reason it would be obvious who they are. 
 
Structure & Systems is for the interviewed managers of less 
importance than culture. In the view of one manager culture is over-
emphasized in his/her organisation (must go from great importance to 
medium); for the other managers culture is of great importance or even 
absolute top, now and in the future. “Structure and culture are intertwined, 
since both depend upon relationships between people” (Espejo et al, 1999, p. 
21).  
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 Then Espejo et al also come up with two ideal types of organisation in 
terms of both structure and culture, comparable to the Positional- and 
Transformational Organising. For the interviewed managers culture relates 
directly to the organisational purposes, for instance ‘the client central’ or 
‘the best patient care’. As manager 2 commented with regard to culture: 
“We are on the right track”. These organisational purposes in turn reflect 
the inner drives or individual purposes of the managers in their 
Weltanschauung. So in a way it is easier to make visible the relation 
Weltanschauung and culture than the relation Weltanschauung and 
structure. It looks like that the being intertwined of structure and culture 
makes that the meanings the interviewed managers give to these terms are 
different to the meanings we ascribe to them in organisational cybernetics. 
 
In what the managers told we have seen back many issues 
discussed in part 1. For instance, duality, heuristic acts, context, making 
people conscious of their unconscious behaviour or habits, know thyself, 
not being rational, emotions, the true time experience, the humane scale, 
co-operation with others, servant leadership, body and mind form a unity 
(in all cases answered instantly), processes of becoming, meaning, 
opposites, interest in Eastern insights, concrete and ‘there is no I’, without 
referring to the theories with the exception of Weick’s theory.  
 
Where can we see back the Weltanschauung in the structure? It 
must be stated in rather general terms because otherwise it would be easy 
to recognise the profiles. Manager 1 says Weltanschauung has “everything” 
to do with structure. Weltanschauung and structure were not discussed 
with manager 2 due a lack of time. With regard to manager 3 the double 
meaning of the identity slogan of the organisation. Second, the protocols 
and frame-works highlight given elbowroom and given responsibilities to 
’lower’ levels in a more facilitating role. Moreover, the management 
considers itself responsible for education of employees, although it is no 
goldmine. Third, there is always work in progress aimed at a better service 
or efficiency. Four, the words team and team spirit come back over and 
over. Five, many taken initiatives betray entrepreneurship. Six, power that 
others (might) have is broken. The manager him/herself sees back being 
practical and a natural authority over professionals based on knowledge 
due to reading. Manager 4 is going from a recognizable drive. “Structure is 
no possession, no tool. Then it works”.  
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 The manager cites the art philosopher Kaulingfreks. “In fact organisations 
are no more than aids, tools to reach a purpose. Yet these help construct-
ions require so much attention that the purpose moves to a second plan”. In 
the view of the manager the purpose is serving the client. It is doing together 
(“I emphasize that we are with each other one”; the manager wants to create 
unity), the bond with managers, development of people and identity, “I is 
always inclusive. What misses in me that he/she does not perform?”. 
“She/he…finds it a challenge to make someone conscious of certain 
patterns. If people break loose from that and make viable groups and 
projects from personal qualities, it inspires him/her”. Boards of Directors 
were cut down in number. Managers of a Centre were replaced because they 
steered on ratios instead of managing people and the dominance of 
technology was broken through (“What do we want? Thereafter we will see 
what technology can provide us with”). “The parts are well constructed; 
nothing needs to be changed there”. In the previous job the manager kicked 
out a big consultancy contracted by his/her predecessors. “They were only 
sitting behind their laptops”. The manager is loyal to his/her small, process 
driven consultancies over the years. And last but not least, the manager 
literally ’manages by walking around’; face to face instead of e-mail and 
telephone. 
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 The first step is to switch from a prescriptive logic to 
a proscriptive one, that is, from the idea that what is 
not allowed is forbidden to the idea that what is not 
forbidden is allowed…Natural selection…discards 
what is not compatible with  [two basic constraints 
of] survival and reproduction in evolution. 
 
Varela et al.  
 
 
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
9.1  Conclusions part 1 
 
The conclusions in this section are a summary of chapter 6. 
 
• Human beings inhabit the world, time and space. We are attached to  
the world in all the meanings of the word. The world remains the 
same throughout our entire life. The world has a physiognomy, a 
certain style. That is the reason we form together with the world a 
 unity, a system. 
• Perception and action are linked together as successively emergent 
and mutually selecting patterns. Perception is suddenly seeing the 
spring out of immanent meaning in a constellation of data. The  
subject of perception is the phenomenal body as an experiential 
structure and the context of cognitive mechanisms. Cognition, the  
process of knowing, is the entire process of life as is the life of  
consciousness. We are our body and the phenomenal body is our  
general means through which we have a world. Our awareness of the 
phenomenal body is no idea. 
• We are prepared for and tuned into the phenomena. The brain lays  
the ground for perception. The sensors translate themselves in each 
other without the need of an interpreter. There is some detailed 
evidence that emergent properties are fundamental to the operation  
of the brain itself. 
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 • The world is full of meaning. The things spread their latent, inner  
meaning themselves. The problem is that there are too many  
meanings; not too few. Meaning is defined at the end of chapter 4.  
• Ambiguity is essential for the human existence and everything we 
experience or think always has a plural meaning. Ambiguity on the pre- 
reflective level triggers sense making on the reflective level. 
• Only in our field of presence, being simultaneously present to our selves 
 and involved in the world as being-in-the-world, we come in contact with  
 time, we learn to know the course (the direction) of time. Only in the 
 distinct memory, as an immediate property of the past without sliding in 
 between contents, and only in the deliberate calling up of the past we  
 come across the past itself and rejoin our selves with the time unfolded, 
 the given to itself aspect of a duality. In meaningful personal experiences 
 and meaningful first time experiences rather early in our life originates a  
 Weltanschauung as part of our self-consciousness. 
• A perceiver is an observer. His experience remains secluded in his  
operational closure of the nervous system including the brain and on 
the other hand, in a meta-domain, is able to operate as external to the 
situation in which he is. We are always situated observers in the world 
who never coincide completely with our selves and others. In  
communication the listener is not instructed, but rather triggered. 
• We have added to sense making the pre-reflective level that precedes 
the reflective level. And on that reflective level we have added  
differences in nuance or denied utterances, like for instance that sense 
making is understood as a process that is retrospective, that perception  
is a form of memory, that individual sense making is an oxymoron and  
that a Weltanschauung is a meta level that defines a situation. 
Weltanschauung has to be separated from sense making although they 
presuppose each other and stand in a circular relation. 
• Weltanschauung as a layered concept is based on how we experience  
past meanings. The layers are based on the felt belongingness in the  
sedimentation, which makes it a coherent whole that gives further order  
to our life. 
 
9.2  Conclusions part 2 
 
Based on the limited number of interviews conclusions can be drawn 
confined to the care sector.  
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 Only whether these conclusions are also valid outside this sector cannot be 
answered. Due to the anonymity of the managers some specific 
conclusions cannot be mentioned or deepened out.  
 
• The Weltanschauung consists of the given profile and the text. On  
the basis of the questionnaire and what the managers told, an accurate  
Weltanschauung could be made visible (see sections 7.4 and 8.2). 
• There is neither a typical female nor male Weltanschauung. There is  
also no typical co-operative Weltanschauung. 
• How they may differ, these managers have certain things in common.  
They are more subversive and unorthodox than expected by me. 
They are (in their thinking) black and white, hot-tempered, impatient  
and trotting through, but they emphasize their other side of the pole,  
(self) reflection and self-development. The night is often used for  
work or hobby. ‘Rather eating dry bread than begging cheese’, ‘Carpe 
Diem’ and ‘Seek and ye shall find’ has a high truth score. All inter- 
viewed managers like classical music and reading.   
• All interviewed managers combine the Theory X and Y aspects and 
Theory E and O orientations in their Weltanschauung. The  
theoretical dichotomies do not hold in practice. That these theories  
do not hold in practice confirms Merleau-Ponty’s claim that nothing  
is absolute, neither ‘either…or’ nor ‘all or nothing’. And before one  
says: ‘it either rains or it is dry’, I say: ‘it is dry, it is dry with a high  
humidity level, it rains, it drizzles, it is pouring down’. Observers  
make distinctions, we said. My proposition would not be to abandon 
these dichotomy theories once and for all. The oppositions of issues  
as such are useful as long as it is seen as an ideal typical picture, a  
kind of shorthand or used as a steppingstone. The only thing to avoid 
is to say that ‘this is how it is’ or ‘that the code of change has been  
broken’, because it isn’t. If used as a tool or in combination with  
other tools as a kind of quick scan these theories might be of help in  
practice. The presupposition that it is hard or impossible to find  
managers with a combined worldview, however, has been denied in  
this thesis. 
• Preferred metaphors of how the interviewed managers would like to 
see their organisation are flux, organism, culture and community. 
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 • In the opinion of the managers there is a link between 
 Weltanschauung and structure although in general culture is a more 
 important issue for them than structure. Manager 1 said that structure 
 has “everything” to do with Weltanschauung. With manager 2 it was  
 not discussed. Manager 3 said: “You cannot round about it”.  
 Manager 3 sees back in the structure: natural ascendancy (reading),  
 being practical and given responsibilities. Manager 4 said: doing  
 together; we are with each other one, the bond with managers,  
 development of people & identity and the dominance of IT was  
 broken. However, further research on a larger scale would be necessary  
 in order to draw further conclusions. 
• Based on the answers of the managers it is ‘the essence’ of self in the 
relation with others, which we can see back in the structure. That  
essence of self came rather early in life. Reading and studying at the  
boarding school (given elbow-room) and the (emotional) bond with  
others (charity) in a rather unruly area in a city. In other words, it is that  
which made up the Weltanschauung in the first place. Weltanschauung  
can then be said to be an intermediary that ‘passes on’ meaningful  
events rather early in life in the structure of the organisation.  
• Proverbs are an expression of Weltanschauung pre-eminently. 
• In fundamental change processes we ask people to change their 
inseparable action and perception. We ask them to change their sense  
of realty. We will elaborate on this conclusion in section 9.4. 
• As mentioned at the end of chapter 8, in Part 2 we can see back many  
theoretical issues as discussed in Part 1. That emphasizes the relevance  
of these theories in organisational theory. At the end of chapter 3 we  
were looking for a felt belongingness. In key words: Bad upbringing  
(held tight) + freedom, given love + being in love, death of father +  
constructive and the Rich Catholic Life + anti-leadership. These are  
more or less opposites, not always in terms of bad and good, related by  
an implicit common term, like in the proverb ‘a child without father is 
like a house without a roof’ where the implicit common term is  
protection. What has stayed with me after the interviews as that implicit  
common term which was mentioned by the managers themselves?  
Become silent, love, (building) relations and (emotional, religious) 
depth. With regard to manager 1 the two poles, top, adventure,  
excitement, delicious and nice + become silent in nature and music are 
opposites. With regard to manager 3, (building) relations, another  
opposite was shown.  
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 This manager is the only one who has one good (girl) friend instead  
of many friends as the other managers have. With regard to managers 
2 and 4, the inner drives ‘being of significance for others’ and 
‘lifework’ can even directly be coupled to these implicit common 
terms, love and depth. My question then remains: has that implicit 
common term between opposites something to do with the 
intentional arc, which brings unity in our life? 
• A cautious conclusion can be that female managers are not more  
 emotional than male managers, but rather are more flexible in  
 coping with work interruptions, which they sometimes or often  
 allow to happen. If necessary they catch up the ‘lost’ time by  
 working in the evening or at night. 
 
 9.3 Some recommendations 
 
Even for an experienced facilitator it is hard to do the interview alone. One 
must be listening, writing, combining and clarifying. My recommendation 
would be to do the interview with one facilitator who writes for himself 
and one extra minute’s secretary. I do not believe in tape recorders. 
Moreover, take your time and make choices. Two hours for only talking 
about the Weltanschauung at a minimum will do.  
 
Suppose that these interviewed managers had not been so open as they 
were, would the outcome have been the same? I do not think so. First, an 
accurate Weltanschauung could only be made visible by the profile and the 
text. Second, their comments on for instance proverbs were illustrative. It 
made clearer why they were of the opinion that…Third, earlier answers 
could be sometimes more deepened out or ‘checked’ on consistency. That 
is in my opinion the limitation of the questionnaire. If you send them out 
in a survey, you probably will know ‘that’ but less or not ‘why’, what it 
means. For instance, two managers mention the word silence, but in a 
different meaning. When manager 4 said: “I am complex” she/he said: 
“That will be under discussion in the course of this conversation, I 
suppose”. In other words, if you ask me the right questions, you get the 
right answers. Manager 3 said one time: “That I already told you”. I expect 
that he/she would have left open the question in a survey. So in my 
opinion the questionnaire will only be useful in semi-structured (also called 
conceptual steered) interviews as a guideline.  
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 People have to be prepared to co-operate in being open and honest. After all, 
we are curious about their ‘inner life’. You can only do that face-to-face. 
 
In section 4.8 on rationality we said intuition is an indispensable 
concept in understanding human beings better. The cheered book ‘Intuition’ 
(2004) did not bring me much further in my understanding of what it is. In 
that book descriptions of intuitions are ‘our capacity for direct knowledge, 
for immediate insight without observation and reason’, ‘intuitive thinking is 
perception-like, rapid, effortless’, ’intuition is recognition’ (elsewhere also 
called accumulated experience),  ‘the sixth sense’ and ‘tacit knowledge; know-
how’. So these descriptions are a combination of what has been said in this 
thesis among other things about perception, common sense and the wisdom 
of Eastern insights. 
In section 3.4 it was said that mind or mental consciousness is the 
sixth sense in Buddhism. It was also stated that feeling (or feeling tone) is a 
mental factor in Buddhism. And that perception normally arises inseparable 
with feeling. Intuition is many times described as: “I feel good/bad about 
that” or “By feel”. We emphasized to distinguish between emotions and 
feeling. May be this is a fruitful point of departure in getting to know more 
about intuition as distinguished from perception. 
  
9.4 Change in organisations 
 
‘Times change, and we with them’ According to Van Dale (2000, p. 
809) views, morals and habits of people change in the course of times 
without being conscious thereof. Or in contrast, ‘Times you change but you 
do not change with them’. The relation between the proverb and the maxim 
is unclear according to Van Dale. Mindful of what was said that it is we who 
execute time and the ‘I remain’ in the poem there is something or even more 
to say for the last statement. It highlights the relative truth (of proverbs) and 
ambiguity, issues we are not very fond of in the Western world. As Varela et 
al make clear we want solid ground or foundation that in many cases appears 
to be shifting sand. And also related to this section there is something to say 
for the proverbs ‘Nature, time and patience are the three great physicians’ 
and ‘Change brings life’. 
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 What do we expect from people when they have to change in 
organisations? What is it they have to change? We said an autonomous 
system is able to specify what is characteristic of it. When structural 
coupling is altered, some forms of behaviour are no longer possible. One’s 
behaviour changes as one learns to cope with new conditions and 
situations. Our concern for the other is emotional, not rational. We 
distinguished emotions from the feeling tone in our experiences. The 
biological basis features (sincerity) are still present in us. 
I think it is ultimately the habits (or habitual patterns) in behaviour 
people execute to a large extent unconsciously in interaction in the 
operational domain. In turn these habitual patterns are influenced by their 
attitude of how they see reality with a Weltanschauung in the background. 
We do an appeal on them in the informational domain by communication 
in language with orally or written ideas and metaphors. We address 
simultaneously the whole organisation and top-down the managers who 
have to spread the news on their level. 
Two managers (2 and 4) emphasize that they make people 
conscious of their unconscious behaviour. They declare themselves more 
emotional than rational and have an interest in Eastern insights. They 
emphasize the Monitoring function as explained in chapter 5. They are 
serving and have the strongest internal drive towards people. Still they 
declare mankind to be totally different. They mention concreteness, the 
exception, context and the humane scale. This can be called the direct way 
of change; breaking through patterns. To talk to someone directly about his 
unconscious conducts or habits. It is more concrete in the operational 
domain. 
Two managers (1 and 3) emphasize communication by transferring 
logic carefully in layers and sharing before you decide in cooperation. They 
have a bias on being more rational than emotional, they are pragmatic and 
being served. This can be called the indirect way; to communicate with an 
appeal to rationality. It is more abstract in the informational domain. 
What we fundamentally do in change processes is to ask people to 
change their (inter) actions in structural coupling whereby they must bring 
forth a different world or whereby they must change their sense of the 
world if the change process is fundamental enough. By a fundamental 
change process is meant that we appeal to people to commit to new 
purposes, values and the like. It is an appeal to an inner life instead of 
superficial change against which nobody would in principle raise an 
objection.  
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 The latter could be characterized by ‘All roads lead to Rome’; whether we go 
to the right or to the left we will end up in the same purpose. Fundamental 
change indeed has to do with ‘to change tack’ so that we will end up in a 
different purpose or desired state.  
A different sense of self, the other and reality in perceptually guided 
actions must be ‘created’ or ‘come into life’. In organisations this question is 
legitimate because the employee has to obey contractually. Outside 
organisations the question is dubious. Because autonomous human beings 
are what they are, and do what they do. That is the second thing we ask from 
people in change processes in organisations. If the employee is not prepared 
to do so or he cannot do so for whatever reason, he must leave the system. 
But to change one’s sense of the world and not to be what you are, is not 
done overnight. This leaves me with the conclusion that it can be done in 
two ways: either there is time enough to do so gradually and continuously or 
there must be an acute crisis situation like a bankruptcy. In the latter case the 
world is already ‘upside down’ for people. The former is the flux metaphor 
or ‘to organise is to change vice versa’. Or in the words of manager 3: 
“Standstill is decline” and manager 4: “Nothing is ever finished”. All change 
processes in between these time frames are in my opinion bound to fail. That 
is my explanation for the fact that so many change processes (it is said 70%) 
fail. After a short time people fall back again into old patterns (or selves). It is 
often heard that a failure is due to a lack of time, money and paying attention 
to people. We already knew this but we now may have a better understanding 
of why this is so and what paying attention to people in this context means.  
 
What then is in general enough time? The starting point is not that 
the noses have to point in the same direction, but rather in Wierdsma’s 
(1999) words, that the playing field is known. That playing field is a 
constraint as a purpose imposed by the management (team). We ask people 
to amplify their own variety (in perception), whereas at the same time their 
variety is attenuated (in action) or amplified dependent on the change of 
playing field. Action and perception point in the direction of knowledge and 
learning. In learning processes we merely talk about years rather than 
months.  
How many years a successful change process would take is difficult 
to say because it is dependent on, for instance, the size of the organisation 
and with that the number of (reciprocal) relations.  
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 In an organisation with 2.500 employees the number of static reciprocal 
relations is 6.247.500. The number of one-way relations is 3.123.750. So it 
will be somewhere around the number of 4.500.000 if everyone is involved 
with everyone one way or another. If you are reciprocally connected to 
only 200 people in practice, the number is still 39.800 in your network. In 
the dynamic picture, the possible number of states in the system 
(connected or not connected) is 2 to the power 200, which is an immense 
figure. This is only meant as an indication of the complexity that has to be 
‘changed’.  
In my opinion we must also here find a balance between what was 
called above the direct (more concrete) and indirect (more abstract) 
approach. But more important is, that alike in sense making, it must be 
emotionally appealing. That is a domain we have skipped in our supposed 
‘being rational’. And that is also the opinion of manager 2 although it is the 
starting point for his/her interest in scientific research. So change 
processes that pay no attention to emotions are also bound to fail. In the 
case of an emergency, like threatening bankruptcy, there are already 
emotions released, like anger for job losses and existential fears for the 
continuity of family life. It is here where people threaten to loose their tacit 
grip on the world. People will do all that is in their capacity to correct that. 
This is typically the domain of interim management. 
 
So it seems to me that there are five issues of importance in change 
processes: there must be trust (a style), a balance in concrete and abstract 
approaches, the awareness that we ask of people to change their actions 
(unconscious habits) and perceptions (meaning; sense of reality), enough 
time to do that and emotionally appealing purposes (meaning) in a process 
that pays attention to emotions (less rational). ‘Trust’ not only in the 
management but also in the chosen strategy (purposes) or direction (after 
having installed some confidence in people). That strategy or direction as 
heuristic acts will often have been discussed in the Management Team. All 
that has been said so far by the interviewed managers and by me in the 
foregoing chapters comes back in this paragraph. If these five issues are 
not satisfied simultaneously, change processes are in my opinion bound to 
fail with the exception of emergency situations. 
 
It turns out, then, that the concept of ‘resistance to change’ is 
useless, because it ‘blames’ the people who are asked to change their 
(organisational) life fundamentally.  
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 The concept suggests that it is ‘those stupid people’ who do not ‘understand’ 
the necessity of the change and are ‘unwilling’. This attitude denies the 
existential and experiential nature and unity of employees. Or in the words of 
manager 4: it is arrogant, meaning ‘presumptuous’ or ‘to exceed one’s 
authority’ or in the words of manager 1: to persuade is noise. Manager 4 also 
said that if someone is not functioning, he/she as manager is to blame in first 
instance. So there is a sixth issue of importance in change processes. It is the 
attitude of managers towards employees with the accompanying awareness of 
the fundamental request.  
 
Is the listener, who can only be triggered in communication, 
determining what the structure will look like instead of the speaker? In the 
communication process, we said, the listener must not only be prepared or 
interested to listen. The listener must also give the same meaning to what was 
intended by the speaker. If the utterance is misunderstood action will not go 
in the intended direction. Action will go beyond the boundaries of the 
intended playing field. 
In my opinion, also here the middle course must be taken by 
loosening a bit the concept of operational closure, as was discussed in 
chapter 2 with regard to autopoiesis. Like the truth of solipsism cannot be 
denied entirely, it cannot be denied entirely that the speaker as the boss has 
‘an influence on the listener’ or sometimes ‘leaves a lasting impression’ in the 
listener as employee. It sometimes is out of sheer self-interest for the 
employee to listen. My emphasis on the listener was meant to bring home the 
point that what managers say is not automatically heard and properly 
understood by employees as is often thought.  
For instance, in two NSM Master theses on Customer Relation 
Management (CRM) in banking and insurance (2002, 2003), it became clear 
that the failure of these millions swallowed up projects was in communi-
cation. (Middle) managers said in interviews that they communicate trans-
parent with their subordinates. All interviewed employees contest to the 
contrary. Also the wrong word was sometimes attached to employees. The 
purpose of CRM was misunderstood by employees. The sentence says what I 
mean, which is called the container metaphor in appendix 1; it is not always 
understood that way. 
Also, in this thesis relative little attention has been paid to the 
speaking body or body language, in other words to that which has not been 
said but has been understood by the other in phenomenal terms.  
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 It makes clear how complex and difficult the communication process is. 
Yet, most Dutch Bachelor 2nd and 3rd year regular and Higher Vocational 
Education students who studied communication theory before they started 
with management science, say unasked for, that they learned nothing in 
their study. In light of what has been said so far that is for me unbelievable. 
One would say: either there is something wrong with these students or 
there is something wrong with the curriculum of these studies in 
communication. 
 
9.5  The impact 
 
Do I nurse hopes that the insights in this thesis will have an impact 
in organisational theory? Honesty compels me to say: I hope so but I do 
not think so. Why do I hope so? Because it comes down to the humane 
scale, as manager 2 and 4 said. Why do I think not? Three rather unknown 
theories in organisational theory at once that throw overboard many taken-
for-granted viewpoints may be too much. However, many insights are 
confirmed in practice as was seen in the interviews without relaying on or 
referring to these theories by the managers. Does this mean that 
organisational theory is behind the times? My answer is: in some aspects it 
must be and in some aspects it is leading where attention is paid to issues 
as sustainability, emotions, gender and the like, as many of my colleagues 
do.  
In some aspects it must be behind because I would not have 
understood properly the interviewed managers, if I had not studied these 
theories. Or to put it in other words, the gap between what I assumed to 
hear in general and heard in reality would have been too big to absorb in 
the given limited time. They would have to explain too much. Do I now 
mix up what is known in organisational theory and my own ‘mental 
organisational model’? I do not think so because that ‘model’ was also 
formed by the known theories. And some of these theories and 
assumptions turn out to be inadequate, to say the least. That is in my 
opinion the second reason for ‘it must be’. We seem to develop and use 
theories (as dichotomies) the ‘truth’ of which cannot be found back in 
practice. If the outcomes of four at random chosen managers in interviews 
confirm this in different ways, then I think the relatively low number of 
interviews is not relevant anymore (‘find me the black swan’).  
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 So on the one hand the used insights in this thesis are relatively unknown in 
organisational theory and on the other hand some of the theories in 
organisational theory turn out not to be confirmed in practice. Moreover, 
there is no doubt about the ‘quality’ of these managers, both male and 
female. They are highly educated, literate, experienced, successful and they 
manage hundreds to thousands of people. 
The second reason that I have doubts whether these insights will 
have an impact is that I have to admit that these insights relate to a deep, 
‘inner life’. Although this life can be made visible, the insights are by far no 
bite-size chunks and do not origin in a known domain, such as psychology. 
The relevance of these insights has already been discussed in chapter 6 but 
the practical ready-made use is restricted to some general remarks, 
recommendations and warnings. A warning against the inadequateness of 
taken-for-granted views still found in textbooks and on the Internet. If 3rd 
year Bachelor students are asked to write a paper they still today come up 
with ‘internal communication is the exchange of information between a 
sender and a receiver’. A week’s work searching on Internet and visiting the 
library!  If there would be something wrong with the curriculum of the 
communication studies, this thesis could have more impact in the domain of 
communication theory than in the domain of organisational theory. 
But my ‘mental organisational model’ (together with prejudices, who 
knows) has been changed after having worked out the interviews. Also in 
that sense it was a fascinating journey from which at least myself has learned 
a lot. First, what these theories (in combination) tell us. Second, the inner 
drives of managers. Be it more for them selves (the top, excitement) or more 
for others (being of significance, social useful and life work). Third, that this 
dichotomy between the self and the other is a relative one. Fourth, that it is 
possible to more or less predict why managers are supposed to work well 
together in Boards. That has only to do with a part of the layers in their 
worldview. Fifth, that we still know so little. Sixth, there is a link between 
Weltanschauung and structure, which has to be deepened out. So even if this 
thesis has no impact, the project was not ‘good for nothing’. 
 
Related to what was said in other sections one may wonder whether 
it is not time for organisational theory to pay more attention to what Eastern 
insights can learn us. Two managers out of four are interested in Eastern 
insights and deal according to them in practice. Varela et al describe a school 
in Buddhism but the managers did not mention Buddhism.  
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 They mentioned Hinduism, Tao, Krishnamurtri and I Ching. Varela et al 
(1992b, p. 248) state that the Buddhist positive is threatening for the 
Western world. I can imagine they write this; it lines up with Merleau-
Ponty’s ‘companions’, Maturana’s ‘mutual acceptance’ in social systems and 
Weicks’s U.S. premises of egocentrism. It lines up with many quoted 
authors and managers. In short, in Buddhism the attention is on the other 
and the world instead of egoism. Practitioners of meditation in Buddhism 
are in the same way strongly involved in the world as Merleau-Ponty’s 
being-in-the-world. The other comes also back in the inner drives of these 
interviewed managers and in the ideology duality of manager 1, where the 
left and right wing are ‘combined’. Individually orientated is not the same 
as egocentrism. So it is not only theoretical stuff that can easily be brushed 
aside by hard-nosed managers but it actually plays a role in management 
reality. Are we then afraid in organisational theory of being taken for starry-
eyed idealists who we in my opinion merely are not, in paying attention to 
these issues? It directly relates to change processes and the humane scale in 
organisations. In other words, it relates to improvements to be made in 
organisations. I think this is the real dilemma. Are we prepared, like 
manager 4 did with regard to mankind, to say that we somewhere took the 
wrong road? In organisations it is a matter of attitude or style. The 
management should not be egocentric but rather be in service of their 
employees. Within this style managers can pay attention to people in 
change processes. If that change of style can be done with the help of 
Eastern insights, why not or the better.   
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  APPENDIX 1  
 
ON METAPHOR 
 
The underlined words are so-called primitives that will be discussed in this 
appendix later on. 
1.1  The minefield 
 
Mooij (1973) distinguishes with regard to metaphors between 
monistic- and dualistic interpretations. According to Van Dale monistic 
means to assume one principle as an explanation of phenomena. Dualistic 
means to assume two principles as opposed to each other or independent 
of each other. In the foregoing chapters we talked about duality; here we 
are talking about dualism. In the dualistic interpretation it is assumed that 
metaphorically used words also still refer to their literal extension 
(denotation or literal meaning, HL). Dualistic interpretations allow for a 
double reference or double meaning. According to Mooij ‘to refer’ could 
be best described by ‘to draw attention to’ that could include a process of 
suggesting without naming it explicitly. An Arab example of a metaphor is 
‘the death claws’; one has to think for oneself of the predator.  
Monistic interpretations deny these features (Mooij, 1973). One 
could say that the literal meaning of the metaphorically used word gets lost 
one way or another. Monistic are the classical substitution- and 
connotation interpretations. According to the connotation interpretation 
the interpretation of a sentence is based on placing the appropriate or 
relevant components (or aspects, HL) of meaning to the foreground and to 
shield the rest of the components (or aspects) of meaning (Mooij, 1973). 
Among others Beardsley is a representative of the connotation 
interpretation.  
Dualistic are comparison- and interaction interpretations. Among 
others Aristotle and Henle are representatives of the comparison 
interpretation and among others Richards represents the interaction 
interpretation.  
‘Seeing as’ could be regarded as related to the interaction 
interpretation (Mooij, 1973). Other authors have been critical of the 
dualistic interpretations. The comparison interpretation would disregard 
the contrast working in metaphors.  
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 The interaction interpretation would unnecessarily deny resemblance and 
analogy, whereby Richards’ explanations would be unsatisfactory due to 
contradictions (Mooij, 1973). The explanation of a metaphor Morgan (1992) 
gives, ‘A is seen as B’, is correct but seems to be too simple. Mooij seems to 
advocate the dualistic interpretation, whereas Ricoeur integrates the two 
dualistic positions. According to Searle there is no single principle or rule 
with regard to metaphor but rather various steps and principles. He alleges 
there must even be more principles. So entering the field of metaphor is 
entering a minefield.  
 
1.2  Words do not only matter, they do dream. 
 
According to Mooij, shortly summarized, a word or expression W in 
a sentence S is used metaphorically when there is a subject of discourse such 
that which is said about that (would be said!) with the assistance of W on the 
ground of its literal meaning and the context, is absurd, irrelevant or untrue, 
whereas still the sentence S has an usable content. Mooij recognizes this 
notion is workable, although it is still too comprised. We could say this is 
nothing else than Searle’s first step. For Searl the speaker says ‘S’ is ‘P’ when 
he means ‘S’ is ‘R’, like Sally ‘S’ is a block of ice ‘P’; Sally is unemotional, cold 
‘R’. 
 
Aristotle gave a definition of metaphor: metaphor consists in giving 
the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either 
from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species 
or on ground of analogy (Ricoeur, 1978). There is no need here to be 
drowned in Aristotle’s philosophy. Apart from one concept, called ‘lexis’. 
Poetics means according to Ricoeur the art of composing poems, principally 
tragic poems. According to Alvesson & Sköldberg (2001) poetics is the study 
of literature, not to be confused with poetry, which can constitute one of the 
objects of study. The Van Dale dictionary points more in Ricoeur’s direction. 
Ricoeur states the duality of rhetoric – saying it well, persuasion, HL - and 
poetics reflects a duality in the use of speech as well as the situations of 
speaking. […] So now we are back in the duality stance. Poetics, as far as its 
function and its situation of speaking are concerned, does not depend on 
rhetoric, the art of defence, of deliberation, of blame and of praise. Poetry is 
not oratory. Persuasion is not its aim […] Metaphor, however, has a foot in 
each domain. So metaphor is a duality of poetic (composing poems) and 
rhetoric (persuasion; saying it well).  
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 Metaphor will […] have a unique structure but two functions: a rhetorical 
function and a poetic function. The poetic function means the ways in 
which we perceive the world. According to Ricoeur, the metaphorical 
expressions ‘speak of the world, even though they may not do so in a 
descriptive fashion, but at a deeper level. Here we are back on familiar 
ground. How we perceive the world at a deeper level comes nearby 
Weltanschauung. Metaphor is placed under the same rubric of lexis, a word 
difficult to translate […]; for the present, Ricoeur says simply that the word 
has to do with the whole field of language-expression […] whose function 
is to make discourse appear to the senses; to make visible. […] This idea of 
virtues of ‘lexis’ is so important […] those that concern metaphor most 
directly are: ‘clarity’, ‘warmth’ opposed to coldness, ‘facility’ (talent, HL), 
‘appropriateness’ (in the sense of harmony, HL) and above all, ‘urbanity’ or 
‘elegance’. Metaphor, he [Aristotle, HL] says, sets the scene before our eyes 
(Ricoeur, 1978). Harmony and elegance come back in the questionnaire 
with regard to Weltanschauung. In the objective idealism the world is 
viewed as an object to be appreciated aesthetically, the world as a universal 
harmony. 
 
Ricoeur gives many more descriptions of metaphor, like the same 
operates in spite of the difference. Or a metaphor is a sentence or another 
expression in which some words are used metaphorically while the 
remainder are used non-metaphorically. Like in the sentence ‘the chairman 
ploughed through the discussion’. This trait provides us with a criterion that 
distinguishes metaphor from proverb, in which all the words are used 
metaphorically. Proverbs will be discussed in Appendix 2. In ‘If you play 
with fire you get burnt’ ‘playing with fire’ in the literal meaning nobody 
does; not even a pyromaniac. He sets something in fire and the fire brigade 
extinguishes the fire. Neither is playing with the fire. ‘You get burned’ is 
also not used in the literal meaning. 
The word ‘ploughed’ is called the ‘focus’; the remainder of the 
sentence is called ‘frame’ (Ricoeur, 1978). So we experience a situation – a 
chairman fighting his way through a discussion, which is the original idea - 
and ‘see this as’ ploughing, the way a farmer makes his way with difficulty 
through the landscape. Gordon (1961) gives the example ‘the ship ploughs 
over the sea’; the ship’s prow is like a plough and the wave pattern of the 
sea is like the furrowed pattern of ploughed ground. The whole motion of 
the ship is associated with the purposiveness implied by ploughing. 
Would not every pair of thoughts condensed in a single expression 
constitute a metaphor? Ricoeur asks himself.  
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 The two thoughts in metaphor are somehow disrupted, in this sense, that we 
describe one through the features of the other. Richards (interaction 
interpretation) suggests that we call the underlying idea the ‘tenor’ (the 
original idea) and that ‘vehicle’ (the borrowed idea) is the name of the idea 
under whose sign the first idea is apprehended. The metaphor is not the 
vehicle alone, but the whole made up of the two halves (Ricoeur, 1978). 
Searle (1981, p. 91) rejects these concepts. The tenor-vehicle pair completely 
ignores the distinction between literal and metaphorical meaning. 
The sole criterion of metaphor is that the word presents two ideas at once; 
that it comprises at once both tenor and vehicle in interaction. In still other 
words, every word that gives us two ideas at once is a metaphor (Ricoeur, 
1978). “And that, I take it, is what Dr. Johnson meant when he said 
metaphor gives us two ideas for one” (Searle,1981,  p. 116). 
Does the relationship between tenor and vehicle belong necessarily to 
the order of comparison? Ricoeur proceeds. To compare, maintains 
Richards, is always to connect things. The mind is a connecting organ, it 
works only by connecting and it can connect any two things in an indefinitely 
large number of different ways. Sometimes a whole poem is needed for the 
mind to invent or find a meaning; but always the mind makes connections. 
Our world, says Richards, is a projected world, shot through with characters 
lent to it from our own life […] the exchanges between the meanings of 
words which we study in explicit verbal metaphors are superimposed upon a 
perceived world which itself is a product of earlier or unwitting (unconscious, 
HL) metaphor (Ricoeur, 1978). The compelling aspect of metaphor is not 
[…] the mental image itself, but the way in which the image reaches into the 
subjective terrain of unconscious experience’ (Kranz, 1990 in Oswick & 
Grant). That unconscious experience is Merleau-Ponty’s perception on the 
pre-reflective level. However, this time it is limited to the use of words. Sense 
making is broader than just words. That is one of the reasons Weick is right 
in my opinion in stating sense making is no metaphor. But metaphor can be 
part of sense making like any interpretative act. 
The word ‘superimposed’ is for an ex TV-cameraman interesting. In 
television terms it means that two or more pictures (images) are combined in 
a single picture. Normally the pictures (images) are aesthetically composi-
tional ugly, but combined they can make up a beautiful picture. Instead of 
individualistic work it becomes teamwork because you need the cooperation 
of more cameras. There is a need to see the combined picture on a monitor, 
the other cameras can be imposed on your viewer (and vice versa) or a 
director must guide the operation.  
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 Anyhow, some guidance is necessary. That relates to the remark of Kranz. 
It seems in the case of metaphor the guidance is the internal structure of a 
good metaphor itself. 
‘Seeing as’ is the positive link between vehicle and tenor. According 
to Ricoeur (1978), in poetic metaphor the metaphorical vehicle is as the 
tenor, from one point of view, not from all points of view. To explicate a 
metaphor is to enumerate all the appropriate senses in which the vehicle is 
‘seen as’ the tenor. The ‘seeing as’ is the intuitive relationship that makes 
the sense and image hold together (Ricoeur 1978). Although Searle (1981) 
rejects the vehicle and tenor idea, his step two confirms to a large extent 
this description if ‘appropriate’ is substituted by ‘well-known’.  
With Wittgenstein the ‘seeing as’ concerns neither metaphor nor 
even imagination, at least in his relation to language. Considering 
ambiguous figures – like the one that can be seen as a duck or a rabbit - 
Wittgenstein remarks that it is one thing to say ‘I see this…’ and another to 
say ‘I see this as…’ And Wittgenstein adds: ‘seeing it as…’ is having this 
image. The link between ‘seeing as’ and imagining appears more clearly 
when we go to the imperative mood, where, for example, one might say 
‘Imagine this’, ‘Now see the figure as this’. Will this be regarded as a 
question of interpretation? No, says Wittgenstein, because to interpret is to 
form a hypothesis that one can verify. There is no hypothesis here, nor any 
verification. One says, quite directly. ‘It’s a rabbit’. The ‘seeing as’, therefore, is 
half thought and half experience. 
 
Thinking in poetry is a picture-thinking. Now this ‘pictoral’ capacity 
of language consists also in ‘seeing an aspect’. To read a metaphor is to 
establish a relationship such that X is like Y in some senses, but not in all. 
It is true that the transfer from Wittgenstein’s analysis to metaphor 
introduces an important change (Ricoeur, 1978). In the case of an 
ambiguous figure, there is a Gestalt (a meaningful whole or a whole we 
regard more fundamental than the parts) B that allows a figure A or 
another figure C to be seen. Thus the problem is, given B, to construct A 
or C. I refer to what Husserl said (and Sally can be cold or slippery) and 
these are the well-known features in Searle’s second step. In the case of 
metaphor, A and C are given in reading, they are the tenor and vehicle. 
What must be constructed is the common element B, the Gestalt, namely, the 
point of view in which A and C are similar’ (Ricoeur, 1978). This is the 
second reason Weick is right at the outset of Chapter 3. That ‘common 
element’ is also the important factor in proverbs. There it is called the 
‘general idea or proverb idea’.  
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 And we came across it in section 3.7 with regard to association, the implicit 
common term.  
‘Seeing as’ is an intuitive experience-act by which one selects from 
the quasi-sensory mass of imagery one has on reading metaphor the relevant 
aspects of such imagery (Ricoeur, 1978). The ‘quasi-sensory mass of imagery’ 
is interpreted by me as we do not see rather imagine as mental acts. We can 
have an image while closing our eyes. ‘Seeing as’ is an experience and an act 
at one and the same time. On the one hand, the mass of images is beyond all 
voluntary control; the image arises, occurs, and there is no rule to be learned 
for ‘having images’. One sees or one does not see. The intuitive talent for 
‘seeing as’ cannot be taught. At most it can be assisted as when one is helped 
to see the rabbit’s eye in the ambiguous figure. On the other hand ‘seeing as’ 
is an act. To understand is to do something. The image is not free but tied. In this 
way the experience-act of ‘seeing as’ ensures that imagery is implicated in 
metaphorical signification: the same imagery that occurs also means. Thus, the 
‘seeing as’ activated in reading ensures the joining of verbal meaning with 
imagistic fullness. And this conjunction is no longer something outside 
language, since it can be reflected as a relationship. ‘Seeing as’ contains a 
ground, a foundation, that is, precisely resemblance – no longer the 
resemblance between two ideas, but that very resemblance the ‘seeing as’ 
establishes. ‘Seeing as’ defines the resemblance and not the reverse. The priority of 
‘seeing as’ over the resemblance relationship is proper to the language game 
in which meaning functions (Ricoeur, 1978). So the common element in 
metaphor is not the resemblance of two ideas but rather the defined 
resemblance or the tied image by ‘seeing as’. That is the third reason Weick is 
right. That is why the ‘seeing as’ can succeed or fail. It can fail as in forced 
metaphors, because they are inconsistent or fortuitous. And in the case of the 
contrary, as in banal and commonplace metaphors. And succeed as in those 
that fashion the surprise of discovery. Thanks to its character as half thought 
and half experience it joins the light of sense with the fullness of the image. 
In this way, the non-verbal [the image, HL] and the verbal are firmly united at 
the core of the image-ing function of language. The poem gives birth to the image. 
The poetic image ‘becomes’ a new being in our language, expressing us by 
making us what it expresses. In other words, it is at once a becoming of 
expression and a becoming of our being. Here expression creates being…one 
would not be able to mediate in a zone that preceded language. What was ‘a 
new being in language’ becomes ‘an increment to consciousness’ or better a 
‘growth in being’. And so, one must attest: ‘Yes, words really do dream’ 
(Ricoeur, 1978). 
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 Here are striking similarities with what has been said in chapter 2 
and 3. ‘Growth in being’ and ‘the inextricable going together of our being, 
our doing and our knowing seen as effective action’. Language forms us in 
a continual process of becoming, Maturana & Varela said. It is also the 
imaging function of language; the joint tied image and verbal meaning. We 
normally speak about the expressive capacity of a writer. But I would again 
add the writer or speaker cannot ‘instruct’ the reader or listener to see the 
image. The latter will be triggered. The tied image must then refer to the 
listener or reader who sees or sees not. With regard to sense making we 
said the more selves we have the more sense we can make out of a 
situation. With regard to metaphor it seems the more experiences we have 
had the more images we can have. 
 
In the interaction interpretation the double reference is also being 
accepted. Here the relation between both situations is not described as a 
case of resemblance or image (Mooij, 1973). That what is known about a 
secondary subject is being projected on the primary subject. In this way the 
metaphor selects, emphasizes, surpresses and organizes features of the  
principle subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the 
subsidiary subject (Mooij, 1973).  
 
1.3 Iconicity of meaning 
 
Ricoeur (1978) asks himself whether the tenor-vehicle is not the 
same sort of mixture that the iconicity of meaning presents. Ricoeur (1978) 
points to Henle who introduced the iconic character that specify 
metaphors. According to Mooij (1973) and Elgin (1997), it was Peirce who 
introduced the iconic sign. However, in this context Mooij has wrong-foot 
me in his explanation. Elgin wants to ‘unmix Peirce’s blessing’. Her 
concern is with how we should understand signs, not with how we should 
understand Peirce (1997, p. 137). 
 
According to Elgin (1997), a sign’s status as icon, index or symbol 
derives from its mode of reference. Icons refer to resemblance. A portrait 
is considered an icon, because its reference is secured by its likeness to its 
subject (1997, p. 137). Portraits are obvious examples of icons, so it is easy 
to conclude that resemblance grounds representation. You should be able 
to tell what an icon refers to just by looking.  
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 We understand a picture then when we can tell what it looks like (1997, p. 
138). The difficulty is that resemblances and natural correlations are 
ubiquitous (1997, p. 139). Something is an icon only if it functions as such. 
But icons require more: a non-conventional hook to their referents. 
Exemplification is the mode of reference that links a sample to what it is a 
sample of. Exemplification requires reference as well as instantiation (1997, 
p. 140). “What I want to suggest is that to refer to an object via a feature is to 
refer to it by means of a referential chain that has the exemplification of that 
feature as an intermediate link” (1997, p. 141). We need to invoke a 
secondary extension in addition to its primary extension. A denoting symbol 
has a number of secondary extensions. The primary extension of ‘house’ 
consists of houses. One secondary extension consists of house owners, being 
a compound of ‘house’ (p. 141).  Secondary extensions are extensions of 
compounds containing the symbol. Some of a symbol’s secondary extensions 
depend on its primary extensions; others do not (1997, p. 142). 
 
“Santa-Claus-pictures cannot exemplify features their object shares, 
for they have no subject. […] Santa-Claus-pictures can no more resemble 
their object than they can exemplify features of it. […] We saw that a work 
qualifies as a Santa-Claus-picture on account of its secondary, not its primary 
extension. It qualifies […] because it is appropriately related, not to Santa-
Claus, but to other Santa-Claus-representations. Similarly, I suggest, it 
qualifies as a Santa-Claus-icon because a suitably configured referential chain 
links it to that secondary extension. More precisely, a Santa-Clause-icon is a 
member of the class of Santa-Claus-representations that refers to the 
membership of that class by exemplifying features some other members also 
exemplify” (1997, p. 142-143). Here we see again the importance of the 
concept of classification in understanding. It is conventional but not always 
in the same way.  
 
“Since the referential link to (Santa-Claus, HL) himself is a matter of 
convention, a work’s infidelity to fact does not impugn its status as icon” (p. 
144). Here we see the same phenomenon as what Searle called mythology. 
We accept something to be true while we know it is false. Candidates for 
joint exemplification of Santa-Claus include features like being portrayed as 
jolly, chubby, white-haired and gift bearing. But these particular intermediate 
links are not necessary and not always sufficient to complete the referential 
chain. “Evidently no general rules specify what sorts of features an icon must 
exemplify” (1997, p. 144). Interpretation is required to fix each link in a 
referential chain.  
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 “Having features in common is not enough. Exemplification requires 
reference as well. […] The links must be connected” (1997, p. 145). Words 
and natural signs may function as icons as well. One speaker may refer 
iconically to another by mimicking his style of speech (1997, p. 146). Icons 
are a delicate and sometimes difficult business, as Elgin concludes. There is 
no talk of simple and easy grasping. 
 
The essential role of the icon is to contain an internal duality that at 
the same time is overcome. We are led by figurative discourse to think of 
something by a consideration of something like it and this is what 
constitutes the iconic mode of signifying. It is a rule for pinpointing an 
object or situation. Subsequently it functions iconically, by indirectly 
designating another, similar situation (Ricoeur, 1978). We have seen, 
according to Elgin, there are no general rules. I am inclined to go along 
with Elgin because of the clarity and simplicity of her arguments and 
explanations. 
 
With regard to a rule for pinpointing Mooij (1973) argues, 
according to Henle, there is a reference on the ground of the literal 
meaning of the metaphorically used words to a situation that function as 
image for another situation. And the metaphorically used word refers, 
besides directly and literally to the first situation indirectly and figuratively 
to the second. Via the image that in turn is an iconic sign the second 
situation is reached also indirectly. In a metaphorical passage, according to 
Henle, some terms refer literally to one situation and figuratively to the 
second while other terms refer literally only and refer to the second only.  
The first mentioned terms are metaphorically used terms; the last 
mentioned terms are being used literally and refer directly to the subject of 
discourse (Mooij, 1973).  Icons are also no image; they might refer to 
pictures and portraits. Ricoeur states this explicitly and Elgin implicitly. 
Indeed, metaphor is a minefield full of misunderstandings.   
Precisely because the iconic representation is not an image it can 
point to original resemblances, whether of structure, situation or feeling. It 
is resemblance that allows us to function in new situations. If metaphor 
adds nothing to the description of the world, at least it adds to the ways in 
which we perceive and this is the poetic function of metaphor. This still 
rests upon resemblance, but at the level of feelings (Ricoeur, 1978).  
A symbol is according to the Stewardship and Elgin (1997) a sign, 
whose association between perceptual paradigm and other concept is one 
of convention. 
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 ‘In symbolizing – in the sense of conventional sign - one situation by means 
of another, metaphor ‘infuses’ the feelings attached to the symbolizing 
situation into the heart of the situation that is symbolized. In its poetic 
function, therefore, metaphor extends the power of double meaning from 
the cognitive realm to the affective or on the cognitive plane itself (Ricoer, 
1978). It is the ‘clash’ on the literal level that leads one to seek out a meaning 
beyond the lexical meaning; while the context allows one to maintain the 
literal sense of certain terms, it prevents one from doing so for others. 
However, metaphor is not quite the clash itself, but rather its resolution 
(decision, HL). One must decide, on the basis of various ‘clues’ provided by the 
context, which terms can be taken figuratively and which cannot. One must 
therefore ‘work out’ the parallelism between situations that will guide the 
iconic transportation of one to the other.  
This activity has become useless in the case of conventional 
metaphors, where cultural usage decides on the figurative sense of certain 
expressions. It is only in living metaphors that one sees this activity at work’. 
In effect ‘seeing as’ orders the flux and governs iconic deployment. The 
priority of ‘seeing as’ over the resemblance relationship is proper to the 
language game, in which meaning functions in an iconic manner (Ricoeur, 
1978). Based on what has been said so far I do not think this statement of 
Ricoeur is correct because iconic representation is not an image. I think the 
best description of the usefulness of metaphor comes from Elgin (1997, p. 
69): Metaphor is a device for breaking through conceptual barriers. 
 
1.4 The conceptual system 
 
According to Lakoff & Johnson (1999) the essence of a metaphor is 
understanding and experiencing something – called a concept - on the basis 
of something else, also called a concept. A concept is metaphorical: for 
instance the concept ‘discussion’ and the conceptual metaphor ‘discussion is 
war’. With metaphor Lakoff & Johnson mean metaphorical concept. There 
exist systematical relations between metaphorical expressions in our language 
and metaphorical concepts. We are neither always aware of these patterns 
nor of their metaphorical nature in this coherent – well matched, HL - 
system. We also exist in metaphors. Be it that the conceptual system with which 
we think, experience and act is not identical for each individual. It emanates 
to a large extent from our physical and (sub) cultural experiences. 
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 Lakoff & Johnson (1999) argue precisely the principle through 
which we understand an aspect of the one concept on the basis of another 
concept makes that other aspects of the one concept remain hidden. These 
are called structure metaphors. ‘The metaphor determines only a part of 
the structure of an every day concept and this structure can be found in our 
ordinary usage of language. If we experience the concept ‘discussion’ as 
‘discussion is war’ we deny that discussion could also be experienced as 
‘constructive’ or ‘valuable’. If we look at structure metaphors of the form 
‘A is B’ we see that the defining concept B is clearer defined and more 
concrete than the defined concept A. Moreover there is more in the 
defining concept than is transferred to the defined concept. In the 
metaphor ‘ideas are food’ we talk about unripe ideas, but there are no 
roasted or grilled ideas. Basic or fundamental domains of experience are 
true-to-nature sorts of experience as the products of our bodies and 
interactions with our physical environment and other people within our 
culture. We have said enough about that. 
The following concepts as defined concepts represent true-to-nature 
sorts of experience: love, time, ideas, understanding, discussion, labour, 
happiness, health, control, status, moral etc. These concepts require a 
definition, because they are not clearly enough outlined in order to satisfy 
our daily functioning. Concepts that are defining other concepts are also true-
to-nature sorts of experience: ways of bodily orientation, objects, 
substances, seeing, journeys, war etc. The defining concepts are only 
conceptually better structured (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
For our purposes it is interesting to note that ‘labour’, ‘control’, 
‘status’ and ‘moral’ are defined concepts. We could add to the list for 
instance ‘power’. So it turns out many concepts in organization & 
management are concepts conceptually less structured. Concrete this 
means we can ‘show’ or bring to the foreground any aspect of it we like 
with the help of a more structured concept.  
 
Metaphorical concepts can also be stretched out beyond the reach 
of the usual literal ways of thinking and speaking. In that case we enter the 
domain of what is called metaphorical, poetic or highly imaginative 
thinking and use of language. Literal expressions (theory as foundation) 
and imaginative expressions (baroque theory) can be part of the general 
metaphor ‘theory as a building’.  
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 There are three kinds of imaginative types: 
- Extending the used part of the metaphor; 
- Using the unused part; 
- Using a new metaphor. 
Each type falls outside the used part of a metaphorical concept that shapes 
our ordinary conceptual system.  
 
Another type of metaphors, orientation metaphors, arranges a whole 
of concepts. These emanate from our physical and (sub) cultural experience. 
Orientation metaphors assign a concept a place or direction in space, like 
‘happiness is above’. In a NRC review (01.05.2002) of K. Devlin’s book ‘The 
Math Gene’ is stated Devlin regards mathematical thinking as an amalgam of 
nine skills, that our ancestors made themselves familiar with in order to 
survive hundreds of thousand years ago: a feel for numbers, counting, special 
insight, a feel for causality, putting things in logical order, working with 
algorithms, abstract thinking, reasoning logically and putting things in 
relation. Special insight lies at the core of these orientation metaphores. 
According to Lakoff & Núñez, mathematics grows on the basis of 
metaphors derived from daily life. The reader ‘is bowled over’, as the article 
goes, after reading their 70 pages explanation of Euler’s comparison.  
 
Lakoff & Johnson state that the intuitive attraction of a scientific 
theory has to do with the extent to which her metaphors link up with 
someone’s experience. For myself I can only agree to this statement. The 
theory of organisational cybernetics attracted me among other things by 
means of the concepts ’freedom’ and ‘autonomy & cohesion’. What was 
freedom more than the rather unconvincing ‘your freedom ends where it 
touches mine’? For theories, like ‘readings’ of organizations, are 
interpretations of reality (Morgan, 1992). Morgan encourages us to use as 
many metaphors as possible because then we come to see different aspects 
of organizations simultaneously. 
 
According to Lakoff & Johnson (1999)  we do not know much about 
the foundations of metaphors. The word ‘is’ in ‘more is above’- orientation 
by way of the distinction ‘above’ and ‘down under’ - should be regarded as 
short for a collection of experiences. However, fundamental values in a 
culture are coherent with the metaphorical arrangement of the fundamental 
concepts in that culture.  
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 Subcultures can have other priorities, but the fundamental values are at the 
top. This they illustrate by ‘more is above’ in our Western society, which 
could be God for a Trappist and money for a businessman.  
To be more specific here, Spinoza et al (1997) argue the goods and 
values that form the basis of national solidarity, however, have a different 
hold on us. They are transformed in our recognizing that we care for them 
in their interrelatedness as the goods and values that make us who we are. 
We distinguish such goods and values by calling them concerns. Concerns 
are constituted in our daily practices as the basis of our identity as members 
of a community. […] Concerns, then, bridge the two (subjective and 
objective values, HL) traditional distinctions’. […] In multicultural civil 
democracies in the West citizens agree on the substantive concerns of a 
nation’. Also following Havel they list these concerns such as respect for 
the uniqueness and the freedom of each human being, a civic society with 
the rule of law and equality of opportunity. […] The ordering of the 
concerns is a matter for politics, while holding a shared set of concerns as 
one’s own is a matter for solidarity’ (Spinosa e.a., 1997).  
Thus our fundamental values in the Dutch culture are at the top of 
our conceptual system. These values have been fathomed by Hofstede 
(1980). More feminist (in the sense of caring) than masculine, a relative low 
uncertainty avoidance, a relative low power distant, a relatively high score 
on individualism and a long term orientation. These values are more related 
to transformational organizing than to the traditional, positional organizing. 
Yet, the traditional, positional way of organizing still runs rampant. This 
seemingly mismatch has ever puzzled me and I also hope to find out more 
about it in this thesis. The Weltanschauungen of the interviewed managers 
in chapter 8 have much in common with the mentioned values. They are 
certainly not on the traditional, Positional side. So these mangers are either 
not representative for the management population (in the care sector) in 
the Netherlands or the supposition ‘still runs rampant’ must be strongly 
weakened. More extensive research must give the answer in my opinion. I 
have found our more about the seemingly mismatch but I still do not have 
the answer. 
Another question is whether Hofstede’s findings are still valid 
today. First, it is long ago Hofstede did his research. Second, the Dutch 
society has changed since then. A city like Amsterdam counts 173 
nationalities at the moment. In Amsterdam 8 ethnic groups can be 
distinguished of which the Dutch form the biggest group with 55%.  
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 Can we still talk about a culture with a mix of shared concerns? If so it must 
have to do with a historical awareness that forms our identity and with more 
or less speaking the same language. Furthermore, concerns such as respect 
for the uniqueness and freedom of people are of a different order than the 
cultural dimensions mentioned by Hofstede. These concerns have a universal 
character in which any human being should be able to recognize himself.   
 
Our experience with physical objects (in particular our bodies) 
provides the basis for a variety of ontological metaphors. These are ways of 
observing events, activities, states, emotions, ideas as entities and substances. 
Ontological metaphors answer various purposes, like dealing with 
experiences rationally, referring to and making something measurable or 
quantifiable. Orientation metaphors and ontological metaphors are not 
recognized as such because they are used for very restrict purposes. In the 
metaphor ‘mind is a machine’ we say ‘I have difficulty getting into my stride 
today’. An extension of these metaphors are container metaphors. Here we 
can distinguish between a container object (like a bath) and a container 
substance (like bath water). 
 
Another type of metaphors is personification. A concept like 
‘inflation’ is viewed as ‘inflation is an opponent’. In doing so it makes way to 
all kind of unpopular economical and/or political measures. Here the 
proverb is appropriate ‘if the world will be gulled, let it be gulled’. It is easy to 
see that the choice of the defining concept, here ‘opponent’, can manipulate 
worldviews. ‘Within personification there is a figure of speech in which we 
use an entity to refer to another entity that is related in a special way. This is 
called metonymics and it includes also representing a part for a whole, like a 
face for a person. Our experience with physical objects provides the 
foundation for metonymics. We usually conceptualize the non-physical with 
the physical. It is possible to have equal sorts of basic experiences, while the 
formed concepts are unequal basic. Compare ‘in a room’, ‘in a social group’ 
and ‘in an emotional state.’ Metaphors and metonymics are distinguished 
from each other, because they are based on different processes. A metaphor 
is based on understanding. Metonymics are based on a referencial function, 
although also on understanding secondary. Within metaphors there is a 
distinction between metaphors that are coherent and metaphors that are 
consistent. Consistent means compatable in a single picture. Within coherent 
metaphors the purpose of using the metaphor – to emphasize an aspect - 
plays the most important role’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
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 There are concepts that manifest it self to us directly (like ‘above 
and down under’, objects and substances) and metaphorical concepts, that 
manifest itself on the basis of our experience (like an activity is a 
container). However, these are no distinguishable categories. Even a so 
fundamental concept as causality is according to Lakoff & Johnson neither 
pure direct nor pure metaphorical. It looks more like the concept has a 
kernel coming out directly, which is worked out further by means of 
metaphors. They suggest cause and effect could be best regarded as a 
gestalt, based on human experience. Gestalt is a collection of components. 
Although activities can be different – switching on the light or opening a 
door - an overwhelmingly part has characteristics in common what they 
call a prototypical or paradigmatical case of direct causality. This collection 
of characteristics (a plan, control, a motorial program) characterizes the 
prototypical direct manipulation. We have at our disposal concepts that are 
at the same time basic, holistic and endlessly parseble. 
 
What makes a conversation a discussion? In both structural 
dimensions can be distinguished like participants, parts, stadia, lineair 
sequences, causality and purpose. To interpret a conversation as a 
discussion means one is able to place a multidimensional structure of a part 
of the concept ‘war’ above the corresponding structure of the concept 
‘conversation’. Such multidimensional structures characterize gestalts, 
based on human experience. These are ways of arranging experiences in 
structured wholes. In the metaphor ‘discussion is war’ the gestalt for 
conversation gets further structure by means of the similarities with 
elements selected from the gestalt for war. The one activity, talking, is 
understood on the basis of the other, physical fight. Because we structure 
our experience on the basis of similar multidimensional gestalts we make 
our experience coherent. In turn the dimensions are defined on the basis of 
directly occurring concepts. This means the various dimensions are 
categories that emerge from our experience in a natural way. Our concepts 
of objects, like our concepts of events and activities, are multidimensional 
gestalts, of which the dimensions (perceptual properties, motility 
properties, purpose properties etc) come to the fore in a natural way out of 
our experience in the world. The difference between a gun and an imitation 
gun is that certain dimension properties are preserved and others not. The 
important point here is that these properties are not inherent properties of 
a gun. These properties origin from what was called true-to-nature sorts of experience, 
our bodies and interactions.  
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 When more than one metaphor structure a concept, the various 
structures put in by metaphors match in general well in a coherent way. A 
specialized concept of the concept ‘discussion’ is ‘rational discussion’. The 
restrictions belonging to a specialized concept require that we pay special 
attention to certain aspects of a discussion, that are not important or even 
absent in a rational discussion, such as content, proceedings, structure, 
power, basis, clearness, directness and transparency. The concept 
‘conversation’ and the metaphor ‘discussion is war’ do not aim at these 
aspects that are crucial for a ‘rational discussion’. From this follows the 
concept ‘rational discussion’ is further defined with the assistance of other 
metaphors, which enable us to concentrate on these important aspects: a 
rational discussion is a journey, a container and a building. None of these 
satisfy separately a complete, consistent and understandable insight, but 
together they enable us to get a coherent insight in what a ‘rational 
discussion’ is.  
 
An example of ‘a rational discussion is a journey’ is ‘we have reached 
an alarming conclusion’. A journey describes a route. ‘He is strayed from his 
path’. Routes are being interpreted as surfaces. Now we can do the following: 
 
The facts with regard to travelling: 
 
A journey describes a route 
The route of a journey is a surface 
 
The metaphorical implications: 
 
A rational discussion is a journey 
A journey describes a route 
--------------------------------------- 
A rational discussion describes a route. 
 
A rational discussion is a journey 
The route of a journey is a surface 
-------------------------------------- 
The route of a rational discussion is a surface.  
 
The brought in implications by the metaphor indicate the internal 
systematics of the metaphor ‘a rational discussion is a journey’.  
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 They make all examples belonging to that metaphor coherent. When we 
want to talk about the content we use the metaphor ‘a rational discussion is 
a container’. Containers can be regarded as things that demarcate a 
restricted space and contain a substance. We say ‘it was a discussion 
without content’. There can also be an overlap in the journey- and 
container metaphors, like ‘if we continue this way, we will be able to fit in 
all data’. If the discussion covers more terrain (via the journey surface) it 
gets more content (via the container surface). The overlap between these 
metaphors is the creation of a surface as time goes. It is this overlap of 
implications that determines the coherence between these metaphors. 
None of these metaphors can do the work alone. They are aiming at 
different aspects, being different purpose. There is no metaphor with 
which we simultaneously get a grip on both the direction and the content 
of the discussion. And for so far the purposes cannot be mixed, the 
metaphors cannot be mixed. This is called the (not-) allowed mix of 
metaphors. We cannot talk about ‘the direction of the content’ of a 
discussion nor of ‘the content of the direction’ of a discussion. So we get 
no sentences like: 
 
The content of the discussion goes by as follows; 
The direction of your reasoning is not substantial. 
 
The same mechanisms play a role in complex examples. This complexity 
has two causes: 
-  Often there are many metaphors that determine the structure of one 
      single concept; 
-  When we treat one concept we use other concepts which themselves  
 are being understood on the basis of metaphors, which leads to a 
 further overlap of metaphors. 
 
Lackof & Johnson (1999) state we categorize objects on the basis 
of prototypes. A prototypical chair has a clearly determined back, seat, four 
legs and (as desired) two arms. In English more than in Dutch, these 
attributes directly refer to the human body. Non-prototypical chairs are for 
instance deck chairs and folding chairs. We interpret non-prototypical 
chairs as chairs, not as such, but due to their relationship with the 
prototypical chair. 
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 For human beings categorizing is primarily a tool to understand the outside 
world. Flexibility is the key word here. This class of prototypes is called 
‘organization’ by Maturana & Varela (1989), although their concept 
emphasizes more the relationships between the back, seat, legs and arms. The 
non-prototypical chairs show enough ‘family resemblance’ with the proto-
typical. Interactional properties are prominent under the sorts of properties 
that relate to family resemblance. Categories can be stretched up in divergent 
ways for divergent purposes. There are hedges – modificators - that choose 
the prototype for the categories and determine the various sorts of 
resemblance with the prototype, like ‘pre-eminently’, ‘taken strictly’, ‘speaking 
freely’ and ‘a real…’ 
 
A difference in form in a sentence can have a subtile difference in 
meaning. That is given by the metaphor as an ordinary part of our conceptual 
system ‘nearness is strength of the effect’, whereby nearness is applicable to 
syntax – the order of words - in a sentence, while strength is applicable to 
semantics – sense or meaning - of a sentence. Also ‘nearby is first’ is part of 
our conceptual system. We say ‘good and bad’ instead of the other way 
around. However, in English we say ‘more or less’ and in Dutch ‘less or 
more’. Here we can speak of a different orientation. Maybe this has to do 
with the Dutch sparing nature; ‘Going Dutch’. For the rest the Dutch 
translation of Lakoff & Johnson’s book shows a cross-linguistic validity of 
the statements, as Steen concludes in his comment in the book. Steen is also 
right in my opinion where he states Lakoff & Johnson’s work is more a 
demonstration of an approach than a precise explanation of a method. His 
questions concentrate on marking off on concepts; in my words as a ‘meta 
container’ concept. 
 
Elaborating a bit further on metaphors and the conceptual system 
means certain laws in the visual arts have to be complied with or can be 
stretched up. ‘A form is a power field, that radiates energy’, ‘We can not 
“read” pictures without orientation’, ‘Distance between power fields does 
increase the visual weight’ and ‘Horizontals have properties as female and 
calm’ (Arnheim, 1988). Orientation in film or video editing with regard to 
viewpoint is essential. If someone goes ‘beyond the axis’ – an imaginary line - 
we get confused. Lakoff & Johnson pay some attention to aesthetical 
experience, where they state the metaphor is not only a language issue. It is a matter 
of conceptual structure. All natural dimensions of our experience play a role in our 
conceptual system, including colour, form and sound. 
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 Truth means for many philosophers often an objective, absolute truth 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). According to Lakoff & Johnson we can only 
speak of truths. Truth relates to understanding the sentence and the 
situation. In a sentence like ‘the fog (as an entity, which it isn’t) is located 
before (an orientation) the mountain (as an entity, which has no front or 
back; that is culturally determined)’ the truth of that sentence is related to 
the normal way we understand the world by projecting an orientation- and 
entity structure. In general the true utterances we make are based on the 
way we categorize things and so on what is being emphasized by the 
natural dimensions, like perception, motorial activity, function, purpose 
and history. Each true utterance omits what has been trivialized or left out 
by the used categories. True utterances on the basis of human categories do 
not as a rule express properties of objects as such, rather inter-actional 
properties which are only meaningful in relation to the human functioning. 
Moreover a sentence normally evokes a gestalt in the sense of a context, 
which calls up more than is meant by the sentence. 
 
Truth is a function of our conceptional system. We understand an 
utterance as true in a given situation when:  
- our understanding of the utterance 
-  fits  
-  with the understanding of the situation 
- for our purposes in a satisfactory way. 
Moreover, we have no access to the entire truth, because understanding is 
always partially. Meaning is dependent on understanding. Meaning is always 
meaning for someone (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). This relates to Searle’s 
truth conditions as background of assumptions. 
 
What Lakoff & Johnson offer with the on human experience based 
explanation of understanding and truth, is an alternative that denies 
objectivity and subjectivity are our only possibilities of choice. The 
metaphor unites the ratio and the imagination. Hence their utterance a 
metaphor is imaginative rationality. Here they come very close to the image-
ing function of language as stated by Ricoeur. In general the objectivist’s 
notion of understanding is restricted to the understanding of the conditions 
for truth and not truth. Their theory is one that meets the real and 
reasonable worries of the mentioned currents, but without the obsession 
for absolute truth (there are truths) and without emphasizing unlimited 
imagination (we coherently structure our experiences).  
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 Here Lakoff & Johnston (1999) seem to steer the middle way. A conceptual 
system enables us through language to understand our experiences, give 
meaning to these experiences, to say something about the truth of a 
statement and to communicate. The conceptual system has eight aspects, 
which play the same role in the direct or indirect understanding of a 
situation. These aspects are in summary: 
 
Entity structure: We experience certain objects (immediately) as bounded 
entities. 
 
Orientation structure: Above/under, inside/outside etc. 
 
Experience dimensions: We categorize entities. 
 
On human experience based gestalts: Object- and substance categories are 
gestalts, which dispose the dimensions: perception, motility activity, 
part/whole, function and purpose. 
                                                          (Immediate) actions, events and 
experiences categories are gestalts with the dimensions: participants, parts, 
motility activities, observations, stages, linear- and causal relations and 
purpose. 
 
Background: A gestalt services as background. Normally we only pick up 
certain aspects. 
 
Foreground: Certain aspects of a situation are placed on the foreground, 
trivializing or hiding other aspects. 
 
Inter-actional properties: No inherent properties of objects or experiences, 
rather inter-actional properties. 
 
Prototypes: These make members of a flexible category or class. 
 
In her Natural Semantic Meta-language Theory, Wierzbicka has 
identified 61 semantic concepts (words), called primitives. A potential 62 
candidate is ‘long’. With these primitives all other words and words that 
express emotions can be defined in all languages so far checked the last 40 
years. The primitives themselves cannot be defined; there are no concepts 
that are more fundamental.  
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 Wierzbicka sometimes uses non-primitives, if a definition with only 
primitives would be too long. Wierzbicka was inspired by Boguslawski who 
held the view that the set of primitives could be less than 100. In 
Wierzbicka’s view in our conceptual system (a bridge that makes 
communication possible) the primitives form a collection with a rich 
internal structure as a universal grammar (in Dutch: spraakkunst) of 
language (NRC, 09.20.2003, p. 35). The underlined words in this appendix 
form part of this collection of primitives. The text misses 19 primitives: 
hear, happen, live, die, when/time, now, after, a long time, a short time, for 
some time, moment, where/place, below, far, side, inside, touching not, if 
very and kind of.  
Later on she deleted the words ‘world’ and ‘imagine’ from the list 
of primitives. Without these words her definitions became better and 
clearer. The word ‘imagine’ is interesting in light of what has been said so 
far with regard to metaphor. The word ‘world’ is of interest with regard to 
worldview and how we face reality. If ‘world’ is not a fundamental concept 
for human beings it underpins the theories used so far that steer a middle 
way (Maturana & Varela, Merleau-Ponty). The word ‘be’ is (so far) no 
primitive. Indeed, ‘I can’ is composed out of primitives. ‘I think, I am’ 
comes close, but is not entirely composed out of primitives. 
In the questionnaire 15 primitives, being body, I, you, do, good, 
bad, true, time orientation, a long time, a short time, far, big (large), small, 
live and die are used as the kernel in the conceptual system, the 
Weltanschauung.  
 
Six primitives fit in Lakoff & Johnson’s entity structure. Something, thing, 
this, big, small,  there is. 
Nine primitives fit in the orientation structure. Where/place, here, above, 
below, far, near, side, inside, touching not. 
Two primitives have inter-actional properties. Do, can. 
Seven primitives relate to Merleau-Ponty’s true time experience. When/ 
time, now, before, after, a long time, a short time, for some time, moment. 
Three primitives relate to metaphor. The same, kind of, like. These 
primitives could explain why the conceptual system is metaphorical in 
nature. These words plus ‘part of, maybe (ambiguity!), because’ must be the 
fundamental, dense connections in terms of interactions, patterns and rich 
structure in the conceptual system. 
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 If we would also keep our mind on Simon’s hierarchy of a logical 
order in complex systems with either the stable forms as sub-assemblies or 
specialization, one would say it must be possible to expose the foundations 
of this internal structure. I will make a preliminary start: 
i) All-many/much-more (encompassing system; it could explain why words  
 as fire, sky and sun are easy to define as the article reads. They are 
 primeval powers. In religious terms, there is more) 
ii) I-live-body-think-know-want-feel-see-hear-say-do-have-can-true  
 (subsystem with intra-actions; Merleau-Ponty’s translation without  
 interpreter) 
iii) Time orientation (all related words)-move-happen-die (specialization; 
 Merleau-Ponty’s meaning of our existence in one go; entropy: given to  
 itself and affecting itself until activity stops; memory gets demented) 
iv) You-other-people-someone-good-bad (subsystem with intra-actions) 
v) Space orientation (all related words)-something-thing-this-word-some- 
 there is-this-one-two-if very-big-small (specialization; Devlin’s amalgam  
 of nine skills) 
 
According to Searle (1981) there is no single principle or rule with 
regard to metaphor but rather various steps and principles. He alleges there 
must even be more principles. According to Elgin (1997) there are no general 
rules with regard to iconic meaning but rather various interpretations. Both 
authors emphasize the importance of context. Searle means by context a 
background of assumptions. Elgin (1997) talks about the relevant ‘trappings 
of office’, matters of convention that vary from case to case. “Plainly this is 
not the sort of thing an uninformed viewer could recognize in a work just by 
looking at it” Elgin (1997, p. 144). It is the same kind of background – figure 
structure Merleau-Ponty advocated. Lakoff & Johnson (1999) state our 
conceptual system is highly structured because it is metaphorical in nature. 
Then here we can also see circularity. We are trying to explain metaphor by a 
system that is metaphorical in nature. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) confirm in 
their eight aspects Merleau-Ponty’s view. We can see on the pre-reflective 
and the reflective layers the same mechanisms are at work. Human beings 
live in (inter)-actions, in language, in metaphors and in categories in a 
background – figure structure. We are also sensible for metaphors. 
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 In Checkland’s (2000) typology of systems he distinguishes – apart 
from transcendental systems beyond knowledge - natural systems (the 
universe and processes of blind evolution), that include man, who can 
create designed physical systems (like cars), designed abstract systems (like 
poems or philosophies) and human activity systems. Our conceptual 
system would have to fit in one of these system classes. ‘Man as designer is 
a teleological being, able to create means of enabling ends to be pursued, 
and to do so on the basis of conscious selection between alternatives. It is 
proper to restrict the word ‘teleological’ to use in this sense, involving 
human will, and not to apply it casually to natural systems. […] The neutral 
word based on the notion of ‘serving a purpose’ is teleonomy’ (Checkland, 
2000). He uses the word ‘purposive’ for the latter and ‘purposeful’ for the 
former. ‘This purposeful activity distinguishes our species from the stimuli-
provoked, goal-seeking, merely purposive behaviour of the other animals’. 
In purposeful action he includes monitoring/recording our mental activity, 
enabling plans to be argued over, communicated, opposed, carried out, 
subverted and/or modified in a purposeful fashion by groups of human 
beings. Moreover, in his hierarchy of real-world complexity, after Boulding, 
man as human beings with characteristics of symbolic language is at level 7 
with related disciplines as biology and psychology. Socio-cultural systems as 
families with characteristics as roles and communication are at level 8 with 
relevant disciplines as sociology and behavioural science. Our conceptual 
system, metaphorical in nature, is not designed; it is not meant for moni-
toring and recording our mental activity at level 8. It is at the basis of that 
on level 7; it is a system for understanding our lived experiences. The 
natural systems would remain. However, man fits in this class as ‘a naked 
ape’. Checkland (2000) argues ‘this is reasonably to the extent that man is ‘a 
naked ape’; but it will be argued below that it is the fact that man is more 
than a naked ape which makes it necessary to create different kinds of 
system beyond those which are natural’. So our conceptual system would 
fit in a sixth class to be distinguished. There seems to be an overlooked 
deeper level between natural (the naked ape) and designed (the self-
consciousness purposeful man). It is this level this thesis is focusing on. 
 
Understanding and interpreting also plays an important role in 
hermeneutics, a form of reflection, with an emphasis on the importance of 
intuition (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2001). They distinguish between what 
they call objectivist hermeneutics – the understanding of meaning with an 
emphasis on the circularity of part/whole - and alethic hermeneutics, 
which have also traits in common.  
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 For the poetic hermeneutics, as part of what Alvesson & Sköldberg (2001) 
call the alethic – uncoveredness or the revelation of something hidden - 
hermeneutics, this something hidden forms an underlying pattern of 
metaphor or narrative. Alethic is a broader term for existential and 
ontological.  
 
According to Alvesson & Sköldberg (2001), Gadamer considered 
language to be central to hermeneutic pre-understanding. Understanding 
comprises both emotional moods and so-called ‘silent knowledge’. 
Intentionality thus becomes a pre-rational pre-understanding. It is no longer 
a question of a subject that passively, rationally and theoretically gazes at an 
object, but of an act of knowledge, whereby subject and object are created. 
Thus, the very act of understanding is primary; subject and object are 
secondary (and misleading) categories (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2001). What 
matters, therefore, is for individuals to understand the world in which they 
live. For this reason, hermeneutics becomes something that permeates the 
whole of existence. Every understanding, of the simplest everyday things, is 
at the same time a contribution to better self-understanding. To Gadamer the 
essence of language – and thus also of understanding, thinking - at its deepest 
level was metaphorical-poetic, not logic-formal.  
 
According to Ricoeur (1978) new-rhetoric is defined as ‘a philosophic 
discipline aiming at a mastery of the fundamental laws of the use of language’ 
by I.A. Richards, an 18th century borrowed definition. ‘From the start 
Richards attacks the cardinal distinction in classical rhetoric between proper 
meaning and figurative meaning […]. Words have no proper meaning, 
because no meaning can be said to belong to them; and they do not possess 
any meaning in themselves […]’. Instead he comes up with a contextual 
theory of meaning. Words owe their meaning only to a phenomenon of 
‘delegated efficacy’, the name for a whole cluster of events that recur 
together, including the required conditions as well as whatever we may pick 
out as cause or effect. The cluster of events that recur together has striking 
similarities with the Gestalt, arranging experiences in structured wholes. 
What a word means is the missing parts of the contexts from which it draws 
its delegated efficacy. So it remains true that the word ‘holds true for’, ‘stands 
for’ – but not for a thing or an idea. Consequently, nothing prevents a word 
from signifying more than one thing.  
 
Root metaphors (or dominant metaphors) are metaphors that 
underlie whole discourses.  
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 Grant (Oswick & Grant, 1996) states by root metaphor, Dunn is talking 
about the key metaphor on which knowledge about a subject is based and 
which is used to start off processes that expand that knowledge. Root 
metaphors, like narrative structures, are an important form of pre-
understanding. R.H. Brown proceeds from a ‘cognitive aesthetics’, that is 
an aesthetic view of societal phenomena, which is not only concerned with 
‘l’art pour l’art’, but also intends to bring knowledge (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2001). Brown arrives at a comparable view as Lakoff & 
Johnson, where it is stated “The concept of aesthetic perception or the 
aesthetic point of view allows us to step outside the dreary debate between 
the ‘objectivity’ of measurement and causal explanation and the 
‘subjectivity’ of understanding. Aesthetic perception is neither pure 
reflection nor ordinary awareness. Instead it combines the detachment of 
the former with the intuitive immediacy of the latter, though each is 
heightened and focused” (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2001). The quotation 
indicates that an aesthetic perception yokes a form of consciousness based 
on immediate, unreflected sensory experience to a more structured 
thought, resulting in a kind of fusion, where intuition enters in an 
indissoluble union with more reflecting categories (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
2001). Brown identifies five root metaphors in sociology: organism, 
mechanism, language, drama and game (such as football).    
 
Alvesson & Sköldberg, (2001) themselves end up with metaphors 
in their studying in depth their reflexive methodology. “The whole point of 
suggesting metaphors is not to stamp or stereotype individuals or positions, 
but to provide suggestive concepts that in practical ways can facilitate our 
own processes of reflection, and help us to resist the temptation to get 
stuck in a favourite position. A degree of (self-) irony is important here”. 
With regard to irony, they describe hermeneutics among other things as 
“the Hermeneutician is well in touch with the powers above. God demands 
nothing; rather, a chosen few are granted divine inspiration. Divine grace 
[…] the sacred light, is achieved through acceptance by the researcher of 
the circular process of the Catholic world order”. 
 
The effect of living metaphors in their poetic function can be 
compared with ‘interpretive speaking’, a concept used by Spinosa, Flores & 
Dreyfus (1997). ‘[…] Members moved people to see things in many 
different and new ways that led to a change of style; they did not speak to 
persuade others to take particular actions […] 
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 Because such groups change the coordination of background practices and 
not just regulations [which is in their view real ‘history-making’, HL] we call 
their transformative kind of speaking interpretive and not persuasive. We call 
speaking interpretive when it allows some practice, thing, or identity to 
appear as worthy of consideration by a mixed community - that is, a 
community composed of a wider range of interests than those of a group of 
professionals or technicians’. Interpretive speaking consist in: 
- articulating an experience that does not fit comfortably with the normal,  
 common sense descriptions of life in the polity; 
- uncovering the grounds of this unusual experience, like for instance what  
 is ‘full responsibility’; 
- offering some description of the relation of these marginal practices [of  
 the members, HL] to the dominant practices. 
But the real work of interpretive speaking comes in making people sensitive 
to the experiences and the practices behind them […] Rather, they (human 
beings, HL) must have identities whose change will be dictated by the style of 
practices with which they are familiar. This is precisely the kind of historical 
identity and change we advocate […] (Spinosa e.a, 1997).  
It is again striking all these quoted authors from various disciplines 
say similar things. The most striking is they hardly refer to each other, neither 
in the text nor in their bibliographies. Are we inventing the wheel again and 
again? Was this not the reason Organizational Cyberneticians set together 
experts out of various different disciplines with the question: ‘This is more or 
less the problem. Who of you can say something about it in terms of your 
own discipline?’ So a problem in an organization or a society could be tackled 
with solutions in similar problem situations ants, bees, lemmings (?) or 
whatever species had found. That solution could be a clue for further 
research. 
In the development of creative capacity, called Synectics, Gordon 
(1961) employs a similar approach. One of the mechanisms is Direct 
Analogy, the actual comparison of parallel facts and knowledge. The richest 
source turned out to be biology, because the language of biology lacks a 
mystifying terminology and the organic aspect brings out analogies, which 
breathe life into problems that are stiff and rigidly quantitative. Synectics also 
uses metaphors frequently. 
 
In the search of what metaphor is many philosophers were reviewed. 
Searle concludes there is no single principle at work in metaphor. The two 
type theories (comparison and interaction) are according to him inadequate, 
mistaken or defective.  
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 Instead he comes up with the beginnings of a theory on metaphor with 
three steps and eight principles. His fourth principle reads: Things which 
are P are not R, nor are they like R things, nor are they believed to be R; 
nonetheless it is a fact about our sensibility, whether culturally or naturally 
determined, that we just do perceive a connection, so that P is associated in 
our minds with R properties. That principle did remind me of Merleau-
Ponty in chapter 2. Sensibility and perception. These words brought me to 
the question: Could metaphor not just be perception in language without 
reducing perception to metaphor? Espejo and myself are in a process of 
writing an article around this question.  
 
Now is this journey satisfactory? Do we have an answer to the 
question of what metaphor is? We have certainly gained insight but we do 
not have an answer, let alone a definition of metaphor. Everybody argues 
with everybody or we do not know what we are talking about in the last 
2000 years. Maybe Morgan is right in just stating ‘A is seen as B’. The 
funny thing is that the same goes for proverbs in the next appendix. 
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 APPENDIX 2 
 
ON PROVERBS 
 
 
2.1  Interpretation  
 
With regard to the study of proverbs one could conclude: a lot of 
work has been done and a lot still has to be done. Although computerized 
text searches make the task much easier compared to the work done in the 
traditional fashion by the doyen in this field, Archer Taylor. Paremiology is 
the knowledge of proverbs and their interpretation. Interpretation in the 
sense proverbs sometimes have to be explained, since they do not always 
have the same meaning amongst people or cultures.  
 
"The apple doesn't fall far from the tree". Wolfgang Mieder,  
another authority on proverb, quotes a U.S. proverb field collector  
in an interview in 1970 with a German immigrant living in the U.S.  
since 1950. The quoted proverb originates in Germany. As Mieder 
says "since it sheds some additional light on the ambivalent (being  
in two minds) function and meaning of the proverb as an  
expression of world-view". The interview reads: [...] Ursula said it 
means that children usually grow up with behavioral traits, world- 
view and customs similar to those of their parents. [...] The proverb 
reveals the 'old world' [Europe, HL] attitude that a child should  
grow up to be like his parents. This would apply to vocation,  
world-view and personality, in that order. This would mirror a  
culture in which there is less social mobility than in the United  
States (Mieder, 1995 f).  
 
So out of the ‘old world’ view and the U.S. view (where she lives for 
20 years) the old world-view gets the upper hand. Striking is she is talking 
about 'his' parents. Indeed, the proverb is usually used in the masculine form.  
 
 
 
 
 
         247 
 2.2 The features of a proverb  
 
Even the definition of a proverb forms an insurmountable 
problem. “The definition of a proverb is too difficult to repay the 
undertaking. [...] An incommunicable quality tells us this sentence is 
proverbial and that one is not. ...” Let us be content with recognizing that a 
proverb is a saying current among the folk (Taylor, 1996 a). Yet based on 
all the information available it is possible to determine the proverb more 
precise. According to Apeldoorn (1999) the distinction between a proverb 
on the one hand and proverbial expressions, phrases and sayings on the 
other, is based on rather subtitle features. The most important feature is a 
proverb contains a general truth. Apeldoorn does not give a definition 
either. This feature follows the intuitive, taken for granted feeling, that after 
all a proverb must be true in order to be a proverb. The feature ‘general 
truth’ should imply the truth in a proverb is context free. We will come to 
see that a proverb does not contain a general truth. Apeldoorn's opinion 
also contrasts strongly with the words of Mieder, who also gave no 
definition on proverbs.  
Proverbs are sometimes contrasting. ‘You are never too old to 
learn’ / ‘You can’t teach an old dog new tricks’ and 'Justice goes before 
power' dueling with ‘Justice goes with power’, the latter characterized as it's 
anti-proverb, are examples of contrasting proverbs.  
These are sometimes heard during a heated argument in conversations, 
many times concluded with the saying ‘The truth will probably lay 
somewhere in between’. “Such contrasting proverb pairs are rather 
common in folk speech and they indicate once and for all that proverbs 
have no claim at being universal truths. On the contrary, proverbs reflect 
the partiality and contradiction of life itself, but the appropriate proverb 
used at the right time and in the fitting context will hit the proverbial nail 
on the head” (Mieder, 1995 c). In the same paper Mieder states “Proverbs 
contain the knowledge, experience and observation of generations of 
people and this distilled wisdom gives them their generally valid character 
and claim to authority”. The word ‘valid’ means reasonable, convincing and 
in legal terms legally lawful. Neither of these words refer to a (general) 
truth. They refer to an argument that holds or does not hold, viewpoint 
and context dependent.  
“Proverbs contain a general truth”, as stated by Apeldoorn, can 
also be refuted from another angle. The German Institute of Demography 
undertook in 1968 a survey that included 24 German proverbs.  
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 They asked the informants to indicate whether they totally agreed with the 
wisdom of these proverbs.  
The highest agreement in the top three of proverbs fell on 69%, the lowest 
on 36% (Mieder, 1995 e).  
More precisely determined, a proverb, as folk, community-sanctioned 
wisdom, is stated in the present time, although it may lack a verb, in an 
unchanging form with rhythmic and/or poetic quality, sometimes using 
(internal) rhyme. It contains a general valid character within a context, 
reflecting the partiality of the speaker in terms of his/her world-view [Based 
on Apeldoorn (1999), Taylor (1996) and Mieder (1995)]. Although I would 
not call this a definition, it summarizes most features in a workable form.  
 
2.3 Origins of proverbs  
 
The origins of the proverb have been little studied (Taylor, 1996 a). 
However, the Van Dale Proverb Book gives many origins. Proverbs are 
invented in several ways: some are simple platitudes elevated to proverbial 
dignity (‘Business is Business’ is so many times repeated, that it gains 
proverbial currency), others arise from the metaphoric use of an incident (A 
sentence comes to mean far more than the sum of the words composing it; 
‘New brooms sweep clean’), still others imitate already existing proverbs and 
some owe their existence to the condensing of a story or fable. It is 
convenient to distinguish as ‘learned’ proverbs those with a long literary 
history, beginning in some apt Biblical or classical phase or a more recent 
source. The relation of the fable and the proverb is particular close. The Old 
English word ‘gied’ means both fable and proverb (Taylor, 1996 a). For a 
gradually different interpretation with regard to fables and proverbs, I refer 
to the last paragraph in this appendix. A sentence comes to mean far more 
than the sum of the words composing it would in systems theory terms be 
called an emergent property. It means that the whole (the sentence) has a 
feature, that none of the parts (words) have. In Appendix 1, Ricoeur said that 
in a proverb all words are used metaphorically. The trades and mercantile 
pursuits have coined almost no proverbs (Taylor, 1996 a). Although there 
seems to be a book of F. López Toral in the Spanish language “The 
Merchant’s Bible or the interpretation of proverbs”, Zaragoza, 1899, which 
Taylor has been unable to obtain (Taylor, 1996 a).  
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 In the Netherlands and the Flemish part of Belgium there are some 
8.000 proverbs, proverbial expressions, phrases and sayings. The Van Dale 
Proverb Book contains some 2.300 proverbs. Many deal with money, 
ordinary food and beverages (egg, bacon, beer) and parts of the body. 
Lords are often jeered at in proverbs. One may assume not publicly, as a 
kind of low profile verbal resistance. On learning by experience many 
proverbs can be found. That may have to do with the Guilds system in the 
past. One would say this a nice mirror image of the Dutch culture in the 
past centuries. 
 
Following the model of Cornelis, Land (1999) distinguishes 
residential land, traveling land and hiker land. Residential land was 
dominant until the 17th century. Key words are family organization, 
imitation & identification and safety. Traveling land, according to the 
railway timetable, was dominant between the 17th and 21th century. Key 
words are organization as a hierarchical control system, importing, learning 
rules and justice. Hiker land will be dominant in the 21th century. 
Keywords are humanitarian organization, learning by experience and self-
identification. The thinking about organization and management started 
around 1900 with Taylor and Fayol. It is my best guess that in the 
imperative mood and the prescriptive mood some 300 to 350 proverbs 
exist. The latter often in the form of “It is better to…than…” On co-
operation the Dutch are ambiguous. These proverbs (some 30 proverbs 
and proverbial expressions) are mostly either positive or negative. 
 
2.4. Proverbs assigned to authors  
 
No standard comprehensive collection of proverbs, however large, 
is complete. And no one has identified the source of Dutch proverbs 
(Taylor, 1996 a). This statement was not or is no longer correct. The Van 
Dale Proverb Book (2000), first printed in 1988, gives the origins. 
Of course every proverb has been created by an individual inside or 
outside the Netherlands and set in circulation until it was accepted by 
popular tradition. The same goes for translations of proverbs. It circulates 
in various translations until the right form and rhythmic quality has been 
reached. A few proverbs can be assigned to definite authors with some 
confidence, like “To be or not to be” to William Shakespeare and “The 
bigger they come, the harder they fall” to James J. Corbett. Many proverbs 
were assigned to the many-sided Benjamin Franklin.  
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 Notably in his autobiography he wrote in 1788 that the proverbs he cited in 
his yearly “Poor Richard’s Almanacs” contained the wisdom of many ages 
and nations. He only created some three proverbs (Taylor, 1996 a). “Check 
your references” is a many times heard expression in paremiology.  
 
2.5 The innocence of proverbs  
 
Proverbs are sometimes not that innocent as they may look at first 
sight. And sometimes they nail the wrong nail on the wrong head. Huizinga 
(1997, I got this text from Regtering) stated with regard to the 14th and 15th 
century: “A nation that has numerous proverbs in living use leaves the 
reasoning, the motivating and arguing to theologians and philosophers [...]. It 
refrains from a lot of driveling18 and safeguards against much defectiveness19. 
The proverb cuts the knots continuously”. As he interprets it, the old, 
compelling ways of thinking overgrew the living kernel of thought; he saw a 
rich civilization shrivel-up and stiffen. In his view it was the end of an 
époque, rather than the beginning of a new period, the Renaissance. 
 “The interest in the study of national character, stereotypes, ethic 
slurs and radical prejudice as expressed in proverbs has a considerable 
scholarly tradition. Willfully planned and ruthlessly executed destruction of 
the Native Americans [Indians, HL] needed its battle slogan, a ready-made 
catch phrase that could help the perpetrators to justify the inhuman 
treatment of their victims. The proverb that gained currency at that time and 
which can still be heard today is the mindless and absurd American proverb 
“The only good Indian is a dead Indian”. It was indeed a devilish stroke of 
genius that created this dangerous slur” (Mieder, 1995 a). Still be heard today 
means: fill in as you please “The only good X is a dead X”. On this proverb 
much research has been done.  
Mieder illustrates how this prejudicial proverb is part of the world-
view of many Americans. He also quotes lines in books and concludes: 
“Rationality is not part of stereotyping, but changing the truth and 
perpetuating lies are definite ingredients. 
 
 
18 In Dutch: gebazel 
19 In Dutch: onklaarheid  
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 And who would ever have thought that one of America’s classical 
children’s books [Chicken Every Sunday, 1943, by Rosemary Taylor] plays 
its part in spreading the frontier stereotype to younger generations, who 
had nothing to fear from Native Americans living on isolated reservations!”  
 
Mieder, like many others, also did extensive research on the 
Nazism propaganda using proverbs during World War Two. “With about 
500 proverbs and proverbial expressions on 782 pages of the German 
edition of Mein Kampf, Hitler reaches the high frequency of one 
proverbial utterance for every page and a half ”(Mieder, 1995 c). Quoted 
from Cornelia Berning and Victor Klemperer in Mieder (1995 c), 
Goebbels, on a party convention in 1934, said “We must speak the 
language which the folk understands. Whoever wants to speak to the folk 
must, as Luther says, pay heed to folk speech”. Hitler actually had already 
said something quite similar in 1925/26 in Mein Kampf, according to 
Mieder. “I must not measure the speech of a statesman to his people by the 
impression which it leaves in a university professor, but by the effect it 
exerts on the people”. In the same book Hitler stated: “But the power 
which has always started the greatest religious and political avalanches in 
history rolling has from time immemorial been the magic power of the 
spoken word [...]. Only a storm of hot passion can turn the destinies of 
peoples and he alone can arouse passion, who bears it within himself. It 
alone gives it chosen one the words, which like hammer blows can open 
the gates to the heart of a people”. And “All propaganda must be popular 
and its intellectual level must be adjusted to the most limited intelligence 
among those it is addressed to”.  
Proverbial stereotypes turned into life-threatening weapons for 
these innocent victims of the Nazi regime (Mieder, 1995 c). Hitler's ideal of 
a healthy human being, “Swift as greyhounds, tough as leather and hard as 
Krupp steel” became proverbial during the Nazi regime and the official 
slogan of the Hitler Youth (Mieder, 1995 c). Hitler frequently used the 
twin-formula, like “Lug und Trug” (Lies and perfidy), which was a 
powerful form for hammer blows. He also was not always satisfied with 
the traditional wording of folk proverbs. He sometimes lengthened the 
proverb. “What people wish they hope for” became “What people want 
they hope for and believe”, also replacing ‘wish’ for the stronger ‘want’ 
(Mieder, 1995 c).  
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 Ruth Klüger, who survived Auschwitz as a young girl, wrote in her 
book “Weiter leben. Eine Jugend” (1992) with regard to amongst others the 
proverbs “Arbeit macht frei” (Work makes free) and “Reden ist silber, 
schweigen ist gold” (Speech is silver, silence is gold) written on the entrance 
and barracks in the camp: “I stared at them every day, disgusted by their 
absolute claim of truth, which this reality exposed as a total lie” (In Mieder, 
1995 c). 
 
Related to this section is Klemperer’s book LTI in which he studies 
the way that Nazi propaganda altered the German language. Weltanschauung 
was quite a rare, specific and culturated term before the Third Reich, but 
became an everyday word. It allowed them to openly begin invasions, twist 
facts and violate human rights in the name of a higher ideal and in 
accordance to their theory of the world (www.answers.com/topic/lti-lingua-
tertii-imperii). 
 
2.6 How old is a proverb   
  
Related to the question of the origins of a proverb under 2.3 is the 
question how old a proverb might be. A proverb that expresses the human 
idea of discontent, envy and jealousy, in a metaphor is “The grass is always 
greener on the other side of the fence”. The proverb is literally true this time. 
J. Pomerantz has proved in an article “The Grass is always Greener: An 
Ecological Analysis of an Old Aphorism” in Perception 12 in 1983, that 
optical and perceptual laws alone will make the grass at a distance look 
greener to the human eye than blades of grass perpendicular to the ground 
(Mieder, 1995 b). Literally true doesn't mean it is true in the metaphorical, 
proverbial sense.  
It came as quite a surprise to see that the earliest recorded reference 
of the proverb stems from 1957, although many Americans will claim they 
have used the proverb before the 1950’s. This is what Taylor has called the 
“incompleteness of collections of proverbs”.  
The proverb is at least a bit older than collections would have us 
believe. It originates from 1924 (Mieder, 1995 b). It shouldn’t be surprising 
to learn that journalists and advertising consultancies find the proverb or 
parts of it very suitable for effective headlines and one-liners. An example is 
“The Grass Isn’t Greener, Just the Money” in the New York Times of April 
1979.  
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 Interesting enough, the German language has not adopted the American 
proverb (Mieder, 1995 b). The Dutch language certainly has. In the easily 
understood meaning and in the meaning “All that glitters is not gold”. 
Surprisingly enough the proverb ‘A picture is worth a thousand words’ 
originates only from 1921 (Mieder, 1995 e). Along with new 20th century 
proverbs as “It takes two to tango” and “Garbage in, garbage out; Gigo”. 
 
2.7 Meaningful communication  
 
According to Mieder (1995 e), there is also an unpublished study by 
the German pollster company Intermarket (Dusseldorf) that reports about 
the familiarity and use of proverbs by 404 informants, nearly half female 
and male, of all walks of life and ages. The questionnaire contained 27 
questions. Three proverbs were the most popular and in Mieder’s words, 
they belong to the German paremiological minimum. Eventually more 
research will lead to an international paremiological minimum of the 
world’s proverbial wisdom. He concludes the article saying “Proverbs 
continue to be effective verbal devices and culturally literate persons, both 
native and foreign, must have a certain paremiological minimum at their 
disposal in order to participate in meaningful oral and written 
communication”.  
  
2.8 The listener 
  
“The listener knows that the proverb used by the speaker was not 
made up by that person. [...] It is the ‘One’, the ‘Elders’ or the ‘They’ in 
‘They say who direct’. [...] The shifting of responsibility for what is said 
away from the speaker and is 'on to anonymous past, the anonymous folk”. 
[...] The distinctive feature of this passage, in contrast to most descriptions 
of proverb use, is its emphasis on the listener rather than the speaker” 
(Arora, 1995). “The success of a proverb performance as such must 
depend ultimately on the listener’s ability to perceive that he or she is being 
addressed in traditional, i.e. proverbial terms. [...] The listener’s 
identification of a proverb as proverbial is actually a two-fold process, 
involving first the abstract notion of the genre ‘proverb’ as it is culturally or 
ethnically conceived and secondly a means of assigning individual 
utterances to that genre. The latter step is the crucial one in the 
performance context.  
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 It is, in fact, less than accurate to describe this process as one of 'knowing' 
that a particular saying was not made up by the speaker. That is something 
only the speaker can ‘know’. The listener assumes on the basis of a certain 
type of evidence that such is the case. He may in fact be mistaken, but it will 
not matter. The utterance in question [.. .] will function as a proverb, with the 
accompanying weight of authority [...] as the direct result of the listener's 
perception, right or wrong, of its proverbiality” (Arora, 1995).  
 
As a means of exploring, on a modest scale, some aspects of 
perception of proverbiality in the Spanish language, 46 people were asked by 
Arora to respond to a proverb survey consisting of 2 proverbs and 23 ad hoc 
inventions as pseudo proverbs with proverb features one way or another, to 
be evaluated as ‘known’, ‘probably a proverb’ and ‘not a proverb’.  
The 2 proverbs were recognized by 87% (in ranking 1 on the list) 
respectively 43% (ranking 6 on the list). So in between were 4 pseudo-
proverbs. The relevance of meaning as a criterion from the respondent’s 
point of view was exemplified in a case of a deliberately ambiguous pseudo 
proverb on the list. A participant explained his rejection by “it didn’t really 
make sense”, whereupon another participant explained his ‘probably 
proverbial’ with not only an interpretation, but an imaginary context as well. 
Arora concludes: “A greater appreciation of the processes involved in the 
hearer’s perception of proverbiality may help us to understand, why it is so very 
difficult to arrive at an all inclusive definition of a proverb” (my italics).  
 
2.9  East West, Home At Best  
 
In an amusing article under the title “East West, Home at Best; The 
Authority of Guru’s and Sayings”, my colleague Lekkerkerk (2001), active in 
the field of technology & innovation, ever wondered how much news many 
new management hypes, called fads, consisted. The examples are obvious: 
for instance Senge’s learning organisation by “Wherever an ass falls, there 
will he never fall again” and Hamel & Pralahad by “Let the cobbler stick to 
his last”. He concluded the article with “It seems to me the best, if scientists, 
consultants and managers approach the hypes with some more language-
historical sense and thus putting things somewhat into perspective”.  
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 With the help of proverbs and sayings he distinguishes between hypes and 
innovation. He does not say that if you can attribute a proverb to 
something new, you will know whether it is a hype or not, but in an 
indirect way it says something about what he considers to be (real) 
innovation. 
 
2.10  Structure of language and a collection of proverbs  
 
Mieder (1995 e) states “Recent theoretical research on proverbs [...] 
has been primarily linguistically”. Grzybek (1995) argues in his for a layman 
not easy to read paper, based on a bibliography of some 80 titles, that the 
Russian scholar Permyakov has solved many questions at the same time 
bringing up a set of questions. Although Grzybek is integrating various 
viewpoints in models, my impression is most authors previously agreed to 
one thing: they disagreed. There have also been impressive misunder-
standings in interpretations in the linguistic community, as the paper makes 
clear. Nevertheless I would like to bring home the point of his article as a 
complete outsider in this discipline. So I will try, doing harm to Grzybek’s 
paper, to explain in more ordinary language what it is all about. Moreover, 
it illustrates that much work has been done on the subject of proverbs, 
especially the last say 40 years. What will be said in this paragraph is based 
on his paper (Grzybek, 1995). Sometimes my comments and examples are 
added; it will be clear where that is the case.  
 
The title of Grzybek’s paper refers to semiotics, the science of 
signs; it focuses on structure in the realm of folklore (the science of folk), 
as distinguished from language. Semiotics and linguistics are regarded by 
the Stewardship as neighboring points on a continuum. Interpretation is 
the subject of semiotics. Grzybek’s paper ends with three observations.  
The first is the Russian scholar Permyakov (1979) has succeeded in 
working out a coherent basis for proverb definition for the first time. The 
second is the useless splitting up in two (called dichotomy) schools of 
Linguistics. One school (called God’s truth system) says language ‘has’ a 
structure (find out what the structure is!) and one school (called Hocus 
Pocus system), to which Permyakov seems to belong, says language is a 
mass of incoherent formless data (impose on it some structure!). The third 
is deductive and inductive ways of developing scientific models have to 
complement each other. 
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 The second and third observations sound familiar in the context of 
what has been discussed so far in this thesis. The useless usage of 
dichotomies is emphasized by many authors mentioned so far. Many 
viewpoints seem to be at a closer look to be complementary, to say the least. 
But the Western tradition of thinking does only allow merely for “either...or, 
black or white, no way in between”. You are my friend or my enemy! But 
luckily, in many books and papers the call for synthesis and/or bringing 
down barriers between disciplines is apparent as of the 1960’s. To name a 
few in management science and system theory: Simon, March, Bertalanfy and 
Beer & Nohria (Christis, 2001). The third observation we came across with 
regard to sense making in chapter 4. We use both logics. 
 
After commenting on a lot of authors, Grzybek concludes, that the 
obviously interrelationship between proverb context, -function and -meaning has 
long been neglected until 1964. Following this line of thought we obtain the 
possibility of describing and perhaps defining the proverb not only on a 
linguistic level but additionally on a deeper logical level. Such a division of 
levels is useful only for analytical purposes and they do not claim any 
ontological (teachings of being; teachings of the general features of things) 
status.  
The description of proverb meaning is not possible without reference 
to contextual factors. Yet, as one of the authors argues, context can be 
regarded as a potential factor and to abstract for heuristic purposes from all 
contextual factors, such as age, gender and social status, is to outline the 
“ethic frame” of proverb usage.  
The author, Seitel, has central assumptions:  
1. There is a situation in which the proverb is actually used, the  
 interaction situation. We are in a conversation about (the lack of)  
 money and one of us says “A creaking cart goes long on the  
 wheels”.   
2. This situation is not identical with the situation inherent in the 
 proverb text itself, the proverb situation. The proverb text (the  
 situation of the cart on the road) may nothing have to do with  
 the situation we are into, the conversation about money.  
3. Both of these situations are not or need not to be identical with the  
 situation the proverb refers to, i.e. the situation to which it is  
 intended to be applied, the reference situation. The situation  
 wherein the proverb would fit is talking about bad health (or 
    may be more literal, such as ‘old soldiers never die’ or the 
    farmhouse situation).  
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 It took me rather long to find a proverb that in the Dutch and 
English language has more or less the literal translation, like in the one 
above. For instance, where the Dutch say ‘equal monks, equal hoods’ the 
English people are talking about a goose, fish, meat or ‘turn about is fair 
play’. This culturally embedded form of proverbs was briefly discussed in 
section 1.3. It is clear that there is a tension among these situations. This 
tension with regard to perception was also discussed in chapter 2. 
 
Thus, when uttering a proverb, the speaker asserts that the 
relationship between the things in the proverb situation is analogous 
(similar) to the relationship between the entities or elements in the 
reference situation. Therefore, proverb usage is related to two distinct, 
though closely related processes, namely the speech act of applying the 
proverb in the interaction situation and the process of relating proverb 
situation to reference situation. These related processes differ from the 
two-fold process as mentioned by Arora. There the question is the abstract 
notion of the genre ‘proverb’ and a means of assigning the utterance to that 
genre. My observation is a proverb used out of context in a conversation 
leads either to shrugging (he doesn’t mesh) or causes great merriment. Not 
to speak about deliberately mixing two proverbs, like ‘own fault is worth 
gold’. 
 
It seems possible to differentiate the concept of proverb functions. A 
first complex of functions might be attributed to the interaction situation. 
Proverbs can have the function of warning, reprimand, description, 
justification, persuasion, admonition, summarization and explanation. It is 
well possible that one and the same proverb takes completely different 
functions in different contexts of usage. One might term these functions as 
pragmatic (informative, HL) functions.  
A second notion of function is related to the function which the 
proverb stock of given society on the whole fulfills within the system of 
norms and values. The proverbs being instruments for creating and 
stabilizing certain social norms and behaviour. Within a family or 
community proverbs can be asserted as norms, which are valid for 
behaviour. Proverbs then contain social norms, e.g. justice. These are 
termed social functions.  
A third notion of function with regard to the proverb situation is 
proverbs can be seen as strategies for dealing with certain situations. One 
might ask “How is a proverb construed to be able to serve as a basis for 
creating and transmitting the analogy between proverb situation and 
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 The central question would be: What kind of relationships are created (or 
modeled) between elements in the proverb situation, which only provide the 
possibility of creating the analogy to the elements in the reference situation. 
This might be called the modeling function. In this paper the modeling 
function is centered on the relationship between two elements in the proverb 
situation. The relationship between proverb situation and reference situation 
focuses on questions such as imagery, metaphorical, allegory etc. The 
essential question is 'what kind of situations ultimately are modeled in 
proverbs’? So it is clear that the pragmatic function and the social function of 
proverbs refer to Weltanschauung. The modeling function is the ‘technical’ 
one. 
  
Another author makes a distinction in the description of proverbs. 
These are two different levels of precise meaning (signification), being a fixed 
meaning (denotation / focus information) and an emotional value or 
association (connotation / fond information). The distinction is based on the 
notion that a linguistic sign may be divided in expression and content 
elements. A sign is an association of abstractions by convention. Expres-sion 
and content taken together on the linguistic level (plane) is only the 
substance of expression for the meta-linguistic (supra) semiotic level. This 
means expression and content, taken together in language as signs, is only the 
substance of expression for myths, fables and proverbs, as signs on the meta-
level.  
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 Contrasting and complementing views, Grzybek comes up with three other 
levels relating to structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 
 
Paradigmatic means according Van Dale: a model word or a 
conjugated word that can serve as model for other words. Syntax is the 
word order of the sentence structure. 
On the paradigmatic level (vertical) we see the hierarchy and 
correlation of the development of opposite meanings (semantic 
oppositions) in for instance myths, e.g. life versus death. This relates to 
what Christis (1998) calls contrast concept (employee-employer) and 
contrast space in ‘why questions’. Here these oppositions only refer to the 
emotional value or association level. Opposite meanings have the danger of 
subjectivity when distributing positive and negative values. The word ‘fire’ 
in a proverb may be evaluated positively (warmth, hearth) or negatively 
(destructive).  
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 The transformational level comprises the deep level structural rules, the 
logical operations. They represent only the rules according to which the 
paradigmatic elements, i.e. the opposite meanings, are combined. The 
transformational level can be interpreted as a switchboard between the two 
other levels (axes).  
On the syntagmatic level (horizontal) one can analyze the successive 
linear unfolding of the logical transformations. Here two levels can be 
distinguished: microstructures and macrostructures. Microstructures include 
all those structures, which are characteristic of the fixed meaning linguistic 
realization up to the level of sentences and sentence sequences. Macro 
structures are abstract schemas, based on a set of hierarchically ordered 
categories; their possible combinations may be conventionalized within a 
given culture. The proverb does not ‘activate’ the level of macro-structures, 
as opposed to myth or fable. 
The model is able to explain to what degree a proverb may be 
regarded to be a minimal unit of the meta-level, being the collection of 
proverbs. As I interpret it, this relates to the questions whether an utterance 
is a proverb or a proverbial expression. Secondly, it becomes apparent how a 
structural description of the proverb should look like. It should make 
transparent the whole paradigm (model) of meaning oppositions, typical of 
and inherent in the proverb. Moreover it would have to work out the set of 
logical transformations (operations), which allow the process of modeling 
proverb situations.  
 
Another author demonstrated the necessity of distinguishing between 
the levels of fixed meaning and emotional value. If one tried to express a 
proverb in analogical form, taking only the fixed meaning into consideration, 
the result of the proverb “Dog of the kings, king of the dogs” would be: 
 
Dog: King :: King : Dog  
A complete different analogy is inherent in the emotional value level form:  
Dog of kings: other dogs :: servant of a powerful man : servants  
The proverb is essentially a statement of analogical (similarity or 
according to the same rule, HL) structure: it is an analogy which constitutes 
the mechanism by which the content and expression of the fixed meaning 
level becomes the expression of the emotional value level.  
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 From the structural integration of these levels and from the analogy 
derived from it, results a particular ‘proverb idea’; a general idea, as one 
author called it. This general, abstract idea must also be the underlying 
basis of the reference situation, if the proverb is supposed to fit. Now the 
double analogy comes in the picture. The first analogy in the proverb 
situation is the result of structural integration of fixed meaning and 
emotional value. The second analogy relates to certain elements, objects or 
notions inherent in the reference situation. We need a ‘proverb idea, a 
general idea’ in between of the proverb situation and the reference situation 
in order to create the double analogy. One may regard every metaphor as 
analogy, however, not every analogy is of metaphorical nature. Moreover a 
distinction may be made between proverb text and use.  
Proverb X may be in a metaphorical relationship to context Y, but 
in a literal relationship to context Z. For example “New brooms sweep 
clean” in the context of organisations with newly appointed managers 
(metaphorical) and in the household context (literally).  
 
What Merleau-Ponty says with regard to metaphor, the analogy in 
its function it refers to, says Crépeau (1975) with regard to proverbs, 
although in other words. But the ‘mechanism’ is the same. According to 
Crépeau the basis for analogy formation is a given opposition. In his 
opinion there is an implicit ‘common term’ between the oppositional 
terms, which represents the ‘key of the analogy’. In the proverb ‘a child 
without father is like a house without roof’ the key would be the relation of 
protection. And, as Grzybek adds, the terms opposed would be ‘protector-
protected’ and it would be exactly this pair of semantic oppositions, which 
is represented on the connotative level of signification. 
 
Now Permyakov comes in the picture again. An invariant is 
according to Ashby some statement that is unchanging; so some statement 
can be made that, in spite of the incessant changing, is true unchangingly. 
Permyakov’s aim is to find out invariant situations, which are modeled in 
proverbs. All proverbs that express one and the same meaning have to be 
regarded as variants of one and the same invariable (proverb) situation. 
Ultimately he describes a proverb’s semantic potential. Permyakov 
distinguished four levels (angles) from which proverbs should be analyzed:  
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 - Linguistic: the difference between proverbs and related  
phenomena; proverbs are syntactically complete utterances,  
whereas proverbial sayings have to be completed out of the context  
of their usage. The focus is on the expression of the denotative  
level. This would then in my view correspond to the syntagmatic  
level and the microstructure in the figure. 
- Concrete things (elements) and thematic (semantic oppositions)  
level, not to be confounded; the focus is on the content of the  
denotative level. The semantic (thematic) oppositions can be  
understood as paradigmatic entities. That would then correspond in  
my view with the connotation axis in the figure. 
- Invariant types of situations, which are modeled in proverbs. These  
can be understood as logical transformations (operations). 
 
The thematic level (connotation) and invariant types of situations 
(operations) relate to each other as do grammar [a set of agreements, HL] to 
lexicon (dictionary). In my interpretation, if you know the alphabet you know 
how and where to find the word. 
 
He comes up with four types of situations, which can be included in 
two groups. The first group models the invariant relationships between 
elements (things) or between things and their qualities. In the second group 
the sayings in the invariant situations model the dependency between the 
relationship of things and the relationship of their qualities. The following 
proverbs would have fallen in one and the same class, being the first group, 
the relationships between things. ‘No fire without smoke’, ‘No rose without 
thorns’ and ‘No river without bank’ maintain in the relationship the first part 
of a pair cannot exist without the second part. However, their meanings are 
different. The first maintains ‘no consequence without reason’, the second 
‘no good things without faults’ and the third ‘no whole without parts’. Hence 
the thematic (connotation) classification level, like <<Part- Whole>>. The 
logical and thematic classification (structures) have to be separated; the same 
goes for thematic and element level. His basic assumption is that proverbs 
are signs of situations. All situations mentioned, interaction, text and 
reference are variable. The only invariable is the proverb idea or general idea, 
as mentioned earlier.  
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 In a footnote it is said, that it is only on the level of emotional value 
that the proverb displays its universal characteristics. This relates to what 
was said by Mieder in 1.2, where he talks about “distilled wisdom gives 
them their generally valid character or claim to authority”.  
A proverb is used as a sign in a particular interaction situation, 
where repeated usage of the sign may lead to a verbal stereotype (cliché), 
which in turn may lead to a proverb, to refer to a particular reference 
situation with the same characteristics, of and for which it is a sign. 
Additionally, the proverb models this situation in a particular way.  
 
Proverbs are both signs and models; as signs they belong to 
language and as models to folklore. Proverbs are syntactically (word order 
in a sentence) complete utterances, whereas proverbial expressions have to 
be completed out of the context in usage. Interestingly enough and 
contrary what bas been said under 2.3, he separates proverbs “upwards” 
from, amongst others, anecdotes and fables. By sign he means a linguistic 
sign, which by common usage has become a verbal stereotype (cliché) on 
the fixed meaning level part of the language system. By models he means 
the characteristics of emotional value level, which is superimposed and 
dependent upon natural language.  
 
Sofar Grzybek. Here his paper ends. These figures should be the 
basis for a consistent system of organizing a proverb collection. 
Permyakov’s system was based on the analysis of 50.000 proverbial sayings 
in 200 Oriental cultures!  
 
In metaphors the emphasis is on the authentic ‘living’ thinking. In 
proverbs the emphasis is on the repeated usage. Metaphor and proverbs 
differ in their function. Metaphor fills a semantic gap that cannot be 
expressed otherwise (or better) in language while proverbs confirm 
common sense wisdom among folk.  
 
Now if we combine what has been said so far in all chapters and 
appendixes it is striking that in perception, sense making, metaphor and 
proverb the same ‘mechanism’ is essentially at work. There are (opposite) 
elements (or things or cues) and a relation in a figure-background setting. 
And we look for an implicit common element or general idea that emerges 
very fast and non-rational. Taylor said ‘an incommunicable quality tells us 
this sentence is proverbial’; Arora questioned how the hearer perceives 
proverbiality. It is the fast emergence that intrigues us. 
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 APPENDIX 3 
 
GLOSSARY 
 
of phenomenological concepts not or hardly used in the text. 
 
Anonymous, pre-personal thinking A kind of (anonymous)  
foreknowledge, like we know 
we are born but we do not know the  
experience. I find in my sense an  
activity of thinking that is older than  
me and of which the organs only  
constitute the trace (Merleau-Ponty,  
1997, p. 409). 
 
Anonymous watchfulness  The body transforms ideas in  
objects or things (1997, p. 211). If  
we want to go to sleep (an idea) we 
adopt an attitude bodily, thus 
imitating sleep, which will lead to  
real sleep, only directed through an 
anonymous watchfulness of the  
senses to the world. That  
anonymous watchfulness explains it 
is possible to awake at all. 
 
Being-in-a-situation   Some illnesses can be explained as 
the refusal of the other human being  
or the refusal of the world, because 
they have been ripped off from their  
transitive nature, generalized, led to  
the end, thus becoming a factual 
situation. This Merleau-Ponty (1997)  
calls being-in-a-situation. For  
patients, the body can become the 
hiding-place of the being, the  
existence, that has become 
entangled. 
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 Body-image Pre-personal awareness of the phenomenal body polarized  
by the world of its habitual tasks (Langer, 1989, p. 101).  
There is a bodily synthesis in which the parts of our body 
are given to us immediately as already orientated towards  
the performance of tasks and the perception of things in  
the world. Our awareness of the body is no idea. 
 
Evidenz Evidenz proper to sensory perception. There is a fulfilment  
of my meaning expectations in the fullest possible sense  
appropriate for that kind of experience. I cannot expect a  
higher kind of fulfilment of my meaning intention. Evident  
intuition (Anschauung) is the basis and motivation for the  
accompanying, justified beliefs (Moran, 2001, p. 128).  
Evidence is originary self-givenness. According to Husserl, 
deductions (from the general to the specific) are founded  
on evident intuitions (Moran, 2001). Then the specific is the  
reason we undertake the trip with regard to the motive in 
Chapter 2. Moran (2001, p. 128) uses the concept balanced. 
“When I hear a musical tone actually being played or see a  
yellow station wagon there before me, this tone or object is  
given with the Evidenz proper to sensory perception, there  
is a fulfilment of my meaning expectation in the fullest  
possible sense appropriate for that kind of experience. I  
cannot expect a higher kind of fulfilment of my meaning  
intention. […] Ordinary sense perception is Husserl’s  
paradigmatic case of evident intuition (Anschauung, HL)  
because […] it is always available for us for inspection. […]  
All other forms of experience set up their own ‘conditions  
of satisfaction’ to use John Searle’s term, and have their  
own kinds of coming to evidence. Thus, in mathematics,  
when I grasp that the three angles of a triangle are equal to 
two right angles I have an object, which is given with  
Evidenz. I experience this simple truth not just as some- 
thing that can be validated or which has been validated but 
as validated right now. Furthermore, intuitions can be 
grasped as not possible otherwise, that is not just as 
adequate but as apodictic (irrefutable, HL). […] 
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 Evidence is the experience of truth; the instantiation of  
truth itself in the judgement. […] This evident cognition of  
the agreement itself is an intuitional experience in its own 
right. It is not to be cashed out as a sensory experience  
accompanied by a belief. […] Rather the evident intuition is  
the basis and motivation for the accompanying, justified 
beliefs”. 
 
Human being (Merleau-Ponty, 1997 p. 28) I am not a ‘living  
creature’ and even not a ‘human being’ or a  
‘consciousness’ with all the characteristics that the  
zoology, the social anatomy or the inductive  
psychology attribute to these products of nature or  
of the history. I am the absolute source. It is  
Husserl’s point zero (Moran, 2001, p. 125). The self  
is a zero point, a centre of reference and orient- 
tation, from which distances, times etc. radiate  
outwards (Moran, 2001, p. 172)  
 
Merleau-Ponty ends his work (p. 517) with the  
words of De Saint-Exupery: The human being is 
nothing than anode of relations; it only are the 
relationships that count for a human being. On  
page 40 Merleau-Ponty says human beings are a  
node of relations of experiences. According to  
Moran (p. 429) Merleau-Ponty said in later works 
we belong to a system of exchanges. Colours,  
sounds and things are the focal points and radiance 
 of being. The beginnings of the system of ex- 
changes are visible on page 39 (1997): “The  
phenomenological world is no pure being. It is the  
meaning that becomes visible on the crossing of my  
experiences and on the crossing of mine and those  
of the other because they grasp in each other. That  
is why the world does not allow being separated  
from the subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. They 
form a unity”. 
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 Intentionality Being conscious of something. Act-intentionality is  
that of judgements and our conscious chosen  
stands. This is the intellectual consciousness that  
creates situations based on choices. And the  
operative-intentionality (in German: fungierende; 
functional) that establishes the natural pre- 
reflective unity of the world and of our life. This is  
the sensory consciousness that expresses given 
situations. The operative intentionality makes  
possible the act-intentionality (Merleau-Ponty, 1997,  
p. 37). According to Achterbergh & Vriens (2002)  
Luhmann introduced with the form of meaning in  
three dimensions the phenomenological insight of 
intentionality in system theory and generalized it to 
both psychic and social systems. Luhmann’s focal  
point and horizon of ‘and so forth’ corresponds to  
the figure-background of Merleau-Ponty. There are  
three reasons to refrain from Luhmann’s insights in  
this thesis. His view of structure and communica- 
tion differs from the usage in this thesis and  
Maturana refused to go along with Luhmann’s ideas  
about the transference of the biological concept of 
autopoiesis to the domain of the social.   
 
Motivation ‘Fluid’ enough to express a domain that is neither 
 ‘objective’ nor ‘subjective’ where being is not fully 
 determinate and significance not entirely clear  
 (Langer, 1989, p. 14). See also Evidenz 
 
Phenomenology The science of every kind of object, where object 
simply means whatever is encountered in  
consciousness (Husserl) (Moran, 2001, p. 82).  
Egology, the study of the ego and its self-experience  
(Husserl). 
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 Synesthetical perception We have no body, we are our body in  
perceiving the world we are familiar with.  
“With regard to the things, on the other  
hand, only the knowledge thereof is 
changeable. The world remains the same  
throughout my entire life” (Merleau-Ponty,  
1997, p. 385). The sensors translate them- 
selves in each other without the need of an  
interpreter. This makes possible, as Moran  
(2001, p. 162) says, ‘to grasp the graspability’  
of a thing in more ‘dimensions’ at once. “All 
perception takes place under a number of  
horizons which are implicit structural  
aspects of our original experience itself.  
When I see a pen, I also, in that very act, see 
it as something, which could be handled,  
which could be picked up”. Or something is  
transparent and inflexible and fragile and  
polished and it could give a thin tone if  
beaten. Yes, it could be glass. Or ice (based  
on Merleau-Ponty, 1997, p. 278). This is  
called synesthetical perception. We also 
speak of a weak, dull or dry sound. This is  
what ambiguity means.  
 
Tacit cogito One cannot think of a subject without a  
world; one can think of a subject without a  
field of vision (the blind) but he will always  
still have a world. It is the still tacit 
experience that has to be taken to a pure  
expression of her own meaning. That tacit  
experience is what Merleau-Ponty (1997,  
p. 463) calls the tacit cogito, an experience  
or presence of myself by myself, in which all 
meaning originates. This tacit cogito is pre- 
conscious thinking or to exist; it the  
existence itself. It only knows itself in the 
border situations wherein it is being  
threatened: for instance the fear of death. 
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 “The phenomenological cogito is the recognition of  
that primordial project of transcendence which is our  
very being. […] It affirms our pre-reflective ‘hold’ on 
ourselves as being-in-the-world. Our knowledge of  
ourselves is inherently mediated by our relationship 
(our actions) to the world (Langer, 1989, p. 116-121). 
 
Transcendence Surpassing towards or according to Van Dale  
dictionary ‘beyond the limits of sensory experience’. 
The movement in which the existence once again  
accounts for or retakes a factual situation and  
transforms it, is called transcendence (Merleau- 
Ponty, p. 216). In that movement the focus is on  
the figure rather than on the background (p. 93).  
Transcendence implies that which is being 
surpassed and towards which the project is  
surpassing; the former is the past and the latter is  
the future (Langer, 1989, p. 127). 
 
Truth Something is true if we judge it correctly (Moran,  
2001, p. 27). See also Evidenz.  
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 APPENDIX 4 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Note: some questions allow for more than one answer. Typically questions 2, 
3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 20, 21 and 27. 
 
1) How would you describe your upbringing in short? 
Pleasant  Good Neutral Bad Other 
     
 
2) What is your education? 
MBO HBO University Ph.D. Other 
     
 
What is your branch of study? 
Economics Management Sc. Legal Social Sc. Other 
     
 
Did you get specific management training courses? 
Yes No 
  
 
3) How would you describe your character in key words? 
Open Quick-tempered Cautious Spontaneous Other
     
 
4) How would you describe your way of life in short? 
Careful Enjoying Live by 
moment 
Conservative Other
     
 
5) Do you have hobbies? If so, which hobbies? 
Sport Form of art Board 
game 
Collect Other
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 6) Which events in your life have affected you especially? 
Death of Love of Dismissal Divorce Other 
     
 
7)  Do you travel frequently? If so, work or pleasure? To where and  
why? 
Yes No Work Pleasure  
     
 
8) Do you have friends? If so, how many? 
No 1 2 3 4 or more 
     
 
9) How would you describe your contact with colleagues on your  
level? 
Pleasant Good Neutral Bad Other 
     
 
10) How would you describe your contact with subordinates? 
Pleasant Good Neutral Bad Other 
     
 
11) How is your contact with your family? 
Pleasant Good Neutral Bad Other 
     
 
12) Are you religious? If so, do you adhere to a church? 
Yes No Yes No Other 
     
 
13) Do you have an ideology in terms of politics or in other terms? 
Yes No 
  
 
14) Do you have a motto of life? If so, what is the motto? 
Yes No 
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 15) Do you have principles in every day life? If so, which? 
Yes No 
  
 
16) Do you have principles in organizational life? If so, which? 
Yes No 
  
 
17) What would you have liked to become as a professional if you  
could redo your life and why is that so? 
Same Other  
  
 
18) Do you think body and mind are separated or do they form a  
unity? 
Separated Unity
  
 
19) The orientations: 
 
Please insert line, like this  
 
 
 
 
 
The other: 
 
- How do you see human kind, ranging from bad to good: 
 
 bad               good 
 
 
 
- How do you see human kind, ranging from fatalistic to proactive: 
 
 fatalistic                    proactive 
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 - How do you see human kind, rational or irrational: 
 
 rational                     irrational 
 
 
- How is human kind best be served, punishment or reward: 
 
 punishment            reward 
 
 
 
The self: 
 
- Do you see the world as – naturalism – idealism - harmony 
 
Naturalism:  man relying on his senses to understand nature,  
adopts a goal of manipulating nature for his own  
ends. 
Idealism (subjective):  the holder projects moral ideals that  
   transcend given reality. 
Harmony (objective idealism):  the world is viewed as an object to  
   be  appreciated aesthetical; the 
   world as a universal harmony. 
 
 naturalism                  idealism      harmony 
 
 
- Are you authoritative or participative: 
 
 authoritative                 participative 
 
 
 
- Are you individualistic or group-orientated: 
 
 individualistic          group-orientated 
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 - Are you being served or serving: 
 
 served           serving 
 
 
 
- Are you power orientated or low-power orientated: 
 
 power orientated         low-power orientated 
 
 
 
- Are you ‘rules are rules’ or subversive: 
 
 rules are rules               subversive 
 
 
 
- Are you doing - being in becoming – being: 
 
 doing         being in becoming                    being 
 
 
 
Doing: corresponds to naturalism. The impossible takes just a little  
longer. 
Being in becoming: the individual must achieve harmony with  
  nature by fully developing his own capacities  
   and thereby achieve a perfect union with the  
    environment.  
Being: nature is powerful and humanity is subservient to it. 
  
- Are you pragmatist or moralist: 
 
 pragmatist                   moralist 
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 - Are you present, near future or past orientated: 
 
 present    near future         past orientated 
 
 
 
- Are you rational or emotional: 
 
 rational                    emotional 
 
 
- Do you expect much and easily of others or not: 
 
 much easily            not much easily 
 
 
 
20) Do you visit exhibitions and/or concerts? If so, which and how  
frequently? 
No Yes Museum Concerts Other 
     
 
 
21) Does your partner have an influence on decision-making in your  
organization?  
Yes No 
  
 
PROVERBS: 
 
22) Which proverbs do you use often in daily life or in the  
organisational context? 
 
How true are the following proverbs for you in percentage: 
 
Proffered service stinks. 
 
 
0%                  100% 
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 Attack is the best form of defence. 
 
 
0%                100% 
 
 
One must be a servant before one can be a master. 
 
 
0%                100% 
 
 
Despots seldom rule long. 
 
 
0%                100% 
 
 
The monkey throws the chestnuts in the fire and gets the cat to do the dirty 
work. 
Meaning: people contrive it so that others must saddle for the  
consequences of their acts 
 
 
0%                100% 
 
 
Rather eating dry bread than begging cheese. 
Meaning: Rather be satisfied with less than calling in help from someone. 
 
 
0%                100% 
 
 
We can live without our friends but not without our neighbours. 
 
 
0%                100% 
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 Who relies on help from others, rest upon a weak wall without foundation. 
 
 
0%                 100% 
 
 
What you can do alone, don’t call in the help of others. 
 
 
0%                 100% 
 
 
None so deaf as those who will not hear. 
 
 
0%                  100% 
 
 
He that hears much and speaks not at all shall be welcome both in bower 
and hall. 
 
 
0%                  100% 
 
 
There is no time like the present. 
 
 
0%                 100% 
 
 
Enough is as good as a feast. 
 
 
0%                  100% 
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 Seek and ye shall find 
 
0%                   100% 
 
 
EMOTIONS: 
 
23) Do you consider yourself to be a generalist or specialist? 
 
 
 
24) Can you improvise? 
Yes A bit No 
   
 
25) Are your work processes or the processes you are responsible for  
likely to be interrupted? 
Own processes No Yes 
   
 
Responsible No Yes 
   
 
26) Do you feel an emotional bond with your employer/company? 
Yes A bit No Other 
    
 
METAPHORS: 
 
27) Which metaphors do you use often in daily life or in the  
organisational context? 
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 Indicating more than one metaphor is allowed: 
 
My organization is 
- A machine 
- An organism 
- As brains 
- As culture 
- A political system 
- A psychic prison 
- A flux; transformation 
- A means for domination 
- A personality of a higher order 
- A robot 
- A refrigerator 
- A spin-dryer 
- A shopping cart 
 
Which metaphor, only one, you would like the best for your organization 
and why? 
 
ORIENTATION: 
 
28) Purpose 
 
Maximize economic value 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
    
 
Develop organizational capabilities 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
    
 
 
 
         280 
 29)  Leadership 
 
Top-down 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
    
 
 
Participative 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
    
 
30) Focus 
 
Structure & Systems 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
    
 
Culture 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
    
 
31) Planning 
 
Programmatic 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
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 Emergent 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
    
 
 
32) Motivation 
 
Incentives lead 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
    
 
 
33) Consultants 
 
Large / knowledge driven 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
    
 
 
Small / process driven 
 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should 
be 
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 34)  Time orientation 
 
Short / shareholder value 
 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should be     
 
Long / stakeholder value 
 Absolutely top Great Medium Little 
Now / Is     
Future / Should be     
 
 
VRAGENLIJST 
 
Opmerking: Op sommige vragen zijn meerdere antwoorden mogelijk. Vooral 
de vragen 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 20, 21 en 27. 
 
 
1) Hoe zou u uw opvoeding in het kort willen omschrijven? 
 
 
 
 
2) Wat is uw opleiding? 
 
MBO HBO Universiteit Promotie Anders 
     
 
Welke studierichting volgde u? 
 
Economie Bedrijfskunde Juridisch Sociologie Anders 
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Plezierig Goed Neutraal Slecht Anders 
     
 Volgde u management cursussen en/of trainingen? 
 
Ja Nee 
  
 
3)  Hoe zou u uw karakter in kernwoorden willen omschrijven? 
 
Open Lichtgeraakt Behoedzaam Spontaan Anders 
     
 
 
4)  Hoe zou u in het kort uw levenswijze willen omschrijven? 
 
 
 
 
 
5)  Hebt u hobby’s? Zo ja, welke? 
 
 
 
 
6)  Welke gebeurtenissen in uw leven hebben u speciaal beïnvloed? 
 
  
 
 
7) Reist u vaak? Zo ja, voor werk of plezier? Waarheen en waarom? 
 
Ja Nee Werk Plezier  
     
 
8)  Hebt u vrienden of vriendinnen? Zo ja, hoeveel? 
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Voorzichtig Genietend Leven bij het 
moment  
Conservatief Anders
     
Sport Kunstvorm Bordspel Verzamelen Anders 
     
Dood van Liefde van Ontslag Scheiding Anders 
     
Geen 1 2 3 4 of meer 
     
 9) Hoe zou u het contact met uw collega(‘s) op uw organisatieniveau  
 willen omschrijven? 
 
Plezierig Goed Neutraal Slecht Anders 
     
 
10) Hoe zou u het contact met uw ondergeschikten willen  
omschrijven? 
 
Plezierig Goed Neutraal Slecht Anders 
     
 
11) Hoe is het contact met uw familie? 
 
Plezierig Goed ‘On 
speaking 
terms’ 
Slecht Anders 
     
 
12) Bent u religieus? Zo ja, behoort u tot een kerkgemeenschap? 
 
Ja Nee Ja Nee Anders 
     
 
13) Hebt u een ideologie m.b.t. een maatschappelijke of politieke  
strekking? 
 
Ja Nee 
  
 
14) Hebt u een levensmotto? Zo ja, wat is het motto? 
 
Ja Nee 
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 15) Hebt u principes (grondbeginselen) in het leven van alledag? 
Zo ja, welke? 
 
 
 
16)  Hebt u principes in het organisationele leven? Zo ja, welke? 
 
 
 
 
17) Als u uw leven zou kunnen overdoen, wat zou u als professional 
willen worden en waarom? 
 
 
 
 
18) Denkt u dat lichaam en geest gescheiden zijn of vormen zij een  
eenheid? 
 
 
 
 
19)  De oriëntaties: 
 
Vult u a.u.b. de lijn zo in, bijvoorbeeld incentives lead 
 
 
 
 
De ander: 
 
Hoe ziet u de mensheid op een schaal van slecht tot goed? 
 
 Slecht               Goed 
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Ja Nee 
  
Ja Nee 
  
Zelfde Anders 
  
Gescheiden Eenheid Anders 
   
 Hoe ziet u de mensheid op een schaal van fatalistisch (voorbeschikt noodlot) 
tot pro-actief? 
 
 Fatalistisch                Pro-actief 
 
 
 
Hoe ziet u de mensheid op een schaal van rationeel tot irrationeel? 
 
 Rationeel                Irrationeel 
 
 
 
Waarmee is de mensheid het best gediend op een schaal van straf tot 
beloning? 
 
 Straf        Beloning 
 
 
 
ZELFHEID: 
 
Ziet u de wereld als naturalistisch – idealistisch – harmonisch? 
 
Naturalistisch: de mens vertrouwt op zijn/haar zintuigen bij het begrijpen  
   van de natuur en stelt zich een doel voor eigen gewin bij  
   het manipuleren van de natuur. 
Idealisme (subjectief): de aanhanger projecteert morele idealen die de  
gegeven realiteit overstijgen. 
Harmonie (objectief idealisme):  de wereld wordt gezien als een object dat  
esthetisch gewaardeerd moet worden; de 
wereld als een universele harmonie. 
 
 Naturalistisch   Idealistisch            Harmonie 
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 Bent u autoritair of participatief? 
 
 Autoritair                Participatief 
 
 
 
Bent u individualistisch of collectivistisch georiënteerd? 
 
 Individualistisch          Collectivistisch 
 
 
 
Wordt u het liefst bediend of bent u dienstbaar ingesteld? 
 
 Bediend                  Dienstbaar 
 
 
Bent u op macht georiënteerd of bent u nauwelijks op macht georiënteerd? 
 
 Veel macht                  Nauwelijks macht 
 
 
‘Regels zijn regels’ of bent u meer subversief (ondergronds; revolutionair)? 
 
 Regels zijn regels                  Subversief 
 
 
Bent u van het type ‘doen’, ‘zijn in wording’ of ‘zijn’? 
 
Doen: correspondeert met naturalisme. Het onmogelijke duurt alleen  
 iets langer. 
Zijn in wording: het individu moet harmonie met de natuur bereiken 
door zijn/haar eigen capaciteiten volledig te 
ontwikkelen en daarbij een perfecte eenheid met de 
omgeving bereiken. 
Zijn: de natuur is krachtig en de mensheid is eraan ondergeschikt. 
 
 Doen        Zijn in wording             Zijn 
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 Bent u pragmatisch of moralistisch? 
 
 Pragmatisch             Moralistisch 
 
 
 
Bent u georiënteerd op het heden, de nabije toekomst of het verleden? 
 
 Heden    Nabije toekomst  Verleden 
 
 
 
Bent u rationeel of emotioneel? 
 
 Rationeel             Emotioneel 
 
 
 
Verwacht u gemakkelijk veel van anderen of niet? 
 
 Gemakkelijk veel         Niet gemakkelijk veel 
 
 
 
20) Bezoekt u tentoonstellingen en/of concerten? Zo ja, welke en hoe  
vaak? 
 
Ja Nee Musea Concerten Anders 
     
 
 
21)  Heeft uw partner invloed op de besluitvorming in uw organisatie? 
 
Ja, veel Ja, weinig Nee 
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 SPREEKWOORDEN: 
 
22) Welke spreekwoorden gebruikt u vaak in het dagelijks leven of in  
de context van de organisatie? 
 
Wat is het waarheidsgehalte in een percentage voor u van de volgende 
spreekwoorden: 
 
Aangeboden dienst is zelden aangenaam. 
 
 
0%                  100% 
 
 
Aanval is de beste verdediging. 
 
 
0%                 100% 
 
 
Geen wijzer abt dan die eerst monnik is geweest. 
 
 
0%                 100% 
 
 
Strenge heren regeren niet lang. 
 
 
0%                 100% 
 
De aap gooit de kastanjes in het vuur en laat ze er door de kat uithalen. 
Betekenis: mensen boksen het zo voor elkaar dat ze anderen opzadelen met 
de consequenties van hun daden. 
 
 
0%                 100% 
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 Liever droog brood gegeten dan kaas gebedeld. 
 
 
0%                100% 
 
 
Beter een goede buur dan een verre vriend. 
 
 
0%                          100% 
 
 
Wie op hulp van anderen zich verlaat, die rust tegen een zwakke muur 
zonder grondvest. 
 
 
0%               100% 
 
 
Wat gij alleen kan doen, roep daar geen hulp van anderen bij. 
 
 
0%               100% 
 
 
Er zijn geen erger doven dan die niet horen willen. 
 
 
0%               100% 
 
 
Horen, zien en zwijgen doet dikwijls veel verkrijgen. 
 
 
0%               100% 
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 Pluk de dag. 
 
 
0%                 100% 
 
 
Genoeg is meer dan veel. 
 
 
0%                 100% 
 
 
Wie zoekt, die vindt. 
 
 
0%                 100% 
 
 
EMOTIES: 
 
23)  Ziet u zichzelf als een generalist of een specialist? 
 
 Generalist                    Specialist 
 
 
 
24)  Kunt u improviseren? 
 
Ja Redelijk Nee 
   
 
25)  Worden uw werkprocessen of de werkprocessen van anderen,  
waarvoor u verantwoordelijk bent, gemakkelijk geïnterrumpeerd? 
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Eigen werkprocessen Nee Ja 
   
  
Verantwoordelijk voor Nee Ja 
   
 
26) Voelt u een emotionele band met uw werkgever / organisatie? 
 
Ja Een beetje Nee Anders 
    
 
 
METAFOREN: 
 
27) Welke metaforen gebruikt u vaak in het dagelijks leven of in de  
context van de organisatie? 
 
U kunt meerdere van onderstaande metaforen indiceren: 
 
Mijn organisatie is: 
 
- Een machine 
- Een organisme 
- Als de hersenen 
- Een cultuur 
- Een politiek systeem 
- Een psychische gevangenis 
- Een voortdurende beweging (flux) 
- Een middel tot dominantie 
- Een persoonlijkheid van een hogere orde 
- Een mobiele robot 
- Een koelkast 
- Een centrifuge 
- Een winkelwagentje 
 
Welke metafoor – u kunt er maar één noemen- zou u het liefst aan uw 
organisatie koppelen en waarom? 
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 ORIËNTATIE : 
 
28)  Doel 
 
Economische waarde maximaliseren is  
 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu is     
Zoals het in de 
toekomst zou 
moeten zijn 
    
 
Het ontwikkelen van organisatorische vaardigheden is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29)  Leiderschap 
 
Top-down 
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 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu is     
Zoals het in de 
toekomst zou 
moeten zijn 
    
 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu is     
Zoals het in de 
toekomst zou 
moeten zijn 
    
 Participatief 
 
 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu 
is 
    
Zoals het in 
de toekomst 
zou moeten 
zijn 
    
 
30)  Focus op 
 
Structuur en systemen 
 
 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu 
is 
    
Zoals het in 
de toekomst 
zou moeten 
zijn 
    
 
Cultuur 
 
 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu 
is 
    
Zoals het in 
de toekomst 
zou moeten 
zijn 
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 31) Planning 
 
Programmatisch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emergent (te voorschijn komend) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32)  Motivatie 
 
Wordt door prestatiepremies geleid 
 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu is     
Zoals het in de 
toekomst zou 
moeten zijn 
    
 
33) Consultants worden ingehuurd bij 
 
Grote, kennisgedreven consultancy’s 
 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu is     
Zoals het in de 
toekomst zou 
moeten zijn 
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 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu is     
Zoals het in 
toekomst zou 
moeten zijn 
    
 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu is     
Zoals het in de 
toekomst zou 
moeten zijn 
    
 Kleine, procesgedreven consultancy’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34)  Tijd oriëntatie 
 
Korte termijn; aandeelhouders waarde 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lange termijn; stakeholders waarde  
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 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu is     
Zoals het in de 
toekomst zou 
moeten zijn 
    
 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu is     
Zoals het in de 
toekomst zou 
moeten zijn 
    
 Absolute top Van groot 
belang 
Van medium 
belang 
Van gering 
belang 
Zoals het nu is     
Zoals het in de 
toekomst zou 
moeten zijn 
    
 APPENDIX 5 
 
STICHTING SINT MAARTENSKLINIEK  
NIJMEGEN 
 
The Foundation Clinic of Saint Maarten is a specialized hospital in 
the field of position and movement and the heading therof. The hospital 
was founded in 1936. The congregation of the nuns of the Choorstraat in 
Den Bosch played a decisive (financial) role. The hospital employs 1.500 
people. Yearly 25.000 people get treatment. The turnover 2002 was  
€ 72 million. The equity and liquidity ratios are excellent. 
The specialisms and care centres are Orthopaedics, Rheumatism 
and Rehabilitation Medicine. Rehabilitation has a neuro-profile and all 
specialisms are state-of-the-art. The clinic is worldwide one of the six 
centres that are allowed to practice vertebral surgery. The clinic has a Sport 
Medical Centre as well as a pharmacy and an outpatient for pain combat. In 
cooperation with various institutions the St. Maartenskliniek looks after the 
education of nurses. On various aspects the clinic has cooperations with 
various hospitals, amongst others the University Medical Centre Radboud 
in Nijmegen. The structure of the hospital was gradual transformed from 
disciplined departments towards patient orientated units or teams. And, 
unlike elsewhere, the struggle with the specialists with regard to their power 
position was moderate. Unlike elsewhere, the specialists have no central 
medical staff anymore. Each of the three care centres has their own 
medical staff. In the articles of association is included in which cases the 
specialists must be consulted. In 1982 and thereafter the hospital was 
seriously threatened with closure by the government, like all similar 
hospitals. As will be clear from what follows, that’s off. 
The motto of the clinic is “strong in movement”. “Movement does 
not only happen on the level of muscles and joints but rather is the result 
of a permanent interaction among perceptual, senso-motility and cognitive 
processes that take place in the brain” (Mulder in Wolf, p. 141). Van 
Limbeek (p. 183) states that you can head the legs not only from the brain 
but also from the low spinal marrow. If you trigger cells, spinal generators, 
long enough in a special way then these cells generate walking movements. 
It illustrates the progress made and the future developments to be expected 
in Rehabilitation. In the future SMK Research B.V. will be more pragmatic 
orientated rather than fundamental orientated. 
 
 
         298 
 In 1982 one of the present managers became deputy director and in 
1986 general director. He/she was responsible after a fire in 1990 for the 
new estate, which was opened officially in 1999. In 1991 another manager 
became manager of the Rehabilitation Centre, in 1996 director Patients Care 
and in 1999 general manager. In 2002 this was called the Board of Directors, 
supervised by a Supervisory Board. The managers have no strict limited 
portfolios but shifting “fields of attention”. One manager is more orientated 
on (coordination of) processes and figures. Another manager is more 
orientated on words, sense making and change processes. One manager has 
the image of “Strategist” and “Builder”. The other manager is associated with 
patient care, management participation of the specialists, emancipation, 
innovation and scientific research. 
Originally a few specialists left their mark on the clinic. A predecessor 
of the managers broke around 1970 with the authoritarian style of his 
predecessor by delegating more. In the 1990’s the hierarchy became more 
stressed again. One manager managed in that period a matrix with vertical 7 
services and horizontal various treatment teams. This matrix was left in tact 
until 1998. Thereafter the splitting of children and adults was accentuated 
and managed by two managers. It ended up with 9 multi-disciplinary patients 
care units or teams headed by a manager and rehabilitation specialist under 
common responsibility. 
In 1991 the care centre structure was implemented. In first instance 
two care centres were formed, Orthopaedics / Rheumatism and 
Rehabilitation, and later on in three care centres. The Management Team 
consists of the Board of Directors and the Heads of Facility, Personnel, 
Information and Finance (together called PIF). Research & Development 
and Education will be combined to RDE. 
The manager draws the organization chart as follows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14       299 
 Combining education in RDE in the near future is efficient. 
Education trains 20 assitant medical specialists and does extra training and 
refresher courses. Education of nurses in RDE is considered to be a 
primary activity by the management. It is considered to be the 
responsibility of the clinic and they are good at it. A central staff function is 
Quality; general quality and hygiene. Care profiles (or care paths) in terms 
of protocols are issued centrally; the quality itself is covered in the three 
care centres. In RDE coordination comes together. RDE has also a 
facilitating function. 
 
In unfolding the complexity of the hospital, it can be driven by 
process (the transformation), customers, geography and/or time. 
Geography plays no role in this case, although there was an annex to the 
clinic planned in The Hague. The annex is off. The transformation is that 
sick persons are transformed in less sick or healthy persons. 
The Sint Maartenskliniek is embedded in the Foundation Sint 
Maartenskliniek. In this Foundation the Supervisory Board resides. The 
Foundation is managed by the clinic’s Board of Directors. In this 
Foundation is also embedded the profit-orientated foundation POM, 
manufacturer of protheses and ortheses. POM is profitable and the profits 
are used to finance research. POM’s Board is formed by one manager of 
the Board of Directors and two members of the Foundation Sint 
Maartenskliniek’s Supervisory Board. This level is recursion level 0 for our 
purposes. 
 
Unfolding the complexity of the Sint Maartenskliniek we get the 
care centres Orthopaedics, Rheumatism and Rehabilitation. It highlights 
the “strong in movement” identity. This level is recursion level 1. 
Recursion level 1 is the system-in-focus. On this level we could also unfold 
POM but we refrain from that. 
Unfolding the complexity of Orthopaedics we get Emergency, 
Outpatient, Intensive Care and the Sport Medical Centre. Emergency is 
considered as important by the management. Nursing is not considered as 
a primary activity by the management, although the hospital gets paid for it. 
Certainly not meant disrespectful one could claim that treating patients in 
bed is a necessary evil. These patienst cannot go home as “healthy” persons 
after a treatment. Or in still other words, the purpose of the hospital is not 
treating patients in bed. The purpose is to get people on the move. 
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 In this sense nursing is considered support by the management. Anaesthesia 
is basically support with the exception of pain combat in the outpatient. The 
same goes for Radiology, although a small part of it is considered as a 
primary activity by the management. A centre for calcium removal in the 
shoulder was opened recently. The Sport Medical Centre is not cost-
effective. It was opened among other things for the aura of the clinic. 
Prevention, testing and intervention in sport could give the centre a top 
national position and would make headway in the region for less complex 
issues. It was expected to have also a reference function but it did not realize 
this function. Although the Sport Centre does not yield money enough, the 
management considers it to be a primary activity. 
Unfolding the complexity of Rheumatism we get Outpatient and 
Pharmacy. Pharmacy can be unfolded in clinical for hospitalised patients. 
This is a support function. The outpatient pharmacy, the Maartens 
Pharmacy, is public and profitable. The profits are used to finance research. 
This is primary activity. Unfolding Rehabilitation Medicine we also get 
Outpatient and in the near future one child centre for the three disciplines. 
Brain damage, Aphasia and Heart Rehabilitation are organised in a different 
form, being patient groups. 
 
PIF, RDE and Facility have a policy function. PIF, RDE and Facility 
have to a certain extent also an Intelligence function. For instance, RDE is 
internationally involved in the vertebral surgery. Especially PIF is externally 
involved in the negotiations with care insurers and internally at the instigation 
of managers of the care centres. The latter is a Resource Bargaining function. 
The quality protocols can be seen as Corporate Intervention. The Board of 
Directors also issues frameworks. For instance to Personnel of PIF: we only 
engage people within the framework of the hospital collective labour 
agreement. These frameworks have a fixed part, which is Corporate 
Intervention and sometimes Coordination and a variable part which is 
Resource Bargaining. RDE facilitates Coordination. The fact that the clinic is 
relatively small makes that we can assume a Monitoring function but this 
function was not discussed. We can assume it in light of one of the remarks 
with regard to the nurses. 
 
This gives us the following picture with three levels of recursion, 
whereby level 1 is the system-in-focus. 
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Figure 15 
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Figure 16 
 
For most managers structure means in first instance the organization 
chart, also called the rake. This is more limited than our definition in chapter 
1, the relationships and recursiveness in the Viable System Model. On the 
other hand for most managers structure is broader. With regard to structure 
the absence of a central medical staff was mentioned by the management. In 
the Viable System Model terms one is inclined to conclude that the medical 
staff is more decentralized or more autonomous. 
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 However, this is not the case. The figure shows a rather balanced structure. 
All functions in the Viable System Model are to a more or lesser extent 
present. In the given time it is impossible to unfold such a complex 
organisation further. 
 
I always like to sample the atmosphere. One example. The secretary 
welcomed me in the hall before the boardrooms and asked me whether I 
would like something to drink. I said “no, thank you”. Everybody who 
passed said hallo. A man who passed even asked me whether I would like 
something to drink. If that is not hospitality! 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
KNOV, 
Koninklijke Nederlandse Organisatie van Verloskundigen 
Royal Dutch Organisation of Midwifes 
 
The organisation has members, a Supervisory Board, a 
director/general secretary and three departments: Services (lobby, tariffs and 
magazine), Quality (projects) and Support (consultancy for obstetric 
practitioners by means of 5 regional offices). The ordering in three 
departments is financial driven. These financial sources are subscriptions, 
grants from the VWS ministry and a VWS ministry cut back grant with 
regard to Support. These Support activities started in 2002 and had to be 
ended by July 1, 2004. 92% of midwifes are member of the KNOV. 
 
Support was aimed at mutual co-operation among so-called first line 
professions and among first and second line professions, quality 
implementation and continuity of care. A new minister prescribed integrated 
first line care and abolished the grants for Support. “This is all done with our 
tax monies”, the manager said rather angry. Quality has an executive and 
hires performance people. The near future of Quality is uncertain as of the 
year 2006. The KNOV will end up with 10 to 15 employees. 
 
A jurist has no Policy function and hardly an Intelligence function. 
The Head of Finance and Administration has a Policy function and no 
Intelligence function. The Head of Personnel has a Policy function and an 
Intelligence function. Communication has a Communication Policy function 
and an Intelligence function. A policymaker has both Policy and Intelligence 
functions. 
 
Intelligence is inclined to ‘every man for himself’. They have to be 
urged to work as a team; it does not happen spontaneously. That has to do 
with the emotional side of team building. There is no Monitoring function. 
There is a need for Coordination. However, nobody does it by himself so 
this is a function on the management level. 
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 So the systemic consequences are: 
Policy : enough represented as can be expected for a  
   lobby association 
Intelligence : present, although too fragmented 
Corporate Intervention : not present, although the management strives 
   for it 
Resource Bargaining : not present; there is a system of internal passing 
   on 
Coordination : not present; management has to do it out of  
   necessity 
Monitoring : not present 
Primary activities : the one that the manager wants to make viable,  
   Support, disappears. The manager’s choice for  
   Support corresponds to what has been said in the 
   Weltanschauung and the chosen metaphor.  
   After my question the manager bent slowly  
   over the writing pad and said with an involved,  
   almost mysterious smile “This one”. A long-  
        term vision followed. 
 
Can anything be said about the relation between Weltanschauung, 
structure and related change processes? First, the management is very 
dependent on the measures taken by the government. The management is 
left little elbowroom. Second, the management is only in charge for the last 
four and a half months. Third, the organisation is relatively small. Four, 
restructuring means mainly to cut back. 
External the manager is proud that the small KNOV has the 
biggest mouth among the care institutions whereby the KNOV has been 
put on the map. Internal the manager tries to bring people together by 
means of communication. In this case nothing can be said about the 
relation of the worldview with the structure. However, the way of 
managing reflects the Weltanschauung and how is dealt with change.  
 
I met the manager for the first time three years ago in another 
setting where he/she was responsible for 850 people. The manager 
promised me to co-operate in this Ph.D. and I was eager to interview 
him/her in a second meeting based on that first meeting. I left the manager 
the choice: to talk about that previous job as a manager, to talk about the 
present job as an interim manager or in a quite different role as member of 
a Supervisory Board.  
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 The manager chose for the present job because the previous job was too 
long ago and much had changed in the meantime due to a merger. This 
choice can also be found back in the Weltanschauung. The manager accepted 
a job in a Board recently being responsible for 1.200 employees outside the 
care sector. With regard to the KNOV I was unable to prepare myself due to 
a lack of a brochure and a website under construction. “I will tell you in less 
than five minutes how it looks like” the manager said on the phone. “We go 
at it”. 
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 APPENDIX 7 
 
ACHMEA 
 
Achmea is a financial service provider, active in (care) insurance, 
mortgages, investment and banking. Some 11.500 people are employed. 
The history of Achmea started in 1811. A bookkeeper started the 
administration of the co-operative insurance company Achlum, a small 
place in the North of the Netherlands. Thereafter many co-operatives 
merged with Achlum into Avéro. The oldest precursor of the co-operative 
Centraal Beheer started in 1902. Avéro and Centraal Beheer merged in 
1992 into AVCB, the precursor of Achmea. In 1994 care insurers OLM 
and Groene Land merged, Staal Bankiers joined and after the merger of 
care insurer Zilveren Kruis with AVCB in 1995, the name became Achmea. 
The name of a plant that grows on it’s own power and feeds the 
environment is Aechmea. In 1992 the European co-operation under the 
name Eureko started. In 2000 Achmea became part of Eureko B.V., the 
Holding. In the same year the corporate brand Achmea was promoted in a 
promotion campaign. Centraal Beheer Achmea and Zilveren Kruis 
Achmea are power brands; Avero Achmea and FBTO are support brands. 
The motto is in Dutch ‘Achmea ontzorgt’. It cannot be translated because 
the word does not exist in the Dutch language. Yet, one knows the 
meaning; it means something like ‘Achmea makes you free of worries’. The 
concept is ‘All finance, all care’. Keywords are: integrity, respect, 
commitment, professionalism, aimed at results and growth. Thus Achmea 
is a chain of mergers of mainly co-operatives with brand names such as 
Centraal Beheer Achmea. Often before and after the merger these co-
operatives are competitors in the market, although many co-operatives are 
geographical rooted and have a strong regional position. Achmea has a 
multi-channel distribution. Centraal Beheer Achmea and Zilveren Kruis 
Achmea are direct writers. Avero is the intermediary company. All brands 
make use of complementary services such as Reintegration, Arbo (working 
conditions), Damage Service, Legal Aid, Health and Euro Cross. The 
Annual Report 2003 is of Eureka B.V.  
Achmea has 9 Business Units. The Business Units are Care, 
Pensions, Social Security, Private, Business, Intermediary, Bank, Corporate 
Accounts and Various. The Business Unit Private is the Damage 
Knowledge Centre. The Holding is located in Zeist.  
 
 
         308 
 The Business Units are located mainly in Amsterdam (3x), Apeldoorn (2x), 
Leeuwarden, Katwijk, Meppel, Noordwijk and/or The Hague. However, if 
you want to write a letter to an Executive Board member or Business Unit 
manager you better phone first in order to find out what the best address is 
to send the letter to. But it must be said you are helped quickly and 
professional. “I will give you the telephone number of her/his secretary. Her 
name is…” And if you want to send a letter to a Business Unit manager: 
“She/he is frequently here but you better send it to ... The postal address 
is…” It makes clear how complex the organisation is. And how rooted 
people are. Striking is that the majority of the seven members of the 
Executive Board come from outside Achmea with the exception of the 
chairman and one of the two vice-chairmen in addition. They joined Achmea 
between 1991 and 2002. Internally, especially the two co-operatives in Care, 
being Zilveren Kruis Achmea and Groene Land Achmea, and FBTO are 
stepping-stones to the (sub) top. Two out of these three co-operatives are 
located in the North of the Netherlands and one in the West. In 2003 an 
Executive Board and Supervisory Board was implemented for the Holding 
company, Eureko/Achmea. Centraal Beheer Achmea is situated under the 
Business Units: Social Security, Pensions, Private and Business. Figure 17 is 
the organisation chart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 
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 Achmea is embedded in Eureko/Achmea B.V. together with 5 foreign 
insurers and 5 foreign associates. Eureko/Achmea B.V. is partner in an 
Alliance called Eurapco. So unfolding the complexity we get:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 
 
One of the interviewed managers was employed within Achmea for 
a long time, mainly in the care sector, until two years ago. He/she was 
responsible for 800 employees. Another interviewed manager is employed 
within Achmea for a long time, also mainly in the care sector.  
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 He/she was in her/his previous job responsible for 2.000 employees; in the 
present job for 2.500 employees. The last time I spoke this manager before 
the interview was four years ago. In his/her previous job the manager 
launched a new, strong motto for the organisation.  
 
What does the manager recognize of his/her Weltanschauung in the 
structure? My conclusion after discussing the VSM functions was that the 
structure was rather centralized. The Management Team does nearly 
everything in the mentioned functions, including Coordination, on the 
system-in-focus level. With regard to Monitoring, a good institute is the 
rather informal lunch on a monthly basis with ‘selected’ employees, who 
sometimes originate from problem domains. “No” the manager said, “It is 
not centralized; it is a whole”.  
 
Are the Weltanschauungen of the two interviewed managers 
comparable because they (used to) work in the same organisation as a co-
operative for a long time? The answer is: No. Under the principles they only 
mention both one word in a different meaning. Do they have something in 
common? The answer is: it is negligible.  
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 APPENDIX 8 
 
VSM 
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 SAMENVATTING 
 
 
In deel 1, de hoofdstukken 1 tot en met 6, staan betekenisgeving door 
mensen en hun wereldbeeld, Weltanschauung genaamd, centraal. 
Weltanschauung bepaalt hoe wij ons zelf, de ander, de organisatie en de 
realiteit bezien. Betekenis en Weltanschauung staan met elkaar in een 
circulaire relatie. Het zijn beide gelaagde concepten. Betekenis ontstaat in de 
waarneming door het fenomenale lichaam op het pre-reflectieve niveau. Wij 
zijn ons fenomenale lichaam, dat weet en begrijpt. Het is de ervarings-
structuur en de belichaming als context van cognitieve mechanismen. Het 
fenomenale lichaam is in essentie een expressieve ruimte, dat ruimtelijke 
‘afstanden’ tot bijvoorbeeld pedalen van een orgel in zich opneemt. Dingen 
in de realiteit, zoals objecten, kunst of muziek, zeggen ons iets, hoe vaag ook, 
door middel van hun inherente betekenis of aantrekkingskracht, waarvoor wij 
ontvankelijk zijn. De sensoren vertalen zich in elkaar zonder de noodzaak 
van een tolk. Feitelijke situaties verlenen hun betekenis, waarmee de 
geaccepteerde situatie en legitimiteit ontstaat, die tot bepaalde acties leiden. 
Waarneming en actie zijn onlosmakelijk. Tijdelijkheid is de betekenis van ons 
bestaan. In de waarneming van de ware tijdbeleving bestaat ons meest exacte 
bewustzijn waartoe wij in staat zijn uit een dualiteit. Deze dualiteit bestaat uit 
‘gegeven aan zichzelf’, de ontvouwde tijd als tijd aspect, en ‘door zichzelf 
beroerd’, de tijd in een proces van ontvouwing, het (naar-de-wereld-) zijn 
aspect. Onze geest (mind) en de tijd gaan hun eigen richting. Beoefenaren 
van meditatie trachten die geest (mind) te kalmeren. In de Franse taal staat 
het woord ‘sens’ zowel voor betekenis als richting. 
Waarneming ontstaat in de hersenen. Vanuit een neurobiologisch 
gezichtspunt leeft de observator in de dualiteit van de operationele 
geslotenheid van het zenuwstelsel, terwijl hij/zij observator is van zijn/haar 
eigen situatie als observator in een metadomein met anderen. Als mens vallen 
wij nooit geheel met ons zelf samen, omdat bewustzijn en zelf-bewustzijn 
simultaan ontstaan. Het één is niet gevestigd op het ander. Een zelf of 
zelfheid als een abstract begrip van het ‘ik’ wordt door een school in het 
Boedhisme ontkend. Uiteindelijk volgt de conclusie, dat er hooguit een 
gevoel van continuïteit bestaat, waarop vele zelven berusten. Dat gevoel van 
continuïteit brengt ordening in ons leven aan, net zoals een Weltanschauung 
doet, waarvan ideologie een onderdeel kan vormen. 
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 Hoe complex en gelaagd we als mens (en manager) ook in elkaar zitten, er 
bestaan ‘mechanismen’, die ordening en eenheid in ons leven brengen. 
 
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt een conceptueel raamwerk toegelicht, heeft de 
vraagstelling plaats en wordt de aanleiding tot deze thesis besproken. In 
hoofdstuk 2 worden ambiguïteit, het fenomenale lichaam, de intentionele 
boog en de dualiteit in de ware tijdbeleving besproken. De intentionele 
boog als eenheidstichtende zin onderspant het bewustzijn en maakt dat wij 
gesitueerd zijn in de wereld, waaraan wij in alle betekenissen van het woord 
gehecht zijn. Wij bewonen de wereld, tijd en ruimte, waarbij de wereld een 
‘gezicht’ heeft, dat ons gehele leven hetzelfde blijft. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de 
dualiteit van de unieke observator besproken. De operationele geslotenheid 
van het zenuwstelsel maakt dat mensen in communicatieprocessen hooguit 
getriggerd ofwel geprikkeld kunnen worden. De luisteraar wordt niet 
geïnstrueerd door de spreker. In de ware tijdbeleving speelt het geheugen 
een belangrijke rol. Wij kunnen het verleden opnieuw heropenen en 
beleven zonder tussenkomst van herinneringen. In dit hoofdstuk worden 
de ‘zelf’ en de ander toegelicht. Weltanschauung en de wijze waarop hierin 
lagen worden opgebouwd komen aan de orde.  
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt betekenisgeving op het reflectieve niveau 
besproken, waarna een definitie van betekenis volgt, gebaseerd op de meest 
saillante kenmerken. Omdat context niet alleen een belangrijke rol speelt in 
betekenisgeving, maar ook in informatie en ‘gezond verstand’ volgt een 
korte toelichting op deze concepten.  
Taal, spreekwoorden als uiting van Weltanschauung bij uitstek en 
metaforen komen aan de orde. In de bijlagen 1 en 2 wordt dieper ingegaan 
op metaforen en spreekwoorden. Emoties komen eveneens kort aan de 
orde in het kader van rationaliteit. In de laatste paragraaf wordt geclaimd 
dat mensen (en dus managers) niet rationeel (kunnen) zijn. In hoofdstuk 5 
passeren enkele gangbare tweedelingen in de organisatietheorie de revue en 
wordt organisational cybernetics en de kritiek daarop besproken. Hoofdstuk 
6 is een samenvatting van de belangrijkste bevindingen in de voorgaande 
hoofdstukken, waarbij de relevantie van deze inzichten wordt besproken. 
Wij denken onze wereld niet, maar leven en ervaren onze wereld in acties. 
Hiermee eindigt deel 1. 
 
In deel 2, de hoofdstukken 7 tot en met 9, wordt bezien hoe de 
gemeten Weltanschaaungen van managers de structuur van hun organisatie 
bepalen.  
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 De structuur wordt zichtbaar gemaakt met behulp van onderdelen uit 
organisational cybernetics, het Viable System Model en Viplan. De 
organisaties en structuren zijn vermeld in de bijlagen 5, 6 en 7. Bijlage 8 bevat 
het Viable System Model. 
 
In hoofdstuk 7 van deel 2 wordt een vragenlijst ontwikkeld op basis 
waarvan de Weltanschauungen van managers kunnen worden gemeten. De 
vragenlijst is als bijlage 4 opgenomen. De vragenlijst bevat onder andere de 
gangbare tweedelingen in de organisatietheorie, de (sociale) achtergrond, 
spreekwoorden en metaforen. In hoofdstuk 8 volgt een weergave van vier 
semi-gestructureerde interviews met managers uit de zorgsector. Twee 
managers zijn vrouwelijk en twee managers zijn mannelijk. Zij bevinden zich 
in de leeftijdcategorie 45 – 60 jaar en zijn verantwoordelijk voor maximaal 
2.500 medewerkers. Het gegeven profiel tezamen met de toelichtende tekst 
vormen de Weltanschauungen. Door de managers worden uitspraken 
gedaan, die gerelateerd zijn aan de theorie in deel 1, zonder dat de managers 
aan deze theorie refereren. Hoofdstuk 9 bevat de conclusies en aanbevelingen, 
waarna een bespreking volgt wat het betekent, indien managers hun 
medewerkers vragen te veranderen in fundamentele veranderingsprocessen. 
Het begrip ‘weerstand tegen verandering’ blijkt nutteloos te zijn, omdat 
mensen in dergelijke processen wordt gevraagd hun beeld van de wereld te 
veranderen, omdat hun onlosmakelijke waarneming en actie dienen te 
veranderen. Eén van de conclusies is, dat de gangbare tweedelingen in de 
organisatietheorie ideaaltypisch zijn en niet worden teruggevonden bij 
managers in de praktijk. Met andere woorden, alle geïnterviewde managers 
hebben een Weltanschauung, die bijvoorbeeld bestaat uit kenmerken van 
Theorie E en Theorie O. De geïnterviewde managers zelf zien aspecten van 
hun Weltanschauungen terug in de structuur van hun organisaties.  
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